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**THE
SIXTH INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS**

(Dacca Session, 1930)

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**The
Sixth Indian Philosophical Congress, Dacca.
1930
OPENING SPEECH**

By

**Hon'ble Mr. K. Nazimuddin, M.A., C.I.E.
*Bar-at-law,
Minister of Education, Bengal.***

Prof. Wadia, Ladies and Gentlemen :—

I should like in the first place to thank you for your kindness in asking me to open this Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress ; I assure you that it is an honour which I very keenly appreciate. My second, and very pleasant duty, is to offer a most hearty welcome to the Congress delegates in my own city of Dacca. This ancient town has peculiar claims upon the philosophers of India, for it has been for generations a strong centre of Muslim culture in Eastern India, and by its propinquity to Vikrampur can claim to be a home where Sanskrit learning and Hindu religion have flourished for centuries. In its young but vigorous University, the departments of Sanskrit and Islamic Studies are carrying on the great traditions of the past, and in the Department of Philosophy the accumulated wisdom of East and West is being sifted, revitalised, and applied to the problems of the present. I am confident that you will find in this University town a body of eager and courageous thinkers who will extend to their fellow philosophers the warmest welcome.

In addressing you this afternoon I confess to a certain degree of tropidation, which every layman must feel in speaking before a body of experts. And yet I am emboldened

by the feeling, which I believe every man to possess deep down within him, that he is "a bit of a philosopher". Indeed it must be so, for Philosophy—the love of wisdom, the search for truth,—is for every one a very vital thing.

It is quite unnecessary for me to stress the importance of such an organisation as the Indian Philosophical Congress. It provides you each year with an opportunity of meeting together and exchanging freely your views and aspirations. You know that many if not most of the great philosophical systems of the world are each associated uniquely with the name of one man. This is not surprising, for it is in the essence of a philosopher's life that his work must for a great part be accomplished in seclusion. But it contains the seed of danger, and such gatherings as this go far to combat the danger. Exchange of thought and word, whether your partners agree or disagree, is equally valuable : if he agree you are encouraged and confirmed in your personal convictions ; if he disagree there arises that clash and conflict of ideas which goes so far to preserve the sanity of philosophical advance. Apart from this advantage which can be termed *academic*, the *social* advantage of such a congress cannot easily be overestimated. Here are assembled on a common platform teachers and thinkers from every part of India, all working under conditions more or less different. The renewal of friendly greetings, the mutual assurance of sympathy, the seeking out of the inner man beneath and beyond the externals of custom and creed, of race and language, and the personal contact thus made possible, cannot but create and foster a spirit of comradeship among scholars who are actuated by a common ideal and who have consecrated their lives to that noblest of ends—the disinterested search of truth.

I said just now that the average man in his heart of hearts always regards himself a philosopher in a small way, but it is, I think, equally true that he stands, or used to stand, very

much in awe of a professed "philosopher". Such a man appeared in olden days as a trafficker in impalpable theories, a nebulous figure dwelling in the arid heaven of Metaphysics, almost too proud to descend to earth and its realities (I hope I do not paint too dark a picture).

But that is gone now-a-days. The unhappy breach between Science and Philosophy is rapidly disappearing. Thinking men realise that both are builders of a great edifice of truth, each with its plans and materials, each working towards one common end. Allow me to quote to you what Professor J. S. Haldane says at the end of his Gifford Lectures of 1928.

"The conclusion which has been reached as to the relation between Science and Religion may be summed up by saying that there is no contest between them at all...Science deals not with ultimate reality, but only with abstractions of limited practical application...When Science pays no heed to the wider analysis of experience or of nature by Philosophy, and sets up her own working hypotheses as representing reality itself she will meet with just as firm opposition from religion as she presents to belief in: supernatural events... Religion will no more die out than Science will or Philosophy will. Religion and Philosophy are in reality one thing, which is just as indispensable as Science is".

If Science can be said to have extended, of recent years, its speculations far beyond the narrow limits of former days, in likewise philosophy is rapidly becoming the handmaid of life and reality through its sister science Psychology. Here in the University of Dacca we have the second oldest Psychological laboratory in India, and the researches carried on there have received favourable recognition in India and abroad. It is in this sphere that philosophy has won more specially the approval of the man "in the street". The mechanism of thought, the relation of philosophy to the

conduct of life—these are problems which touch mankind very nearly and it is to you that we look for throwing light upon these problems.

I am sure you will find the soil of Dacca extremely congenial for your deliberations. Bengal has been the mother of many religions in recent times, and although she cannot claim the eminence of South India in providing a prolific philosophical foundation of religious faith, she too can claim a certain amount of distinctiveness in her thoughts and aspirations and also of achievement in Buddhism, Tantricism and Vaishnavism. Hence went forth the most learned missionary of Buddhism to Tibet, Atisa Dipankara, and from this region flowed strongly the current of lyrical devotion, known as the Chaitanya movement, which at one time covered the greater part of eastern India. Santaraksita and Udayana have been claimed for Bengal—I leave it to scholars to decide with what amount of justification. But there can be no doubt that Bengal has very seldom been without her experiments in religious doctrine and practice, and Saktaism and Buddhism and Vaishnavism are still living forces in different parts of this Province. In this city is celebrated every year the famous Janmastami festival which draws large crowds from different parts of the country, and Vajrayogini and other names in the near neighbourhood testify to the existence of a strong Tantric or Buddhistic influence down to recent times. Within sight of the intellectual soil of Vikrampur, whose contribution to the cultural, religious and even political thought in Bengal is truly remarkable, Dacca provides the aptest venue for such a gathering as yours. During the past few decades Hindu learning has indeed suffered the neglect of its wealthy patrons; but the signs of a revival of interest are already in the air, and the East Bengal Sarnswata Samaja with its headquarters at Dacca is doing admirable work to justify that revival in this part of Bengal.

Bnt Dacca is of interest not only to Hindu philosophers but to Muhammadan thinkers as well. From very early times Dacca has been one of the strongest centres of Muslim learning and tradition. Situated in a predominatingly Muslim part of Bengal, Dacca could organise its Muslim culture more satisfactorily than other towns of Bengal and the foundation of the University with adequate provision for supplying the coping stone to that culture has been a natural culmination of the intellectual growth of the Muhammadan community of Bengal. The rapid development of education among the youths of the Muhammadan community since the establishment of the University has more than justified its foundation ; and I am glad to learn that in your particular subject Muslim youths have shown equal ability with their Hindu brethren in the highest examination of this University.

If I may be permitted to make any suggestion for the wider diffusion of your collective wisdom, it would be this : Get into the current of the world round about you and interpret for your countrymen in the language which they can read and understand the newest problems and their recent solutions. In a country just beginning to be self-conscious there is a danger that the rich heritage of the past should be regarded as constituting the final word in wisdom and its thinkers should turn again and again to this single source for a solution of all the problems that have confronted man ever since. It is more in keeping with the spirit of truth to admit that rolling years are bringing forth novel situations and relations and that only a new way of looking can give a true perspective. Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is god's. For spiritual edification you may continue to drink in the fountain of your forefathers in so far as it provides you with a pure supply ; but for the problems that the development of science has initiated you must seek a personal solution. Broadbase your philosophy upon the totality of human

experience and in your writings and your speeches impress upon all the necessity of the widest possible knowledge if philosophy is to be adequate to the needs of the entire community. It is lamentable that while in other countries there should be so many organs of philosophical speculation, the two or three journals that exist in India should be in a moribund condition because you do not take sufficient interest in them or fight shy of expressing your own views. In a literature where development has taken place by the criticism of earlier views there is no room for this diffidence and I would earnestly appeal to all of you to be more active throughout the year and not remain satisfied with a single annual publication in the Proceedings of this Congress. I would also request you to contribute more largely to the vernacular papers of your own provinces and bring philosophy within the easy reach of the entire population. In India where even the untutored peasant has a philosophy of life and can utter words of wisdom in days of trial your incursion into the vernacular press would not be resented; incidentally you will raise materially the level of popular thought and set up an effective barrier against that sordid thinking for the day which the advance of material civilisation inevitably brings in its train in every country of the world.

And do not neglect the social science. The contribution of the thinkers of India to this fascinating branch of learning is very slender indeed and yet India provides one of the most fruitful fields for social study. Upon a foundation laid in the dim beginnings of civilisation India has been rearing successive structures of social organisation and the advent of every conquering race has meant a readjustment of the social equilibrium. Without stirring out of India at all you may here on the spot, learn much more about the effect of social conflict and social co-operation, absorption and repulsion of social groups, disintegration of social structure and formation of

inter-societies, than by a travel abroad. The heterogeneity of the population, its various occupations and social stratification according to trade and guild, the effect of industrial development upon a predominatingly agricultural population, the influence of the environment upon occupation and social surroundings upon local customs, the spread of education and its influence upon family organisation—all these are inspiring studies in this land of ours and I wish that more active research were undertaken in this direction and the main principles of social relation enunciated out of Indian data. We have now a respectable body of researches upon ancient social organisations—they have their value as all curiosities have; but it is in the living society that we are more interested because it is this society that we are to anticipate and to mould according to our understanding and our power.

Before I close, I should like to extend an especial welcome to Prof. Wadia who will preside over your deliberations. Prof. Wadia comes from the Southernmost University of India to the most Easterly. He is no stranger to you or to the University, and his reputation as a thinker and speaker will, I know, ensure that your meetings will be fruitful in pleasant intercourse and worthy results.

Gentlemen, with this brief address I have much pleasure in declaring open the Dacca session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

Sixth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

held at Dacca on the 20th December 1930.

Presidential Address.

By A. R. WADIA.

I

The Indian Philosophical Congress has this month completed five years of its existence, and though nothing extraordinary can be claimed to its credit during this short period, it cannot be denied that it has led to intense philosophic thought, which in God's good time may lead to renaissance of Indian thought, and Indian thought may once again regain its lost laurels. It is a question of deep concern to us why it is that in proportion to our great philosophic heritage and undoubted interest in and genius for philosophic thought, our output in recent centuries has been so surprisingly poor. It is equally surprising that the impact of the Western civilization has made itself felt in the realm of literature and science, and yet in our native domain of philosophy a new philosophy has not been born, which could claim to synthesise the best in the Western and in the Eastern thought. Perhaps it is in this direction that this Congress may have to play its rôle, and to emphasize this I venture to linger for a few moments over some of the paradoxes, which have affected the growth of philosophic thought in India.

There are two ideas of supreme importance governing Indian thought ever since its birth. The first is the supremacy of spirit and the second is its pragmatism, not the shallow pragmatism of the Americans, nor the pragmatism

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which makes man the centre or the measure of everything, but the pragmatism of a profounder type, which makes philosophy not a mere play of intellectual powers, but a basic principle of life. It is the supremacy of spirit that has made us conscious through the ages of the unity of life, the central core of Upanishadic thought and of the major portion of all subsequent thought. The oneness of the Brahman has literally intoxicated every Indian sage and Francis Thompson echoed this when he wrote :

"All things by immortal power,
Near or far
Hiddenly to each other linked are ;
That thou canst not stir a flower
Without troubling of a star."

No wonder on such a sublime basis the Upanishadic seers and the Vedantic thinkers were able to rear a structure of thought, which penetrated the remotest crannies of human heart and appeared to have solved once for all the riddle of life. But this very perfection coupled with the mode of its formulation carried within it seeds of weakness, which made the succeeding generations take a long philosophic holiday : they read and studied and worshipped thought, but ceased to think. This has retarded the normal development of our thought right down till our own times. Until we become conscious of this, we in this Congress shall be handicapped in our efforts, and so I should like to put before you what appear to me to be the defects, which have vitiated the philosophic inheritance of India.

It has been generally claimed as a merit of Indian thought that it has known no conflict between religion and philosophy, that the religious and the philosophical categories in the last resort are identical. That is why the mystical and metaphysical Upanishads are regarded as a part of the Vedas, though some centuries divide them in time and the contents are as

the poles asunder. The Vedas are the result of a revolution and deal with the duties and ritualistic sacrifices expected of men, while the Upanishads deal with Reality through the medium of thought and so have a right to an independent existence. But once they are made to partake of the revealed character of the Vedas, they become an object of thought, not a living process of thought. They are put on a pedestal above criticism. Great metaphysicians like Sankara and Ramanuja were born centuries later, but they too were content to formulate their philosophy only as humble commentators. Their originality, their profundity were all involved in making the Upanishads and the Gita say what they wanted them to say. While Plato developed his thought in dialogue form and Aristotle, summing up all previous thought, agreed to differ wherever he could not help it, and preferred truth to friendship in building up his own system of thought, Sankara and Ramanuja created systems of thought, far more profound than any the world has ever seen, only as appendages to the revealed Vedas and Upanishads. The difference is striking and instructive, for it epitomises the history of Indian and Western thought. While philosophy in the West forged its independence of dogmas and religious creeds, it was content in the East to play the rôle of an advocate of revealed truth. Hence the immense vogue of the *śabda pramāṇa* in the history of Indian philosophy. A great genius can be an independent thinker, even while ostensibly playing the rôle of a mere commentator, but for the rank and file such a system of philosophy becomes a creed, too true to be criticised, too sacred to be questioned. In such an atmosphere philosophy cannot but become a creed, and this explains to my mind the curious paradox that in India the metaphysical interest has always been very high, but metaphysical thought has been content to revolve round the old old puzzles of the era of Sankara, of the era of Ramanuja. Philosophy has become a matter of

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birth ; a man is expected to believe in the philosophy accepted by his father and grandfather, and during the last five years I have noticed with amusement as much as with deep concern that papers in the Indian Philosophy Section of this Congress usually proceed on the principle of heredity: tell me what your family is and I'll tell you what your paper will be.

Scepticism and dogmatism are both the result of the weakness of human thought. The former is baffled by the riddle of existence and refuses to be baffled any further by seeking refuge in the gaiety of the moment by taking cash and letting the credit go. But this mood of Omar Khayyam is just an escape, more or less short-lived, from the birthright of man as a thinking animal. There is another type of men, serious and earnest, who would fain solve the puzzles of life, but are baffled by a native incapacity to think, and so are content to live on authority and revelations. They are the religious-minded and these include men who, frightened by the scepticism of thought, use their reason to establish the supremacy of *śabda pramāṇa* and this type has flourished both in the East and in the West. But there is a palpable weakness in this. It develops a smug self complacency, and what is infinitely worse a fear of thought, which makes cowards of the best of men. A stand-still system of thought makes no attempt to keep pace with the march of history. New situations arise and the old philosophy fails to explain new phenomena, and so instead of helping man to discover himself it becomes a hindrance. Since religion is a matter of heart, it is imperative that its stream should run pure, and this can only be done when each generation is alive to its own needs and by living thought prevents religion from degenerating into a stagnant pool. This of course implies a strife of thought, a clash of intellects, but only thus can be kept fresh the zest for life, the purity of thought.

From this standpoint one can appreciate how it is that the West, even though the impulse to philosophic thought there is confined to a few, has shown progress ever since the fetters of mediaevalism were shaken off, while India, where almost every other man is inclined to be a metaphysician, stands to-day where it stood some centuries ago. Few would be so bold as to say that any philosopher of modern Europe with the possible exceptions of Kant and Hegel can come up to, still less surpass in breadth or depth, the systems of Plato and Aristotle, but who would care to be content with these to-day? In the realm of action the better is invariably the enemy of the good, but in the realm of thought, which by its nature is co-operative, there is none so insignificant as to count for nothing, provided there is sincerity and an honest attempt to envisage a living problem. Plato and Aristotle are there, a mighty background of European thought; but if it came to a choice to-day, who would miss reading Descartes and Locke, Spencer and Haeckel, or any of our great living contemporaries, who shoulder the burden of facing living problems to-day?

In view of the fact in India religion and philosophy are generally supposed to have been on the best of terms, one might expect that religious practice would be thoroughly consistent with the philosophic theories. Here too our *prima facie* expectations have to face a rude awakening. The exquisite catholicity of Vedantic metaphysics, essentially unitary, has through the ages come into dire conflict with the grim demands of a social philosophy, essentially pluralistic. The theory of *Varnashrama Dharma* may be a mooted question, but there cannot be any difference of opinion as to how it has worked in practice. This is a social usage, which ought to have its philosophic justification, and this has indeed been forthcoming, but at a heavy cost, i. e., by sacrificing the Upanishadic monism and introducing a dualism, which has crea-

ted more problems than it has ever solved. In this connection an exception will have to be made to a certain extent in connection with Ramanuja and Sankara apart from their followers.

It is significant that in the classification of the three Vedantic Schools, it is the *Dvaitism* that furnishes the *fundamentum divisionis*, and *Advaitism*, in spite of its theoretical monism, in practice is rooted in dualism. Its whole ethic centres round the distinction between the *paramarthika* and the *vyavaharika*. The former is real, the latter only phenomenal. The former implies an annihilation of all distinctions and is attained through the knowledge of the identity of the *Atman* and the *Brahman*. In theory this knowledge is open to all, in practice it is the privilege of those who through endless births have so developed themselves that *moksha* through *gyanam* is theirs by birthright. This is how *Varnashrama* is sought to be justified. Let us see its implications. It makes not merely the social organization, but also philosophy itself aristocratic, because philosophy becomes esoteric, it is the possession of a few. The vast majority have to be content with the ordinary *achars* of life, the daily round of worship and ritual. In other words, while religion is the concern of all, philosophy adopts a patronising air of aloofness. The consequence has been that the religion of the common folk has degenerated, has become even fossilized. Philosophy that has to supply an adequate criticism of religious practice has failed in its mission, and the dualism of the *paramarthika* and the *vyavaharika* reigns supreme, with Advaitism as just a fine finishing gloss to remove the acerbities of dualism. A similar dualism closely connected with the first one is to be found in the Advaitic distinction between the *karma-mukti* or *apekshiki mukti* and the *para-mukti*. The former is relative, the latter is absolute. The former is meant for the *vyavaharika* and is a means to an end, the latter is an end in itself.

It has been the experience of mankind in all ages and in all climes that a rigid demarcation between the high and the low develops a double standard of morality, which by its very nature must make for duality and not unity. I am not concerned here with the truth of Advaitism, nor am I concerned to deny that it may be so worked as to do away with a double standard of morality and make the treasures of Advaitism available to all, instead of their being kept the close preserve of a few. What I am definitely concerned with is that in practice it is the dualism that reigns supreme, that in practice this has tended to divide Hindu society into water-tight compartments, and what is worse gives a spurious sanction to an evil system, which puts a premium on mere birth and heredity, on the inequality of mankind rather than on the essential Brahmanhood of man, howsoever lowly he be. It is here that we feel the moral superiority of Zarathustra, Buddha and Christ, of Mahomed and Kabir. The ideal of purity in thought and action that they lay down is in no way inferior to what an Advaitin of to day lays down, but their message is formulated in terms which brush aside mere intellectual superiority and make morality—and through it salvation—the common goal of all.

Hence it is that in the history of Indian thought while religion and philosophy have experienced no open rupture, they have existed apart : religion for the masses, philosophy for the elite. Religion has become dogmatic, even crude. Philosophy in its self-satisfaction has patronisingly tolerated religion with all its crudeness as a matter of only relative importance, while it has missed its true mission of keeping religion at a high level by a continuous criticism of its practices and its dogmas. Hence too the variety of religious practices in the whole of India, not all of which could be endorsed by the truly moral, and which in the course of these long centuries would have automatically become impossible,

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had not philosophy failed in its task by adopting an air of superior tolerance of the ignorant multitudes as *vyavaharikas*. There never has been a century when India did not produce great saints, great reformers, but the ingrained dualism of the higher and the lower humanity that has soaked into Indian consciousness has successfully barred the way to a general all-round recognition of the unity of the mankind.

When men's thoughts had become conventionalized in India, some great disturbing force was necessary, and such a disturbing force swam into Indian horizon with the study of Western culture. I think I should admit that in many directions the philosophy of the West lacks in that depth which has characterized Indian thought at its highest, but there are features in it of priceless importance : its independence of mere authority, its courage to face problems, and above all, its courage to criticise itself. Criticism of a philosophy we do not accept, is easy enough, but it is harder to criticise one's own hero in philosophy. Love and reverence are apt to blunt the desire to differ, even where the need to differ is imperative. Thanks to the great example of Aristotle in this respect the claims of truth have not been sacrificed to the promptings of discipleship or friendship. Hence the key-note of Western philosophy is a spirit of criticism, which always keeps alert the desire to be true to truth. We in India have to rediscover this truth, for philosophy has become a matter of birth, of family traditions, of family loyalty.

As against this great advantage of Western thought, we have to note that since the days of Aristotle European philosophy has been conceived primarily and fundamentally as knowledge. Its disinterestedness has been emphasized ; its passion is to know for the sake of knowledge ; it has no other motive behind it, not even the motive to see that the truth it knows is put into practice. Hence arises a *prima facie* divorce between thought and life, but this is mainly theoretic-

tical, for every important advance in philosophy has had marked repercussions everywhere else, whether in religion or science, while philosophy has never given up its right to sit in judgment on the ultimate worth of a great scientific discovery or a great historical event. Hence have arisen two curious paradoxes : that in India philosophy is supposed to rule men's life, but it doesn't, while in the West though philosophy is just a disinterested study of existence, its influence generally percolates through to the lowest strata, and no better example of this could be adduced than the history of socialism, for Karl Marx on his own admission took his inspiration from so difficult a thinker as Hegel.

There is no country in the world to-day, which is so favourably situated for the study of philosophy as India, for it is in our universities that there is an intensive study of both Indian and European philosophy. The former in its original purity made philosophy the Way of Life, while the latter has made it a disinterested criticism of life. We need a synthesis of these two basic ideas, and such a synthesis has been forthcoming from the Indian of Indians : Mahatma Gandhi. He may not technically belong to our ranks, but the right to think, the right to truth is not the monopoly of any one, and after centuries we have in our midst a teacher, who is not content to quote scraps from texts, but can face life and can think and can teach.

II

It is not altogether an easy task to deal with the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, for he is a politician as well as a world teacher. In the history of the world no thinker of his eminence has cared to engross himself in the current events of his generation, but the time for this intervention has become ripe, for in the world to-day politics has become supremely important and therefore also so arrogant as to consider itself above even the bare principles of morality. There is

'need for a teacher, who could teach politics to take its rightful place in the scheme of things. Moralization of politics has been the dream of most political thinkers, to make it a reality has been the dream of Mahatma Gandhi, but an active politician cannot escape the great risk of losing the proper perspective and confusing between the universal and the ephemeral. We in this Congress are interested in the universal aspect of his teaching, and to that extent my task is simplified, but it would be impossible to pass over some inconsistencies between Gandhi the man and Gandhi the teacher. In order to bring out the significance of his teaching, I shall have to bring out as briefly as I can the mental make-up of his being, for this alone supplies the requisite background.

(a) *Gandhi the Man.*

A breadth of outlook has generally characterized the whole career of Mahatma Gandhi. There was a time when he appeared to hover between Christ and his native faith, and when he ultimately stuck to Hinduism; it was to a new Hinduism, revived and chastened through the crucible of his own thought. The Gita has been his constant companion and the doctrine of the New Testament has become a part and parcel of his very heart blood. That explains why he has said: "My religion has no geographical limits." Hinduism is the most difficult thing to define, and some of the most eminent Hindus have been content to define it in terms of birth or even negatively in some such terms as these: "It is enough if you are born of Hindu parents and have not been converted to another faith." It is no wonder therefore if for Gandhiji Hinduism is just "a search after truth through non-violent means." The addition of these last words is really superfluous, as no one outside Bedlam ever thought of discovering truth through violence. So defined as a search after Truth, Hinduism ceases to be a religion or a philosophy, and to speak of a Hindu in this sense has no exact significance. The habit

of using old terms with new connotations has almost become chronic with him so that his terms sound national or geographical, when in reality they are universal. He himself has admitted that he has been most influenced by the New Testament and then by Ruskin and Tolstoy. A seeker after truth needs must go where truth beckons him, and patriotic considerations cannot confine the area of his search. Similarly in questions of bodily health he pays a warm tribute of affection to Dr. Kuhne and Dr. Just. Such a man, such a Hindu can truthfully say : "For me patriotism blends with humanity."

When a man is so prepared to receive currents of truth from whatever source they come, he is logically bound to make a full use of his reason. "I shall not make a fetish of religion and I cannot justify any evil in its sacred name. I have no desire to carry one single soul with me "if I cannot convince him by an appeal to his reason. I shall even go to the length of rejecting the divinity of the most ancient Shastras, if they do not appeal to my reason." This is a remarkably new note in the history of Indian thought. When Maulana Zafar Ali Khan wrote to him in anger for venturing to differ from the Koran in some particular respect, he had the courage to retort : "...even the teachings themselves of the Quran cannot be exempt from criticism. Every true scripture only gains by criticism. After all we have no other guide but our reason to tell us what may be regarded as revealed and what may not be." In this he has gone miles beyond the *Subda Pramana* of the traditional Hindu philosophy and heralds the birth of a new epoch of thought. And yet this is done not with the arrogance of a mere rationalist, but in the spirit of a humble devotee, who does not believe in the exclusive divinity of the Vedas, but recognizes the Bible and the Koran and the Zend Avesta to be "as much divinely inspired as the Vedas."

What is accepted by reason may be merely intellectual in character, a belief which does not govern action. But with

Gandhiji a belief which cannot issue in a right action is worse than useless. It is this courage to act which makes him one of the very greatest Karma-Yogins of history, and by far the greatest service that he has rendered to India is that he has battled with fear and conquered it in himself and taught others to conquer it. This has not been a mean achievement in a country where the people have been paralysed through fear : fear of the police, fear of the military, fear of public opinion, fear of social ostracism, fear of ghosts, fear of shadows. Our politics, our social reform have all been vitiated by fear. Till but recently all reform was a matter of talk. Our Vedantins will flood you with quotations to show how catholic Hinduism is, but woe to the man who dared to take this seriously and ever acted upon them. Quotations are for show, not for action. In fact I believe so much precious time has been wasted in proving that Hinduism is cosmopolitan, is catholic, that no time has been spared for the practice of it. Fear leads to repressions and without its conquest no man can find himself or rise to his full stature.

Fearlessness does not imply the courage of a bravado or a criminal. It is meant to be the manifestation of a severely disciplined soul, disciplined in the purest spirit of righteousness. It implies in Gandhiji's own words "the non-violence of the strong, who would disdain to kill but would gladly die for the vindication of the truth." He has meant this, and lived up to it. The overflowing warmth of his loving heart and his cheerful smile have made him a living magnet, drawing the homage of willing hearts, and his scrupulous simplicity has disarmed all suspicion of the type to which leaders of men are peculiarly subject. Prevading him and enveloping him is an aroma of religiousness, an unarguing and unarguable faith in God and His divine governance. The peace of God shines in his face and dwells in his heart.

Such is the man. But it is his thought we are primarily

concerned with. We are not bidden by him to accept all he says. We are not required to accept anything, till our reason has stamped its hall-mark on it. As he himself says : "Blind adoration in the age of action is perfectly valueless." His teaching as such is simple. There is nothing tortuous or esoterical. In dealing with it I shall concern myself only with the universal aspects of his teaching, for they alone can claim to be of permanent importance.

(b) *Gandhi the Teacher.*

In *Hind Swaraj* published as far back as 1908 Gandhiji wrote : "Religion is dear to me and my first complaint is that India is becoming irreligious. Here I am not thinking of the Hindu and Mahomedan or the Zoroastrian religion, but of that religion which underlies all religions." The core of his religion is an intuitive faith in God, and for this very reason it does not admit of proof or demonstration. But he never tires to emphasize the righteousness of God. In his *Atmakatha* (Vol. I, p. 4) he says : "In my experiments everything relating to soul has been a matter of morality ; religion is morality ; morality from the standpoint of soul is religion," and in his *Ethical Religion* he refuses to distinguish between religion and morality. Since in his system of morality truth is the highest principle. God Himself comes to be identified with truth. Some years ago a legend used to be current in Tibet that Second Buddha had been reincarnated in India and was known as Mahatma Gandhi. One thing is certain that since the days of Buddha no Indian with the possible exception of Kabir has attached so much importance or grown so eloquent over pure morality as Gandhiji. His religion is the religion of service, a practical idealism, which "is not meant merely for the Rishis and Saints. It is meant for the common people as well."

In the sphere of religion Gandhiji cannot be regarded as an original genius, but his sincere search after religious truth,

wherever found, is an inspiring example. He is keen to be known as a Sanatani Hindu, but on his own terms. Too great to accept any dogma second-hand, too sincere to have any uneasy compromises with others, his Sanatani Hinduism is much deeper and nobler than the general run of it and involves four main points: acceptance of the Hindu Scriptures, though he claims to have made a study of the Gita alone. He believes in the *Varnashrama Dharma* "in a sense strictly Vedic, not in its present popular and crude sense." He believes "in the protection of the cow in a much larger sense than the popular." Lastly he says he does "not disbelieve in idol-worship."

It is not difficult to see that Gandhiji's Sanatanism is of a very diluted type, or else he could not have become the champion of the oppressed and the depressed, still less could he have made good his spiritual and ethical kinship with Buddha and Christ. His reverence for the cow is only a symbol of his reverence for all life: "The cow means to me the whole sub-human world. Man through the cow is enjoined to realize his identity with all that lives.....The cow is a poem of pi y." Through the cow he comprehends the profound Upanishadic unity of life. His attitude to idol-worship is cautious, but not at all unreasonable. He does not disbelieve in it, and who would care to, provided the worshipper always realizes the symbolism behind the idol? But it is not difficult to see that his native tendency is away from ritualism, even like Buddha and Christ. Few pages in his *Atmakatha* are so interesting or so philosophical as those in which he deals with the question of *janoi* (sacred thread). When he went to England his mother had given him one, and out of reverence to her he never took it off, though he admitted that apart from her he saw no reason to wear it. But when it wore off, it saw no substitute. If a Sudra is not permitted to wear it, why should other Hindus wear it? he asks. Wearing a *janoi*

means a new birth, it means the advent of purity. But in the present state of Hindu society, what right have we to claim this purity? When the Hindu society, runs his argument, washes off the dirt of untouchability, has forgotten the distinction between the high and low, does away with other evils that have found a home in it, and removes irreligiousness, then can a Hindu claim the privilege of wearing a *janoi*? We may disagree with his view, for a *janoi* is nothing but a symbol to mark out a Hindu, but there can be no denying the high ethical tone of his argument, for to him Hinduism as a search after truth cannot be dissociated from truth. A *janoi* for him is not an outward symbol. It must stand for inner purity, or not worn at all. When he differs so fundamentally from the current beliefs of Hinduism, his Hinduism may invite the appellation of being shadowy, but it is a misuse of language to dub his religion agnostic theism, as is sought to be done by Dr. Macnicol. There is only one way of correctly designating his religion, and that is to call it Ethical Theism.

His ethical system rests on the twin principles of truth and sacredness of life. Love of man as man is inborn in him. In an interesting passage in his *Atmakatha* he says: "In all my experiences I have known no distinction between relations and strangers, my countrymen and foreigners, between white and black, or between Hindus and Mussalmans, Christians Parsees and Jews. I can boldly say that my heart has never been able to recognize such differences. I do not claim this as a merit in me, for I do not remember ever to have made any attempt to develop this sense of equality, as I have endeavoured and I am still endeavouring to develop *ahimsa* and *brahma-charya*.' He sees God in man, and that is why he has developed a most novel difference between evil and evil-doer, which made him say with reference to General Dyer: "I hate the thing he has done, but if he were ill I would go to him

and nurse him, and if it were possible heal him."

Here in a nut-shell we have a practical exemplification of his *ahimsa*. His creed is to hate the evil, wherever found, not the evil doer, for the evil-doer does not cease to be human, and the divine lives in every creature. *Ahimsa* is as old as Buddhism and Jainism, but Gandhiji's genius has made him work it in defence of what he sincerely believes to be truth on a scale unparalleled in the history of humanity. To a world which has grown war-weary this new instrument of Gandhiji has come with great force, but it would be futile to deny that like most human instruments, if it can be used to advantage, it can also be worked to abuse. It has been hailed with delight as a substitute for all the brutalities of warfare, but as between two hostile nations it is questionable whether the fundamental condition of a successful Satyagraha will be ever fulfilled: the condition namely of a basic love, which aims at conquering the enemy through love. If both sides are prepared for this, there is no room for a war, violent or non-violent. If only one side is *satyagrāhi*, it will be at a palpable disadvantage, for the organized military strength of the other party will have worked havoc with effect long before it could come face to face with its enemy prepared to suffer through love or a sense of righteousness. On the other hand it could conceivably work with success even in international affairs under either of two conditions, in which there is nothing inherently impossible. Suppose the government of a country X prepares for a war against its neighbour Y. If the people of X are convinced that their government is in the wrong and the war would be palpably unjust, they can force the hands of their government to give up their warlike intentions. This is all the more possible to-day, as no war can be carried on with the small armies that were in vogue even a century ago. Governments will be forced to go in for conscription and with all their force it rests with the people

to decide whether they shall support their government bent on war or whether they are prepared to make war impossible by resisting conscription. It is clear that in the latter case if the majority is against government, war would indeed become impossible; even if there is only a minority, but a strong minority, imbued with a great moral fervour, no government will be able to overlook its views and will have to steer their course with caution.

Another condition under which Satyagraha can work with effect in internationalism is connected with the work of the League of Nations. In itself the League is a great advance in internationalism, but it has suffered from the palpable defect that it is weak, where each one of its members is strong, viz., that as a League it is unarmed and as such unable to exert its authority especially against a strong recalcitrant state, whether a member of the League or not. To arm the League is fraught with this danger that any little war may become a world war with all its attendant horrors. It is perhaps here that Gandhiji's principle of Satyagraha will find a noble field of activity, for it is open to the League to refuse co-operation to any state, that is callously bent on war. Each member of the League will have to cut off its trade with the aggressors, refuse supplies or loans, and confront them with the sense of an outraged humanity. This state of affairs will dawn the sooner, when the moral links that bind the nations to one another come to have a greater value in the eyes of men than the desire to be rich through trade anyhow, and in this task Gandhiji's personality and philosophy may in the days to come play their rightful part.

In the internal affairs of a state Satyagraha is more easily practicable, but the greater the ease the greater the responsibility of those who launch it. None realizes this so clearly as its creator, for in *Hind Swaraj* he lays down very difficult, if not impossible, conditions. "After a great deal of experience,"

he writes, "it seems to me that those who want to become passive resisters for the service of the country have to observe perfect chastity, adopt poverty, follow truth and cultivate fearlessness." The last goes without saying ; truth will have to be basic ; the first two do not appear to be essential, for the spirit of service is not inimical to wealth, while chastity in the sense in which Gandhiji would have it is irrelevant to the purposes of any particular Satyagraha. But these conditions effectually bring out the high seriousness with which he approaches the question. Its great success in South Africa has contributed to its popularity. Its vogue in India is great, and it is for the historian of the future to consider it dispassionately. But even assuming its theoretical correctness, its practical applications have to face certain attendant difficulties and defects, which a wise leader of men cannot afford to overlook. The first difficulty is the fatal ease with which it could be launched under the impulse of a sudden sense of wrong. The second is the need for a leader, sufficiently self-disciplined to check any violence in himself and in his followers. The third and the last is an acute sense of balance, of mental poise, which would have recourse to Satyagraha only in those cases in which normally a war would be justifiable. What I have in mind is this. Suppose there is a democratic governmental machinery, which operates as the will of the majority in a constitutional fashion. There will be countless occasions on which the minority will honestly feel aggrieved, they may even honestly feel that the right is on their side and therefore they should go in plump for Satyagraha. Needless to say that this difficulty is not merely academic, and will be anything but academic in the days to come in our own country, when there is sure to be a tussle between the forces of a disruptive orthodoxy entrenching itself behind its centuries old traditional rights and the forces of a progressive nationalism, which is sure to chafe under old restrictions. This tussle will be as

intensive as one can imagine, and if it could end as such tussles ended in ancient Rome or have ended often in modern England, where the sense of political compromise has been exceptionally strong, it would be well and good. But where each side honestly but stubbornly feels itself to be in the right, a resort to Satyagraha may grow to be dangerously common. I use the word *dangerously* very advisedly, for it would be a mistake to imagine that because Satyagraha is non-violent; it does not produce as much dislocation of normal work as a violent war, and to that extent the normal evolution of the arts of peace is bound to receive a set-back.

I have thought it necessary to emphasize this aspect of Satyagraha, for Gandhiji's political philosophy is such as not to make a due allowance for it. He is fundamentally a religious ascetic, forced into the whirlpools of politics by the *Zeitgeist*. Religion in its essence is personal, and a truly religious person feels that his own existence is a matter between himself and God, and other individuals have nothing to do with it. Add to this the determined feeling of a religious person that for him God is self-sufficient and therefore he inevitably feels independent of any man or a body of men, governments included. As far back as 1915, when Gandhiji was a loyal citizen of the British Empire, he said: ".....I am no lover of any government, and I have more than once said that that government is best which governs least. And I have found that it is possible for me to be governed least under the British Empire. Hence my loyalty to the British Empire." This was the attitude of Tolstoy, of course without any reference to the British Government. In technical language neither of these great souls can escape being classified as philosophical anarchists. Both of them are devotees of God, Who is Love; both of them are weary of the complexities of modern civilisation and would willingly go back to the pristine simplicity of manual labour; both of them would work directly

on the heart of each man so as to make him see the God within ; conscious of their inner power both of them scorn governments. It is an accident of history that one was born in Russia and the other in India ; wherever they had been born they would have come to grips with the powers that be, for they make men look inward and not to external authorities for the creation of a better world. Tolstoy escaped acute suffering because he wrote and preached, but remained an aristocrat, while Gandhiji with the inheritance of the Karmic teaching of the Gita strode out as a warrior, albeit a non-violent one, and has not found the prison bars any restraint on his inner freedom or on his consciousness of the God within him.

Whether Philosophical Anarchism is the right type of Political Philosophy is a question by itself. It would be a conceivable possibility, if every man realizes that there is God in every man, that the love of God spells the love of His creatures, and that therefore no man can be injured without violence being done at the same time to God, that when every man sees God in every other man there cannot be any room for violence, for any ill-will. When these conditions are fulfilled, who would stand in need of government ? Where there is peace of God, nothing else is needed. But where is this peace ? It is a quest of all, but the discovery of a few. His whole *Atmakatha* shows the gradual pace in his own spiritual history, and in the end he admits how difficult the path of purity is. "To conquer the passions of mind seems to me far more difficult than to conquer the world with arms !" If so, in the absence of inner authority there must needs be some external authority, whether it be the Church or the State, perhaps better both combined. But this external authority exists not in its own interest, but in the interests of those under its authority. Therefore in the last resort the external authority of the State is not a repository of physical power, but of moral



force. It was the late Mr. Tilak who said : "Politics is not for *sadhus*." Gandhiji is on a far higher level when he says : "He who says that religion has nothing to do with politics does not know religion." We may differ radically from him in his view of the State, but if the State is to exist and to fulfill its end as a moralizing agency, the world will have to pay heed to the example and the inspiration afforded by his career. He will not have lived in vain, if the rulers of the world realize that the world has lost through their crooked aims and secret diplomacy; and that the world will gain by their straightforwardness and desire to do the right thing by their own as by others' subjects. Through the agony of suffering cometh good. Politics has been the last stronghold which has held out against the laws of morality, which at its highest is the law of Love. If India can help in winning that last stronghold, she will have fulfilled her mission in its pristine purity.

I shall now come to that part of Gandhiji's teaching with which I disagree most and that relates to his view of modern civilization, which means of course Western or industrial civilization. In 1908 he wrote *Hind Swaraj* or *Indian Home Rule*, which is a sustained attack on civilization as such. It was evidently written at a time when his gentle and sensitive soul was literally writhing under the studied insults of an unchristian and wilful bureaucracy in South Africa, and it is intelligible, if not quite justifiable, that in resenting these insults he should have gone to what he considered to be the root of the matter, viz., the Western civilization as such. A book written in bitterness is likely to suffer from defects and I should have preferred to ignore it, but unfortunately in the *Young India* of January 1921 he blesses it once again with the imprimatur of his approval, and on 14th August 1924 he affirms that the *Indian Home Rule* "depicts an ideal state." So it is impossible to overlook it, however much I dislike it,

and I dislike it because there Gandhiji takes up the position not of a world teacher, but of a narrow nationalist, which would take India back some thousands of years. It would be fair to add that in the pages of the *Young India* he has had to make admissions, which go a great way to soften the extreme rigour of his earlier book, but he always leaves the impression behind that he would much rather not make these softening admissions. In fact it is only in this part of his teaching that I miss the firm hand of the master, who knows his mind.

The modern civilization is the industrial civilization with the full sway of machinery. This civilization is "cursed"; it is "only in name," and wholeheartedly he would have it driven out of India. Lawyers and doctors and teachers come in for very hard knocks. In his ideal state where there will be individual self-rule and no government, presumably there will be nothing to own and nothing to lose and so a lawyer would find his occupation gone. Most of us will agree that the world in general and India in particular can do with fewer lawyers, but in this work-a-day world with our imperfect human nature they have played a part which they alone could have played, and on the whole the world has gained by them. Surely lawyers could not be entirely useless when Gandhiji himself was enabled to do God's good work in South Africa because he was a lawyer. One could wish that every lawyer would follow his example and Abraham Lincoln's and not take up a single dirty case. This would indeed be a welcome reform.

And poor doctors. We would gladly keep them at arm's length, if we could be guaranteed against all ills of the body. Gandhiji himself has written *A Guide to Health*, an excellent book, excellent because he has not hesitated to learn from Western doctors like Dr. Kuhne and Dr. Just. The ideal state would first have to guarantee that no man falls ill, before it can afford to do away with all doctors.

And teachers. Here are some of his observations : "What do you propose to do by giving him (a peasant) a knowledge of letters ? Will you add an inch to his happiness ? Now let us take higher education. I have learned Geography, Astronomy, Algebra Geometry, etc. In what way have I benefitted myself or those around me ?" And in this connection of all people Huxley is quoted at length.

In *Young India* of 17th July 1924 he writes : "Divine knowledge is not borrowed from books. It has to be realised in oneself. Books are at best an aid, often even a hindrance." It struck me as most extraordinary that in the Tolstoy Farm he attached least importance to the barest knowledge of letters. It would be futile to pursue this further. One cannot fail to see that the man is much greater than his teaching and no inconsistency can be nobler than his whereby he has read deeply not merely in Sanskrit and Hindi and Gujrati, but even in English ; and not merely read, but written profusely, and on the whole the world has benefitted by reading him and not shunning books.

His views on lawyers and doctors and teachers in his ideal state may be taken as harmless cogitations of a man who has risen above the need of needing any of them. Not so his views on machinery, which affect the fundamentals of his teaching. Machinery for him "is the chief symbol of modern civilization ; it represents a great sin....I cannot recall a single good point in connection with machinery." But since then he has yielded at several points to the logic of facts with reference to railways and cars and telegraphs and printing presses. In an interesting conversation with one Ramachandran, a student of Shantiniketan, recorded in the pages of *Young India*, he makes an interesting exception in the case of the Singer Sewing Machine : "It is one of the few useful things ever invented, and there is a romance about the device itself. Singer saw his wife labouring over the tedious process of sewing and

seaming with her own hands and simply out of his love for her he devised the sewing machine, in order to save her from unnecessary labour. He, however, saved not only her labour but also the labour of every one who could purchase a sewing machine." Extend this logic further afield and it would be impossible even for Gandhiji to deny that all machinery is at bottom a device to save labour and to minimise its tedium.

Studying all these passages together the right line of approach for a spiritual leader like Gandhiji would be to see that machinery does not enthrall the spirit of man, that at no stage shall machinery be anything but subservient to the happiness of mankind. True that the human genius of invention has flourished as much in discovering the most nefarious means of human destruction in warfare, as in discovering most benevolent things, but with true spiritual enlightenment it should not be impossible to minimise, even to annihilate, the scourge of science in evil directions. Gandhiji is less than just to himself when he says that the attempt to spiritualise machinery seems an impossible task. If this were true, verily is humanity in great danger, for it is impossible to do away with machinery and revert to a by-gone age, and yet to feel enslaved to it would be a great calamity.

The whole discussion of machinery in Gandhiji's writings is dominated by a sullen silent spirit of asceticism, which has been a most peculiar feature of Hinduism. In the Tolstoy Farm he admits that his aim was to lead a life which the poorest of the poor would lead and this holds true of the Sabarmati Ashrama as well. In his *Guide to Health* he actually says: "It is wrong to eat anything for its mere taste." There is absolutely no aesthetics worth the name in him, and yet when he comes to speak of dress he suddenly discovers that "dress, indeed, detracts from the natural beauty of the body." He goes to Hardwar and is repelled by the iron bridge near Lakshman Zula, Mr. Kallenbach and he

were on board a ship on their way to London : Mr. Kallenbach was fond of binoculars, but this militated against Gandhiji's sense of simplicity and to put an end to endless discussions, which these binoculars gave rise to, Gandhiji suggested and poor Mr. Kallenbach acquiesced that the binoculars should be thrown into the sea, and they were : the claims of simplicity were satisfied !

I should not like to deny that there is something beautiful in certain types of asceticism which have prevailed in India through the ages, e. g., the type represented by Rudyard Kipling's *Puran Bhagat*, who after a life spent in arduous labour would fain in the evening of his life seek solitude where he could rest at preece. There is a beauty in the type of a sanyasin, so beautifully pictured by Tagore, who has given up the world to serve the world. But asceticism for the sake of asceticism, void of beauty, serving as a rule not for the few but for all, is an asceticism which human nature cannot, and thank God will not bear, for it spells a starvation of that side of the soul of man which delights in beauty and creates great art.

Gandhiji's moral fervour and austerity evoke our deepest homage, but true morality must flourish not in the artificial atmosphere of studied simplicity, but in the busiest haunts of men. Genuine simplicity belongs to the heart, not to our mere physical environment. He has forgotten the long aeons that the spirit of man has taken to rise above its animal origin and create bit by bit that mighty fabric which we call civilization. Philosophy and ethics did not take their birth in the caves of the cavemen or in the huts of savages. They awoke when man had conquered nature sufficiently to give him leisure to look around him and think. Hegel's great remark that the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering, has a marked bearing on the philosophy of civilization. It was not a mere accident but the

truth of history that Indian philosophy was nurtured in the palaces of Kings Janaka and Ajatasatru and other Kshatriyas, though later it may have attained its full form in the ashramas of ascetics. Man's nature is so many-sided and so organic that no side of it can be completely starved without there arising evil repercussions of it on other sides of human nature. More than others a great Karma-yogin like Gandhiji should realize the full significance of *homo faber* : man as tool maker. His is an essentially inventive genius and it would be a wrong to his nature to put any artificial limits to his inventiveness. If in the fullness of time man has invented machines, he has not sinned against his nature, rather he has fulfilled it, for he has added to the fullness of life. Is he happy ? I do not know. Was the savage happy in perpetual terror of animals and hostile tribes ? Happiness is a state of mind fully under the control of man's will. One can be happy in abject poverty, unhappy in the midst of plenty. Mere happiness is no measure of man's advance. Rather the more he thinks, the more discontented and unhappy he is bound to become. Buddha and Christ and Gandhiji could have been happy, if each had left humanity alone. But their nature would not let them. Happiness or no happiness their place is in the heart of humanity, sharing their joys, lightening their burdens. If science and machinery have killed, they have also saved. To the credit of the West let us remember the army of nurses flitting from bed to bed assuaging the agony of pain, many of them well born, some of them even high born, all of them educated and trained, with a sense of high refinement, and yet willingly doing the work, which in India has consigned millions outside the pale of civilized humanity, with the curse of uncleanness clinging to them from generation to generation so that tons of soap will not make one of them admissible to the temple of God or to the dining room of an orthodox Hindu. Who is more conscious

of all this than Mahatmaji himself ? Who has struggled more to lift them up than he, to cast out fear from their heart and to put the thought of divine kindness in them ? And where did he get the inspiration for all this, if not from the "cursed" civilization of the West ? If we in India have to make good our boast that the spirit of India is so broad as to harbour in its bosom varied cultures and varied creeds, we cannot bar the way to industrialism. We have to assimilate it and transfuse it with the best that the culture of India can give. If the industrialism of the West is really wicked and soulless, it will not do for India to turn her back upon it, but she must spiritualise it and this will be the test of her spirituality. This is what many in the West look eastwards for. Spirituality is not nihilism, it has to spiritualise the most recalcitrant material. The book of India is the Gita, and the message of the Gita is bravery, is action. There in the background is the spirit of Sri Krishna to goad the sluggard to action. India is never taught to despair, for the genius of India has spoken through Sri Krishna :—

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।
 अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥
 परिव्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् ।
 धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाय संभवामि युगे युगे ॥

III.

CONCLUSION.

Before I conclude perhaps I may as well plead guilty to the charge of having taken up a very unconventional subject for my address to-day. But I feel that this Congress cannot hope to achieve anything substantial, unless and until we give up the fear to think, and no Indian of our generation has made himself responsible for such unconventional views or pursued them with so high a sense of honour as Mahatma Gandhi. To agree and to appreciate and to disagree and criticise are

our privileges and I have exercised them both. He is the only teacher in India to-day who can claim to have been looked up to by the world, and we in the Congress have something very vital to learn from him. His fearlessness and freedom from the tyranny of texts are a genuine inspiration. His emphasis on the moral as the ultimate principle in life holds out a great promise of a religious revival free from ritualism, which tends to veil the soul of God more than reveal it. This is all for the good, and he has deservedly been hailed as an Olympian of Olympians, who make history.

But I have always felt that a world that is governed by God—and this is a cardinal faith with so confirmed a theist as Gandhiji—must be a rational world, which somehow forges its way through to progress. And I have never been able to appreciate that easy-going attitude which is always looking backwards, always praising the past and always afraid of the future. It is not given to man to stand still, unless he is prepared to lose what he has achieved and thereby retrograde. In a world that is fired by the great scientific achievements of the last hundred years, there is only one faith possible and that is in the power of man to overcome difficulties. This faith inevitably and logically rests upon either a belief in God, who is fundamentally benevolent and righteous, or a belief that this universe is fundamentally rational where what is rational struggles for mastery and in the long last secures it. This is the metaphysical problem, which no man can escape, and that is why philosophy will subsist, even though it literally bakes no bread. But philosophy can make itself felt only when it recognizes that it is concerned with life, and the moment it cuts itself adrift from life in an aristocratic spirit it ceases to count. It may delight dialecticians; it may overwhelm mortals with clever subtleties; it may appear to move on a high plane of thought; but in fact it will be moving in a vacuum. There is nothing more beautiful to-day in Western

life than the countless laboratories, dotted all over Europe and America, wherein devoted men are working day after day to snatch some little secret from nature, to create some little device to add to human convenience. This example has been followed in our country too. But a specialist, however useful, however great, can work only with blinkers. Outside the range of his narrow work he has no interests, no knowledge. Hence it is that philosophy will always be needed to remove this narrowness, to look at life as a whole. That is why our philosophy courses need to be so revised as to bring out their bearing on life. Gandhiji is not a metaphysician, but within the limits of his theism he has done what a metaphysician may be expected to do. His distrust of machinery implies that he has not succeeded in assimilating it within his philosophy, and yet machinery has done so much for humanity whether in bridging distances or minimising human drudgery or adding to the amount of time that could be devoted to make life better, that it cannot be left out of a scheme of complete life. Let us take but one instance which I recently read in an article by Prof. Thompson : "The sewage of Pasadena, one of the most beautiful residential towns of the world, is so drastically treated that there is nothing left to go to the sea, for the residual clear water is restored to the fields, where it is very welcome and the residual dry organic matter is sold to the farmers to enter once more into the circle of life." But as Gandhiji has realized perhaps more than others, machinery has also created problems which do not always testify to a simultaneous moral growth of man. This has been accentuated by the prevalent individualism of Western character. Hence it is that India with her more corporate life may have something to contribute towards mitigating the evils of a mechanized life. We want a new social philosophy to meet new conditions, a new message of hope and it is here that this Congress may aspire to play

its rôle. There is no such thing as mere matter ; what is called matter is pregnant with spirit. It is the task of philosophy to make this recognized in thought and in practice, and it is here that the Indian thought in spite of all accretions through the ages has yet vitality enough to play its part in the rightful evolution of humanity.

Presidential Address.

BY PROF. T. D. SULLY,
(*St. John's College Agra*).
(METAPHYSICS SECTION).

We live in an age of Congresses and Conferonces. Whatever problem it is which arises, the solitary armchair or desk is not sufficient: we must have our round table and our symposium. In whatever other spheres we may cling to private property, in the sphere of ideas we must be communists. We are coming to take this almost as a matter of course, though some, no doubt, would still make it matter for complaint.

But when it comes to a Philosophical Congress, and withal to a metaphysical section therein, we have a phenomenon worthy of remark. It is the business of the metaphysician to take nothing for granted, and he must be ready at all times not only to question the assumptions and presuppositions of the sciences, but also to re-examine the departments of practice and production. And in all this it is fitting that his criticism should begin at home.

I suggest then for our consideration for a few moments this phenomenon of a metaphysical conference. Not that I would emulate Kant by throwing down a challenge to be faced and met before we indulge in any future metaphysical speculation; such a challenge would require more thorough thinking than I have been able to give to the subject. Yet it may not be without use if I try to pass on such thoughts as I have been able to gather, and if we endeavour to see how far the theories we propound can be considered consistent with our practice, and capable of explaining it.

Our practice—whatever our theories may be—implies that

there is reality and use in philosophers meeting together to confer. But many of our metaphysical theories appear to deny, or at least, to cast considerable doubt on, either the reality or the use, or on both. If we are to confer together, with any consistency, we are taking for granted the reality of a plurality of individual persons, of different minds making their varying contribution to the common subject. We presuppose the possibility of communication between ourselves, of what has been called 'intersubjective intercourse'. It appears also to be understood, unless we are unduly cynical, that the cause of truth may be advanced by such a mutual exchange of ideas. These are all assumptions which at one time or another, and from one point of view or another, have been rejected, and are even virtually rejected by those very metaphysicians who indulge in public speaking or who publish books.

"The materialist," says Eddington, "who is convinced that all phenomena arise from electrons and quanta and the like, controlled by mathematical formulae, must presumably hold the belief that his wife is a rather elaborate differential equation; but he is probably tactful enough not to obtrude this opinion in domestic life." Yet there are others who would not allow us even the reality which belongs to a differential equation. They will either question my right to any assurance of the existence of other persons, or they may relegate such belief to a low level of popular understanding which would be unworthy of such a gathering as the present. Yet really, if I am to be left in doubt whether there are other persons present, whether the minds in this hall are really many and not one, and whether I am really communicating my ideas to other minds at all; I should regard the chairmanship of this metaphysical section as a rather doubtful honour and privilege.

Whatever we may be in our several metaphysical arm-

chairs, it is certain that by nature and in practice we are all confirmed pluralists. Yet it would be true, surely, to say that the implications of this fact form a subject which has not yet received the attention it deserves. Metaphysics has been rather an individual game. At the start it has tended to set over against the "self" a "not-self", over against a finite and relative subject the infinite and absolute. It is then plunged at once into such engrossing and apparently insoluble problems that it hardly has had time to consider the everyday situation of the self finding itself up against other selves.

These 'other selves', both in the classical systems of the East and of the West, are relegated to a dubious position in the realm of the 'other', the world of experience. Thus, in the speculations of Descartes, the reality of other human spirits is guaranteed to us in the same way as the reality of the physical world by the perfect trustworthiness of the Supreme Being, who no doubt would not allow us to be always deceived by the resemblance of other human bodies into supposing minds when they are not really there. But for his followers there was no such easy solution.

In Berkeley's idealism it is clearly necessary for me to infer *some* spirit other than my own, so as to account for the origin of ideas of sense; for only spiritual agency can account for the existence and the changes of ideas. Yet it is not obvious why I should infer a number of other finite spirits as well as the Supreme Spirit for this humble purpose. It is an inference resting, it seems, on the very questionable foundation of analogy, from observed resemblances in those groups of ideas which constitute what we call our bodies.

But apart from the questionable character of this analogy, to which I shall return, Berkeley was evidently conscious of the other difficulties in his position. When he comes to attempt an account of how one human mind can communicate its ideas to another, he confesses, "That it is evident



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that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body ; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite, any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator." Clearly, on Berkeley's assumptions, my own volition can only affect the ideas in my own mind, or if *in fact* it could directly effect changes in the mind of another, I could in no direct way be aware of the fact. There can really be no effective windows in Berkeley's Monads, and it is only by a divinely arranged harmony that what appears to be intersubjective intercourse comes about.

Indeed it seems clear from a study of the western empirical philosophy that there is no explanation possible of our experience of other finite minds along the way of the Cartesian ideas. If we start to account for our knowledge in terms of the content of the individual mind we are committed to a subjectivism from which it is only by miracle or fiction that we seem to escape. It may seem superfluous to dwell again on the subjectivist fallacy, which has so often been exposed ; yet it is one of those illusions which, as Kant pointed out, continues to trouble and mislead us long after its illusory character has been recognised.

It is significant that Kant himself, while recognising the inadequacy of the empirical philosophy and reaching his conception of a 'Kingdom of Ends' as an essential postulate in his ethical view, is still so individualistic in his metaphysics. In his doctrine of "Inner Sense" we still find that view of experience as a content of the individual mind,—though now it is a part only of experience which remains subjective in this sense. And even this part of inner experience, of motives feelings etc., is regarded as though it could be rendered objective, and thus could become as fully determined by the categories and as much a part of the one common world, or "Nature" as any other part of our experience. The late

Prof. Ward has well exposed this form of dualism in which the objective system of phenomena seems to float uncertainly on the surface of the flux of subjective representations of the individual mind. Kant, he suggests, has failed to draw out the full implications of his doctrine of transcendental apperception.

Yet even if we admit that the objective level of understanding is trans-subjective, and that the unity of apperception is no merely individual or subjective entity; even if we admit that inter-subjective intercourse is a necessary condition of the categories of the understanding as well as of the consciousness of a moral law; we are still not in a position fully to account for our assumption of a plurality of minds and of the difference between my *self*-consciousness and my consciousness of other selves. If we confine our attention to the problem of knowledge, as Kant tended to do in his first Critique, this privacy of the subject over against the objective system as known remains an unaccountable problem, and we may be tempted to sweep it away into the limbo of illusions.

Some attention has been given to the problem in recent times both on the side of psychology, and on the metaphysical side in the Gifford Lectures of Profs. Clement Webb and Alexander. The insufficiency of analogy as a basis for our belief in other persons has been exposed in a way that seems to admit of no answer. A clear statement of this criticism is to be found in a suggestive chapter of C. D. Broad's 'The Mind and its place in Nature.' It is clear, as he points out, that "most of us pass through life with very little direct perceptual knowledge of what we 'look like' when we feel angry or pleased or in pain." And it is palpably absurd to credit the child, or primitive man—let alone the higher animals—with inferences from resemblances which they are not in a position to perceive, even where they exist. However much such

comparisons and inferences may later on contribute to the elaboration of our knowledge of other people's minds and characters, and, incidentally, of our own,—and undoubtedly they form a very large and important factor—they cannot account for the *origin* of our belief in the existence of another person. Yet this belief in other persons seems certainly stronger even than our belief in the physical universe, and even philosophers generally dislike the charge of solipsism.

Prof. Broad himself holds that we must admit the existence of what he terms "extraspective situations," where we are in direct cognitive contact with other minds and their states, on a level with those introspective situations which give us knowledge of our own mind. As to whether a foreign mental event can be a direct objective constituent in such extraspection is left somewhat doubtful; though Prof. Broad himself evidently believes that the phenomena of abnormal psychology give us reason for accepting such 'telegnosis.' In ordinary experience it would be difficult to distinguish it from those quasi instinctive interpretations of bodily expression, etc. which he admits in any case to be an important contributing factor. Interpretation is clearly involved in the somewhat difficult process of 'knowing our own mind' as well as in coming to know that of another; and it would seem as though psychology gives us no real warrant for supposing that in our immediate experience we have any more intimate certainty about our own mind than we have about the minds of others.

The idea of a foreign consciousness, as Prof. Alexander reminds us in his "Space, Time and Deity", cannot possibly be derived from anything we can find in ourselves. Rather our suppositions of what is to be found in ourselves have been profoundly influenced by the supposed implications of our experience of other minds. Prof. Alexander himself, as you will doubtless remember, finds the basis for our idea of foreign consciousness in the experience of sociality. It is the mutual

responsiveness in act and emotion between two or more persons which gives rise to their cognitive recognition of each other. We may remember how Mill found in the social feelings the ultimate sanction for a morality which recognises the happiness of others, when we find Alexander resting upon a more developed psychology of our sociality our ultimate assurance even of the existence of others. It is "this experience that other humans excite our social desires and in turn satisfy them, which gives us the assurance that they also are minds like ourselves." And the old appeal to analogy is now seen to involve a deeper misapprehension, since in this mutual responsiveness "the part which the two participants in the social situation play is not the same but different; the child's response to the mother is not the same as the mother's caresses."

But the distinction which Alexander makes between the 'enjoyment' we have of our own minds, and our 'contemplation' of external objects leaves us with a difficulty. In our assurance of the existence of another's mind, we are neither 'enjoying' that mind nor can we be said to be directly contemplating it. "What sort of a mind it is," he says, "how the other mind feels in a given situation, I am left to divine sympathetically on the basis largely of analogy with my own." Thus again, surely, we are thrown back into the impossible position of imagining a child being given the assurance of its mother's existence, while it has to wait for the development of its powers of inference and sympathy before that assurance can have the least content either of enjoyment or of contemplation. For my part, I cannot see any sense in the word "enjoyment" which will not allow us to claim that the child 'enjoys' the love and understanding expressed in its mother's caresses; nor does there seem to me to be anything particularly mysterious or mystical about this very common experience. I am at this moment enjoying

a very intelligent and sympathetic attention on the part of my audience, and it does not seem to me that this is a mere equivocation in the use of the word. It seems to me that Prof. Alexander's denial of enjoyment in our relation to other minds needs to be challenged, just as I should wish to challenge his denial of either enjoyment or even of the experience of responsiveness in the case of our relation to God.

However, in Prof. Alexander's view of our assurance of the existence of other minds we are brought back to the point suggested by Ward, that to account for the facts of experience we must consider our cognitive state in its intimate relation to volitional and emotional responses. Here we are situated together in this hall, you, I fear, with a growing emotional response of boredom excited by this lengthy address, I with an awareness still of sufficient intelligent interest on your part to encourage me to continue for a few minutes longer. The whole situation requires for its interpretation on the level of intelligent consciousness a recognition of three factors at least: of myself as subject of my experience; of objects around experienced; and of other selves sharing more or less in the experience. We should not be able to account for the distinction of either pair of these without reference to the third; and we have no ground, it seems to me, for discriminating between the reality of either term in this complex situation. Still more, on the level of our appreciation of values, the intelligent recognition of truth, our conscientious approval of goodness, and the aesthetic appreciation of beauty alike imply the sharing in a community of mental life, a sharing which involves the volitional and emotional as well as the intellectual responsiveness of person to person.

No doubt with our modern outlook, influenced as it has been so greatly by the biological sciences, we should find here a certain continuity with sociality on its lower levels; and

our experience may be regarded as emerging into conscious recognition, from the forms in which we may trace it in all animal life. When we see two white butterflies chasing each other in the sunshine, we may reflect on the perfect responsiveness of action and reaction on the level of instinct, an intimate sociality which requires no learning by experience on the part of the individual. In the higher animals the emotional expression has developed along with this intimate coordination of act and response. We too, as Aristotle long ago remarked, are essentially social, and our sociality must find its own expression ; so that, for Aristotle, even the philosopher can hardly dispense with friendship even in his contemplative activity.

But it seems to me that we have to give more consideration, if we are to reach an adequate view of the question, to the undoubted fact and reality of our awareness of being known, of being approved, and of being appreciated and loved. We are apt in our exclusive attention to the problem of how we come to know another mind, to overlook this element in our experience. The realist's insistence that knowing does not affect or alter the object known does not seem to apply when we are considering this kind of situation. It was, I believe, the late Prof. Cook Wilson who once remarked that, "you can no more act upon the object in knowing than you can please the Dean and Chapter by stroking the dome of St. Paul's." That may be true enough of Alexander's object of 'contemplation'. But, as Prof. Webb puts it. "When we come on the one hand to spiritual being and specially to that grade of spiritual being which we designate as personality, and on the other to that sort of knowledge which we have in personal intercourse with our fellowmen, here it is no less evident that to be known makes a very great difference to the person known." And that difference is one of which he may be very acutely conscious. Which of us has not suffered from

being obviously misunderstood ? What artist does not crave for appreciation, and enjoy it beyond all other enjoyment when he finds the response of a kindred spirit ? As the ancient sage of the Upanishad declared of the original *Ātman* ; "Verily he had no delight. Therefore one alone has no delight. He desired a second."

These, it seems to me, are among the realities of the situation in which we find ourselves as metaphysicians in conference ; and, though I may not have succeeded in giving you anything particularly original, it may be suggestive and deserving of further thought. I have, of course, confined my attention here to the situation as it concerns the intercourse of *human* minds, and I have avoided the temptation to digress into the implications which my suggestions may have in the realm of theology and religion. That they have such implications will be obvious enough, and we are reminded of them whether we turn critically to Prof. Alexander or whether we reflect on the philosophic systems of this country. But it may be well to review once more the familiar ground of our ordinary life and experience, before we betake ourselves to more ambitious flights of metaphysical fancy ; and I shall be content if I have succeeded in persuading you that there is room here for further exploration, and that such exploration in these times has something more than a merely academic interest.

Presidential Address.

BY DR. K. A. HAKIM

(Osmania University, Hyderabad, Deccan.)

(ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY SECTION).

There is a general tendency among the specialists of Philosophy to avoid any direct dealings with positive religions as far as possible. This tendency has its justification because Philosophy, in order to be true to its nature and its vocation, has ever been and ought to be a perfectly free attempt to understand and evaluate life. But when one observes in the history of human thought and culture that it is not so much the systems of Philosophy as concrete positive religions that have affected the destinies of mankind and determined the course of history, it would be sheer specialistic snobbery and academic abstractness to avoid dealing securely and fairly with the outlook on life of a positive religion that dominates and regulates the life of a large portion of Humanity. It is needless to recount that the problems of religion and Philosophy coincide to a very large extent although they differ in their method of approach. The main purpose of religion is not theory but practice. It is not so much logic as life. For that very reason the Science of conduct or ethical theory has more in common with religion than some other parts or branches of philosophical inquiry. It is not so much the critical Philosophers as the teachings and lives of the great seers and prophets that have been a real dynamic force. One of these great forces that still continues to work is that system of life called Islam. It is a definite and definable ethical system which though unique at the time of its inception and original propagation has been rediscovered in other quarters

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as well. So it does not appear so unique to the modern thinker who has learnt to think of things independently as it did to humanity when it was originally preached.

Like all other systems, the ethical system of Islam too has a metaphysical background. Man is not a whole unto himself and the entire significance of his life and ideals cannot be satisfactorily understood or convincingly grasped without reference to the Spirit that governs the Whole. So in the interest of a real understanding of the ethics of Islam let us review briefly its metaphysical basis :

According to Islam life and the universe are ordered and rational manifestations of a Self-conscious unitary rational will. 'I created the universe in truth' and this world is as real as Reality can be. According to Islam God created the universe because he willed it and still creates it as he wills. He creates creatures with the sole purpose that they may share his Will. Man is the acme and paragon of creation. He has put his appearance last on the stage of life. The universe and all the other beings were already there before him. The Lord of All governed this creation and his creatures from worms to angels adored him and were singing a chorus of his praise before man arrived.

The arrival of man is described in the Koran in a symbolical legend. God expressed to his angels his intention of creating a being on this earth to whom he wanted to delegate his powers. So that working as a trustworthy plenipotentiary he may co-operate with God in the fulfilment of the purposes of creation. On hearing this the angels raised an objection. They said, "Oh Lord ! we adore thee and offer unqualified submission. We follow thy biddings unquestioningly. Why dost thou now propose to create a being who would be turbulent and shed blood" ? God answered that objection by establishing the superiority of man to the angels on account of superior knowledge vouchsafed to him. God instructed man about the

nature of things about which the angels were ignorant. Recognising the superiority of man all the angels of god prostrated themselves before man, the image of divinity. There was only one angel called Satan who refused to accept the superiority of man saying that he was made of mean clay and he was inferior to the stuff of which he, the Satan was constituted. God said, "I have breathed my own spirit into that clay," but as the spirit was not visible he denied its existence and refused to be convinced in the absence of a material evidence. The angels perhaps were not quite mistaken in their conjecture about Adam, because inspite of the great wealth of knowledge with which he was endowed, he did do something which caused his temporary fall. But finding himself fallen he suddenly realised his degradation and turned to god for forgiveness which was immediately granted. Not merely was he forgiven and all his sins washed away, but he was once for all made God's viceroy on earth, so that he may continue to understand the nature within and without him and ask for the co-operation of the universe which he shall surely secure. Because the universe is so constituted as to be understandable for him and pliable to his action.

According to Islam Adam, the symbol of humanity, emerges only with the advent of reason and a power of control over nature. The progeny of Adam ever since the beginning of history repeatedly forgets its mission and is to be reminded of its vocation by great men who are born from time to time to destroy falsehood and to establish, fulfil and advance the real purposes of life. Such is the picture of man and of his relation to God and to the universe. That is the foundation of the Islamic outlook on life. All that will follow will really be a corollary from these fundamentals, the meaning of which can be easily culled from the symbolism set forth in the legend of the creation of man.

The problem of free will, the problem of the individual's

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relation to society and all the complexity of life is derived by Islam as a necessary consequence from these basic principles :

The Problem of Free Will.

According to Islam the moral ought is a necessary and inalienable nature of the human self. God himself is a freely acting spirit in whom freedom and rational necessity are reconciled. Man in his divine aspect partakes of the nature of God and is therefore endowed with free will. God has granted him free will not to go his own way or be free as the wind to blow on whensoever he pleases ; but in order to freely identify his will with the will of god. In granting him freedom God takes the risk of man drifting into evil but the risk was necessary because there was no other way of making him rise to the full status of divine liberty. Man has free will but his life is determined by God at the same time. Logically the two concepts are contradictory but in reality they are not so because they deal with two different aspects of life. The boundaries between determinism and indeterminism are not determinable from the point of view of mechanical coinisation. He is determined because he is the part of a whole and because God having delegated him some authority has not ceased to function himself. From the point of view of ethical life freedom and necessity are co-equal realities and no attempt at logical consistency ought to sacrifice the one for the other. In progressive self-realisation of man the antithesis between freedom and necessity is transcended and they are synthesised into a higher reality. Freedom becomes his necessity and necessity becomes his freedom and the two are reconciled as they are originally one in the realm of the spirit.

Reason.

Islam's attitude towards reason and knowledge is also a corollary from its conception of god. God being rational will

the universe which is its manifestation is rational and ordered whole and its rationality is its truth. The truth about the life and the universe is discoverable within them. There is no reality which is either irrational or suprarational. Causation or the uniformity of nature denotes an ordered manifestation of God's habits which he does not change. There is no disparity between theoretical and practical truth. According to Islam revelation is nothing but direct intuition of reason, granted to certain individuals who are fit to receive it, in order that they may impart it to less gifted humanity, to be tested, verified and established by reason and experience. According to Islam empirical knowledge or science is the greatest ally of religion. The knowledge of God is the basis of all truth and the knowledge of God is derivable from the observation of nature inside and outside of man. Faith is nothing but a legitimate extension of reason. But with the rational insight, Reason leads to faith and time leads to eternity because the all is fundamentally one nature. The distinction between this world and the next, between the heaven and the earth, the flesh and the spirit is only the distinction of points of view.

Determination of the Good.

Now let us come to the fundamental ethical question as to what is the nature and content of the Good according to Islam. Man is endowed with a particular physical and mental constitution. No element in his life is created in order to be thoroughly suppressed or annihilated. All the desires of man, all his passions and emotions are there in order to find legitimate satisfaction. According to Islam sin is nothing but the exaggeration of a single desire which rushes to be satisfied at the cost of other desires and this disturbs the harmony of life. God being one, harmony is the fundamental note of the universe and harmony means associated diversity. Islam etymologically means peace and submission to the

will of god who is the spirit of the whole. Man is required to do justice to himself and to other beings, with which he comes into contact. If one part of his nature desires satisfaction at the cost of another part it tyrannises and violates inner justice. On this basis Islam disallows asceticism and repudiates complete suppression or renunciation of life. The harmonious development of all the instincts of man is the key-note of Islamic ethics. It neither advocates the pursuit of pleasure nor shuns it as an evil. Pleasure is only a natural concomitant of the satisfaction of wants which constitutes the nature of man. The pursuit of pleasure for its own sake would defeat its own purpose, disturb his internal and external harmony and make man unfit to fulfil the purposes for which he is created. Good and evil besides being their own reward extend their causation beyond themselves. A really good act is also a useful act for the individual as well as society. But there is no guarantee of material benefits or sensual pleasure accruing from it. And individual doing a good act should have the satisfaction that he is acting according to the will of god as expressing his own nature. As, according to Islam, man lives only a fragment of his life on this earth, therefore certain fruits of his action may be deferred which either the generations after him may reap or he himself may experience in the life beyond the grave. Man's life on this earth is not a self contained whole. Therefore all these problems cannot be solved herein now. Every action is weighed in the extremely scientific and accurate balance which weighs even the imponderables. In the life of man good or evil do not exist side by side but continuously act and react on another reinforce and cancel each other and the net personality of a man is the resultant of this continuously shifting debit and credit.

Social ethics.

According to Islam man is so constituted that he cannot

realise his self in isolation from society. The man who only cares for his own soul and wants to live in communion with God and spends his energies only in prayers and religious ceremonies, violates the purpose of his existence. In order to fulfil his real self all his actions ought to have a social reference besides being beneficial to his individual self. By the honest application of his energies he may enrich himself even materially if he is able to do it without the violation of the rights of others. According to Islam a rich man who has wealth and if he is healthy must marry and hand over the torch of life from generation to generation with added brightness and warmth. He who wants to renounce life in order to attend to god understands neither life nor god. The honest wage-earner is a friend of god, said the Prophet, and he who shuns the responsibilities of life in order to rise above life, does not rise above but sinks below it. Man is not born to kill nature but to regulate it. Regulated nature is truth and regulated life is reality. The apparent evil and resistance in the universe and in the life of man is an impetus to the development of character and evolution of latent potentialities.

It follows from this that Islam believes in culture and civilisation provided it is not based on tyranny and exploitation.

Equality of man.

According to Islam all men are not equal. They are born with differences of original equipment and status. Life and society cannot be based on colourless equality and forced levelling of status. But this does not imply that the better equipped has the right to exploit the less equipped solely for his own benefit. The difference between the employer and the employed, the rich and the poor, between man and woman does not signify an absolute difference. All men ought to have the same fundamental human rights.

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Every worker has the right to the fruits of his labour to the extent he has earned them. Islam does not recognise intellectual, spiritual or rational castes. According to the Koran it is possible that the son of a prophet may be a sinner or *vice versa* a son of a sinner may be a Prophet. No individual has any special merit in the sight of god merely by the accident of birth. A women has fundamentally the same civic rights as man subject to some modifications, necessitated by the disparity of function. Every Mussalman is to abolish slavery and the best way of atoning for a sin is to set free a slave.

If in a particular stage of culture or in certain compelling circumstances he does want to retain a human being as slave, he can do so on condition that all his criminal acts towards the slave will be punished by the state and also on condition that he feeds and clothes him as he feeds and clothes himself. Like all the other teachings of Islam this was no ideal utopia but was a thing actually practised by the Prophet and his companions. The Prophet never kept a slave except after freeing him and gave him the same food which he ate himself. There is an authentic story about the great Omar, second successor of the Prophet, that when he was riding to Palastine in the capacity of an administrator of all Islamic dominions he had only one camel between himself and his slave. Omar as true follower of the Prophet made an arrangement with the slave that each one of them will ride this camel alternately in alternato stages. Omar walked for miles along the camel when the slave was riding on the back of it and it so happened that in the last stage at the journey's end it was the turn of the slave to ride. The people who came to receive him were astonished to see the slave riding the camel and the master on foot. On enquiry they learnt from Omar that the last stage happened to be the slave's turn.

Now we turn to its treatment of women. In most countries and cultures women, before Islam, were treated like cattle and they had no independence or status. The Koran laid down this fundamental rule that although man is so constituted that he ought to be a supporter and protector of women, he has no right to deprive them of their fundamental civic rights. Marriage in Islam is simply a civic contract entered into with an intention of permanence and can be annulled if either party or the court held that the circumstances are such that the purpose of wedded life cannot be fulfilled. The woman has the independent right over all that she either earns herself or has legally inherited or received as a gift. It cannot be appropriated by anybody else without her consent, a privilege for which the women in the West are still struggling after thirteen centuries of Islam. For the purposes of fundamental rules and duties Islam does not make any distinction between sexes. Monogamy is enjoined by Islam as the ideal state of wedlock but it does not make fetish of monogamy under certain compelling circumstances. For instance, in the case of certain types of diseases or barrenness he may take unto himself another legally wedded wife provided he can maintain both of them in accordance with the principles of strict justice. If he is not able to fulfil these conditions, the Koranic Islam does not allow him this privilege.

Law and morality.

Before Islam certain cultural systems had laid an undue emphasis on laws, rules and regulations, ceremonials and rituals. Over against these systems there were certain other creeds that inculcated only broad principles of morality and laid an emphasis on love and good will. One of the characteristic features of the Islamic ethics is its attempt at synthesis of these two necessary and vital elements in human culture. After enunciating the broad principles of morality, love and

fraternity it enunciates certain laws for the regulation and discipline of life at the same time providing for their liberal modification and variation according to varying circumstances. Koranic system of laws is an open system and there are certain exceptions attached to every rule. The Prophet discouraged people to fix the details of life for themselves for all time and consistent with the spirit of his teaching he gave them as few laws as possible. The law of crime and punishment in the Koran has so few items that one can count them on the fingers of one hand. The Prophet said, "The greatest enemy of mankind is the man whose action fixes a detail of law for the people in a matter in which God had left them free to judge for themselves. Islam enunciates the principle that the basis of all law and ceremonial must be utilitarian not in the narrow hedonistic sense in which Bentham and Mill expounded it but covering by utility man's physical, mental and moral existence, immediate as well as remote. Koran definitely laid down the principle that the purpose of religion is to lighten the burden of man and not to add to it. Prophet said, "If two methods are open to you in any matter—choose one which produces the greatest result with the least expenditure of energy provided it is not a sin. Law is made for man. Man is not made for law."

Economic structure.

The economic structure of Islam is predominantly socialistic. It recognises neither monarchy nor hereditary nor official priesthood and tolerates capital only under certain conditions. The kings, according to Islam, are a menace to society. They appropriate all powers to themselves and use them very often on destructive purposes. In a society or state the best man ought to be elected by a consensus of opinion and entrusted with administration. He can hold this position as long as he acts according to a constitution embodying the fundamentals of Islam. If he acts otherwise he must be set aside. He

can draw his wages from the revenue of the state only as much as he is allowed by a consensus of opinion which should by no means be disproportionately higher than is paid to the other servants of the state. His post cannot be made hereditary.

Priesthood.

The word "priesthood" has no equivalent in the language of Islam ; because really there is no difference in this system between the secular and the religious duties. When men gather together for prayers, the wisest or the best among them leads the prayers. All the rest—rich and poor, master and servant—stand in a line behind him with no rights of precedence or preference. As Islam has the minimum amount of ritual and ceremonial no specialists in the arts of religiosity are required by it. The marriage contract can be performed by any lay man for a couple intending to enter it. Mutual contract witnessed by a third party suffices to complete it. A man who possesses more religious knowledge is respected and followed without consideration of his race, nationality, status etc.

Capital.

According to Islam every individual has a right to earn as much as he can by honest labour. The fruits of his labour belong exclusively to him as long as he lives. But if he has capital which he has saved and left over and which is not a part of his current expenses, it is taxed by the state to the extent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum. After his death, everything that he leaves, is to be distributed among his male and female heirs. The law of primogeniture in which the eldest heir inherits leaving nothing or a negligible amount for the others is condemned by Islam as the unjust means of the perpetuation of capitalism. Usury or exorbitant interest is similarly condemned because it is a form of exploitation and tyranny and ultimately demoralises him who takes and ruins him

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who gives. Each capitalistic concern must according to Islam be on a basis of co-operation in which the shareholders are responsible to the extent of their capital for profit as well as for loss. The economic solution offered is an attempt to synthesise the rights of property with the claims of society and the general wellbeing of humanity, leaving to each individual the free play of his initiative.

The above is a brief sketch of the ethico-sociological structure of Islam. You will see it is an attempt at synthesis all round. In its fundamentals it is a synthesis of reason and faith, of stability and progress, of the immutable laws of life with its changing aspects. It is a message of all round freedom of development in the interest of individual and social development and the realisation of the larger self which is held to be the self expression of the whole man and a harmony that may embrace infinite diversity. It is an attempt to say "yes" to life to transmute and not to kill the low and the mean and in this way to achieve the identity of will with the Spirit that creates and sustains the whole. No man can become God but he can ally himself with Him by the identification of wills.

Presidential Address.

(Section of Indian Philosophy).

BY MAHENDRA NATH SIRCAR, M.A. Ph.D.

BROTHER DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I must express my sincere thanks to the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for inviting me to this place of honour and responsibility. I accept it in all humility. I am conscious of my limitations, but I count upon your ready and generous co-operation to fulfil the task imposed upon me and to bring the session to a successful close.

The Indian philosophy section may be said to be the most important section of the Congress. It covers within its deliberation a wide range of subjects. Every system of Indian philosophy is a complete system of logic, psychology, physics, ethics and metaphysics. But in these days the student of Indian philosophy can hardly neglect the light that reaches him from the West, and sometimes the acquaintance with the Western system of thought enables him to follow and appreciate better the trend of Indian philosophy. This comparative study cannot be expected to be useful unless we are quite acquainted with the concepts and imageries of Indian thought in their true meaning and significance.

The word 'philosophy' has a unique significance in India, it means not only a reasoned-out system, but it implies a more profound sense of the intuition of Truth. Philosophy cannot neglect the higher experiences and mystical intuition if it is to fulfil its vocation and claim as the final arbiter of Truth. If the senses reveal to us the surface existence, intui-

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tion reveals to us an order not accessible to the senses. Philosophy must be defective if it ignores the vistas of supra-mental perception and merely confines itself to the task of systematisation of experience. The rational understanding of life will be defective if philosophy neglects the deeper currents of the soul which do not meet the 'sensa.' This noble office which philosophy used to fulfil in the hands of the ancients has been neglected in the claims of intellectual analysis and rational understanding. The effect has been that philosophy has now the restricted connotation of systematic thinking and has the task of rearing up a conceptual construction. The modern tendency has been to dislodge philosophy even from the task of constructing conceptual systems and to engage itself to the analysis of perceptual facts and building up systems upon the facts of analysis. The conceptual logic has been displaced by the logic of use, by pragmatic and realistic logic. The effect has been that the scope of philosophy has been more and more limited. But the Indian teachers in their wider and deeper visions have extended the connotation of the term to cover apprehension. Except the Lokayata school no form of serious philosophy has denied the possibility of higher intuition and supra-logical revelation but in this anxiety for intuition of truth, the claims of reason and experience have not been neglected. Only they have been restricted to their proper sphere. And so long as reason is masterful, philosophy cannot rise above experiences and conceptual construction and welcome truth in the wise passivity of the soul. Reason, therefore, suffers limitation in its task of positive understanding and the truth it worships cannot exceed the phenomenology of experience or at best the schemata of pure reason. The seers of Upanishads felt this and they condemned the doctrinaire spirit of reason regarding the final truth. Buddha has the right vision when he observes silence regarding the ultimate truth. The consciousness of

the limitation of reason is the end of logical pursuit ; this consciousness inspires new preparations and novel adjustment to welcome and receive truth and the history of Indian philosophy despite searching analysis of the teachers has been the history of types of thought generated by kinds of intuitions. Dr. Otto in his recent publication *The Indian Doctrine of Grace* has pointed out this speciality of Indian thinking especially, of the Vedanta. And if the approach to the study of Indian philosophy is made with sympathetic insight into life and inspiration the key to its right appraisal and proper valuation will be immediately found. The thought construction follows the deeper appreciation of reality through intuition and if differences of constructions are prominent they are only because the inspiration is not always drawn from the same plane of experience and the logical mind becomes anxious to build up a construction upon the phases of immediate experiences that may reveal themselves to the seekers. This truth is pressed home to us if we follow the conception of reality as set out in Indian philosophy.

REALITY AND APPEARANCE

The problem that interests the student of philosophy is the question of reality and appearance, for on the decision of this problem, depends the final outlook of life and its adjustment. The Hindu philosophers think that the knowledge of reality gives us the final release.

There are many view-points from which the problem can be studied.

In a short paper a detailed discussion may not be possible, we shall confine our remark to salient points.

I

The Nyaya and the Vaisesika form the Realism in Hindu metaphysics, for they view ultimate realities as independent of our minds. They are *realitas objectivas*.

The Nyaya accepts some supra-sensible realities. The

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appearances are realities which originate and vanish in time. And that which vanishes in time cannot be called reality. The order of appearance changes and may totally come to nothing in cosmic involution, but it is not totally illusory. It is non-eternal. The order of appearance which affects us in our knowledge is, therefore, an order which is really built up by the conjunction of ultimate realities, but which has no permanent reality in itself. The appearance is, therefore, a temporary effect of the underlying causes and cannot be placed in the same category of reality with the causes. The realism of Nyaya, cannot accept the reality of effect and appearance in an identical sense with the cause. The permanent causes cannot make the effects permanent, though the effects cannot vanish unless the causes be separate and cease to produce them. The Mimamsakas think in this strain. The division of the realities as eternal and non-eternal is a distinction that may not be inconsistent with realism, but it introduces an idealistic element in realism, in this that the data of experience are not what the ultimate realities are. The knowledge of appearance may not be false, but still it does not report the ultimate existences. Is there really a correspondence between Sense-data and ultimate Realities? Experience cannot give us knowledge of metaphysical entities. But the non-eternal things can be called Pseudo-objects, their existence Pseudo-existence. They are strictly the 'sensibles' of experience, but behind them lies the realm of *realitas objectivas* which is not the direct object of knowledge. These *objectivas* are the supra-sensible.

Though the Nyaya draws a distinction between the sensible and the super-sensible existences still it has not denied the objectivity of the sensible. But this objectivity does not make them real in the sense of the super-sensibles. Our perception has a reference to things; it is not a causal inference, it is direct. Hence it has been possible for the

Naiyayikas to draw a distinction between correct and illusory perception. The illusory perceptions are subjective, the correct perceptions are objective. They are real. In perception not only things but also their qualities and relations are revealed. If the existences of things are given in perception, their nature, properties and relations are given. The Nyaya, therefore, accepts Realism in its full sense and does not allow subjective construction either of the objects or their properties. Even in false perception, the percept is not false, but the localisation and the reference. Unlike the Vedanta the Nyaya retains its realistic bent even in illusory perception.

The Naiyayikas do not accept any form of distinction between 'sensa' and their corresponding objects as held by Meinong. 'Things are directly perceived and not through the 'sensa.' No doubt, contact of the sensibles with the senses and the mind is a necessary requisite, but that does not make the perception of the objects indirect through the 'sensa.' The sensibles are not in the least transcendent. 'Sensa' are the effects of things. The Nyaya maintains that knowledge is objective and thus avoids the confusion introduced in Realism by the distinction between the *sensa* and the 'objects.' The Naiyayikas conceive a 'contact' but the *sense* of contact does not produce anything intervening between the percipient and the perceived. Hence the difficulty of explaining error does not arise, for it is the exact *contact* that gives the true perception, and where the exact contact is not possible through the distance of the thing or the defective senses, then alone false perception arises.

Perception gives the knowledge of the objects, not of the 'reals' or the super sensibles. The realm of the super-sensible is to be inferred. But the ultimate realities including atoms have been regarded as amenable to the supra-normal perception of Yogins and Yogic

perception is a legitimate category of perception. This distinction between the sensible and the super-sensible is really worthy of note from the metaphysical standpoint, for it makes clear the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and the Nyaya explicitly states that the order of things in themselves are the ultimate causes of the phenomenal order. The realities, therefore, remain as matters of inference different from the objective data of knowledge. These realities are many, and not one. These categories of realities are either categories of relation, categories of existence or categories of attributes. But these are separate and ultimate existences. The Nyaya does not obliterate the distinction between the nine super-sensibles. These super-sensibles have the capacity of being in actual touch with the sensibles and in this lies their infinite magnitude. *Paramanus* are without any magnitude whatsoever. The infinite magnitude, therefore, does not convey the ordinary sense of all-inclusiveness. Since there are more than one ultimate existence, they cannot possess the infinite magnitude in its usual connotation. And the tendency of defining magnitude in its usual sense is stigmatised as the conceptual bent of thinking. Kala, Atman, Direction, Manas and the five elements are the necessary implications of existence, and we cannot think any one of them illusory.

It should be noted here that the Nyaya has not attempted the impossible task of creating the sensible world out of space and time and has not accepted the possibility of an emergent evolution of the complex out of the simple. The Nyaya accepts the creationist theory; and the creationist theory teaches that the world order has a fresh beginning out of the permanent causes. The creationist theory does not put into the effect the reality of the cause. And, therefore, when the world order dissolves, the causes remain fixed.

The Indian realism does not commit itself to the reality

or the super-reality of the appearance. Nor does it maintain the ultimate reality as one. They accept a plurality of substances as equally real without the least conflict between them.

This distinction between the non-eternal and eternal existences, between appearance and reality, has enabled the realists to retain the transcendental bent of Indian philosophy, in the conception of liberation or emancipation. The extreme realism would have made this impossible. Whatever hold the order of appearance may have upon us, the Naiyayikas along with the Mimamsakas cannot accept them as the finality of experience, they are anxious to transcend them, allowing them phenomenality and not reality. The scientific perception of reality is to be displaced by the metaphysical reflection, if freedom from the contraries of the empirical life is to be attained.

The Mimamsakas have not gone to the extreme of declaring the appearance as illusory, still they do maintain that Reality lies behind appearance, and the knowledge of the ultimate categories of existence enables us to transcend the appearances. The difficulty of the realism in the Nyaya and the Mimansa arises from the co existence of the reals without delimiting one another. This is an apparent contradiction. The definition of infinite magnitude as the capacity of being related to every form of finite existence takes away from it the real sense of infinitude. The reals or the super-sensibles of the Nyaya may be the 'reals' of science, but not of metaphysics. Supposing for the moment that these reals are quite independent of one another, still their equal and simultaneous contribution to the world-formation would require a pre-established harmony. And this harmony cannot be explained save and except by a deeper unity.

II

The Samkhya and the Patanjala system accept a duality

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of substances, but the order of appearance has been referred to the creative principle of Prakriti different from the transcendent reality of Purusha. The creative dynamism and the transcendent reality are two different substances and the order of appearance has, therefore, no relation to the transcendent order. It is not possible for the Samkhya to go beyond this or to make a happy combination of the both. The Samkhya recognises two principles in nature and character different, the static and the dynamic but it does not take upon itself the task of philosophically establishing any relation between them. Since the transcendent reality has no touch or relation with the creative reality, it cannot be traced in the order of appearance. There is a great difference between the creative principle and the transcendent reality. The one changes and transforms, the other does not. And, therefore, the changing appearance can have no bearing upon Reality. The changes may be real in the creative order, They may have a meaning there, but they have no transcendent meaning or significance, since they do not obtain there. They have an apparent meaning to the empiric or logical self. The changes in the Prakriti can have no meaning by themselves, their meaning arises by a reference to self. In other words its changes in the creative order have a scientific value and meaning but have no metaphysical value, since such values must be relative to the transcendent self. But such a self is non-relational. Strictly speaking in the Samkhya the creative order has no metaphysical value or meaning, it has an existence in scientific sense. No doubt, Vacaspati Misra conceives that Prakriti itself is as autonomous as Purusha, though in its creative activity it plays the second fiddle to Purusha. But Prakriti has got a transcendental activity without any reference to Purusha in Pralaya and has noumenally enjoyed a co-ordinate rank with the Purushas. Vijnanabhiksu suffers from a theistic bias and has made Prakriti an adjunct to Iswara.

It is indeed possible to conceive a transcendent formative principle, spontaneously creative, but to accept two substances creative and static side by side without any relation, can give the former a scientific value and existence. Strictly no metaphysical reality can be ascribed to it, for its very existence is ignored in transcendent Reality. The creative order has no meaning to this reality and as such its creations are not entities in the metaphysical sense. Moreover the creative principle has not the same reality with the transcendent; had it been so, they could not have been different. Both of them may be timeless existences, but not in the same sense. The one is eternally moulding in time, the other has no relation to time. The eternal duration is not even theoretically separable from Prakriti in a state of creative functioning. (*Vide Vijnanabhiksu*).

Patanjali does not much improve upon the Sankhya, save and except that he introduces an additional element, *Iswara* into his system. But the conception of God has in it more a pragmatic than philosophical value. Philosophically *Iswara* is a detached existence like the *Purusha* and out of all touch and relation with *Prakriti*. It may generate spiritual insight in us and may make way for the final release, but in the philosophical scheme it has not a position different from the *Purushas*. According to Bhoja, *Iswara* can influence this union and disunion of *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. *Vijnanabhiksu* too accords this activity to God. The first momentum of creation by establishing the primary conjunction between the *Purushas* and the *Prakriti* is given by the divine will of God. But *Vacaspati Misra* does not countenance such interpretation and in this he seems to be loyal to Patanjali and his scholiast, *Vyasa*. (*Vide Yoga Vartika and Tattva Vaisaradi, under Iswara*). This influence of *Iswara* indeed establishes the control of *Iswara* over *Prakriti*, but it cannot dispense with the distinction. Naturally the gulf of dualism remains.

These systems have their value as practical disciplines no doubt but the philosophical instinct cannot conform to the dualism of Samkhya and seeks the synthesis in the Vedanta. The gap between the creative dynamism and the static being is sought to be filled up by the conception of a unity of Being. The order of appearance has been relegated to the creative principle, and is true in the relativistic sense. But this order, however much real, cannot strictly cast any influence upon the transcendent order of Purusha.

Though the Samkhya seems to be anxious to keep the two orders separate, yet by recognising the ends or values in an avowedly non-teleological system, ends and values which can have a meaning for the Purusha—the Samkhya recognises an intuitional relation between Purusha and Prakriti. Prakriti energises spontaneously, but this spontaneous energising allows either gratification or redemption of Souls. Such an influence of Prakriti upon Purusha is not explicable without a deeper connection between the two than what is generally recognised. The Samkhya in recognising the mutual influence of the two principles upon each other really establishes the ground of the unitary principle of the Vedanta and this mutuality cannot be explained without the hypothesis of a common principle. The metaphysics of the Samkhya is fulfilled in the Vedanta.

Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Vijñānamṛta Bhasya* has sounded the theistic note completely. He is anxious to reconcile the truths of the Samkhya and the Patanjali with the recognition of the Vedanta. He accepts the reality of the creative dynamism, the reality of Purushas and their mutual influence upon each other. Iswara is the transcendent existence. Maya is its *Śakti*. Iswara energises Maya in the beginning of a cosmic cycle, he withdraws it again at the end of the cycle. Bhikṣu by conceiving Maya to be the material-efficient cause and Iswara to be the locus (*Adhithana*) has not been able to

get over satisfactorily the difficulties of the dualistic position of the Samkhya. Since Maya is the Sakti of Brahman, it is not clear how by this transformation, Isvara is not effected. Bhiksu borrows from the Samkarites the conception of Brahman as the locus and ends in a confusion by conceiving the reality of Maya and the actuality of its relation to Brahman. The assertion of non-difference (*Abibhaga*) in place of identity (*Aveda*) is not much helpful, for the non-difference does not bear Isvara in complete detachment from the changes and mutations of the creative dynamism. This difficulty does not arise in Samkara Vedanta, for Maya is regarded as Upadhi of Brahman or Isvara and not in any way related to it.

III

The divergence of the order of appearance and the realm of reality has been dispersed from all the phases of Vedantic thought, for Vedanta is avowedly monistic. Its monism has different phases admitting of the different stages of integration in the ultimate reality, but the ultimate reality has been recognised as one.

The Vedanta incorporates the creative dynamism with ultimate Reality. Though the nature of assimilation has not been always the same, still the fundamental concept of Reality can be said to be statico-dynamic. It may be that the creative dynamism has not the same reality with Being, still, metaphysically considered dynamism is associated with Being.

Save and except Samkara the Vedantic teachers have accepted the reality of dynamism with the reality of Brahman ; and the realm of appearance has, therefore, a value and an existence co-eternal with Brahman. The world of appearance is the order of expression in space and time and represents the ultimate reality as appearing through its manifestation through a creative dynamism. Expression is the law of spiritual reality, the spiritual expression can be an expression to itself, or it can be an expression to others. The former

is the transcendent expression, the latter, the immanent. Both proceed from the same law, the law of self-alienation. But this law is not the final law. We have the contrary law of self-integration also. The former establishes the reality of appearance, the latter makes it an integral element of reality.

The laws of contrariety and synthesis, therefore, present the reality in its concreteness. This has been mainly the position of Vaishnavas and the Shaivas of the school of Srikantha. The Vaishnava philosophy puts the world of nature, the world of finite souls and God in integration to one another to form the Absolute Reality. The distinction exists between them as the different phases of the same unity.

Though the Vaishnavas perceive the truth of contrariety and distinction in Reality, no less do they perceive the truth of Identity ; the distinctions are assimilated in it. The law of contrariety is not the final law of thought, contrariety gives way to unity or Identity. The Identity is not the abstract identity. It is the identity which realises itself through contrarities. The logic of contrarities in dynamism is not the final word. The Vaishnavas emphasise the unity of Being. Identity is the law of the Absolute Being, the contrariety is the law of appearance. The world of nature is ceaselessly changing and evolving, the world of spirit has transcendent or empiric experience but the two orders are encompassed in Brahman, the ultimate reality, which is fixed, unchangeable and integral. The order of appearance is, therefore, the sectional presentation of the reality as manifested through nature or spirit, but the realm of reality is the fuller presentation of the whole in relation to the orders of appearance.

The Vaishnava philosophers—all emphasise the truth of appearance and integrate it in the Absolute, though in the method of integration they have their differences. The finite experience has a history and growth but the Absolute experi-

ence is integral and eternally complete.

Philosophy develops in us the sense of the whole and inspires our adjustment that way. This sense of the whole displaces false individualities, and inspires the transcendent sense and supra-mundane values in life. In whatever way the relation of the finite Being and nature to God be conceived, no teacher denies the possibility of a higher intuition of the transcendent and the cosmic. In fact, the Vaishnava's appeal to faith is the appeal to the finer psychism which can make us the recipient of the radiant spirituality.

Whatever may be the form of connection between the finite and the infinite distinction, or difference—none of the teachers have denied to the aspirant this association with and the enjoyment of cosmic life, for the Vaishnavas have equally emphasised the Unity of life amidst the differences. Madhwa accounts for the differences by a specialising or particularising power of God, but this specialisation cannot displace the fundamental Unity. Visesa holds distinctions and differences in the Absolute totality. Ramanuja integrates the differences by the predicative theory. Nimbarka accepts difference in Unity.

IV.

SAMKARA VEDANTA

Samkara recognises the static Being and the creative Becoming and instead of reconciling them he divorces the one from the other and at the same time saves his system from the commitment of dualism, by introducing the conception of degrees of reality and the illusoriness of appearance. So long as the metaphysical vision is not in sight, Reality and appearance appear as fundamentally the same, and in scientific sense the world of appearance is causally attributed to Brahman, the cause of all causes. But Samkara soon recognises the distinction between the scientific and the metaphysical view-points. Scientific accuracy recognises the

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law of efficient and material causation and attributes it to Brahman. And so long as the philosophic vision does not dawn upon us, the intellect becomes satisfied with the attribution of appearance to Reality.

The ordinary logic cannot think it otherwise, and therefore the dynamic Maya had been conceived of as centred in Being. Samkara recognises, therefore, the value of the law of contrariety and self-alienation from the standpoint of idealistic logic ; and it has been, therefore, possible for him to integrate appearance with Reality. Had there been no other method of appreciating reality, the order of appearance would share the same existence and value with Reality. Happily for Samkara there is the transcendental sense for apprehending Truth and the transcendent intuition steers itself clear of the intellectual categories in the understanding of Truth. Samkara, like Kant, feels that the categories of the understanding can have no transcendent use. So far as the understanding works under the pressure of the ordinary logic, it interprets Reality and appearance in the terms of cause and effect, but the supra-logical sense dispenses with this relation and conceives Reality as transcending and denying completely the world of appearance and attributes.

Samkara conceives a supra-logical and a logical appreciation of Reality. The supra-logical is the right method, for the ordinary logic of relation cannot apprehend the transcendent reality. Reality is non-relational, because it is absolute. To this the other absolutists may agree. But Samkara goes further, he does not allow the least internal distinction in the Absolute. The identity of appearance and Reality does not commit his system to naturalistic Pantheism, or even to Agonistic Pantheism, for Samkara is decisive about the ultimate nature of Reality. It is transcendent intuition. Strictly speaking intuition is the ultimate being, this intuition does not intuit itself.

Samkara does not admit contrariety in the Absolute Being, and, therefore, there seems to be an apparent contradiction in his system when he recognises the becoming of Maya and links it to Brahman. Samkara by recognising the creative principle of Maya saves his system from the pitfall of the Samkhya system. He gives satisfaction to the metaphysical demand of the Unity of Being. And, therefore, theoretical reason conceives the eternal becoming in the background of the timeless Being.

This attribution of becoming to Being also distinguishes his system from the trend of Buddhistic philosophy, for the order of appearance is not reduced to nothing or to a subjective creation. And this provides for the pragmatic satisfaction in religious and moral values. The creative tendencies of the soul can find its proper display, for Samkara does not deny the Archetypal values deep in the soul.

V

SAMKARISM AND SAIVAISM

This point will be made clear by a comparison between Saivism and Samkarism. Saivism like Sankarism accepts the static-dynamic character of the ultimate reality, which is allogical. While Samkarism does not accept the dynamism to be inherent in Being, Saivism accepts it. The law of continuity works out through the creative becoming, but the law of continuity is not in Saivism different from the law of identity. Continuity is an aspect of it. Samkarism does not assimilate identity with continuity, Saivism does. Continuity implies expression and change, hence Samkara attributes it to the dynamism, but he cannot accept it of Being. Continuity consequent on contrariety is a dynamic category and so far as the dynamic aspect of life is considered it fits in with it quite well. But Samkara cannot extend it to the static reality. The Absolute is static being and is identical being, it transcends the continuity in changes and develop-

ment. Continuity suits the idea of evolution and progress and even expression, but none of them suit the conception of the Absolute, for change is implied in every one of them and change implies contradiction. Samkara cannot bear up with the primordial and the bare Absolute and the fuller and the complete Absolute. The bare Absolute is full of potentialities, which later on become actual. The actualised Absolute is more real than the primordial one. Professor Whitehead thinks in this strain but Samkara would think it otherwise, to him qualification is negation.

Saivism accepts the reality of expression and change. The law of continuity has been integrated with the law of identity. In fact the continuity is an expression of identity. Appearance is, therefore, more real in Saivism than in Samkarism. It may run in quick succession, but it is not quite false. It might not have the enduringness through time, but the moments of appearance are expressions of the underlying dynamism. These appearances are not quite illusory, they originate, they have growth and development, as they form the link in the chain. The creative dynamism may have a polarisation or a depolarisation. Sakti projects itself out of Siva and again seeks union with it. The process goes on eternally. The cosmic history is repeated eternally in cycles. From the silence of Death shoots the spark of life and to silence again it returns. Siva smiles, the cosmic stirring begins; Siva sleeps, the cosmic stirring is hushed into silence.

VI

In Vaisnavism the appearances are co-real with the Absolute, in Saivism they are not co-real with the Absolute, though they are not quite ideal or illusory as Samkarism supposes. Saivism strikes the middle path; but in recognising the ultimate dissolution of the appearance into the reality, Saivism recognises two kinds of experiences of

knowledge—knowledge immanent and knowledge transcendent. And the logic of them differs.

Saivism naturally recognises the logic of realism, the logic of idealism and the logic of transcendence. In the crude perception, 'the given' is presented and received as the data of our knowledge, but this presentation is a sectional presentation of Reality.

Maya is the limiting principle which creates the world of relativities, the world of space, time and causality, the world of subject and object. It is impossible to get beyond the logic of the relative, so long as the realistic sense dominates. And the realistic sense has always identified this 'given' with the presentational continuum through the senses, and the pragmatic instinct has always confined us to this 'continuum' as the truly real. This limitation of the perception to the 'given' of the senses has the baneful effect of denying the wider presentation of supra-sensuous intuition and has made us ignorant of the great and the absolute fact, of which the sense perception presents a section.

The logic of realism is confined to the world of effects into which the ultimate reality by its own dynamism disintegrates itself; the world of the temporary modifications and their relations, internal or external.

Saivism transcends the realistic logic of the Naiyaikas by the recognition of the principle of continuity working through the changes. The principle of continuity is consistent with the dynamic conception of reality, for the dynamic conception presents something more than 'the given' of the immediate perception, and explains it. And here the sectional presentations are assimilated in the totality of the background; and the moment the causal background of the sectional presentations is apprehended, the world of perception transcends from the given of the senses to the 'given of the fact' in its unbroken

continuity. The fact is perceived as being becoming, and the spiral ring of becoming has infinite modifications and gradations of being ; but even through them the law of continuity works, the continuity displaces the relativistic and pragmatic knowledge and presents us with the integrity of becoming. However vast the presentational continuum may be, it is formed out of Reality, if there is the concentration of it to a particular point. The focussing of the otherwise indeterminate being-becoming is concentration. Concentration creates the false sense of subject-object, of matter and mind, of limitation and diffusion and a thousand other concepts of the logic of relatives, which lead to a false supposition that they are real.

The grafting of reality upon the limiting centres of experience is the creation of Maya. The logic of relativity and the contraries are to be transcended to get to ultimate reality. Hence Saivism recognises the value of the logic of idealism which is to get over the sectional experience and view the reality as a whole. The logic of idealism, therefore, demolishes the Naiyaika conception of eternal relations, for these relations really make the concentration real and relations external.

The idealistic logic, therefore, brings forth the non-reality, though not the complete ideality, of all the centres of experience and their presentated datum. The non-reality is due to the sense of limitation, not to the sense of complete illusoriness. They are real, but not completely real, for they are lost in the causes ; but they are not baseless illusion.

Though the effectual order has this much of truth yet practically it comes to nothing since the effect vanishes in the indeterminate cause. This effectual order is not permanent, the causal order is, but strictly speaking the effect is the determinate formation of the indeterminate becoming, and in this formation the determinateness of the appearance

cannot have the same reality with the cause. Hence the world of relativity has a periodical rise and fall in the real. The fact, therefore, transcends categorical understanding.

Saivas recognise as Schopenhauer recognises the transcendence of the dynamic principle, and the ultimate fact as alogical. Since the fact is alogical, it can be neither substance nor attribute, neither one nor many. These categories apply to the sectional presentation of the whole, but not to itself. It is undivided and undetermined being.

Though the fact is then beyond all logical understanding and empiric perception still it is the fullest existence for the sectional appearances in their totality rise out of it. The sectional presentations presuppose it, for the presentations are the fact recorded through the limitation of our logical mind. We require to rise above the realistic logic to fathom the fact in its integrity. And this is possible only in the supra-mental intuition which can present the total fact which may not deny but does transcend the space-time world.

This intuition can present the fact in its immediacy and this immediacy is different from the supra-sensuous immediacy in this that it presents the alogical character of the fact. Vaisnavism accepts a form of immediate intuition, knowledge beyond the sensuous preception but this form of intellectual intuition is not free from notional immediacy. The subject-object relation is there. Spiritual perception is transcendent, but even in this transcendence the intuition is not free from inherent logical limitation. The transcendent in Vaishnavism is the concrete notion or idea and, therefore, it is the all-inclusive totality in which the particulars function as its parts. But in Saivism the world is the particularisation of the alogical dynamic reality, the polarisation of the ultimate reality. This polarisation is natural with the ultimate reality. It possesses the contrary tendency of a depolarisation. The centrifugal and centripetal are the two tendencies,

the one is the tendency of creating bipolar forces and inter-actions, and the other is the tendency of breaking these limitations and to enjoy the lost equilibrium. There is such a thing as the actualisation of potential fact, or the primordial absolute, and there is the contrary tendency of the creative dynamism to pass into the centre by transcending the world of forms and experiences. When this tendency becomes apparent, the realm of alogical reality comes in sight, in the transcendent sense which it develops.

In the dynamic logic though the ultimate reality is statico-dynamic, still the laws of identity and difference (separation) are active ; when the difference becomes inappreciable, we have identity, and when in polarisation the difference becomes appreciable, we have separation. The diversity seems to be permanent only because we try to understand it by our logical understanding. Dynamic logic, therefore, emphasises the law of continuity and when the least difference implied in continuity is set aside, the identity of being is appreciated.

And this identity is the Siva-Sakti. The dynamic continuity can be traced through changes, but the ultimate reality is *identity* in which the least difference between the static reality and dynamic efficiency is denied, for in this state the efficiency remains a form of the initial potency. And the principle appears as static.

Saivism combines the two extremes of static being and external becoming, the one is empty, the other is dependent, because it is variable, and combines the two as the invariable and variable reality. Its dynamism, therefore, cannot make itself independent of the constant reference to the centre, and, therefore, it provides us with the principle of equilibrium in identity. The dynamism works both the ways, and, therefore, separation and identity harmoniously adjust themselves.

The ultimate reality is the indeterminate being, the being without any determinate formation. Though Saivism has, in common with Vedanta, Samkhya and Buddhism, characterised the reality as beyond all logical concepts and ultimately to be known through a form of immediate realisation in intuition, still the characterisation of the ultimate reality as Being-becoming cannot really make it indeterminate. The indeterminateness may be the indeterminateness of a neutral equilibrium ; this equilibrium contains in potentiality all the logical differentiation. These differentiations are not imposed from without. They are issued from within. And, therefore, it cannot claim to be strictly *alogical*. And being and becoming are not fundamentally the same thing, for they are different concepts, the one is static, the other dynamic. Thought demands a relation between them. And the relation is of identity. It will be better to speak of it as non-difference. But what does this non-difference imply ? Either the dynamic is to be lost in the static or the static in the dynamic. But we cannot accept both. Saivism differs from Heraclitus and Bergson in accepting a static character of Being, and from the Eleatics and Vedanta etc., in welcoming the dynamic character of becoming. The *alogical* cannot be the both.

Samkara Vedanta sees the difficulty of conceiving a relation to the final *alogical* principle. It has, therefore, to conceive the Absolute as completely *alogical* and Isvara as the final logical unity. The dynamic principle is related to Isvara but not to the Absolute. The principle of dynamism may be indefinite, but this indefiniteness does not prevent it from being related to Isvara. Its indefiniteness is felt when we fail to describe it either in terms of reality or in terms of non-reality. But its eternity has never been denied. The principle of change must be true to a percipient which is conscious of a meaning. Change is, therefore, a mode of self-expression and when the self-expression is unlimited and

unrestricted it can have reference to the highest unity of the cosmic subject. Samkara is careful enough to ascribe the principle of dynamism to a subject, the dynamic logic may trace identity between the highest subject and the principle of change but it cannot conceive dynamism without locus.

VII

The truly alogical reality according to Samkara is the Absolute. It transcends all difference ; it denies all relation ; it denies all concentration ; it is ever immediate. Samkara does not attempt any synthesis between this alogical principle and the logical unity of Iswara. They cannot be synthesised for they are strictly speaking two orders of reality ; the one alogical, the other logical ; and they are eternal in two different senses, the one is eternal in the sense of timelessness, the other is eternal in the sense of enduring through time. Time cannot touch the one. It resides in the other. Samkara accepts two poles of our experience, absolute and relative ; and the two can never meet.

There is a dialectic process of self-expression in Iswara. The empirical order has therefore an objective existence but its objectivity does not make it truth. Subjectivity and objectivity are the two poles of relative knowledge. The one cannot stand without the other, the reality of the object is relative to the knowledge of the subject. Apart from the reference to the subject the object can have no independent existence. This mutuality does not reduce the object to an idea. The object is real to us. But its extra-subjective reality does not make it transcendently real. The reality of the given is accepted by Samkara, and the barring the few extreme Samkarites, none have denied the objectivity of the given. To this extent he is a realist.

The subject-object reference of knowledge continues up to Iswara, and in his case the actual given is assimilated in the subject and is understood to be ideal. It is then found

to possess no independent reality of its own. The given is assimilated in Iswara.

A distinction can be drawn between the super-subject and the Absolute. Iswara is the super-subject. The super-subject has no essential differences from the subject except that it focuses the totality of experience. Its experience is more unified than can it be in the subjects. But that does not make any essential difference between the two. Both possess a form of immediacy. But this immediacy cannot rise above the subject-object reference in knowledge, above the implications of the relative. The super-subject gives the highest unity of knowledge possible in the relative existence. It has a transcendence in this that no definite presentation can exhaust its experience, and that its unification is singular and unique. But this does not make it a trans-subjective reality.

The reality of the super-subject stands on the same place with the reality of the subjects, the magnitude of its knowledge and power cannot make the least distinction in the nature of its Being. The difference is the difference in radiation, but not in being.

Both belong to the plane of concentration, and concentration implies limitation. The super-subject is a subject amongst the infinity of finite subjects. It may focus the infinite presentation, and its unity may necessarily be higher, but to say that the super-subject assimilates all the distinctions of finite or empirical subjects is really a travesty of logic. The subjects—the psychological and logical centres are as much true as the super-subject is, and, therefore, in the being of the super-subject they cannot be integrated and assimilated in a way which will make the super-subject the only individual, and reduce them to members of this highest individual.

VIII

In the relative order Sankara maintains a distinction between Jiva and Iswara and there is no attempt to reconcile the differences. The Jiva by controlling its Upadhi can rise above its formal limit and externality and its historical continuity, it can open unto itself wide ranges of perception, but it cannot completely break its limitation. Samkara recognises in the realm of Maya the fine marches of the soul in spirituality and comprehension and admits for it the occasional overshadowing of its individuality and the sense of exclusiveness, but it does not admit the possibility of complete self-effacement of the finite subject in super-subject. In the relative order this is not possible, for however wide the range of comprehension may be, it cannot wipe out the inherent distinction between the subject and the super-subject and the subject holds its experiences in its own personality as moments of its self-expression. The occasional overshadowing is a form of consciousness in the personal self, which welcomes and enjoys it, but this overshadowing is not the loss of, temporary even, of the personal consciousness. It is a phase of its own self in which it enjoys the possibility of expansions, but in no case it can be without reference to the self or the subject.

And again the distinction of the super-subject and the subject is possible and real, so long as the time-sense in its historic continuity holds; but the moment the time-sense and the sense of distinction cease to exist, the personality cannot function, and we are brought face to face with an order and plane of existence quite different from the relative.

And in this plane of existence neither the sense of the person or a person can hold. So long as the soul marches through time, such a possibility cannot be attained, and, therefore, the formal exclusiveness may be of some phases and aspects of life and experience in the past, but this tran-

scendence cannot get us to a completely non-relational and alogical reality. The finite still continues, the exalted moments of its life in the infinite cannot completely obliterate the distinction. So long as the sense of a personality remains this is not possible.

Of course Bosanquet is right in holding that in the eternal march of the soul, the soul transcends the past. In fact, it does, but that does not necessarily mean that personality can completely transcend time-sense. Progress implies sometime the rejection of the past, specially in the case of finite persons, but this rejection has meaning in the sense that it marks out the turning-point of another history in the progress of the soul. So long as the sense of personality continues, the finite soul cannot look upon the past with complete detachment, and even in this transcendence of the soul in progress though the past with its history of struggle and development of the person has not its original meaning, still it cannot be said to have lost its significance.

The past is transcended as an event in time series, it has not been transcended as a moulding influence of progress and development, it has been incorporated with the present.

The past and the future must have a meaning for the finite subjects whose knowledge takes place through a mediate process and whose progress must be through the rejection and the assimilation of the changes through time. The finite, unless it can rise above the time-sense, cannot be free from the inherent limitation of its being, but this possibility cannot come through ordinary faculties. Reason cannot anyhow rise above the limitations of relative construction, and every moment reason seeks to assimilate the differences in the identity it involves itself in antinomies.

So long as the distinction is retained between the subject and the super-subject it is not possible to get the non-relational Absolute. The highest conception may be reached in

community of spirit but within the community the finite subjects retain their community and history and in such a continuity the super-subject is as much a personality as the finite subjects are. They are individually true and a spiritual co-ordination cannot interfere with their personalities. Lest it should pass for the desirable consummation in metaphysics it must be said that it is more a practical compromise than what is in reality. It might have some importance in moral and religious sense but cannot displace the Absolute in philosophy. Bradley perceives the limitations of these ideas and conceives reality as super-personal.

Samkara has avoided the Scylla of the Absolute as the individual and the Charybdis of the Absolute as non-relational system. The two ideas are evidently contradictory. Evidently the analogy is of a psychological unity and identity of feeling. He was making a confusion between the two. The former gives the idea of a system, the latter an identity beyond relations.

Samkara holds that identity and system cannot be united. They are strictly speaking, different kinds of concepts. Identity is non-relational, system is relational. Identity is the law of the Absolute, system is the law of the empirical and, therefore, their logic is quite different. In Samkara the orders of relations and reality are different.

IX

The poles of empiric intuition, the subject and the object, cannot belong to the different orders of reality. The 'sense' can reveal objects which are empirically real. And to refer our experience to the thing-in-itself through the manifold of sense is the remnant of realistic thinking in Kant. The thing-in-itself is not real in the same sense as the manifold, and the manifold is not the sense-impression of the thing-in-itself upon mind. In fact, Kant accepts the mediate theory of

perception so far as objects are concerned. Samkara accepts the immediate theory of perception and maintains the mutuality of I and NOT-I. He does away with the transcendental truth of NOT-I for the transcendent lies beyond the bifurcation of I and NOT-I of the realistic consciousness. Samkara's philosophy contains realistic touches, but this realism of perception does not in the least interfere with the transcendent aspect of his philosophy. Buddhism (specially the Vijnanvadi) at this point differs from Samkara, for it reduces the NOT-I and the 'given' of perception to the subjective states and processes, and refuses to accept the realistic element of Samkara's philosophy. The 'given' in perception is a subjective construction and self-projection, but nothing real. The NOT-I has not even the objective reality. The world is reduced to ideans. Samkara has not in the least interfered with the *truth of the 'given'* and if he calls it illusory, it is in connection with a transcendent reference. Samkara, therefore, differs from Buddhism in the acceptance of the reality of the 'given' and can construct a realistic knowledge out of the 'given' of the experience. This realism is not present in Vijnanvadi, it tends distinctly to an extreme subjectivism. Fichte also constructs the NOT-I out of I, but in his philosophy the I is the permanent factor and the creative principle. In Buddhism the 'I' has been reduced to a procession of ideans in quick succession, and the procession has been installed in the place of a definite reality. The 'I' is no less a fiction than NOT-I but the fiction appears to be a reality because of the long-standing continuity of the procession which has generated a realistic sense and consciousness. This 'I' has its root in Avidya and beyond Avidya what exists is still a matter of difference of opinion amongst the scholars. Buddha calls it silence, because no thought category can be applied ; it can be called neither positive nor negative, for these are thought-characterisations.

In Buddhism reality is, therefore, described in negative terms as Nirvana, cessation from the processions of Skandhas. In fact Buddha's problem is more practical than theoretical, and he refuses to question, he refuses to answer. 'Question not, answer not,' for logic can give no idea of the final truth. Buddhistic logic, therefore, has taken upon itself the negative task of rejecting all concepts, realistic or idealistic, including even the notion of the self.

Vivarttavada is the highest achievement of reason. It sees clearly the Absolute cannot concentrate itself. Self-concentration is the denial of its absoluteness. The logical division of subject and object is more epistemological than real. The reality of concentration of Bhaaskara's philosophy and of Saivism is displaced by its illusoriness. But the illusoriness is not evident to reason, for though reason can understand the non-relational character of the fact and the relativity of meaning, reason cannot transcend the world of meaning and grasp the fact. It sees through limitation to understand Reality. It posits the appearance in the Absolute, it denies it there again. The first moment of thought is position, the second moment is denial, and in this reason comes to understand the phenomenality of appearance. Reason cannot think of appearance without its locus; Padmapada has well said that the illusion has for it a true datum.

Hence when reason posits the appearance, it posits it on a datum, but soon it discovers that the position can not have any relation to the datum, for the Absolute is non-relational and hence in the second moment comes to feel the illusoriness of appearance.

But though reason thus understands the illusoriness of appearance and the Reality of a non-relational absolute still this philosophic conception is not the end of our pursuit, for the knowledge is still mediate and dialectical. The human soul cannot be satisfied with a negative dialectic and hence

seeks a way to immediately feel Truth. It wants to sanction it by singular experience. The limitation of reason naturally calls for other avenues of apprehension, and this is supplied by the Vedantic doctrine of intuition.

X

The ancient seers of India, more than anybody else, recognise the possibility of apprehending Reality and Truth in a direct way. If Reason can give systematic thinking, intuition can give direct knowledge.

But there are forms of intuition. The word is loosely used, sometimes in the sense of direct knowledge through the senses—as in empiric intuition, sometimes with a universal, sometimes with an individual connotation. Sometimes it is used in the sense of poetic or aesthetic perception of dynamical symmetry. And this accounts for the different kinds of conclusions in philosophy even when these conclusions are affirmed on the evidence of intuition. The human mind is a complex fabric and it is likely that when the deeper chords are touched, it gives expressions to tunes of varied description, and not unlikely that these open the wide vistas of perception. The human limitation beigns to work here; the subconscious visions are not always supra-mental, and we are overcome by the super-sensuous visions of archetypal forms of existence and sometime spin theories out of them.

Hence difference arises in the form and character of intuition. Intuition may be concrete or transcendent. The one is logical, the other alogical, The theists believe in the former. They are inspired by the aesthetic intuition of the soul, and hence even in the highest stretch of ecstacy in love and grace, they attain the utmost limit of all conceivable rapture, and sometimes lose themselves in its depth. This is possible in the highest tension of the soul, incomprehensible to the creature, but comprehensible to the soul. Even

in this rapture thought expires leaving aside blessedness and joy. The soul becomes overwhelmed with the infinite shades of joyousness and the rosy hues of love-consciousness, with the eternal giving of the soul and the consequent receiving of the polyphony and symphony of the spiritual life. It is essentially the eternal march of life in its ever-new freshness and over-delicious festivity.

But the march of soul cannot stop there, and in its ever-widening penetration to the root of existence, it reaches the level whence the relational consciousness completely drops and a new perception begins in which the supra-mental ranges of consciousness in their unrestricted expanse and unbroken continuity take place.

The intuition may transcend the sense of eternal duration and continuity and can impress us with the sense of Immense. The intuition of eternity takes the form of timelessness, for the time-sense cannot exist in so elevated an existence. Because the mind cannot transcend the time-sense, it cannot feel the *Ever-present*; even the supra-mental time-sense (what Bergson calls intellectual intuition) cannot feel it. The supra-mental time-sense only displaces the notion of time as a series by the notion of a continuity; but it cannot transcend the sense of duration, the soul of time. This intuition of the *Ever-present* is, therefore, the intuition of Siva with the complete equilibrium of Sakti. The perception is the highest intuition in Saivism, it is next to the highest in Samkarism.

Intuition has still a reference to the *present* and to the dynamism in complete equilibrium. It is the vision of the Chidakasha of the Vedanta, the *spiritual space* in which is entrenched in silence the seeds of creation.

When intuition is free from this reference to the Chidakasha, it becomes transcendent; the subject-object consciousness is got over in Chidakasha, but it is totally denied in

Absolute intuition. The soul gets its paradise regained and becomes free from the snares of a divided existence. The perplexities of philosophy become silent and the mystic voice whispers after recovery from the plunge in the oceanic calm—I am.

Whatever may be the trend of thought, realism or idealism, the Indian teachers have not lost sight of the value of transcendence in life. They have emphasised the realisation of the complete beyond the partial, the eternal beyond the transitory. Nowhere the aspiration to the eternal is so eloquent as it is in India. The fine texture of Indian life is moulded by this longing for the eternal. The transcendent notes have not the same tune always, and the Indian philosophy in its variations only presents the various tunes which it feels and enjoys in the super-sensuous flights of thought, imagination and intuition. Life aspires to rise from fatality of division not only in its philosophic vision, but in actual adaptation, for in Indian soil philosophy inspires life, life influences philosophy. And this inward bent of the soul has enabled the Indian teachers to emphasise an equilibrium between vision and adaptation. The intellectual intuition cannot leave us cold in our internal and external adjustments; Truth has the most formative influence in life, and the more it reaches us in the silence of our being the more powerful it becomes as a dynamic force. And this explains why the greatest teachers in India are the most active forces in construction. No doubt, strictly as thought-construction, divergence has been actuated between intuition and reason, between thought and activity; but it should not be lost upon us that midway between the complete transcendence and the narrow activism we are inspired by the orchestral harmony of intuition and life, thought and action, and they are evenly fitted in the concrete unity of life in the plane of spiritual and physical expression.

The Jivan-muktas, the Buddhas, the Arhats, the Tirthankaras and the Siddhas have the rare possession of the cosmic vision and transcendent intuition, and this rare privilege has made them conscious or unconscious transmitters of moral and spiritual influences. They shed the genuine lustre of the spirit upon humanity. The Indian teachers have not confined their philosophy to academy, but have inspired life by its vision and message. This unity of philosophy and life has been unique in India, and in this sense philosophy has been the greatest formative force on the Indian soil. This explains why amidst the apparent divergences of thought the soul of India runs on the same ideal of formation, growth, transcendence, cosmic love and sympathy.

The life of restraint and asceticism in the period of formation is the wonderful asset and strength in the period of creativeness in family and social life, the experience of limitation in active formation in family and society seeks the higher path of higher expression in the life of transcendent intuition and cosmic service. The instincts that bind man to family and society are transformed by the deeper intuition of cosmic life which life even in its biological and psychological adaptation cannot fail to reveal. The spring of life is one and undivided. When the cosmic intuition begins to have a free vent and expression, life begins to be influenced by new perceptions and visions and begins to stir to establish Truth and blessedness on Earth. Truly India has the vision of this cosmic life and society when it trans-values the values in terms of **ब्रह्मलो जीवाब जगद्विज्ञाब ब ।**"

Presidential Address.

(PSYCHOLOGY SECTION.)

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The Psychological Outlook in Hindu Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

The position of a psychological section in a philosophical congress is rather anomalous. It is true that psychology has been a handmaid to philosophy from time immemorial but philosophers have seldom been interested in psychological problems as such and whenever they have used any psychological material they have utilized it as a stepping-stone to some philosophical generalization. Psychology is not the only science laid under contribution by the philosophers. The discoveries and deductions of physics, chemistry, astronomy and other natural sciences have in a similar way been used to build up definite philosophical systems. A scientific truth after all is only a specific instance of a much wider philosophical generalization. A philosophical speculation based merely on a scientific theory is on an extremely unstable foundation. Discoveries of new facts often lead scientists to change their theories but philosophers cannot afford to see their generalizations changing from day to day. A philosophical doctrine, therefore, should be essentially independent of scientific theories. The present day psychology bears the same relation towards philosophy as the other sciences do. Hence in recent times persistent efforts are being made to separate psychology from philosophy and it is for these reasons that I consider the position of the Psychological Section in

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this Congress as something out of place. It is like a section of physics in a medical congress. A psychologist therefore is something of an intruder into the domain of philosophy. He can at most examine and evaluate the psychological facts gathered by the philosophers.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Indian philosophy when compared with western systems stands on a peculiar footing. In no western system of philosophy has the psychological material been so dominant. The outlook of the Vedanta as well as of the Sankhya system is almost purely psychological as I shall presently explain. A psychologist, therefore, is more in his elements in the domain of Indian philosophy than in the province of western thought.

OBSCURE PASSAGES.

There are many obscure points and dark lacunae in the Indian philosophical systems which have their origin in the remote past. Many passages in the Upanishads appear on superficial examination to be childish and even silly. It seems that at times the Upanishads rise up to giddy heights on the intellectual plane and then immediately afterwards sink to the level of childish thought and meaningless assertions. No serious attempt has been made to reconcile these incongruities. Scholars have generally passed over such apparently unintelligible portions in silence while detractors have made fun of them. Even if we assume the different origin of these different levels of intellectual performance it is not clear why they have been put together and accepted as parts of the same whole by the ancient scholars. If there has been any interpolation in the Upanishads it must date back to a remote past and it is curious that it should have escaped the vigilance of the lynx-eyed intellectual giants like Sankaracharya.

Instead of considering the obscure passages in the Hindu Shastras as puerile and meaningless I am inclined to think

that we have failed to realize their true significance. If we could place ourselves in the position of the ancient *rishis* and revive their mode of thinking, much of the obscurity of their utterances would disappear. The key to the solution of these riddles must have long been lost to us and commentators have either taken the meanings of passages which seem difficult to us to be self-evident and so familiar as not to require any interpretation or found themselves in the same predicament as ourselves and simply shirked the difficulties of explanation.

TYPES OF OBSCURITY

I contend that the psychological outlook which seems to me to be the principal basis of Indian philosophical thought will enable us to explain many difficult passages in the *shastras* in a rational manner and will remove the prevailing obscurity to some extent. Unfortunately my knowledge of the *shastras* is extremely limited but if I succeed in correctly interpreting even a single obscure passage by the method suggested here, the intrusion of psychology into the preserves of philosophical thought will be amply justified. We shall have to wait for qualified workers equipped with a proper knowledge of both philosophy and psychology to come into the field and carry on the work more successfully.

I shall first of all deal with the Upanishads, the great storehouse of all Indian philosophical speculations. The passages in the Upanishads may be classified under three heads from the standpoint of the present-day rationalistic demand. Under the first division will be included all those passages which are both understandable and acceptable as propositions worthy of reasonable consideration, e.g.,

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लब्धो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।

यमेवेव ब्रह्म तेन लब्धस्तस्मै ब्रह्मते तन्न साम ॥

i.e., "The soul is not to be realised by reading the Vedas

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or by the intellect or by a knowledge of the *Shastras*. He only is able to realise it who is chosen by it and to him only the soul unfolds itself."

You may not accept this proposition as true but it is certainly like any other philosophical assertion of the present day.

Under second division will come those passages which savour of mysticism and which are difficult to accept as reasonable statements, *a. g.*,

पृथ्वतेजोऽनिसखे समुत्थिते पञ्चात्मके योगानुये प्रवृत्ते ।

न तस्य रोगो न जरा न दुःखं प्राप्तस्य योगान्निभयं शरीरम् ॥

When earth, water, fire, air, and sky rise and when the fivefold qualities of Yoga are manifest the aspirant's body is permeated with the fire of Yoga and he becomes free from desire, decrepitude and pain."

It is difficult to understand what the sage of the Upanishad meant by the expression "rising of earth, water" etc. Then again the assertion that disease, old age and pain can be conquered is hard to believe. We are thus forced to admit that the meaning of this passage is obscure.

In the third group are included all those passages in which absolutely no sense can be made out. As an example I may cite the story of the song of the dogs to be found in the 1st chapter, 12th section of the Chhandogya Upanishad. The dogs chanted verses from the Sama Veda and went through queer movements and uttered weird sounds. As the story is a long one, I refrain from quoting it. Why this curious story should find place in the Upanishad is more than I can say; nor can I point out the moral of this parable if this is a parable at all.

I have selected these examples haphazard to illustrate the different types of obscurity to be found in the Upanishads.

The earnest reader will notice such peculiarities on almost every page.

THE RISHI'S MIND

Before I undertake to solve some of these riddles it will be desirable to make an effort to get at the mental constitution of the ancient *rishis* who formulated the teachings of the Upanishads. To do this we have to develop that peculiar mental trait which psychologists have called empathy. Empathy enables us to put ourselves in the position of another man and feel like him. The *rishis* of old were unsophisticated people having an immense faith in their own experience and an unrivalled courage of conviction. The main thesis of the Upanishads is, as is well known, the search for the Brahman or the Absolute. The question naturally arises what made the *rishis* take up the search for this obscure entity? How did they arrive at the knowledge that the Brahman exists at all and how did they find out the characteristics of this being?

SEARCH FOR THE BRAHMAN

It has been said in the Bhagavad Gita that four types of persons search for God, viz., (a) those who are in danger (b) those who have a thirst for knowledge (c) those who have a strong ambition to acquire wealth and happiness, and lastly (d) those who are wise. The wise person seeks God because he has already felt His presence. Therefore I leave him out of account for the purpose of the present discussion. The psychology of the person who seeks the help of God when in danger, or of the man who offers prayers for the furtherance of his ambition is easy to understand. It is a natural tendency of our mind to wish for outside help when our efforts fail in any direction. The child looks up to its father when in difficulty and psychoanalysts have proved that the hankering for a heavenly father is directly traceable to this childish trait which

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continues to persist in the adult in the unconscious mind. The heavenly father is a bigger prototype of the earthly parent and being a projection of the unconscious tendency of our mind is immune from the demands of the reality principle so that he is invested with all sorts of inconsistent qualities like "all-kindness and all-powerfulness." From this standpoint the doctrine that God created man out of His own image had better be replaced by the assertion that man creates his God out of his own mental image. You will presently see how the *rishis* of old located the power of creation within the human soul. At this stage you must remember that this psychological explanation of the creation of the Godhead leaves the question of the actual existence of God unsettled. An innate hankering makes a man believe in the existence of the elixir of life or the philosophers' stone which will convert every base metal into gold, but this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of ultimate discovery of such substances. The wish to be able to communicate with people at a distance has been realized by the discovery of the wireless.

I now come to that important class of persons who seek God because of a thirst for knowledge. The motive here is exactly like that of a scientific worker who wants to discover a law of nature or who wants to test the validity of an assertion by another scientist. Scientific curiosity has thus been recognized by the *Gita* as a legitimate motive for the search for the Godhead.

Seekers after God therefore belong ultimately to two classes, *viz.*, the worldly seeker and the scientific seeker. I shall cite evidence to show that both these types existed among the *rishis* of old. Sometimes the scientifically minded *rishi* started his investigation in another sphere altogether and incidentally as it were, came upon the discovery of the Brahman. Sometimes again we find him proceeding

boldly in his enquiries but he stops just short of the final point. Apparently his intellect or intuition could not carry him any further. The Upanishads give a faithful account of all such efforts and provide the present-day reader with an interesting and invaluable document for study.

Bamadeva, one of the *rishis* of the Rig Veda says :—
 "Owing to my poverty I had to eat the entrails of the dog, I prayed to the gods for wealth but all to no purpose. I saw my beloved wife humiliated before others but now God in the guise of a hawk, has come to me with the nectar from the heaven"—Rig Veda : 4.18.13.

This passage along with some other 'mantras' composed by the same *rishi* proves to us that Rishi Bamadeva's life was not a happy one. His sufferings drove him to search for God.

SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM

As an illustration of the scientific type of enquiry for the Godhead I might point out to you the very first *sloka* of the Svetasvetara Upanishad which raises such questions as "whence do we come?" "how do we live?" "which is our support?" etc. In the Kathopanishad again Nachiketa asks Yama (1.20) whether the human soul survives after death. In answer Yama explains to him the mystery of the soul and begins to discuss the problem of the absolute which is intimately associated with it. In the Prasnopanishad (*sloka* 3) Kabandhi son of Katya asks "whence do these animals come to the earth?" In the same Upanishad (chap. 2, *sloka* 1) another *rishi* puts the question "what is the number of forces that keep the animal body alive and which of these is the principal one?" Then again in the third chapter (*sloka* 1) Kausalya asks "how does life come into being?" In the fourth chapter Gargya, son of Sourya, raises some very interesting problems. "Which are the sense organs that go to sleep and which are the ones

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that keep awake ?" "How do dreams arise ?" "Which is the agent in the body that feels pleasure ?" "What is the ultimate support for everything ?" In the *Kenopanishad* again (sloka 1) we find the questions "who controls the mind and which is the agent that keeps the sense organs active ?"

There are quite a number of such questions scattered throughout the different *Upanishads*. I refrain from quoting any further here. These passages will amply prove my previous assertion that the search for Brahman was not always the primary concern of the *rishis*. They were very often moved by scientific curiosity just like any one of us. Most of these questions are either psychological or physiological ; a few come under the domain of physics and philosophy. We thus find that the *rishi* did not start with any preconceived notion about Brahman and very often he had no notion of this being at all when he first started on his enquiry. He was troubled by these problems like any other mortal. As a teacher it has been my fortune to be asked some of these identical questions by my students.

A HYPOTHETICAL ENQUIRY

Let me point out that there is nothing of mysticism in these questions and the effort at answer is irreproachable when judged by the scientific standard of the present day. If the *rishi* ultimately came upon such an obscure entity as the Brahman it was only because his enquiry logically and quite naturally and inevitably led him to this point. It must be remembered, however, that he was mainly guided by his psychological sense, i. e., his own unsophisticated experience. He had no text book by Newton or Einstein to consult. When he looked up and saw the immense blue vault of the heavens above he concluded that that was the boundary of the universe upwards. In his deductions he depended entirely on his psychological sense impres-

sions. This attitude saved him from logical pitfalls. What ever the *rishi* said is absolutely true psychologically. The *rishi* boldly proceeded on his enquiry on this basis untroubled by the nature of his conclusions which may seem absurd to the ordinary person.

To give an illustration of this scientific method of approach let us consider the case of an enquirer who puts himself in the position of the *rishi* and tries to solve one of the riddles raised by him. Let us take up the question "which is the ultimate support of everything" and proceed step by step with our hypothetical enquirer to wherever his conclusions lead him. That the support is bigger than the things supported is self-evident so that the ultimate support would be the biggest entity we can conceive of. This biggest entity is the Brahman of the *rishis*. The root meaning of the word Brahman signifies that which is big. We shall call whatever is big by the term Brahman. Our enquirer will not depend on book knowledge or on any outside source of information. He will be mainly guided by his psychological experience. The first thing that will possibly strike him is that the earth is the biggest entity on which everything finds its support. Therefore, the realization will come to him that the earth on which he stands is the biggest entity he knows of and that the earth is the Brahman. When this knowledge comes to a person in a logical manner he may not be emotionally affected by it. When there is a true psychological realization on the part of the enquirer that he has come face to face with the biggest object on which everything finds its support a feeling of awe and reverence will naturally arise in his mind. We all experience a similar feeling when we look at the almost infinite expanse of the sea or the immense heights of the Himalayas. Under the influence of such a feeling it will be quite natural for our unsophisticated

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enquirer to say, "O Earth thou art the Brahman ; thou art our support ; I make my salutation to thee." The scientific curiosity of the enquirer may not be satisfied with this conclusion after all. He may try to find out an entity still bigger than this earth. He will soon realize that the air, which he feels, covers the earth wherever he goes. The conclusion will naturally dawn on him that the air is the bigger entity and that the earth with its immense seas and mountains finds its support, inside the air which envelops all. That the air is thin and incapable of supporting a solid body does not trouble him in the least. He actually finds that the earth is surrounded by the air on all sides. He therefore, depends on his own direct experience and does not care about such sophistries as thinness of air, etc., which do not immediately affect his problem. He is now in the mood to say "O air, thou art *Pratyaksha* Brahman, the Brahman of direct experience. Within thy fold everything has its being and dissolution. My salutation to thee."

Modern science might tell our enquirer that the sky is a bigger entity than the air which reaches up to only about fifty miles above the earth's surface ; beyond that lies space without any air. But we must remember that this is inferential knowledge ; whereas our enquirer takes into consideration only his direct sensory experience. To him there is no means of distinguishing the air from the sky or the psychological space which can be directly visualized. Our enquirer will, therefore, say "O Air, O Space, ye are one and the same and you are the Brahman of direct experience."

Our enquirer when he comes upon an open plane and looks upwards, will find that his space is bounded above by the immense blue vault of the heavens called by the name of 'Dau' by the *rishis* of old ; the lightning

which seems to flash out of the *dou* is called *bidyut* in Sanskrit which means the piercer of the *dou*. The sun, the moon, and the stars all move within the *dou*. The *dou* is limited below by the different points of the compass and is the biggest entity. The '*dou*' is the Brahman.

When our enquirer makes a careful observation of the *dou* he finds that the position of the stars and the heavenly bodies change from day to day till after a year the original configuration comes back. It is within the fold of time that the *dou* goes on changing. Therefore, time is the larger entity and Time is the Brahman. You might raise the objection that our enquirer who is unfamiliar with Einstein should include space and time within the same category and should call one the bigger of the two. It is true that the psychological perceptions of space and time are quite distinct from each other and have nothing in common between them. If we go deep into introspection we find that the experience of time, unlike that of visual space, does not come through the intermediary of any special sense organ. Time is directly apprehended by the mind as it were. All sensations have duration as one of their attributes. The 'time feeling' is especially marked in all those mental experiences, which have the characteristic of change in them; all such experiences take place in time. It may, therefore, be said that the experience of time is a wider experience which includes all other experiences. The time of the physicist is only an outward projection of the psychologists' time experience. Time as an entity, therefore, is the biggest entity of all. The spatial experience of *dou* of our enquirer has the characteristic of changing from day to day and that is the reason why introspection shows it be engulfed in the wider experience of time. Our

enquirer is perfectly right when he says "O Time, everything happens within thy fold, none can escape thy embrace. Every being is born in Time and dies in Time. Thou art Eternal and Thou art the Brahman. My salutation to thee."

A COMPARISON

Let us now ask our hypothetical enquirer to stop his investigation for the present and let us compare his results with those actually arrived at by some of the *rishis* of the Upanishads. There is an interesting story of three Brahmins in the Ohhandogya Upanishad (chap. 1, sec. 8, 9, 10 and 11) which we may take for comparison. Shilaka, Chaikitayan and Jaibali were three learned *rishis* who once met to discuss certain problems. Shilaka said to Chaikitayan "If you will permit me I shall ask you certain questions." Chaikitayan having given the necessary permission Shilaka asked him "What is the ultimate source of Sama Songs?" Chaikitayan answered, "The Voice is the source of songs." Shilaka again asked, "What is the source of the voice?" Chaikitayan said, "The vital energy of the body." "What is the source of this energy?" The answer was "Water" because without water no life can continue. "What is the source of water?" Chaikitayan said, "That region" apparently pointing upwards. Again the question came "What is the support of that region?" Chaikitayan had come to the end of his learning, so he answered "Don't try to get beyond that region." Then Shilaka said, "O Chaikitayan, you have failed to point out the final support of your Sama, so if anybody challenges you on that point your head will droop down." Then Chaikitayan said to Shilaka, "Please enlighten me on this point." Shilaka answered. "The support of that region is this earth." Chaikitayan in his turn asked "What is the support of this earth?" but no satisfactory

answer was forthcoming. Jaibali the third *rishi* who had been hitherto listening silently said to Shilaka, "O Shilaka, if anybody challenges you now your head will surely droop down." Jaibali then enlightened the two *rishis* and said that the earth had its support in space or the sky which was the largest entity. He further pointed out that everything had its origin within this space and perished within it; the sky was immeasurable and infinite and he who knew it to be so was bound to become great and victorious in life.

THE GREATEST ENTITY

This story clearly illustrates the mode of thinking of the *rishis* which you will now find to be identical with that of our hypothetical enquirer. Certain points in this story deserve our attention. You will notice that there is nothing of what we call philosophy or religion in the discussion recorded here. Then again the highest entity so far recorded is a physical object. There are many such discussions in the Upanishads ending with the discovery of some physical object as the highest entity. It must have been a big jump for the *rishis* to come from the physical to the spiritual plane in search of the greatest entity. How this was achieved I shall discuss presently. You must not forget for a moment that the *rishi's* attitude was psychological throughout; so when he, like our hypothetical worker, arrived at the conclusion that Time was the final entity he must have realized the psychological significance of his findings. Physical time is an elusive object which cannot be apprehended by any sense organ, whereas psychological time is a matter of direct experience. The dominance of a psychological entity over the physical one must have struck certain *rishis*. It should be noted that different *rishis* arrived at different conclusions regarding the Brahman according to the

different levels of their intelligence and intuition. Some never got beyond the physical plane but as they did the spade work, so to say, their efforts were carefully recorded. Such records enable us to follow step by step the progress of thought of the ancient *rishis*. With the postulation of time as the Brahman the emphasis was shifted from the outside physical to the inner mental world. It must have been realized at the next stage, that the experience of Time was after all only a part of the ego's experience. The ego therefore, was the greatest entity. Everything in the outside physical and inside mental world was apprehended by the ego. The objective reference to the outside world was ultimately dropped altogether and it was appreciated that the experience of the ego was the only reality. The subjective reference entirely superseded the objective one. The importance of this change will be understood when we come to discuss the ideas of creation which the ancient *rishis* entertained.

THE EGO

The search was now directed towards the ego. What was the nature of the ego, which seemed to compass the entire universe within it? The line of thought which the *rishi* followed is highly interesting and is illustrated in the Vriguballi of the Taittiriyaopaniṣad and in the 7th section of the 8th chapter of the Chhandogya in the story of Prajapati, Indra and Virochan. I cannot quote the stories here for want of space. I shall remain content with pointing out the salient features of those stories. In his search for the nature of the ego, the enquirer quite naturally at first failed to distinguish between the body and the true ego. The body was thought to be identical with the ego and as the body grows out of food, the food was the Brahman. "All animals are born out of food, they are nourished by food and ultimately

resolve into the elements of the food after death." The fallacy was soon realized. A body without vital energy or life was like a lump of inert matter and did not show any of the characteristics of the ego. Therefore, life or the energy which produced movements in the body was the ego. It was then realized that mere mechanical movement was no attribute of the ego. The mind which received all impressions and guided the movements was the true ego. Therefore, the mind was the Brahman. Mind was a composite something; it had different faculties. There was the faculty of receiving sensory impressions or the faculty of *chitta*; then there were the *mana* and *buddhi* which were concerned respectively with the choice of different impressions and different lines of action and final adjustment; then there was the feeling of I or *ahimkara*. Which of these was the Brahman? Vigra the enquirer said Bijan was the Brahman. It is not perfectly clear what was meant by this term *bijan*. Very likely it means *buddhi* or that portion of the mind which is concerned with reasoned activities and knowledge arising therefrom. Although *bijan* was identified with the Brahman, it was not the final conclusion.

It was ultimately asserted that Ananda was the Brahman. Ananda is to be identified with Pure Consciousness, not the consciousness of this or that or the knowledge of anything, but the pure consciousness without reference to any context: which like the light illuminates everything on which it alights and which it brings within its grasp. It is to be noted that most of the present-day psychologists do not admit a pure consciousness without a context: consciousness must be of this or that. But the pure consciousness of the *rishis* is no imaginary concept. It is to be realized in actual experience by ardent effort. I have only made an attempt here to

arrive at it intellectually. It took one hundred and one years of hard meditation on the part of Indra to realise this pure consciousness which is identical with the Brahman. The search for Brahman thus essentially turns out to be a pure psychological problem. The *rishis* have recorded their experience of the Brahman in glowing terms and have asserted many wonderful things about it. When this realization comes to a person all pains cease to exist, and there is a peculiar feeling of blissfulness. The experience of pure consciousness is identical with the experience of this bliss which has been described as Ananda. The experiencer ceases to be troubled with doubts and the manifold world is lost in one unitary experience. These are all strange assertions but we have no reasonable grounds to doubt the correctness of the introspective experience of the *rishis* of old mentioned in such detail in the Upanishads. It is open to anyone to make an effort to realize the Brahman. Certain psychological laboratory experiments point to the presence of pure consciousness as described by the *rishis*, but I need not refer to them there.

AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS.

You will now understand the significance of my previous assertion that the *rishis* did not start with philosophical speculations in the first place. The discovery of the Brahman was an incidental affair and the philosophy that grew out of it was a later product. This is the reason why every system of Hindu philosophy ultimately depends on the authority of the Vedas and the Upanishads which are records of introspective experiences of unsophisticated minds. No philosophy can get beyond facts of experience. The Vedas being a storehouse of the natural impressions and hankerings of the human mind give us a mass of psychological data for the building up of a philosophical system. Just as the facts of observation in physics and chemistry are independent of the intelligence of

truthful observers, so the human passions, cravings and impressions recorded in the Vedas and the Upanishads may be described as independent of the intellect of their unbiassed observers. This is very likely the explanation of the doctrine of *Apurashyata* of the Vedas and this is perhaps the reason why the Vedas were looked upon with such reverence even by those ancient scholars who did not believe in God. From this standpoint Vedic rites will be comparable with the apparently unintelligible rites which are often developed by psychoneurotics and psychotics and which owe their origin to the deeper unconscious layers of the mind. Psycho-analytical investigation is likely to throw light on the point. The method of approach illustrated in the present paper is not the only method to arrive at the conception of the Brahman. Since the Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness any psychological experience when deeply introspected is likely to lead to the realization of the Brahman. In the Upanishads many such methods of approach are to be found.

THE FIVE SENSE DOORS

As the time at my disposal is limited I shall hurriedly pass on to other considerations in the Hindu Philosophy which are likely to interest the psychologist. The sense organs are the doors through which all impressions of external events come to us. While modern psychologists count as many as eleven different sense organs the Hindu philosophers described only five *jnanendriyas* or sense doors for knowledge. It might appear at first sight that the kinaesthetic group of sensations entirely escaped their observation as they did in the case of ancient western thinkers. But the real explanation is different. The Hindu thinkers were not concerned so much with the actual sense organs as with the different modalities of experience. The sense organs are really *indriyasthanas* or the places where the sensory experiences are located. The true *indriyas* are hypothetical bodies which are responsible

for the experience itself. Thus although there may be two eyes the *indriya* of vision is only one. The minimum number of *indriyas* corresponding to entirely different types of sensory experiences is only to be admitted. The kinaesthetic sensations give us an idea of movement and position both of which can also be experienced through vision. The deep sensibility derived from kinaesthesia is akin to touch and may be considered to be one of its variants. Thus there is no necessity of recognizing a special kinaesthetic sense from the Hindu standpoint. Introspection shows only five modalities of sensory experience, hence the number of *indriyas* is limited to the minimum of five.

THE FIVE ELEMENTS

The external world can only be apprehended by us through these five *indriyas*. There is no other source which can give us any information about matter which constitutes the physical world. Psychologically speaking matter is ultimately resolvable into five different elements corresponding to the five different *indriyas*. This is the explanation of the five primary elements posited by the Hindu philosophers. The elements of the chemists are no real elements in this sense. Take the case of chlorine for instance: chlorine as a gas can be felt, smelt, tasted and seen. We are cognizant of its existence by at least four different sensory impressions; therefore, it is not an element in the Hindu sense of the term; it must be composed of at least four different elements. The Hindu classification of matter into five elements is, therefore, not at all absurd as is supposed by many scientists who have an entirely different standpoint.

CREATION—MODERN VIEW

When a modern scientist attempts to formulate a theory of creation he begins with matter either as a primordial stuff or electron and proton or whatever it is. Out of such stuff

the nebulae are formed and then the suns and stars which are of the nature of incandescent gases. The stars give rise to planets which gradually cool down and become liquid and finally the crust becomes solid. There is no life, much less consciousness, up to this stage. Then the oceans come into existence and out of inorganic matter life of a simple type in the form of unicellular organism comes into existence very likely in the ocean. This unicellular organism develops along two directions and in the process of evolution gives rise to the immense varieties of plants and animals. Consciousness is the last to develop and first appears in a rudimentary form in the lower animals. In the human being which is the last word in creation consciousness attains its fullest development.

The Hindu theory of creation stands in sharp contrast with the modern scientific doctrine. It begins at the wrong end as it were. Consciousness is the first element in creation and inert matter is the last to develop.

CREATION IN SAMKHYA

If we consider the theory of creation propounded in the Samkhya system of philosophy, we come across an essentially psychological outlook. The Purusha of the Samkhya is to be compared with the pure consciousness discussed before. Besides the Purusha another entity is recognized by the Samkhya called Prakriti or primordial matter. In contact with the Purusha the Prakriti manifests itself in different physical and mental phenomena. During the process of creation the primordial Prakriti is at first transformed into what is called *mahat* which in its turn leads to the development of *ahamkara* or the ego feeling of I. It will be seen that creation according to this theory starts in the mental sphere or the psychological plane. From *ahamkara* is developed the five *jnanendriyas* or the five sense doors, the five *karmendriyas* or the organs for action and the mind or the

controlling agent for both sense impressions and actions. Corresponding to the five sense doors five sense impressions or *tanmatras* are developed from the same *ahamkara*. The *tanmatras* or sensory impressions by projection give rise to five primary elements or matter. Aitareyopanishad also says "out of the eyes the sun was born." Physical matter is therefore the last to be developed and is merely an offshoot from the mental sphere. The theory of creation is thus purely psychological. You will notice that this explanation of creation is individualistic. How this is to be correlated to the cosmic theory of creation I leave to the specialists to consider.

The Samkhya along with other systems of Hindu philosophy considers the mind to be a form of matter. The mind is a product of the Prakriti and as such is devoid of the element of consciousness. The mind appears to be conscious because of the borrowed consciousness of the Purusha. When the borrowed light illumines mental events they appear to be conscious products. Mental events belong to the same category as physical events ; only they are made of a finer stuff. This view of the relationship of body and mind steers us clear of the pitfalls of both inter-actionism and psycho-physical parallelism and I commend this theory to the consideration of modern psychologists.

There are many statements in the Sankhya philosophy which require to be carefully investigated before we can grasp their meaning. Why the *karmendrius* or the bodily agents for action have been limited to five, is more than I can explain at present. Why the five primary elements corresponding to the five sense impressions have been located in earth, water, fire, air and sky also require education. I am sure psychology will ultimately solve the riddle the key to which has been lost to us.

THE THREE GUNAS

The theory of the three Gunas viz. Sattwa, Rajas, and

Tamas so widely accepted by the Hindu philosophers is another baffling problem. It is a favourite theme with them to classify all objects and actions under the three heads of Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas. There are certain elements in creation *e.g.*, the *indriyas* which belong to the Sattwa group ; certain other elements belong to the Rajas group and the rest belong to Tamas group. The Brahmin's profession is 'sattwik' the King's duties are 'rajasik' while the butcher's activities are 'tamasik'. Milk is a 'sattwik' food, meat is 'rajasik' while alcoholic drinks like whisky and brandy are 'tamasik' ; and so on, in every department of life. What the Hindu philosophers actually aimed at achieving by the classification is difficult to realise. Max Muller in his "The Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy" says in page 357 : "I have tried to explain the meaning of the three Gunas before, but I am bound to confess that their nature is by no means clear to me, while, unfortunately to Indian philosophers, they seem to be so clear as to require no explanation at all." Sattwa is described as the quality of goodness, rajas as that of passion and tamas as that of darkness. "Goodness is all that is bright, passion all that excites and darkness all that is not bright." Then again Sattwa has been described as illumination or knowledge, rajas as action and tamas as inertia. It is difficult to find out the motive for this tripartite classification with so many vague connotations of *gunas* or characteristics of physical and mental phenomena. The principle of classification does not seem to be at all logical. How such different things as brightness and action could form the basis of classification is difficult to understand. The explanation of the riddle of Sattawa, Rajas and Tamas is to be sought for in the psychological plane and the solution that I offer here will, I hope, prove to be satisfactory.

Unlike most of the philosophical systems of the West the aims of all Hindu philosophical thought is essentially

practical. Hindu philosophy teaches the methods of permanently getting over all sorts of pain in this world and attaining a state of perfect happiness. Because of this practical outlook philosophical teachings and doctrines have permeated every phase of the Hindu's life. Even food and sexual enjoyment are sought to be regulated on philosophical basis. The religion of the Hindu is an offshoot of his philosophy and really consists in practices in conformation to the philosophical doctrines suited to different social and intellectual strata, the ultimate aim being the attainment of a state of perfect freedom from pain. Pain is only to be conquered by the realization of the relationship between the ego and the external world which constitutes the non-ego. For this the nature of the ego must be appreciated and anything that helps to favour the development of this knowledge is to be encouraged while all activities and agents which divert us from this aim are to be avoided. The nature of the self or the ego is to be realized by knowledge. Ignorance stands in the way of this realization. Knowledge is of two kinds *viz.*, (i) the knowledge of external things and (ii) the knowledge of the inner workings of the mind. These roughly correspond to what we would call physical knowledge and psychological knowledge respectively. The knowledge of external objects directs our mind towards them and leads to activities with reference to them. Although such knowledge is desirable from the practical standpoint of life and society it is not the type of knowledge which helps us to realize the ego. In fact this knowledge takes us away from the ego. The only knowledge which will reveal the ego is introspective knowledge of the mind. But the human mind is naturally so constituted that it has a preference for running after external objects and events rather than concern itself with its own workings. Incidentally I might say that this is why introspective psychology as a science is not so popular as physics or chemistry. Introspec-

tion of the mind is the method advocated by the Hindu philosophers to find out the nature of the ego. Introspection, which may be difficult to practise in the beginning, gradually leads to the development of the knowledge of the self which has been called the "true knowledge." The *rishis* observed that certain conditions favoured the growth of introspective power in an individual and certain other conditions retarded it. Food, environment, habits of life, all have their peculiar influence on the introspective faculty of the mind. Anything that stands in the way of knowledge, whether objective or introspective, is supposed to be invested with a peculiar quality which has been called the 'Tamas.' In the domain of creation the 'Tamas' obscures the light of consciousness and is responsible for the evolution of inert matter. In practical life "Tamas" obscures our knowledge of external objects and the inner affairs of the mind. Darkness, for instance, interferes with our perception of the true characteristics of an object; hence darkness has the attribute of 'Tamas' in it. Similarly alcohol makes a person unfit to grasp the true perspective of things and events; therefore alcohol is a tamasik drink. "Tamas" is of the nature of obstruction or ignorance.

'Rajas' is that attribute which helps the development of knowledge of external things and events i. e., of the non-ego. Knowledge of external things is a pre-requisite basis of all our actions. Take the instance of the simple act of drinking water. We must have a knowledge of water as an external object and be familiar with its characteristics before we attempt to drink it. 'Rajas', therefore, is an incentive to action. A butcher's action is considered 'tam-*vik*' because he does not realize the pain and sufferings of the animal he slaughters; and to that extent his knowledge of external events is defective. It is also supposed that activities like that of the butcher deaden the finer sensibilities and lead to an incapacity to understand the subtle workings of the

ego, the knowledge of which constitutes 'Sattwa' and is essential to salvation. In the case of the butcher the 'Tamas', therefore, interferes, both with Rajas and Sattwa. A king's activities on the other hand is 'rajasik'. A king or a judge may order a person to be hanged but he does it after carefully considering all points. His appreciation of external events does not suffer. The true warrior is similarly of a *rajasik* bent.

We now come to Sattwa. Whenever our attention is directed towards our own mental experience 'Sattwa' is predominant. The introspection of the psychologist is *sattwic* in nature as it is by such introspection that the mysteries of the ego are ultimately revealed. The knowledge that results from inner observation of the mind in contradistinction to *rajasik* knowledge is 'pure' in nature inasmuch as it does not lead to action. Whenever any *Indriya* is active sensory experience results and this subjective experience by itself, without reference to the object which produces it, is the result of 'Sattwa'. Both 'Rajas' and 'Tamas' are opposed to 'Sattwa' in the sense that one diverts the mind to the outward world or the non-ego, while the other opposes the development of knowledge altogether.

In all our actions there is an intermixture of the three *gunas* in different proportions. Pure 'Sattwa' or 'Rajas' or 'Tamas' does not exist. Generally one of the *gunas* preponderates over the others. One must be 'Gunatita' or beyond all three *gunas*, if the self is to be realized. While the 'Tamas' and 'Rajas' prevent the vision of the self, 'Sattwa' helps to open the road to it. But an individual who merely goes on taking interest in his own mental experience, although he may turn out to be a good psychologist, fails to understand the nature of the self which is the experienter and not the experience. The attraction of the road is to be overcome before the goal can be reached. One must get

beyond the mind itself to reach the ego. The Koushitaki Upanishad says (3rd chap. Sec. 8) "Do not try to understand the nature of vision but try to understand the visualizer ; do not try to understand sound but try to understand the agent who hears the sound ; do not try to understand touch but try to understand the experiencer of touch ; do not try to understand the mind but try to understand the agent who controls the mind," and so on. This is the theory of Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas in a nutshell. If we accept this interpretation all anomalies and vagueness disappear and the fundamental importance of the theory clearly stands out. The limited time at my disposal prevents me from doing full justice to the problem which is one of the key-stones of Hindu philosophy.

THE HINDU PANTHEON

Let me now pass on to other considerations. The Hindu pantheon consists of innumerable gods and goddesses who have their special devotees. This fact has been responsible for the charge of idolatry and polytheism brought against the Hindu religion. Let us try to understand how this conception arose. Without referring to the anthropological explanation of the problem, I shall deal only with its psychological aspect. The numbers of *devatas* or gods in the Vedic period appears to be smaller than at the present time. New gods have been introduced into the pantheon from time to time and some of the older gods have lost their importance. The original meaning of the term *devata* is "the shining one." In the Upanishads the *indriyas* or sense doors have often been called *devatas*. These facts give us a clue to the mystery of the recognition of the different *devatas* by the Hindu philosophical systems. The *indriyas* or sense doors are called *devatas* or shining ones because they illuminate or bring into consciousness outside objects. The objects them-

selves must be supposed to have certain characteristics which make them fit agents to receive the light of consciousness. The modern theory of psycho-physical parallelism assumes that physical agents cannot bring about a psychic change. As physical energy effects a physical change so physical energy alone can produce a mental change. The implication of this theory is that objects have their psychic counterparts and it is only because of this that they can affect our sense organs and give rise to sensory impressions which are changes in the psychic plane. From this standpoint the *devata* is the psychic counterpart of an object and the *rishi* was right in calling both the sense organs and objects, which can be looked upon as unitary wholes, as *devatas*. Both the groups have the capacity to illumine the mind by producing consciousness. Thus every object has its corresponding *devata*. The *rishi* is perfectly explicit when he says, "Julavimanini devata", "Bidyudavimanini devata" etc. i. e., the 'devata' which illuminates water, the 'devata' which illuminates lightning etc. It is the illuminating agency that is the 'devata.' All objects of importance and all groups of ideas having an important bearing were thus conceived to have their special 'devatas'. There were the god of thunder, the god of the winds and the rains, the god of the mountains, the goddess of the river, the god of death, the god of creation, etc. As the social conditions changed different deities made their appearance according to the importance attached to special events. Even at the present time we can see the process at work. The Deshamata or the goddess representing the motherland is in the course of being incorporated within the Hindu pantheon. In a suburb of Calcutta, there is a goddess of cholera who receives offerings from innumerable people. I shall leave out of discussion, the psychology of worship, for the present.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTLOOK

The psychological attitude is of importance not only in understanding the definite problems of Hindu philosophy but in clearing obscurities of isolated passages in the Hindu *shastras*. The Hindu philosophers assert that the seat of the emotions is in the heart whereas modern physiologists will tell you that the brain is the seat of all mental processes. If you place yourself in the psychological mood, introspection will definitely tell you that the kinaesthetic sensations which accompany emotions are located near the region of the heart called *hriday* in Sanskrit. *Hriday* does not mean the heart itself but the indefinite region round about it where emotions are located. During an intellectual performance you may experience a feeling of strain in the region of the head and that is why the head has been described as the seat of intellect. Many people fall into the error of thinking that the brain is meant by the term head in the ancient Hindu philosophy. You must remember that the Hindu philosophers dealt with pure psychological entities and were not concerned with physiological findings. A psychologist, in fact, has no necessity of admitting that anybody has brains !

The soul has been described as "guhahitam" or residing within the cave. By *guha* is meant the *hriday guha* or the cave in the region of the heart. The expression "guhahitam" seeks to convey the idea that in deep introspection the ego appears to be located within the region of the heart. There is no need to bring in any mystic explanation. The ego has again been described as "angusthamatra" or of the size of the thumb. Although, I am not in a position to substantiate it, I am sure this refers to the introspective experience of the *rishis*. There is an interesting sloka in the Swetaswetara Upanishad (chap. II. sloka 2) which says,

नौद्वारं धुमार्कानिखानखानां

खदगोतं विदुः स्मृष्टिकं मयिनाम् ।

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PART II.

A Note on the Problem of Self in Absolutism.

BY

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What is of fundamental importance with regard to the problem of self is the distinction of the strictly logical or epistemological from the psychological or genetic aspect of the question. Genetically viewed, the supposed 'ultimate substantiality and closed privacy' of the self, one would be prepared to agree with Bradley, 'seem to be no more than false inferences' from the accredited view of self as 'an indispensable element in the world.'¹ One may, indeed, go so far as to describe this self as a 'construction', in as much as it counteracts the notion of self as a *res completa*, starting on its career as a combining and unifying agency, whose sole function is to convert the unrelated elements of knowledge into a connected experience of a world of objects. It would be nearer the mark to assert that instead of such a unified experience being the construction or product of the self, the self is, on the contrary, the construction or product of experience, and its unity is derived from the apprehension of the orderly or uniform connection of parts in the originally given material. It is not indeed denied that the primitive appre-

1. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 249. Hereinafter written as T & R.

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hension of the connexion among the different parts of the given lacks that systematic unity and coherence which, with increasing knowledge, comes to be more and more articulate, and that the unity of the self develops *pari passu* in richness and complexity with increasing recognition of unity of the objective world. Nor can it be disputed that 'the idea that the whole self can be observed in one perception would be merely chimerical' for 'the actual subject is never, in any state of mind, brought before itself as an object.'² It is thus apparent that Hume deduced wrong conclusion from a perfectly veridical testimony. He was looking for the self in the wrong direction—wanting to have the subject as the object—and hence his inevitable failure in getting at the self. Truly speaking, we never possess ourselves entirely, as Bergson would say.

It is with no reservation but in strict fidelity to the realities of the situation, that we can affirm that the self or mind is its states—a continuum of specific acts of awareness, which is its own exemplar,—and is in no other way definable. The analogy of the 'part and the whole' and the like cannot be employed without falsifying the essential nature of the self and its states. Whether one is prepared to subscribe to Leibniz's metaphysical principle that activity 'is of the essence of substance in general' and thus holding that everything exists only and in so far as it is active, one is bound to confess, however, that the human individual, at least—the self, in the strict sense of the term—reveals itself only in and through its acts of awareness, in virtue of its essential power of mirroring the universe from its own unique point of view. In consistency with his rejection of the notion of 'activity' as something ultimate, Bradley, of course, is bound to dissent from this view of the nature of the individual. But the truer meaning of 'the reality of the

2. *Appearance and Reality*, pp 109, 111. Hereinafter written as A. & R.

individual' is to be recovered from its definition in terms of its influence, or, as Bradley has, with unerring precision, observed³ that "the real individual is in short 'that sphere which his activity doth fill.' Had he but consistently carried out the profound implications of this dictum, he could not have so easily discounted this feature of activity—wherein consists in point of fact the individuality of the individual—and represented it as something adventitious, fugitive or unimportant and, therefore, as a 'frame', merely, having 'no existence in reality, but only in our impotence.'⁴ He did not stop to enquire whether this so-called frame is the very *raison d'être* of all the potency that an individual is capable of, and thereby can justify its individuality, but proceeded to denominate it variously as 'form' or 'element' destined to be dissolved or merged in the end in the content.

If, again, souls 'from the side of the Absolute,' 'would be', but as such 'would not have reality',—if, in short, 'their existence is not genuine'⁵—there is conceivably no point in declaring that 'the identity of their content is just as real as is their separate existence !'⁶ This I take to be a pregnant utterance on Bradley's part, which, if taken in bitter earnest, would call for a revision and repeal of that inveterate tendency to define and measure existence in terms of content, which appears *in excelsis* in Bosanquet with whom he has been all along in doctrinal sympathy. While conceding at the very outset that 'individuality or personality has an aspect of distinct unshareable immediacy' he yet thinks that 'in substance, in stuff and content, it is universal, communicable, expansive', so that 'the formal diversity of finite centres' is 'in some degree reacted on and inspired' by the par-

3. *T. & R.*, pp. 423.

4. *A. & R.*, pp. 253.

5. *A. & R.* pp. 304-5.

6. *A. & R.* p. 353.

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tial identity of their content, and individuals or persons at their strongest 'become confluent.' Here appears undisguisedly the moving spring of the entire machinery with which is established the 'precarious and superficial' nature of individuals—the view of individuality as purely a matter of content. Arguing from the same standpoint Bradley also concludes that souls 'are, as such, nothing more than appearance', while 'the self will be an adjective and a state, in the end, of itself.'⁷ Here we have a typical case of the profound ambiguity that attaches to all his references to self, and it is from this characteristic ambiguity in the interpretation of the nature of self that his arguments against Solipsism derive their plausibility; but what he does not see is that these arguments cut both ways. Not having cared to distinguish between the aspect of existence and that of content, Bradley has left this very typical passage in a state of ambiguity.

Consider, again, the far-reaching consequences of his admission, as taken out of the limited context in which it appears—namely that 'the identity of their content of souls is just as real as is their separate existence.'⁸ If he were consistently to abide by this dictum of his,—without punctuating it with forward reference to the Absolute—he would have discovered herein the most potent solvent of the seemingly insoluble problem of monism *versus* pluralism. He would have then found that without compromising in the least the multiplicity of individuals or souls as existents—which is, by the way, the most important, and indeed the basic contention, of all pluralism, even of the most uncompromising type—it is yet possible to discover unity in the identity of content known by these existentially separate

7. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. pp. 38, 53, xxi.

8. *A. & R.*, p. 306.

9. *T. & R.*, p. 421.

10. *A. & R.* p. 353

individuals. Unity in respect of content and plurality in respect of existence—this would be the central teaching of his philosophy on a consistent adoption of the category of 'system'. Thus, and thus only, can there be secured a harmony between truth and existence, or thought and reality. Indeed the category of system once for all negatives the possibility of the ruinous consummation of individuals in their absorption in the Absolute. Reality as a system or concrete unity is staked upon the maintenance intact of the integrity of all individuality or diversity. As on the one hand it resists the reduction of all differences to one matrix of reality, it provides, on the other, the necessary safeguard against the absolute independence that is claimed in certain quarters on behalf of the concrete particulars of the universe. So far as that is concerned, Bradley's searching analysis and criticism of 'logical atomism' and all other species of absolute pluralism is quite pertinent and just. His philosophic construction, however, goes astray only when he abandons the category of an interrelated system in favour of a more stable, comprehensive and superior kind of unity presumed to belong to the Absolute as the true Individual. A unity so perfect that it has no aspect of genuine otherness or diversity, a unity that is not based upon a full and frank recognition of plurality, is only dead uniformity and not that true type of unity which is unity in variety.

Now, where is the exemplar of this unity to be found? Obviously in the unity of self-consciousness.

That the unity of the self depends upon the unity and continuity of the experienced and is not something original and ultimate, is a notion that bears a striking testimony to Bradley's psychological insight, and thus scores a distinct advance beyond the first impression produced by Kant's treatment of the subject. But he gives away his case so far he deprives the 'experienced' of its *de facto* objectivity and

independence, and makes both the 'self' and the 'object' each a 'construction' based on immediate experience. Most assuredly the self, that thinks and judges and is the very presupposition of all 'intellectual construction' cannot itself be an 'ideal' or 'intellectual' construction. Nor is it feasible to represent the unity of the self as a 'felt' unity. What provoked Bradley into opposing and demolishing altogether the 'psychological monster' of 'a timeless self'¹¹ is, in all probability, Green's theory of 'self', and so far his tirade against it is justified. But what it does not surely justify is his falling back upon "a whole that is given" and "does expand and contract, and feels pleasure and pain," generating "a core" against which the alteration can come as an 'other' and thereby rendering "the aspect of self"¹² possible. Granted that 'the mere form of a subject could do nothing';¹³ neither would the 'felt whole'—which is the originaive source of 'a felt expansion', and that which is 'to feel it as such'¹⁴ and is thus in unbroken unity with the subject that 'always is felt' and 'experienced because it is felt,'¹⁵—would serve any the better. In point of fact 'the felt whole' is a mere whole of being, and not a whole of knowing—being that is, on his own showing,¹⁶ 'different from reality,' so far as it 'is immediate and at a level below distinctions.'

Admitting that 'in truth neither the world nor the self is an ultimately given fact,' yet one fails to see how that can in itself 'justify the contention that each alike is a construction and a more or less one sided abstraction.'¹⁷ Concerning

11. *A. & R.*, pp. 113-4.

12. *Mind*, xii, 1887, p. 365.

13. *Mind*, xii, 1887, p. 366.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

15. *T. & R.* p. 196.

16. *A. & R.* p. 243.

17. *T. & R.*, p. 247.

the question of the reality of the Ego or Self, his conclusion that the 'Ego is a mass of confusion'¹⁸ or the self 'a mere bundle of discrepancies'¹⁹—which out-Humes Hume himself—is liable to the trenchant criticism he has himself urged against Bain in his *Ethical Studies*. "Mr. Bain collects" so it is phrased,²⁰ 'that the mind is a collection. Has he ever thought who collects Mr. Bain?' Does not the same argument apply *mutatis mutandis* with equal force, against his view of self as an 'inconsistent construction'?

Nor would it do to argue from the fact of the derivative character of self-consciousness or the unity of self, that the self is a mere abstraction. Assuredly, the self of self-consciousness is no more abstraction—having, as it does, no reality apart from its contents, the awarenesses to wit, of which its structure is composed. It may thus be said to be an organized system of such awarenesses, of which the form and the content must be held in inseparable unity. It is too late in the day to learn that the form, which is but the organisation of the content, is strictly inseparable therefrom, and is not merely an empty mould into which content is poured. That Bradley is labouring under this misapprehension is apparent from the very language—'the mere *form* of the self,'²¹—that he employs to discredit and overrule any interpretation of the nature of self other than the one he has himself offered. It is no wonder, therefore, that he would readily charge every other characterisation of the nature of self with taking a mere abstraction for reality. But the *onus probandi* lies, properly speaking, on him who imputes the charge of abstractionism to any other view of self. The only other alternative to his theory he conceives to be 'the notion

18. *A. & R.* p. 316

19. *Ibid.* p. 120.

20. *Ethical Studies* (2nd edition) p. 39 (f. n.).

21. Vide *supra*.

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of myself as a thing standing over against the world, externally related to it in knowledge,'²² or even 'a theory of Monads' with its ascription of 'independent reality' to 'each self.'²³ Those who have employed the principle of self-consciousness with such admirable results would, in the first place, take exception to the attenuation of the self of self-consciousness to a mere 'form' and the consequent externalism of its treatment in the knowledge relation for, wherein do we possess a more typical illustration of internal relation, which interpenetrates at least one of its terms, than in this very relation of knowledge? Secondly, they would repudiate altogether a monadistic interpretation of the nature of the self; for, the self as a monad or an existent entity with an articulate unity and identity is a clear *non sequitur* from the unity and identity of the self of self-consciousness.

22. *T. & R.*, p. 326.

23. *A. & R.*, p. 117.

Are There Many Souls ?

By

G. R. MALKANI.

The idea of a soul has been distinguished from that of a self or a subject. For my present discussion, I do not admit any material difference in the meaning of these terms. I mean by them that unity of consciousness which each individual person calls his self or the "I". I shall not raise here any question whether there is any real entity which deserves to be called by that name, nor again whether our meaning of self is perfectly definite and intelligible to us and can be made so to others in terms of reflective thought. I shall take for granted for my present discussion that we all agree what sort of entity we ordinarily call our "self", and that therefore that term signifies for us something quite definite. The unity of consciousness which we call our "self" or the "I" is not further definable; and if anyone wants to know the exact meaning of these terms, he has simply to appeal to his own experience in the matter and see for himself what he means when he himself uses those terms (as he cannot help doing) in the ordinary converse of daily life.

The soul then defined in this way is some sort of entity which any person who intuits his self, or is self-conscious, cannot help regarding as real in the ordinary usage of that term. The question for us is whether any person who thus intuits his self can have any rational ground for belief in the reality of other selves just in the same sense. That he may be taken to postulate the reality of other selves in the same way as he postulates an independent physical world is perhaps undeniable. The question is whether he can justify the belief to himself on grounds of reason.

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He may adopt the stand-point of common-sense, and he may argue in some such way: I am indeed not aware of other selves as I am aware of my own self. But that is only because other selves are not my self. On the other hand, I have every reason to believe, on the ground of my own experience, that other selves exist. I have as definite a meaning for the term "I" as I have for the term "you". There might indeed be an objection that all your experience is restricted to your own states, and that therefore you can never know what does not form a state of your own being. But that is an impossible interpretation of experience. Experience would not be experience if that were so. Its essential character consists in suggesting a meaning that goes beyond what is strictly private and personal, namely the states of my self. There is therefore no contradiction in saying that, on the ground of experience, there is reason to believe that there is extramental reality, such as the physical world or other selves; or as Bradley puts it, "If experience is mine, that is no argument for what I experience being nothing but my state". (App: and Reality. P. 259).

We are not here concerned with the general interpretation of experience. That interpretation, in our opinion, would not support the view here put forward. But however that may be, we have no such experience of souls that we may deduce from that experience the extra-mental reality of those entities. We do not experience directly a soul or a self as we may be said to do a physical object. Still, if souls are really outside us, they must be capable of being directly experienced by us in some such way. We rely entirely on direct experience to posit a world outside. But there is no direct experience to conduct us to a soul outside. "There indeed you are oh souls,—but we shall never know you face to face",—that sums up our mental plight. Direct evidence however may not be the only means of proving actual exist-

ence. There might be indirect evidence. Let us therefore examine some of the arguments which are advanced to prove the reality of souls indirectly.

(a). There is first the argument based on practical considerations. It runs as follows : There are no real solipsists in behaviour. Even a supposed solipsist would like to persuade, argue and win over. He cannot do without having some sort of dealings with his fellowmen in society. But if that is so, the reality of other souls is implicitly admitted by him ; and if he asserts anything to the contrary, he is contradicting himself.

A consistent solipsist however cannot be put down in this way. If he denies the reality of other souls, he will also deny that his behaviour has anything to do with real souls at all. The so-called other souls are just creations of his experience ; and his behaviour towards them is no more real than his behaviour towards the souls created in a dream-experience.

(b). There is secondly the theoretical argument that the existence of other souls is inferred by us. Bradley puts the argument thus : "My own body is one of the groups which are formed in my experience. And it is connected, immediately and specially, with pleasure and pain, and again with sensations and volitions, as no other group can be. But, since there are other groups like my body, these must also be qualified by similar attendants. With my feelings and my volitions these groups cannot correspond.....Therefore these foreign bodies have, each of them, a foreign self of its own." (*App: & Reality*, p. 255). He further admits that this argument falls short of demonstration, because firstly the identity in the bodies is not exact, and secondly the consequence of such identity might be modified by additional conditions, making the other soul materially so different from my own that I should hesitate to give it the name of soul.

It appears to us somewhat grotesque to require exact identity in the bodies in order to argue to souls within those bodies, as though the soul is the necessary accompaniment of "just this one particular form of a body." If the argument were correct, we could never infer a soul from the body of any creatures other than man. Indeed many Christian writers do not believe that other creatures have a soul. But still they will be admitted to be as good centres of experience as man himself, and since that is our only definition of a soul, the inference will have to be extended to them also. This is however by the way. The important point to consider here is whether the soul can be proved to be the *necessary accompaniment* of any physical group whatsoever. My body is united to a soul. But there is no necessary connection between the two if we examined them as any observer would. The body will continue to be a certain physical group without the soul. It can also be a soul-less automaton or a mechanically-driven machine having no connection with any soul whatsoever. Lastly, it might also be a vehicle of the experiences of a soul. But there is no necessary connection between a body of any class or kind merely as a physical group and a soul, and there is no basis therefore for any inference from the one to the other. The attempted inference of the kind we have set forth above is theoretically quite valueless; and that is the more so, because of the impossibility of verifying the inference in any particular instance where there is a need to infer.

The form of this inference however might be somewhat modified. It might be contended that we infer a soul not from bodies identical in form, but from the intelligent behaviour of certain physical groups. We notice the behaviour of other bodies similar to our own either in form or in function. We infer that, as in our own case, such behaviour must be associated with intelligent purposes, and therefore with an intelligent being or a self. But it will be quite evident here

that there is nothing to distinguish purely mechanical behaviour from intelligent behaviour merely as behaviour. A certain behaviour is intelligent not because it is that behaviour, but because it is guided and controlled by purposes and therefore by an intelligent being. But the existence of such a being in other bodies is just the point at issue.

It may be argued that we can know *objectively* that there is a purpose behind a certain movement. Now it is indeed true that, as a matter of fact, we regard movements of certain bodies as being controlled by purposes. The primitive man went so far as to suppose that all natural changes were brought on by intelligent beings. But still purpose is essentially subjective. There can be no objective evidence of purpose. A purpose might be entertained, and yet there might be no physical movements initiated to express or to carry out that purpose, and when these movements are initiated, they are still physically possible without the purpose. There can therefore be no indubitable evidence of purpose in movements objectively known. The only indubitable evidence of purpose is the subjective fact of purposing. In fact, when I read purposes in the objective world, I really project my own purposes therein, real or imaginary. I read the evidence in the objective world of what my mind thinks is or should be the purpose. Purpose as such is never objective to any-one, and can never be thus known. The possibility therefore of any inference from behaviour to an intelligent being is ruled out. All the facts objectively known to me are lacking in the character of intelligence. They can provide no ground for any inference to that which is essentially intelligent.

(c). There is lastly the negative argument. If we supposed that there is only one soul, all possible experience would be the experience of that one soul, and there would be no experience which would fall outside it. But we cannot point

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to any one individual and say that all possible experience belongs to that individual only, and that there is no experience which falls outside him. The theory of one experient cannot be maintained.

Now it will have to be granted that there is at least one experient,—let us say, the person who raises an objection to the theory of one soul. He cannot doubt that he is an experient : for otherwise, the doubt itself would not be. The question is, what prevents him from supposing that all possible experience is his experience ? His own experience cannot prove to him that there is some other experience which falls outside his experience. If it did, then that other experience must somehow fall within his experience. His experience must reach out beyond itself ; and in thus reaching out beyond itself, it cannot fail to include that other experience. In fact, in the consciousness of its own limitation, the individual experience has already gone beyond the limitation ; and in the attempt to distinguish itself from some other experience, it has known that experience. There is no theoretical limit to the experience of any individual, however limited his powers according to his own conception. The individual is really the universal, because there is no other individual beside himself by the evidence of his own knowledge.

We have so far examined the arguments that are advanced to prove that there are many souls. We have found them unsatisfactory. It might now be contended that although we cannot prove the reality of many souls, neither can we prove the opposite thesis, namely that many souls cannot be real. They may be real, although we cannot get at them by any experience which we have. We should therefore rest satisfied with the modest conclusion that we cannot prove the reality of other souls, but neither can we prove them to be unreal. They might be real for aught we know.

We grant the supposition. Still we have a right to inquire, if we are to take our beliefs in a rational spirit, wherein such souls can be possibly distinct from one another. We can distinguish one object from another, because the objects are known by their qualities and no two objects have exactly the same qualities. Souls are not thus known, and they cannot be so distinguished. Is there anything inherent in each soul to distinguish it from every other soul ? Let us examine this point.

Souls we have said are not mysterious entities that may be regarded to be somehow different. A soul is known. The consciousness of self gives us all the indication we want of the reality of a soul. Shall we say that this consciousness resides in different bodies, and that therefore the souls are different because they are differently located in these bodies ? But although it is true that the body is an instrument of the soul's activities, the soul or the self that is aware is not itself located in any part of the body. Our intuition of self is of something that is wholly beside the body. The body is merely its instrument ; it is not a box containing it in some corner or other.

How then must we distinguish souls ? Is there anything peculiar to our own awareness of self, which, with some variation, may constitute another soul or self ? But our own consciousness of self is of something that always knows and is never an object to itself. How can this essentially un-objective being of the self have any peculiarity to distinguish it from anything ? If it had, it would forthwith become an object. It is only an object that can have any character or any peculiarity to distinguish it from something else, which in its turn must be another object. The self must necessarily stand alone, undistinguished, and unpartnered. It is true that ordinarily we distinguish one individual x from another individual y . But then we do not distinguish souls as such,

which we do not know. We distinguish certain objective characters which we assign to supposed souls. The souls are not there for us to know them, and if we persist in knowing them as distinct from ourselves and from each other, we shall only succeed in knowing certain lifeless and soulless shells. The truth is that what is distinct is so by virtue of some distinguishable content or objective limitation. It must therefore be capable of being held and contemplated as object by a subject that distinguishes it. But a soul can neither be contemplated truly by itself nor by some other soul. To distinguish a soul therefore is to kill its soulhood or its essential spirituality.

The common-sense belief in many souls requires a new interpretation accordingly. We should have to say that all these souls are essentially the same soul. This soul is the universal knower, and is indicated in each of us as the "I". What I call "myself" is exactly the same entity which you call "yourself" and which every-one calls "his self". To know this one in self-intuition is therefore to know the knower of all and the knower in all. It is the only self. This self knows through different bodies, and appears as manifold as the bodies which it assumes. Each body-soul becomes an exclusive centre of experience (the exclusiveness being wholly due to the body), it becomes a historical individuality, and the popular imagination regards it as an ultimate, eternal, and unyielding atom of being. But all the while, the true soul-substance is one and the same. It is not lodged in any body. Indeed, so far as it knows through any particular body, it may be said to be limited by that body, which limitation we express by saying that A can never know what B knows, and *vice-versa*. But even then it is not truly limited; for it knows the limitation, and distinguishes its own experience from the experience of other individuals. It could not do this, if it were really limited by its own

body-experience. The finite individual is thus seen to be, in his true nature, not finite. It is the infinite. There is nothing to limit his vision. He knows all limitations and goes beyond them.

We thus conclude that there cannot be many selfs. The proper question to raise is not whether you and others exist beside me. There is a sense in which you and others can certainly be admitted so to exist. The question is whether you and others can be different from myself in your truly spiritual natures. We have seen that there can be no difference here, and that therefore all the selfs are really one self, and that self is neither mine nor yours, but is the self of all of us. Still, as the only valid starting point is that of individual experience, it would be quite legitimate to say that the self of the individual is the Absolute Self. This however must not mislead any-one into thinking that each individual can take his self to be the Absolute Self, and that therefore there can be many absolute selfs. There is no possible point of view from which there can be many real selfs at all. Start where we will, the one will always absorb the many.

Appearance

By

RASVIHARY DAS.

Students of philosophy are familiar with the distinction between reality and appearance. The idea of appearance is very prominent in the philosophy of Bradley. It is present even in certain types of modern realism in which a distinction is made between *sensa* and the things known through them. In Vedantism too the idea of appearance is very important inasmuch as it expresses for it the character of the world as opposed to the ultimate reality. We propose to examine in this paper the idea of appearance and see whether it can be used as a valid metaphysical category. It will probably be enough for our purpose to study the notion (of appearance) as used in the systems of thought referred to above.

The fact of illusion primarily gives rise to the idea of appearance as distinguished from that of reality. Whenever there is an illusion we are presented with an appearance which does not correspond to the thing to which the appearance is referred. But an appearance need not always be illusory. In veridical perceptions things are believed to appear just as they are, and in these cases we may suppose that appearances are real appearances. But as from the cases of illusion we see that the being of a thing may be different from its appearance, we come to form the idea of appearance as distinguished from, though not necessarily contrasted with, that of reality. The term 'appearance' has thus come to stand for that which is given in knowledge with no assurance as to whether or not it is real in fact.

The idea of appearance however has not got exactly the same significance in different systems. For the Vedanta the

category of appearance covers up the entire sphere of knowable universe. It is all appearance and stands in sharp contrast to the absolute (Brahma) which alone is real and which negates all empirical existence. Here the relation between appearance and reality is that of opposition. The truth of reality shines when the falsity of appearance has come to be recognised.

On the opposite pole stand the realists. They do not as a rule use the term appearance ; their favourite expression is sense-datum or sensum, although Mr. Reid has suggested the word appearance for it. (*Knowledge and Truth*, p. 141). A sensum is that which is given in a sense-perception as distinguished from the act of perceiving. The realists believe in the reality of physical objects. But the physical objects are to be distinguished from sensa. So sensa may very well be conceived as appearances in which real objects appear to us, but there is no suggestion that these appearances (sensa) are not real. In fact according to some realists sensa are the ultimate elements of reality out of which various physical objects are constructed. Those who believe that sensa are only logical essences do not of course think that sensa exist ; but they do not by any means suggest that sensa are not real. They are real in the world of subsistence and may be considered as a sort of eternal objects.

Bradley strikes a middle path. Although he condemns appearance as too full of contradictions to be wholly real, he protests vigorously against the idea that appearances are not real at all. He thinks that appearances, though in themselves falling short of reality, are retained as transformed and harmonised in the absolute. The absolute of Bradley comprehends and retains all appearances whereas the absolute of the Vedanta rejects and negates them all. Unlike however the sensa of the realists, the appearances of Bradley are not real in their own right.

By Bradley and the Vedanta the idea of appearance is applied to that which cannot stand the test of reality. According to Bradley non-contradiction or harmony is the test of reality. But the world as conceived in terms of thought is found to be infected with self-discrepancy. According to the Vedanta ultimate reality belongs to that which does not depend on another for its manifestation. It is the pure subject alone which shines by its own light and is not dependent upon anything else for its manifestation. The world comes to us in the form of an object and as such it lacks the principle of self-manifestation. It is only in the knowing consciousness of the subject that an object as object realises its being. Pure subjectivity or consciousness being the ultimate nature of reality, the world of objects can only have the status of a false appearance.

It is not our purpose here to examine the validity of the different arguments which Bradley and the Vedanta have used in order to show that the world of everyday thought and experience is an appearance. Our immediate object is to examine whether the idea of appearance itself is a valid metaphysical idea. By a metaphysical idea we understand an idea which can be applicable to reality.

It may be objected here that both Bradley and the Vedanta do not profess to apply the notion of appearance to reality. What meaning is there then in examining it as an idea applicable to reality ?

In answer to this objection we have to point out that although the idea of appearance is not applied to reality, in their sense of the term, both Bradley and the Vedanta have made use of the term appearance in order to signify certain actual facts by it. If the idea of appearance did not stand for any fact in reality, it would be an empty idea devoid of all meaning. Therefore the idea of appearance must have been used with a view to express some aspect of

reality in some sense. We wish only to consider whether it can stand for any intelligible aspect of reality. That some part or aspect of reality was sought to be covered by the idea of appearance is evident from the fact that both Bradley and the Vedanta deny that an appearance is absolutely nothing. It is not altogether unreal. In almost identical terms they ask 'if an appearance were nothing, how could it appear ?'

But if appearance is not unreal, why is it not identified with reality ? It is not identified with reality because it cannot stand the test of reality. So it is found necessary to conceive of appearance as different from both reality and unreality. But can we really conceive of a third something which is neither real nor unreal. The Vedanta gives us the instance of an illusory object in order to facilitate our understanding of this concept. According to the Vedanta an illusory object is neither real nor unreal. It is not real, because it actually disappears when the illusion disappears and is negated in the correcting judgment. It is not also altogether unreal, because if it were completely unreal, it should not be seen at all. We cannot see an object which is not there. The illusory object is not even a mental idea, because an idea has never an external appearance. So the Vedanta maintains that there can be a thing which is neither real nor unreal and which may therefore be called indescribable.

Bradley tries to solve this difficulty of conceiving appearance as different from both absolute reality and complete unreality by his doctrine of the degrees of reality. Nothing in the world is, according to him, absolutely real or unreal. There is more or less of reality in everything in the world. An appearance is thus more or less real according to the degree of its freedom from self-contradiction.

But can we really accept either the Vedantic view that

there is an indescribable kind of being which is neither real nor unreal or the solution of Bradley that there are only degrees of reality? We find it impossible to conceive of different kinds of being; being as such must be of one sort only. Things differ in their specific characters, but they never differ, if they are real, in their being. So we cannot think of two kinds of being, one real and the other illusory. Illusory being is no being at all. If it is asked 'if an illusory object is not, how is it that it is seen at all?' We have to say that it is the very characteristic of illusion that in it we seem to see things which are not there. No further metaphysical account can be given of an illusory object.

The same difficulties present themselves in connexion with the degrees of reality. There can be more or less of a thing that admits of quantitative measurement. There can be more or less of height or weight or any other measurable character which a thing may possess; but if a thing is real, it must possess being in the absolute sense. Our idea of being is simple and unanalysable; it must be either affirmed or denied. There is no *via media* between reality and unreality. If a thing does not satisfy our test of reality, the only legitimate conclusion that we can draw is that it is not real at all. Hence we see that the idea of appearance as neither real nor unreal or as real in varying degrees is a spurious idea.

When we come to consider appearance as *sensum*, we find ourselves faced with similar difficulties. We know that a *sensum* is defined as that which appears in a sense-perception as distinguished from the act of perceiving, and we shall presently see that it is impossible to find a suitable metaphysical status for all *sensa* as such. A *sensum* can be either physical or mental or logical; we cannot think of a fourth alternative. But a *sensum* as such cannot be physical, because in the place of a round physical thing, we are sometimes

presented with an elliptical sensum and it is impossible to identify the two. It cannot be mental, because what is mental never has an external appearance. It cannot also be logical, for a logical entity is never found confined to a particular time and place, and a sensum is certainly referred to a particular time and place.

The difficulty arises from the fact that sensum is present (i. e. there is a sensuous appearance) in illusion as well as in veridical perception. The appearance in veridical perception can very well be identified with the object of perception. The object being real, the appearance is also real. But in illusion the appearance or the sensum is certainly different in its proper character from the object which is actually present before the percipient subject. Without such objective consideration a veridical perception cannot be distinguished from an illusion. But both in veridical perception and in illusion the sensum as sensum has absolutely the same character. Merely as contents of sense there is nothing to distinguish an illusory object from a real one. The snake of illusion as well as the snake of veridical perception has the same appearance of a real snake. But metaphysically there is the greatest of difference between an illusory appearance and a real one. In veridical perception the appearance or the sensum is real, being identical with the object before the perceiver. But in illusion the sensum is merely a false appearance which cannot in its proper character be identified with anything real in the world. The idea of a snake in the mind of the percipient subject or the existence of a real snake somewhere else in the world cannot lend any real being to the illusory snake which is seen in an illusion. The sensum (in illusion) as qualified by its attributed position in time and space cannot at all be found in reality. Thus it is clear that a sensum is sometimes real and sometimes unreal. But since there is nothing common between reality and unreality, it is impossi-

ble to find a common metaphysical status for all *sensa* as such.

For the purpose of this paper we have assumed that there are veridical perceptions as well as illusions, and since *sensa* are present in both, we have maintained, we cannot give a common ontological character to all *sensa* as such. But it may be argued that there is nothing in a perception as such to show whether it is veridical or illusory and as, therefore, we do not know whether in any perception we have got a real object or not, we have to start our metaphysical speculation about the world only with *sensa* and construct real objects out of them.

But how should we think of these *sensa*? As we cannot think of anything as neither real nor unreal, we have to think of *sensa* as either real or unreal. If they are unreal, we cannot do the work or our construction with them; nothing can be constructed out of unreal entities. If they are real, what is the use of further construction when we have got reality already in them? Besides if *sensa* as such were all real, there would be no illusion, as every perception would have its own real object. But can we truly think of them as real? Mutually conflicting *sensa*, such as yellow and white, round and elliptical, are referred to one and the same place and it is impossible that they should all be real.

The idea of *sensum* may be useful, in epistemology, as standing for the common object of sense-perception, before the distinction of truth and falsity has yet arisen. But the distinction is bound to arise. We may differ as to what tests should be used in order to distinguish a right perception from a wrong one. But there is no doubt or difference of opinion as regards the fact that some perceptions are right and some perceptions are wrong, and all perceptions are not equally right or equally wrong. Such distinction of rightness and wrongness, made by whatever tests,

is significant only by an objective reference. There is nothing right or wrong merely in seeing. It is the nature of the object seen that makes a particular seeing either right or wrong. A perception is right when the object as seen exists in fact and a perception is wrong when the object as seen does not exist. Hence if there is a wrong perception or illusion, as we believe there are many, the *sensum* appearing in it cannot be credited with any real existence. There is nothing else to make its illusory character significant. From this point of view the bent appearance of a straight stick thrust into water will be considered an illusory appearance, because the object as appearing in perception does not exist.

There is only one real world and if this world cannot accommodate an illusory *sensum* as qualified by its attributed position in time and space, it is clear that the *sensum* does not belong to it, i. e. it is nothing in reality. Since a *sensum* can be real as well as illusory, it is easy to see that a *sensum qua sensum* cannot have a real metaphysical character, obviously because there is nothing continuous with, or common between, reality and unreality. Hence we conclude that appearance conceived even as *sensum* is not a genuine metaphysical idea.

Logic and Internal Relations.

By

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This paper proposes to investigate some of the presuppositions of Logic with the view of ascertaining their compatibility with the doctrine of internal relations.

By Logic is meant proof or demonstration. Very little consideration is needed to understand that this conception of Logic is more fundamental than any that can be suggested. Suppose we fall out on this very issue of the conception of Logic as this or that, we cannot hope to settle the dispute but by arguing, by adducing reasons acceptable to both parties. It is evident therefore that the conception of Logic as Proof is more primitive than any other. It is not here contended that this is the only source of our knowledge but that this is the only way of convincing others and even ourselves too on most occasions.

Of Proof, there seem to be only two modes—Inclusion and Exclusion. The first is best understood as the traditional syllogistic mode of inference because it brings the case in dispute under a well-established and accepted rule i.e. by showing that this is but an instance, a repetition of the general rule and as such is included under it.

The second operates when there is no such explicitly well-defined rule from the outset. An isolated complex situation is analysed and from the known inadequacy or irrelevancy of certain elements in it to account for the determination of the situation some one factor is assigned as supplying the ground of it. Or it may be that a number of alternatives, which together exhaust all possible modes, are framed, and from their known consequences, all but one of them are

ruled out, excluded, resulting in the establishment of one. This sort of reasoning is the one really employed in all induction, and roughly corresponds to what Johnson calls *Demonstrative Induction*. From the point of view of leading to new information this is more fruitful than the previous one. In contrast to the *Inclusive type*, proof here consists in the elimination, exclusion of all but one. The rigour lies in three points :—

- (i) isolation and accurate characterisation of the complex situation ;
- (ii) the exhaustiveness of the factors or alternatives applied ;
- (iii) and their precise values.

These three cannot be strictly guaranteed in a concrete application of this type. But this does in no way militate against its being considered a rigorous method. To illustrate, take the instances used to establish the law that the rate at which a body falls in *vacuo* to the earth is independent of its weight. The complex situation is analysed into certain determinate factors as distance from the earth, absence of air, substance and shape of the falling body and its weight. We now vary the weight, and find that the variation has no effect on the rate of falling. It is excluded as irrelevant.

Or take for instance Kant's method which may be indicated thus :

- (i) He starts from the indubitable fact of the existence of *a priori* synthetic judgments in Arithmetic, Geometry and Physics. This being a present indubitable fact whatever is required for its constitution must also be granted. It may be noted that he never doubted either the synthetic character of these propositions nor their existence, and hence the question that he propounded to himself in the "*Critique*" was not whether the said propositions were synthetic or existed, but only "*How they are possible*" i. e. which hypo-

thesis would secure such results.

(ii) Therefore as a second step we may mention, he considered the alternatives already in the field—empirical generalisation and analytical concept, and ruled them out on their known and accepted character of a posteriority, and lack of syntheticity. His arguments regarding Space and Time are cases in point.

(iii) Thirdly, it is not possible to refer these to either things-in-themselves or their determinations or relations, for in that case they cannot be known and predicated a priori—as the said propositions undoubtedly are.

(iv) Fourthly, he maintains that there remains only one alternative that of taking them as categories of the mind. Our analysis of Kant's method also effectively disposes of the contention that his method was not logical but epistemological. There are all the signs of a practical application of the Exclusive type of proof. His characterisation of pure Mathematics as a body of synthetic propositions can be questioned, as has been done by Russell, and the exhaustiveness of the alternatives considered may not be granted.

From the foregoing it is evident that we cannot accept the conception of Logic held by some Mathematicians the Logicians especially. They maintain that all the mathematical sciences can be deduced from a few propositions and primitive ideas. And some of these notions are that of class, order, aggregate, relations, etc. It may at once be pointed out that what is Logic in such a view is not the propositions and the primitive ideas, however few they may be, but the demonstration of the rigour with which conclusions follow from certain premises, whatever they may be. The primitive notions and propositions themselves cannot be claimed to be logic or logical, for it is at least theoretically possible to start with some other primitive notions and propositions, and proceed logically to draw within the conse-

quences and construct a system of Pure Mathematics. The choice of the primitive notions is bound to be arbitrary. The result would be that we shall be dumped with more Logics than we can conveniently accommodate and assimilate. What is more, another Logic shall have to be requisitioned to co-ordinate and judge these logics. It is evident therefore that the conception of Logic as Proof is more fundamental.

For a similar reason we have also to reject the conception, which sees no difference between Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. The latter is the analysis of a given complex with a view to disengage the various factors that together condition it, and ascertain their validity. In drawing conclusions, in eliminating alternatives and arriving at the valid factors, the Exclusive type of proof is employed. It may be, that in analysing and investigating all cognition, knowledge in general, reasoning too is included, but nevertheless all investigation employs logical proofs, and so presupposes the validity of such a procedure. In a sense the Theory of Knowledge can very well be called the Logic of the Real, for knowledge-relation being co-extensive with all objects, whatever is true of knowledge must be true of the objects as well, though not *vice versa*. If logical proofs were not applied and considered valid in the inquiry about knowledge, it is difficult to see what can guarantee the validity of the procedure and the conclusion. There is no reason why it should be convincing.

§2. Such a Logic has its own presuppositions or postulates. By a presupposition it is not meant that something is hypothetically held, but a proposition or principle without which logic is impossible but which nevertheless is not demonstrated by logic itself. Of these three kinds may be distinguished:—viz., Epistemic, Constructive, and Ontological. Of the first, we can formulate one at least; "Nothing is self-evident." The reason for any assertion is not contained

within itself. This can indifferently be called the category of Self-transcendence, or the principle of mediation which is preliminary to all reasoning. Very little consideration is needed to see that without this no reasoning is possible. If everything or anything were self-evident, no proof shall be asked for any assertion, and none will be assigned. Consequently, no tests will come to be formulated for judging any proof as valid and exclude others. There will be no occasion for Logic.

(ii) To the constitutive belong the Principle of Non-Contradiction etc. to which all the other principles of inference have to be reduced. The fallacies are but violations of this principle, the only difference between a fallacy and contradiction is that in the former, though there is contradiction in fact, in procedure, it is not manifest to the person. The Principle does not mean that we cannot affirm and negate at the same time, but that we cannot affirm and negate the same predicate of a subject at once, for it would be asserting the being and non-being of the predicate at the same time. So Non-contradiction is not our subjective inability, but the inability of things to be and not to be at the same time. This is a presupposition in this sense that though it is drawn upon in all inference, it is itself never proved. Any attempted proof will involve the use of the very principle sought to be proved.

(iii) The third is an ontological presupposition, and one with which we are chiefly concerned here. It is that things or entities are repeatable, i. e. that there are universals. By this it is meant that reasoning requires the presence of identical entities in different complexes. The entities may be conceptual or otherwise; their ontological status is indifferent to logic. They can be called universals provided we keep away the notion of their inhering in particulars. This may or may not be true, but for reasoning this is not

required. What is required is their identical repetition in different complexes.

It is also necessary not to confound this postulate with that of the law of identity, which on a very favourable interpretation would mean that A an entity has a fixed value, is identical throughout the universe of discourse, but says nothing about the existence of universals or logical atoms.

Which are these fortunate universals, and how many they are, are questions which do not concern us here. Their nature and number depend upon concrete situations. We have only to realise that the existence of such identities is essential for any reasoning.

In both the types of Proof-Inclusion and Exclusion the use of universals is involved. In the first, we can include a particular instance under a general rule just because it is a repetition of it in another complex; its presence in that situation does in no way transform it. In the second Exclusive type it is involved in a two-fold way. (i) Analysis and isolation does not change the constituents of a situation; the same identical entities are present before and after the analysis, else the very analysis will so change the situation, that we cannot even assert that we are analysing with what we began. (ii) Secondly, the known and ascertained values of some of the factors or alternatives should be capable of being substituted and deducted. But this is impossible if things were not to be repeated, or their nature got impaired and their value altered when taken out of their original situation.

The existence of universals is a presupposition of logic in this sense that it is not proved by logic. It will be a serious misunderstanding of the function of Induction, if it were thought to prove the existence of the universals. It is not to prove their existence but only to dis-engage them from a complex mass containing adventitious factors. In

such a process of disengagement it employs the method of exclusion, which has been shown to require the use of identical entities to be deducted away. "Thus any survey which is analytic, so that it gives foothold for demonstration, or any definition following upon such an analysis presupposes the repetition of the same essences in different contexts.

§3. This position which demands a world of identically repeatable entities is incompatible with either of the following positions :—

(a) absolute particularity or uniqueness, and (b) an all-embracing Universal.

Taking the first alternative viz. that of absolute momentariness or particularity, we need not question the arguments by which this position has been arrived at, or even its being true to facts. We are here interested in showing that absolute momentariness will make reasoning impossible. The absolute momentarist cannot use the two types of Proof, Inclusion and Exclusion. The first because no rule can be framed without universals, for a connection between two discrete particulars cannot be justified as holding good of other particulars. The rule cannot be applied too, for when a particular case is sought to be included under a rule, it is because of the identity of the entity in the rule as well as in the case under consideration. This *ex hypothesi* is here lacking.

Exclusion too is impossible, for that is possible in a complex situation where all alternatives or factors but one are ruled out, because of their *known* significance and character in some other situations. But for a thorough-going momentarist, the factors occurring in this present situation are not the same as those already known, and so they cannot be isolated and excluded.

Lastly, if there were no universals how can one feel justified in asking others to be convinced of what is true to

oneself at a particular time only. A defence may be put up by saying that one can carry on the game without really believing the possibility of any persuasion. But as long as we are in the game it is proper that we observe the rules of the game, and do not remind ourselves too often that it is a game.

The other alternative is that of an all-embracing concrete universal. The basis of that theory is the doctrine of Internal Relations. Plainly stated, it means that the natures of the relata are constituted by their relations, i. e. the related terms are so gripped in, and modified, that when they are taken out of this collocation, they lose their nature. In some other complex, in some other relation, they are bound to be different. But this is at best only to state a part of the theory. It also means that every relation is grounded in the nature of the related terms. The very nature, the complexity of the relata is such, that the precise relation in question subsists between them alone. Change the terms, and the relation has *ipso facto* to change. If A and B are two terms which together sustain a relation C, the doctrine of internal relation demands two things : (1) that A and B cannot be repeated, i. e. they cannot be what they are outside this relation C ; and (ii) the relation C itself cannot subsist between any terms except A and B ; i. e. it also cannot be repeated.

The whole notion can further be clarified by considering the concrete universal as a heirarchical series. A heirarchical series is possible when the members comprising the series satisfy the following conditions.

(i) First, the members of the series must occur at some assignable interval among themselves ;

(ii) And second, all of them must bear an assignable distance-relation to the first or the last member of the series, such that the said distance is identical for no two members.

Condition (1) by itself, would give us a group of discrete entities, a crowd, but not a graduation. Condition (ii) guarantees that the members occur at various intervals such that, given one distance-relation, one and only one of the members of the series can be picked up. Its position in the series is inexorably fixed. The notion can be illustrated in the case of the ordinal numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., and spatial-distance.

So, each member in an ordered whole sustaining a unique relation to the first member of the series, is differently constituted because of the doctrine of internal relations. No two entities have the same relation, for they occur at fixed places fixed in a whole, and so no two facts, however similar can hope to have an identical relation, and consequently cannot be identical in constitution. This is to say that everything is unique, and nothing is repeatable.

The criticism that was passed against unique momentariness, viz. the inability of framing general rules, and the impossibility of applying the two types of Proof-Inclusion and Exclusion apply here too with equal force.

The only difference between the unique momentaristic position and that of the concrete universalist is that in the latter there is only one particular, more often called the individual. In both the cases there can be no universals. This means that any argument, whatever be its starting point, cannot stop short, cannot be valid unless the whole field has been traversed, a full circle has been described. We can further question the manner in which we can pass from one member to another, as the whole is not yet given in its entirety at the outset, but itself stands in need of being worked out. So the whole or the universal is not available for proof, and when it has been worked out, there is no use for it, for it is required only in the procedure. The pre-supposition of universals or identical entities alone will help.

It may be urged that the ideal of course is such a complete whole, but in procedure practical considerations put convenient limits. And that though, the terms and relations cannot be repeated, i. e. occur once again in any other complex without undergoing a change in their nature, it is possible to ignore these modifications, and to treat them as repeatables. This is tantamount to giving up the position of internal relations. It may also be pointed out that procedure is possible on the presupposition of repeatable identities while the conclusion sought to be reached is that of one Individual. As the latter is engendered by, and dependent upon the former, it is hardly necessary to point out which of the two is to be accepted.

The presupposition of Logic would be adequately met, if the repeatable entities were mere Essences without any claim or suggestion to existence, their chief character being their identity in different complexes.

The conceptions of self and God in Berkeley.

By
D. M. DUTT.

There is an aspect of the philosophy of Berkeley which should be of immense interest to the students of contemporary philosophy. It concerns Berkeley's theory of spiritual substances—self and God.

It is generally known to students of history of philosophy that while Locke believes in two kinds of substances, Berkeley believes in one and Hume believes in none. But it is not realised very clearly that though Berkeley believes in the existence of spiritual substance his conception of a spirit is a peculiar one, that is as different from that of Locke, as from those of the many idealists who either preceded or succeeded him.

In his "Principles of human knowledge," Berkeley defines a spirit as an essentially active substance which is the cause of all ideas,—those of imagination as well as those of sensation. He also states that this is the only kind of substance we can reasonably believe in. If Berkeley rested here, his conception of a spirit would be neither difficult of understanding nor very different from those of ordinary thinker. But he lays down two other principles which make the conception of spirit very peculiar, if not positively unintelligible.

These principles are :—(1) The nominalistic theory that universal ideas are abstract ideas which the mind has no power to conceive ; and (2) the theory, very emphatically asserted, that an idea is essentially passive and static and that consequently we can not at all have any *idea* of a spirit.

He utilises the first principle in proving that matter is

inconceivable and therefore cannot exist. Matter he holds, is thought of as the general substance which is not identical with any particular substance like, iron, copper or gold, but as that which is common to all of these. Though in our ignorance we believe that such a general conception can be formed by the mind, we find, however, on careful and sincere introspection that the mind can think only of a particular thing made of gold, copper or iron, but cannot form the abstract idea of something which is not any of these particular things, but yet exists in all of them. For the formation of such a general idea, the mind is required to abstract from each of these particular things their particular colour, size, weight etc. and to think of something which has colour but none of the particular colours we perceive, which has size, but not any of the particular sizes we can mention and which has weight but not any particular weight. Mind is, therefore, incapable of forming the abstract general idea of matter. Being unthinkable matter cannot be thought to exist. Berkeley, therefore, says, "If we enquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense. . . . And is not this direct repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?"¹

Now this principle of Berkeley (viz. that the mind cannot form an abstract idea of the kind of general notion) though so explicitly applied by him for the reputation of the concep-

1. Principles of Human knowledge, par. 17.

tion of matter is not so fully applied to the conception of a spirit. But as this nominalistic principle forms a cornerstone of his philosophy we cannot think that he would ever ignore it, with respect to any of his conceptions or that he would resist any of the logical conclusions following from it.

When we try, however, to apply this principle to the conception of spiritual substance we get a result which would most probably disappoint the philosopher, though he might not disown it. For we find that just the conception of material substance involves a general abstract idea of matter which the mind has no power to form, the conception of spiritual substance also involves a general abstract idea of spirit, which also according to the same principle the mind cannot form. And if again material substance does not exist because it is inconceivable, spiritual substance also does not exist because it is inconceivable. In other words, spiritual substance conceived as a general substance is unthinkable and cannot be thought to exist.

Berkeley might perhaps, try to avert this suicidal result of his theory of abstract ideas by saying that by spirit he does not mean any genus under which all spirits would come, but only an individual spiritual substance like a self or God. But this defence can scarcely be accepted. Because in the definition of a spirit we find him saying, "by the word *spirit* we mean only that which thinks, wills and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term." And does not this notion of a spirit also involve an abstraction and generalisation? How can we think of a spirit that is the *common* substratum of those different activities of thinking, willing and perceiving? Surely, not by thinking of it as identical with the momentary substratum of a fleeting act of thinking, willing or perceiving, but by thinking of it as that which is the *abiding* substratum *common* to all of these acts. And thinking of this kind involves an abstraction

and the formation of a general idea. The notion of an individual spirit also depends, therefore, on abstraction, and if abstraction of this kind, is impossible, as Berkeley in other contexts so strongly asserts it to be, then a spiritual substance is as unthinkable as a material one; and if the existence of the latter is denied on this ground, that of a spiritual substance also has to be denied. To be plain, the self conceived as the common substratum of all activities of the mind and God, conceived as the common cause of all the ideas of sensation, are both unthinkable, being abstract notions and therefore they do not exist.

This suicidal logical conclusion of the first principle will, however, be apparently set at naught by the second principle we have mentioned above. For according to it an idea being *passive* and inert cannot represent a spirit, which is essentially *active* and consequently we cannot have any *idea* of spiritual substance. So Berkeley can say in defence of the existence of self and God, that they are not at all known through ideas,—general or particular—and, therefore, it is meaningless to say that as we cannot have a general *idea* of self or God, they do not exist. As a spirit is not known through an idea, there is no change of the knowledge of a spirit depending upon any abstraction or generalisation. The above criticism, therefore, falls to the ground.

But this defence, coming from the second principle would have been very apt and satisfactory had it not been for the fact that Berkeley himself does not always clearly realise this principle with all its logical implications. It is true that in explaining this principle he emphatically asserts that a spirit can never be known as an idea or through an idea and that its existence is to be judged otherwise, namely from the knowledge of its effects or activities such as thinking, willing, sensations etc. But still he seems to forget this principle in other connections. For he describes the self as the

common substratum of all mental activities and conceives God as the "one, Eternal, Infinitely wise, Good and Perfect" and as one "who works all in all", and "by whom all things consist".

Now if a spirit can never be known through an idea, there being nothing in common between the two how can a spirit be known as remaining the same through its changing activities or as being eternal, infinite, perfect etc. or as being one "by whom all things consist"? How can unity infinity, perfection be known except through ideas? If so, how can they give us the knowledge of any spirit-self or God? Consistency with the second principle would demand that we should not speak of any *conception* of a spirit and should far less predicate of it any attribute which can be known only as or through an idea. Berkeley is not therefore, consistent with his principles.

But if Berkeley is inconsistent, what should be his theory of spirits consistent with the two principles we have mentioned above? To answer this question we have to understand very clearly how according to Berkeley, spirits are known? A spirit is known, says, Berkeley, not through the intervention of any idea but directly through its perceiving, willing or thinking activity. That is to say, as the essence of a spirit is activity, we feel the existence of the spirit when we feel its activity. But this is possible only when a spirit is to know itself. I can feel only my own existence when I think, will or perceive. How am I to know other spirits—the spirits of other persons or the Divine spirit?

In reply to this question Berkeley says that the existence of other spirits is known "by their operations or the ideas by them evocited in us."² "I perceive" says he "several

motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, *like myself*, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is *not immediate*, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant *signs*"³ Again with regard to God or the Divine spirit also he says—"Hence it is evident that God is known as *certainly and immediately as any other mind* or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves".⁴ (Italics ours).

It appears from these words, that according to Berkeley, the existence of other spirit is not immediately known; it is inferred from the effects, i.e. the ideas produced by them in our minds. The existence of the Divine Spirit is also inferred from the effects produced by it. Though in the passage quoted above he says that God is known "immediately", he does not mean thereby that he is directly perceived; he simply means that He is known without much difficulty or delay. Otherwise Berkeley could not say that God is known in the *same way as spirits, other than ourselves*, are known. That God is known inferentially from His effects as manifested by the phenomena of Nature is evident, beyond all doubts, from other well-known passages, which need not be quoted here.

Now, if we try to deduce the conceptions of self and God from this theory about the knowledge of spirits, we obtain strange results. It is found that the only possible way in which I can conceive my self would be as an activity (of thinking, willing or perceiving) the existence of which is directly felt. It is doubtful whether I can think of it even

3. *Ibid*, par. 145.

4. *Ibid*, par. 147.

as a substance that supports such an activity. Because the *activity* of the self is alone directly felt. The existence of the substratum of such an activity can be proved, if at all, not by direct feeling, but by implication or inference (e.g. an activity must belong to some substance ; hence the thinking activity implies a substance to which it belongs). But an inference being a process of mediate knowledge necessarily involves ideas. And if we have an *idea* of a substance—and not a direct feeling of it—then that substance cannot be an active or spiritual substance, for according to Berkeley there can be no *idea* of a spirit. Consequently the substance whose existence is proved by inference is anything but the self,—it is a false shadow of the self that tries to usurp the place of the self. The real self is, therefore, never known as a substance. Similarly unity, continuity and other properties, which Berkeley seems to ascribe to the self fail to give a knowledge of the real self. My real self is, therefore, known as the activities of thinking, willing etc. which can be directly felt, but which cannot be expressed by ideas or concepts.

But what then can we know about other spirits and God ? As we can never feel the internal activities of another spirit, we cannot have any direct knowledge about it. And the mediate knowledge that, Berkeley thinks, we have of another spirit being, as already shown, necessarily involved in ideas and concepts does not give us a genuine knowledge of that spirit. What then can we really know about other spirits or God ? Nothing, except a few symbols. The ideas, with the help of which we try to infer their existence, may be taken as symbols or signs which may help us to realise that there are spirits, which possess activities like ourselves. To know other spirits we have really to transfer through imagination, our own activities to other centres. Consequently we can imagine other spirits as having only those qualities the existence of which we can *feel* in our selves.

The qualities which we do not feel in ourselves cannot be understood as being in other spirits; for we have to depend on our own selves alone in understanding a spirit. It follows, therefore, that infinity, omnipotence, omniscience etc. which are ascribed to the Divine spirit or God can be understood only if they are known to exist in us. God and other spirits can be understood, therefore, only as series of activities, like those we feel in our selves.

But even this meagre knowledge of other spirits and God is possible only if we can really *imagine* the existence of spiritual activities in other centres. The objection may be raised that imagination cannot work without ideas and that the imagination of spiritual activities is, after all, having ideas of such activities, which is believed to be abjured by Berkeley. And then we have to confess that we cannot even imagine the existence of other spirits. Berkeley's idealism would then be reduced to solipsism pure and simple.

Strange as these conclusions might appear to the students of Berkeley's philosophy, they are the only logical conclusions from the two principles standing on which he refutes materialism and establishes the existence of spirits.

In conclusion we may sum up the results of our investigation. It is commonly known that Berkeley believes in the existence of spiritual substances. Berkeley's statements regarding this matter also would seem to support this opinion. But if we look sufficiently deep and try to understand his conception in the light of the two main principles mentioned above, we find that Berkeley would not be consistent to entertain any common conception of a spiritual substance which has to depend upon any *idea*, far less an *abstract* idea, of a spirit or a substance. To be consistent, Berkeley can only feel the existence of his *own* self; he cannot even prove the existence of other spirits or God as such a proof has to depend upon imagination or inference which again

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involves ideas. But his own self also is known not as a substance but *felt* only as a series of changing activities. This would remind one of Berkeley's conception of Reality as change, the existence of which can be known not through concepts, but through direct intuition ; but more specially of Gentile's theory of mind as a pure act which is essentially subjective and can never be known as an *object*.

Sensa.

By

D. G. LONDHE.

The problem of Sensa arises in the treatment of the problem of perception. Perception, as ordinarily analysed, reveals a distinction of what perceives and what is perceived. This distinction is variously described as the distinction between act of awareness and object of awareness, or the one between the subject and the object. If I am aware of blue, my awareness of blue, will be analysed from the standpoint of common-sense and also from that of the philosophy of common-sense, into the act of being aware of blue, on the one hand, and the blue patch, on the other. It will be observed that, on this analysis, the blue patch as it 'appears' to me, is taken as being identical with the blue patch as it 'is' in itself. Further reflection, however, creates a suspicion that the blue patch as it appears, is, in some respects at least, different from the blue patch as it is in itself. Supposing that the blue patch in question is the surface of a book, its appearance will not be strictly rectangular in shape, when the book is seen from a side, while its surface is rectangular. Again, if the book is seen from a distance it will appear smaller in size. So also the appearance of a penny is elliptical, while the penny itself is round. This distinction between an appearance of an object and the object itself is hardly recognised in the case of the manifold objects of ordinary experience, but it is marked in the case, say, of a stick half-immersed in water, and it becomes glaringly evident in the case of a white shell which appears yellow to a man who has taken santonine. Thus the two-fold analysis of sensuous perception into an act on the one hand, and the object, on

the other, is found inadequate in contemporary philosophy and a further distinction on the object-side itself, is made between sense-data or sensible appearances and the physical reality, that is, in other words, between *sensa* and the physical object. The *sensa*, thus, are the data which are given (*prima facie*, only, according to some) by means of the sense-organs of sight, hearing, touch etc. and also those given in motor and organic sensations. It is the *sensa* which we immediately perceive and about which we make such judgments as "I see a table", "I hear a bell" etc. The problem of the *sensa* may be stated thus: What is precisely the nature of the *sensa*? Are the *sensa* physical or mental? Or, in other words what is the status of the *sensa* in the world? It will be easily seen that any attempt to arrive at a solution of this problem will have to take account of, and critically consider the question of the relation of *sensa* to physical objects and to minds.

For the sake of convenience of treatment, I will make Dr. Broad's theory of *sensa* my starting point. To begin with, why at all it is necessary to distinguish between a *sensum* and a material thing, and recognise the *sensum* as an 'object' distinct from the physical thing? The grounds that he adduces are firstly, that there must be *something* which has the quality which the thing appears to have; when a penny looks elliptical, there must be *something* which has the quality of being elliptical, as the penny obviously has not that quality, but it has the other quality of being round. Secondly, according to the scientists, physical objects are not "really" hot or red, that is, temperature or colours do not really belong to matter. Now, if this be true, there must be some objects other than the physical ones, which have colours and temperature. These objects are *sensa*. The *sensa*, therefore, must be recognised as being distinct from the physical objects. Thus the *sensa* are called "the

objective constituents of perceptual situations" and the physical things are described as "the external reference of the perceptual situations." The *sensa* have such properties as shape, size, hardness, colour, loudness etc. They are "concrete particular existents, like coloured or hot patches, noises etc." We get a brief, and yet, clear statement of Dr. Broad's theory of *sensa* in the following: This theory allows that the objective constituents of perceptual situations really do have all the positive characteristics which on careful inspection they seem to have. And it allows that these characteristics inhere in these objective constituents in the straightforward dyadic way in which the common-sense supposes them to do. But...it cannot admit that the visual situations of a number of observers, who say that they are "seeing the same object", contain a common objective constituent.....On this theory, then, the objective constituents of most, if not all, perceptual situations *cannot* be spatio-temporal parts of physical objects. No doubt they are really extended, they really last for so long...But they are not in any plain straightforward sense, in the one Physical Space in which the physical objects are supposed to be...they are, on this view, particular existents of a peculiar kind; they are not physical as we have seen; and there is no reason to suppose that they are either states of mind or existentially mind-dependent. In having spatial characteristics, colours etc, they resemble physical objects, as ordinarily conceived; but in their privacy and their dependence on the body, if not the mind, of the observer, they are more like mental states. I give the name of '*sensa*' to the objective constituents of perceptual situations, on the supposition that they are *not* literally parts of the physical objects which we are said to be "perceiving", and that they *are* transitory particulars of the peculiar kind which I have just been describing. And I call the theory which assumes the existence of such parti-

culars "The Sensum Theory." (Mind And Its Place In Nature p. 180-82).

The central point of the Sensum theory, as it appears to us, is that the *sensa* are existents-concrete, particular existents having the characteristics of the objects. Their nature, it is admitted, is peculiar and odd, but the fact of their concrete existence is frequently emphasised. The difficulties of the sensum theory, arise, in our opinion, from this point. It is clear to any one that the existence that is here sought to be attributed to the *sensa* is of the same sort as that of the substantives and not that of the adjectives. But we find it difficult to admit the substantial existence of the *sensa*. For, what is really meant by the substantial existence of an entity is that it exists in itself and by itself, that is, it does not depend for its being upon any thing other than itself. In other words, the entity which is a substance *has* qualities or attributes, but it is not itself a quality or an attribute of anything. Now, if we try to analyse and see whether this essential requirement of substantial existence is fulfilled in the case of *sensa*, we find that it is not fulfilled by the indubitably known and universally accepted facts about the *sensa*. When a penny appears elliptical, what is elliptical, cannot, on any liberal interpretation of the facts of the case, be said to be existing in itself. Its existence, in a plain and literal sense, depends upon the existence of the round penny. However indefinitely localised it may be, its existence seems to be pinned on to the existence of the penny. This is exactly the mode of being, possessed by an attribute. When we say that a particular object is beautiful, we cannot specifically localise it; the characteristic of beauty seems to be a 'floating' adjective. Similarly, when we perceive the absence of a book on a table, the absence of the book is certainly a characteristic of the table though it is very vaguely localised. What we want to point out especially in this connection is

that the difficulty about placing the elliptical sensum in precisely the same portion of space as the round penny is not in itself a conclusive argument to prove the existential difference between the sensum and the object. It may as well be that the sensum is only a transitive attribute of the physical object, and it need not be an existent substantially different from the material object, as Dr. Broad is anxious to maintain in his theory.

The main reason why the *sensa*, in such a theory, are taken to be existents, is that they have all the characteristics of the physical objects colours, temporal duration etc. But we think that it may be shown that the characteristics which are supposed to be belonging to the *sensa* are, as a matter of fact, the characteristics of the physical objects. The colour of the sensible appearance of the penny is brown. Now this colour is the same as the colour of the penny ; however close and persistent our analysis may be, we fail to see any difference between the brown of the sensum and the brown of the penny. According to the theory we are considering the two colours must be different individually, that is as belonging to two different entities. But this is not borne out by veridical perceptions. The only ground for considering them as different is the supposition that they belong to two different entities. And if it is asked, why are the entities individually different ? the only answer, in Dr. Broad's view, will be : because the characteristics possessed by them are different. But, this is certainly arguing in a circle. We find, therefore, that if we leave aside the hypothesis of the separate existence of the *sensa*, as something yet to be proved, there is no justification in facts for supposing that the brown of the sensum is different from the brown of the penny. The same is also true of the temporal characteristic of the *sensa*. Every sensum, seems, no doubt, to have some temporal duration. But this duration is identified with a

part of the duration of the thing. The *sensum* cannot be said to be directly and literally in time. The temporal duration it possesses does not stand on its own account, but it is due to the fact that it itself belongs as a characteristic to the thing of which it is a *sensum*. So, it is clear that the contention that the *sensa* have all the characteristics of the physical objects is still a matter under dispute and not quite an obvious fact as the *Sensum* theory appears to imply. If, then, this fundamental point is not granted,—and we think it cannot be granted—the proof of the theory suffers from a logical weakness and must be declared as inconclusive.

Now let us consider the distinction of veridical and illusory perceptions as implied in this theory. This distinction is illustrated by such situations as "I see a penny" as is ordinarily said by a man who sees a penny, and "I see pink rats" as is said by a drunkard. (Cf. *Ibid* p. 155). In the one situation, the object which the man says he sees is there, while in the other, the object is not there. For common-sense this distinction is adequate but it is not adequate on the *sensum* theory. When *sensa* themselves are taken as objective constituents of perceptions, a further distinction of 'real' and 'illusory' *sensa*, so to say, has got to be recognised in the *sensa* referring to one and the same physical thing. For, in the penny-situation, the elliptical *sensum*, is illusory, while the brown *sensum* and other *sensa*, are real; in the 'yellow shell' situation the yellow-*sensum* is unreal while the *sensa* of size, shape etc. are real, while in the pink rat-situation, the *sensa* of colour, size, shape etc. are all unreal. It will be observed that in this further distinction, the reality or illusoriness of the *sensa* is judged by the very standard by which the reality or otherwise of perceptions is judged in ordinary distinction, viz. the absence or the presence of the object. Whereas in the *sensum* theory the object has special meaning, that is, each *sensum* is an object,

this standard must necessarily introduce a fresh distinction of the real and the illusory in the *sensa* themselves. But we find that on Dr. Broad's theory all *sensa* have got one and the same mode of 'being, all the *sensa* enjoy, so to say, the same metaphysical status.

It will be interesting to see what conclusions can logically be deduced from the view that all *sensa* are of equal existential status. If we take any *sensum* of the shell-silver situation (that is, where silver appears in the place of a shell,) and allow that it is a 'concrete particular existent' in the plain sense in which a brown *sensum* of a penny is generally accepted as existing, one inevitable result, at any rate, will be that we shall be altogether deprived of any means of distinguishing the veridical perceptions from the illusory perceptions. For, in both the cases the objects, that is, the *sensa* do exist. Moreover, it would not be correct to say roundly that one perceptual situation, i.e. that of a penny, is veridical, another, i. e., shell-silver is illusory. But it will have to be further specified what *sensa* are veridical or illusory in each case.

A further conclusion also will necessarily follow. One, who believes that all *sensa* are particular existents of equal status and moreover, holds that what we perceive are *sensa* and nothing but *sensa*, physical objects being never given directly, must, if courageous and consistent, abandon the concept of the actual existence of physical reality as being wholly gratuitous. For he cannot logically justify his belief in its existence. He cannot suppose that there must be something of a physical nature which should be the cause of the *sensum*. In order to prove this point, some such argument will be put forward: The *sensa* are perceived to have some qualities, there must, therefore, be some material object as cause, having those qualities which are perceived as belonging to *sensa*. This argument, however, is unsound.

It is here taken for granted that the cause must be similar to the effect. The principle of the similarity of cause and effect is true only when a general similarity is meant. But such general similarity is useless in the present argument. What is needed here is a specific similarity of particular qualities but this is not available. When a stick half-immersed in water appears bent, the shape of the sensum which is supposed to be the effect is quite different from the shape of the stick which is said to be the cause. Here, there is dissimilarity between cause and effect, rather than similarity. Again, when a red-hot iron rod is perceived, there are admittedly the *sensa* of form as well as the *sensa* of colour. Here the principle of the similarity of cause and effect holds good in the case of the *sensa* of form, that is, of shape only, but not in the case of the *sensa* of colour etc. For, on the scientific view which the Sensum theory also accepts, the material object is neither coloured nor hot. So it is only in the case of some *sensa* only, the material object is shown to be similar to the effect. Thus it is manifest that the principle of similarity of cause and effect which the sensum theory invokes for its support, is really of very little avail, so far as the question of the rational justification of the belief in the material object is concerned.

The case of the "red-crystal" sensum leaves no doubt as regards the unsatisfactory nature of the theory we are here considering. In this situation, the crystal cannot obviously be taken as the cause of the red quality of the sensum, because the crystal is not red in itself though it looks so in virtue of the red flower reflected in it. So it will have to be admitted on this theory that in such a complex case, a group of *sensa* are not caused by one physical object. But such an admission will no doubt be fatal to the Sensum Theory.

The *sensa* in the perceptual situations in dreams show that at least some *sensa* are not caused by physical objects

and also that they are mental, that is, "existentially dependent on the mind" of the percipient. The claim of the data in dream perceptions to being regarded as *sensa* at all, may be disputed. But one illustrious western philosopher, viz. McTaggart has observed that no reasonable objection to such a claim, can be put forward. (*The Nature of Existence* Vol. II p. 46). We think there is one positive consideration in favour of regarding dream-percepta as *sensa*; it is this that the dream objects also are perceived as having the characteristics of colour, shape etc. If, then, this claim of dream-percepta to being regarded as *sensa* be granted, as we think, it must be, a way is decidedly opened for the possibility of showing that *sensa* may be mental. Some philosophers arrange all *sensa* in one series of which the sensations of headache and such other bodily feelings are the bottom members; and they argue that as it is evident that the *sensa* of headache or toothache are mental (in the sense that here the object is not and cannot be, distinguished from the act of sensing, and an unsensed toothache is inconceivable) and as there is a continuity of series between these *sensa* and the *sensa* of blue or red, these latter *sensa* also may be taken as mental. In criticising this view Dr. Broad says "I do not find the slightest intrinsic difficulty in conceiving the existence of unsensed red-patches or unsensed noises" (*Scientific Thought* p. 262). We venture to suggest that there is an intrinsic difficulty in conceiving unsensed red-patches, etc., For if we analyse the situation a little more closely, we find that what we seem to conceive are not really unsensed red patches but only some colourless ideas of—them ideas which are abstractions from the original situations in which they were inseparable from the sensing acts and which we now confuse with the unsensed red patches. So, it appears that the arguments in favour of the view that the *sensa* are mental are not successfully refuted by Dr.

Broad. The same is true as regards the argument based upon the privacy of *sensa*. The privacy of *sensa* is not adequately accounted for by the unique position of the body of each observer, as he thinks. The privacy in question does not simply mean some character determined by unique spatial relations. The privacy of *sensa* ultimately means some unique, unshareable experience of each individual self. That the privacy in the case of *sensa* is due to their being mental is made still more evident by the fact that the body by itself does not see ; it is only an en-souled body, that is, a mind having a body as its instrument that 'sees'. Seeing is essentially mental. This argues for the probability of *sensa* being mental rather than physical. The character of what we see is determined, in some significant sense, by our mental attitude. This is of course, certainly true in the case of hallucinations and illusions, but in a moderate sense, this is true of all our perceptions.

We conclude, therefore, that the view that the *sensa* are, in some sense, mental may be held with rational justification. This conclusion is forced upon us, partly, by the failure of the theory which takes them as 'concrete particular existents.' This failure is made obvious by the fact that the world of *sensa* cannot be accommodated in or harmoniously adjusted with the world of physical objects, as is especially seen in the case of mirror-images etc. And again, partly, this conclusion is based upon positive arguments which take account of dream sense and the privacy etc. of all *sensa*.

The Self and the Ego.

BY

BHASKAR S. NAIK.

In European philosophy no distinction is generally made between the self and the ego, the subject and the mind. In the Vedanta each of these terms has a distinct meaning. The purpose of this short paper is to explain and justify these distinctions.

The self is spoken of as 'I'. But the application of the term 'I' is possible only where there is knowledge. To an inanimate unconscious thing the term 'I' can never be applied. It is only the knower who can speak of himself as 'I'. Therefore the first definite meaning of self is the subject. The self is the subject that knows.

Since the subject is that which knows, it must be distinct from that which is known. The meanings of knower and known are entirely different. If they were to be identified, all sorts of confusion in thought and speech would inevitably arise. So it should be agreed that the subject in its true character can never become an object and an object can never be treated as the subject.

Another important fact to be noted about the subject is that it is not liable to any change. All change presupposes the unchanging subject which must bear witness to it. If the subject itself were to change, no consciousness of change would be possible.

When we understand the subject in this sense we find we have to admit another entity called 'mind' which is different both from the subject and from the body. There are certain states given in our experience which are not the states of the subject nor of the physical body. Such states

are, for instance, fear, anger etc. No body can say that there are no such states nor that they are the states of the body. There may be some bodily changes accompanying these states. But anger, fear etc. are not in their proper character mere bodily states. They are not also the states of the subject. The subject only knows ; consciousness is its only possible nature or state. There is a consciousness of these states ; but these are not states of consciousness. These states cannot belong to consciousness itself to which they are given as objects. So they must pertain to something different from both the subject and the physical body. This third something is mind. The mind belongs to the object side of experience, because its states are given as objects. The entity whose states are given as objective cannot be anything but an object.

The mind, being thus an object lacks entirely the principle of manifestation which is the characteristic of the subject. So the states of the mind are not really conscious states. We think of them as conscious by identifying the mind with the self and thinking of these states as the states of the self. We cannot deny the fact that in ordinary life we think of ourselves as happy or unhappy and this is possible because the mind is identified with the self. In fact happiness and unhappiness, being states of the mind, are not really the states of the self. So the 'I' who am happy or unhappy is not the pure self but the ego which is the self as united with the mind. Ordinarily the ego is taken to be the self. One of the peculiarities of the Vedanta consists in showing that the self is different from the ego.

Let us see what is the real meaning of the ego and whether it can be identified in its proper character with the self.

"I am running"

"I cannot lift this weight"

"I am uneasy"

"I am thinking seriously about something".

We make such statements and understand what they mean and believe them. You may say it is the body that ran and not you. But do you really believe that the body itself gave the original push and kept itself being pushed by itself all the way, and you were simply looking upon the whole affair, as upon the movement of a foreign substance? Or is it not rather the case that you identified yourself with the body and did actually the moving?

Even if we rise above the bodily self, the mental self cannot so easily be got rid of. I feel I am happy or unhappy. It cannot be said that there is no experience of happiness or unhappiness. It must be referred to some mind or ego. It is I or you who can be happy. So happiness or unhappiness can be taken as the characteristic of the ego. The self cannot be either happy or unhappy.

It cannot at least be denied that it is the ego which thinks, when I am perplexed with any problem and I try to find out a solution for it, I cannot suppose either that nobody is thinking at all or some-body else is thinking for me. It is certain, therefore, that thinking is a function of the ego, but the self never thinks because it is not perplexed with any problem.

Waking, dreaming and sleeping are different states of the ego. We cannot say that there are no such states or that they are the states of physical objects. But the self has no states,

I know one thing at a time. That is not the way of self's knowing. There is no succession in its knowing. In fact it does not know; it is because of it that we know; it is knowledgo itself.

The ego is given as an object in our sense of egoity. What is given as an object can never be that which is never

an object. The mode of knowing the ego is not a mode which has no form and having a form it can not show us the formless.

It is said that (1) the ego is never absent and (2) that we cannot separate knowledge from the ego. As regards (1) we can say that the subject may always be there but the ego is not always found to be there. Whenever we like, we may be self-conscious but we are not always self-conscious. The sense of the ego is not always present, it comes and goes. It is not reasonable to suppose that the ego can be present even when there is no sense of it. Vedantism together with all forms of idealism believes that the being of a thing cannot be separated from the sense of it given in knowledge. As regards (2) we may state that the ego cannot be separated from knowledge just as any other object cannot be separated from knowledge; but this does not mean that any object is the self; still it cannot be denied that the ego is taken to be the self and this is ignorance.

Knowledge belongs to the self and if the ego also knows, it does so by reason of its identity with the self. The identity cannot be real, it must be illusory. The self knows in me, not in its true nature but as limited by ignorance, and even this limitation is not real but illusory.

Thus we find that besides the subject and the mind, we require the ego to explain our experience. There is no doubt about the fact that happiness and unhappiness are states of the mind and if the mind is merely an object among other objects, the states of the mind should be recognised as merely objective states that is, we should think of them as merely there and not as belonging to us. But we do not simply say that there is happiness or unhappiness but we say we are happy or unhappy. This is possible because happiness or unhappiness is not a state of the mere mind but of the mind as identified with the self. The mind united with the self or

the subject is the ego.

The concept of the ego is necessary for another important purpose. Merely with the subject we cannot explain the particularity and privacy of our individual knowledge. There is no distinction or differentiation in the subject as such. The subject in me cannot be distinguished, as subject, from the subject in you. If the subject alone knows and if the same subject is present in both you and me, then my knowledge should as well be your knowledge. But this is not so. The fact that a student can learn from his teacher what he does not know shows that the knowledge of one person is not always the knowledge of another person.

There is another point. We have seen that the subject does not change. If this is so, then its knowledge should not also change. This means that there should be no acquisition of any new knowledge and no forgetting of past knowledge. But this goes against the accepted facts of experience. We have therefore to accept that besides the subject and its knowledge there is another way of knowing which comes and goes and takes place like any other transitory event.

Knowledge as such is not possible without the subject. The subject should be there whenever and wherever there is knowledge. If there is to be any impermanent knowledge, there should be some changing element in association with the subject. This changing element is supplied by the modifications of the mind. In every case of empirical knowledge, the mind undergoes some change in accordance with the object known. Every act of such knowledge is nothing but a state of the mind illuminated by the presence of the subject. As one state of the mind is different from another state, one act of knowledge is different from another. Similarly, since the mind of one person is not the mind of another the knowledge of one person, so far as it is dependent upon mental states, is necessarily different from that of his neighbour.

We see thus how with the help of the ego, we can explain the privacy of our individual knowledge as well as the acquisition of new knowledge. The ego is one with the mind. It is that which is happy or unhappy. It owns experience and knows things by undergoing modification in itself.

We have already seen that the ego is different from the self. Even the pure subject is not the self. The subject has to be distinguished from the object. The object stands over against the subject; without such opposition between subject and object the subject has no meaning. But such distinction is part of ignorance and so the subject, which has to be understood only with such distinction, is not altogether dissociated from ignorance. The seer, as seer, is there so long as there is something to be seen. In the pure self or outside it, there is nothing to be seen. So it is not in itself a seer or subject, but seeing or knowledge itself.

Is there 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension' ?

BY

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Summary of the Paper.

The paper contains a discussion of what has been called 'Knowledge by Acquaintance' by the Hon. Bertrand Russell and 'Simple Apprehension' by the late Dr. L. T. Hobhouse and Prof. Stout. It also contains a reference to the existence of parallel doctrines in the epistemology of some of the schools of Indian Philosophy. By means of an analysis of sense-cognition it is shown that in every act of such cognition there are two moments : the first of these is acquaintance, which is altogether non-reflective, non-inferential and non-descriptive ; while the second is knowledge based upon this acquaintance, which is reflective, inferential and descriptive. The question whether besides sense-cognition there are other kinds of direct knowledge or not is also discussed. The paper ends with a criticism of the view that in memory we have acquaintance with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or the inner sense, and of the doctrine that there can be acquaintance with certain kinds of 'universals'.

Is there 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension' ?

BY

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In this paper I propose to take up a discussion on the subject at the point it was left in Dr. Broad's paper published in 'Problems of Science and Philosophy' (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. II, 1919). In the four papers, which form the symposium on the subject in this volume, the main basis of discussion is the Hon. Bertrand Russell's theory of 'knowledge by acquaintance', which is altogether rejected by Dr. Hicks and Dr. Edgell, and partially supported by Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad. The kind of immediate awareness which is meant to be expressed by the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' has, however, been advocated by other writers even before Bertrand Russell, the foremost of whom, I think, is the late lamented L. T. Hobhouse. He discusses this under the title 'Simple Apprehension' in the first two chapters of his 'Theory of Knowledge', and tries to meet such objections to it as were urged, for example, by T. H. Green, or are urged, at present, by Dr. Hicks. Among contemporary British thinkers, besides Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad, another advocate of this kind of immediate experience is Prof. Stout, who also calls it Simple Apprehension. What is also interesting is that this theory of immediate awareness has been advocated by some of the mediaeval Indian Philosophers, and we find some very suggestive and parallel notions in the definitions and descriptions of such experience as given by these thinkers of the Orient independently of the philosophers of the West.

'ACQUAINTANCE' OR 'SIMPLE APPREHENSION'. 63

It will appear that some of those who have advocated the theory of knowledge by acquaintance or simple apprehension, or the same, or a similar theory, under a different name, believe that there is such an experience as consists of a *mere* cognisance on the part of the subject of an object, which is *merely* presented to it. In other words, they believe in the existence of a subject-object relation which consists of *mere* cognisance and *mere* presentation of an object. For example, consider Hobhouse, who, as I have already said, is one of the foremost among the modern thinkers who have discussed and advocated the theory of immediate experience in this sense. He says: 'Thought relations never constitute a content of immediate apprehension. Such contents do stand in manifold relations which are unfolded by judgments about them; but the apprehension of them is not the thought of their relations, nor does it depend for its existence in consciousness upon these relations. The judgments themselves would have no meaning if they did not refer to the data as apprehended. Apprehension, therefore, does not depend on any hitherto assigned mental activities.'¹ And again: 'I conclude, then, that the consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us, a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a primitive or underived act of knowledge'.² Prof. Stout speaks of this immediate experience in similar language. 'Simple apprehension,' says he, 'is the term which seems most suitable for naming this bare presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this object.'³ Bertrand Russell too, in spite of his frequent use of the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' means by it the same kind of experience as is meant to be expressed by

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 31.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

3. Manual of Psychology, 3rd edition, p. 103.

'simple apprehension' in the works of Hobhouse and Stout, that is to say, he really means 'acquaintance' and not knowledge based upon acquaintance. He has, in fact, used the very term 'acquaintance' at times to express this. For example, in the following statements: 'We shall say that we have *acquaintance* with any thing of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths';⁴ and again, "All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon *acquaintance* as its foundation." Among the Indian philosophers Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school and the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras, defines direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) as that which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, which is not inferential, not discrepant from its object, and definite. Later on, in the schools of Hindu Logic, direct knowledge was divided into two kinds: (1) non-reflective and non-descriptive; (*nirvikalpaka*), corresponding to 'simple apprehension'; and (2) reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*), corresponding to ordinary perception. The Buddhist philosophers admit only the first kind of cognition as direct knowledge, for they say that the second kind of cognition is also inferential. That this first kind of cognition corresponds to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' will be clear from Kumārila's description of it. 'At first', says he, 'there is cognition' which is mere apprehension (*ālocanajñānam*); free from reflection and description (*nirvikalpakam*); that which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (*buddhāvastujam*)'. Similarly, Bhāsarvajña describes

4. Problems of Philosophy, p. 73. (*italics are mine*)
5. Problems of Philosophy, p. 75 (*italics are mine*)
6. Kumārila, as also most of the other Indian philosophers, regarded such experience as knowledge.
7. *Ślokavārtika*, IV. 112.

this kind of direct cognisance as 'that which manifests the mere form of an object (*vastu-svarūpamātrā-vabhāsakam*) ; for example, such cognition as produced at the first glance at an object (*prathamākṣasannipātajam*)⁸. Another significant definition of direct knowledge, in the history of Indian philosophy, is that given by *Gangeśa*⁹ the founder of the New School of Indian Logic. He defined it as that direct apprehension which is not the result of (previous) knowledge.

Thus we find a number of European and Indian philosophers agree in holding that there is a kind of direct experience in which the object is *merely* presented to, and taken cognisance of, by the subject. In order to decide whether this view is correct or not, I think the crucial point to consider is whether there is, or there can be, a cognisance of the various qualities which constitute the sense-data (called an object), such as a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch, etc. without thinking at the same time that it is red, it is extended, or it is hard ; or even that we know a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch. And if there is, or there can be such a cognisance, when and under what conditions does it take place ? It will appear that it is really a satisfactory answer to this latter question which will establish the validity of the claim to the existence of such cognisance as is alluded to in the first question ; and it will further appear that although all the advocates of such direct experience agree in admitting that there is, and there can be, such a simple cognisance as described above, they differ with regard to its exact status in relation to cognition. There are, *firstly*, those who seem to think that such direct experience is not to be had in adult life, and that it is simply a factor in the complex cognitive act revealed by analysis. Hobhouse, for example, says : 'For our purpose it is indifferent whether

8. Nyāyasāra, (Calcutta, 1910) p. 4.

9. Tattvacintāmaṇi, Bibl. Indica, p. 552.

an act of apprehension ever exists by itself in the sense of forming the whole state of consciousness for the time being. We are contending merely that such an activity is to be found on *analysis* in many of our mental states ; that it is a condition of knowledge ; and that by itself it takes us a certain distance and no further.¹⁰ On this point Bertrand Russell also agrees with Hobhouse. He says : 'Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, *though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them*'.¹¹ Secondly, there are others who think that such immediate experience as is expressed by the terms 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension,' and which consists of simply a subject-object relation, does exist at the first moment of contact of the object with the sense-organs as a condition and substratum of the later cognition which may be called 'knowledge by acquaintance'. This seems to be the view held by Prof. Stout and Dr. Broad, and by most of the Indian philosophers. 'It is a precondition,' says Prof. Stout, 'of the cognitive attitude, the feeling attitude, and the conative attitude that there should be something before the mind with which they are concerned,' and the 'bare presence' of this 'something' to consciousness he calls simple apprehension.¹² Similar is the view of Dr. Broad, according to whom, if I understand him rightly, there is acquaintance every time a fresh object, or parts of an object, comes into contact with the sense-organs. 'Indeed', says he, 'the following seem to me to be plain facts : (a) That when I suddenly look at a landscape or hear a gun fired, I enter

10. Theory of Knowledge, p. 36. (*italics are mine*).

11. Problems of Philosophy, p. 72. (*italics are mine*).

12. Manual of Psychology, p. 103.

into a special kind of relation with a visual field or a noise ; that this relation probably begins to subsist before I begin to judge or discriminate ; and that, at any rate, it is present in full force at a time when my acts of discrimination and judgment have hardly begun to enter the field ; (b) That when I have discriminated and recognised various parts of the landscape, one at least of the relations which I have to these parts is of precisely the same kind as that which I originally had to the whole. And this relation is what I understand by acquaintance with sense-data.'¹⁸ The same conception appears in the works of a number of Indian philosophers, 'At first', 'says Kumāṛila, 'there is cognition which is mere apprehension (*ālocanajñānam*), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb, and is caused by the mere object (*śūdhavastujam*). And, according to Bhāsarvajña, this cognition, which manifests the mere appearance of an object, is such as is produced at the first glance (*prathamākṣaṇanipātajam*). Rāmānuja, another well-known Indian teacher, seems to think that it is only when a particular sense-datum is presented to an individual *for the first time in life* that there is such an immediate experience as we have called 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension' ; otherwise, in all cognition, there is present the subject-predicate relation of the form 'This is so.'

It is rather difficult to convince another of the truth of what one finds in one's own experience. All that can be done is to appeal to certain facts, which may or may not be seen by others as one sees them. Some facts, however, to which I should appeal in connection with the problem under consideration are as follows :—

(1) Before I know, or can know, an object as 'This is A,' 'This is B,' or even as 'This is something' (which I do not

exactly know), there should first be a presentation of the sense-data of A or B, or of the something as mere sense-data, and the mere cognisance of these at the first moment of their presentation is what is meant by acquaintance or simple apprehension. That is why such cognisance was called by Indian philosophers as that caused by the mere object (*suddhavadustujam*). This distinction between the object as it is presented at the first moment and as it is perceived later on should come home more clearly by considering the fact that there is no reason why the object as it is presented at the first moment of the contact of the sense-organs with the object in adult life, should be different from what it would be like to a child at the first moment of its perception, it being granted, of course, that the senso-organs of the child are structurally similar to those of a grown up person, and function in the same way so far as the mere apprehension of the sense-data is concerned. A red patch, *as it is in itself*, should appear as such even to a child the first time it is presented to it, although the child would not be able to perceive it as 'This patch is red'.

(2) All such judgments as 'This is red'; 'This is green', etc. which are symbolical of a descriptive perception involve the identification of a familiar notion e. g., of redness or greenness with a particular sense-datum 'red' or 'green', which ought to be present, presented and taken cognisance of first as the condition of such identification.

(3) So far as I can see while acquaintance with sense-data is altogether non-inferential, their perception as having a certain character and the descriptive judgment, which follows from it, are inferential. The patch which is presented to my sight is perceived as red *because* I am familiar with other patches having that appearance as red.

From what I have said above with regard to the nature of acquaintance it should be clear that I do not mean by it a

vague or primitive kind of knowledge as some have characterised it to be. What is known by acquaintance may represent a *thing* vaguely or distinctly, but so far as the presented sense-datum goes it is bound to be definite. When I hear a voice, I may not be able to make out whose it is, or may not be sure whether it is, or is not, of a particular friend of mine whose it might be, but the voice, whatever it is, is definite *in its own character*. Similarly there is no question of acquaintance being a primitive kind of knowledge. In so far as it is a mere presentation and mere cognisance of sense-data, devoid of all interpretation, it is the same in the case of a child and in that of an adult; in the case of a primitive savage and in that of a civilised man of our modern times.

So far I have considered the nature of acquaintance with sense-data only. A further question is whether there are other kinds of acquaintance also, and if so, what they are. What have we to say to the following observations of Bertrand Russell in this connection?: 'We have acquaintance in sensation,' says he, 'with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense-thoughts, feelings, desires, etc., we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense. Further it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things. In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call *universals*, that is to say, general ideas such as *whiteness, diversity, brotherhood*, and so on.'¹⁴ By a happy coincidence an Indian philosopher of about the 7th Century, Dharmakirti, has also included more than the acquaintance

of sense-data in his definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and has classified it into four kinds ; (1) Sense-apprehension (*indriyajnānam*), corresponding to acquaintance with sense-data ; (2) Mental apprehension (*manovijnānam*), corresponding to Russell's acquaintance with the data of the inner sense ; (3) Self-consciousness (acquaintance with self) ; and (4) Mystic intuition (*yogijnānam*).¹⁵ The essential and common characteristic of all these kinds of direct knowledge are : *firstly*, that they do not admit of description (*kūlpānā-bodham*), that is to say, there is no subject-predicate relation in them ; and *secondly*, that there is no mistake about them (*abhrāntam*). Now I shall make these two classifications of direct knowledge, which are very similar to each other, the basis of my further discussion of the subject.

After a sense-datum has ceased to be presented I can have an image of it in my mind, and there is as much acquaintance with it as there was with the original sense-datum ; and hence memory images may be said to be known by acquaintance. Similarly, that I am acquainted with all my feelings and emotions is also evident from introspection. In the case of memory, I think, we have to draw a distinction between the remembrance of concrete sense-data and that of mere abstract facts. When we remember a mere fact, to me it appears it is not the fact but the remembrance of that fact with which we have acquaintance ; and hence, Russell's statement that we have acquaintance in memory with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense will not be strictly correct. In fact, I think, in memory, we *never* have acquaintance with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense. What we have acquaintance with is either the image of concrete things, or simply the remembrance of abstract

15. Nyāyabindu, Bibl. Indica, p. 1.

facts. Along with the remembrance of abstract facts it happens, however, that there are also some images of concrete things associated with them for example, along with the memory of the fact that yesterday I read about the disturbances in Bombay there may also appear, and they usually do appear, the images of the page of the paper in which I read the news, some pictures which appeared on that page, and so on. That besides acquaintance with the external and the internal data, we have also an ever-present immediate consciousness of the existence of a subject or self to which this acquaintance and the other mental processes belong, is also a fact which, I think, may be granted.

A rather more complex question than the others is whether we can claim acquaintance with universals; and if we can, with what kind of universals and in what sense? 'It is obvious, to begin with,' says Bertrand Russell, 'that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc. i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whitenesses'.¹⁶ Similarly he claims to have acquaintance with what he calls time-relations and space-relations, and also with resemblance. Now the question is: In what form are we acquainted with these universals? Are we acquainted with such universals as whiteness, redness, blackness, etc., in sense-presentation, or otherwise? Some philosophers, for example, in the history of Indian philosophy, Kumāṛila, Prabhākara and Rāmānuja, seem to think that they are presented as a part of the sense-

data ; while others seem to hold that they are simply exemplified in the sense-data. It will appear, however, that we are acquainted with these universals neither in sense-representation nor otherwise as purely abstract notions, whatever we have in sense is a particular sense-datum,—a particular red-patch, or a black-patch. We simply identify our notion of redness or blackness with the particular instance of it in sense representation. Redness or blackness as universals cannot be said to be presented in sense, nor are we acquainted with them as *sensa*. Nor can there be an acquaintance with them as abstract notions, for so far as I can see the content of abstract notions remains altogether unrepresented and uncognised until they are analysed, and all analysis implies something more than mere acquaintance. In fact, it is questionable whether there is anything at all like a purely abstract notion of such simple sensible qualities as redness or blackness. What we have of these by generalisation is a sort of generic image, and it is this with which we are acquainted. Whenever I think of redness independently of a red patch presented in sense it is a sort of generic image of redness which is presented to my mind, and I may be said to be acquainted with this in the same sense as with a particular red patch presented in sense. The same may be said of space and time relations. What is presented in sense is so many particular situations in space. By generalisation we get generic images of 'right' and 'left' ; 'above' and 'below', etc., and it is these generic images with which I am acquainted when I think of space relations independently of objects in sense-experience which stand in these relations. Similarly, with regard to time relations, in sense, we have only particular sequence, and out of these by generalisation we get generic images of 'before', 'after', etc., and it is these with which I am acquainted when I think of time relations independently of particular sequence presented in sense. As

regards more abstract and complex universals, such as brotherhood, virtue, etc., I do not think we even have a generic image of these or an acquaintance with it. All that we can get is a sort of image of an indifferent concrete instance of brotherhood, virtue, etc. All that I say is that we cannot be said to have acquaintance with them as such abstract notions.

The question whether acquaintance is knowledge or not is, as Dr. Broad says, mainly a verbal one. If by knowledge we mean only that which consists of a subject-predicate relation, acquaintance is not knowledge; but if we use the term 'knowledge' in a wider sense so as to include even mere awareness or cognisance of a sensum, acquaintance is knowledge. By most of the Indian philosophers it has been regarded as a mode of knowledge.

All knowledge based upon acquaintance and having acquaintance as one of the factors at the time of cognition may be called knowledge by acquaintance. It is also knowledge by description. It corresponds to the second kind of direct knowledge in Indian philosophy, viz, that which is reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*).

I agree with Dr. Broad when he says that acquaintance is incorrigible, or as the Sanskrit term '*avyabhicāri*' literally means : 'that which is not discrepant'. It cannot be different from what it is as presented to an individual at a particular moment. By its very nature it is free from the distinction of truth and error, for it is not of the nature of a judgment.

The Influence of Schopenhauer's Doctrine of Intuition on the Philosophy of Bergson.

By

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Bergson appears to follow Schopenhauer when he points out that there are "two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol."¹ The two ways, as we know, are the *rational way of knowledge* which is made use of by science and the *intuitive way of knowledge* which is the proper method of philosophy. The same opposition was also maintained by Schopenhauer between "the relative" and "the absolute" ways of knowledge. And, just as Schopenhauer tries to establish the validity of intuitive knowledge by pointing out the inadequacy of scientific knowledge to grasp the inner nature of phenomena, Bergson also endeavours to point out that conceptual knowledge which the sciences make use of, is incapable of knowing the reality of things. In this way then, for Bergson as for Schopenhauer philosophy begins in an "intuition" that turns the mind aside from the ready-framed concepts to place itself in the very heart of reality which is the life and essence of all things. We shall try to understand more closely the exact nature of Bergson's "intuitive method" and its affinity with that of Schopenhauer.

1. Intr. to *Metaphysics*, P. 1.

II

Bergson has hinted innumerable times at this "act of intuition" or "communication sympathique" or "espece de sympathie" which rends the veil and reaches the shrine, which "possesses the reality absolutely" but he has not been able to explain it. It is not a logical way of knowledge and evidently by its very nature it is not explicable, for to explain means to analyse, to define; and analysis and definition are, according to Bergson, "symbolical" but his metaphysics "claims to dispense with symbols".² This is therefore, the main difficulty in the way of Bergson which prevents him from giving a clear account of the simple and spontaneous act of intuition that enables the philosopher to penetrate to the very depths of reality and like the artist or the poet, "quaff the live current." Accordingly, Prof. Hoffding points out that "while Bergson's *psychological intuition* (i. e. immediate perception) is of decisive importance...he has not given a perfectly clear definition of *metaphysical intuition*, though he affirms its possibility, and he has not determined its philosophical character."³ Prof. James suggests in a passage in "A Pluralistic Universe" that Bergson's intuition is nothing but the immediate perception of the concrete reality,— "diving back into the flux" of things, "turning the face towards sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse."⁴ Bergson's psychological intuition is the same experience that James calls "Knowledge of acquaintance," and this is opposed by James to what he terms "Knowledge-about" or conceptual knowledge which is mere "translation" into 'discontinuous' and 'static' or 'rigid' symbols. There is, no doubt, a great similarity in the views

2. Intr. to *Metaphysics*, p. 8.

3. Hoffding's "Modern Philosophers and Lectures on Bergson," p. 256.

4. *A Pluralistic Universe*.

of Bergson and James as regards the nature and function of concepts and their relation to percepts, but what Bergson means by "metaphysical intuition" must not be identified with what he (Bergson) intends by "psychological intuition". The best way to understand Bergson's metaphysical intuition is to interpret it in the light of Schopenhauer's "intuitive Welterfassung." In what follows I shall, then, try to show that both Schopenhauer and Bergson adopt precisely the same way of knowing the "Absolute" and this they call "intuition" or the way "from within".

In spite of the insuperable difficulty of conveying a definite notion of "Intuition" Bergson has tried, time and again, to render it as clear as possible. In what is now considered as a *Locus Classicus* he says: "By Intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible" (in concepts). In opposition to this "analysis" is defined as "the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common to it and other objects." In several different passages Bergson describes intuition in different terms but conveying the same idea as a process of "transporting oneself" or "inserting oneself into the interior of the concrete reality." Intuition understood in this sense is according to Bergson the proper vehicle of real knowledge. To live with the absolute reality ("Miterleben") of the thing, to insert oneself into it, is what metaphysical knowledge teaches us. In this "coincidence with" what is absolute or unique in the object "points of view" disappear, as the object is known in its perfection and absoluteness. In intuition then the reality is known in its essence whilst in analysis or symbolical expression the simplicity of intuitive act is shattered and points of view become important; knowledge no more remains "absolute" but becomes "relative". It was for this reason that scientific

knowledge was deprecated above. The task of metaphysics has been shown "to get as near to the original itself as possible", "to search deeply into its life" and, as it were, "to feel the throbbings of its soul."⁵ This is true empiricism and true metaphysics and the knowledge that it imparts installs itself in the objects and "adopts the very life of things."

Is there any experience in which we are aware of the reality in this way "from within" and not "from without?" We seem to get some light from Schopenhauer's doctrine of intuition. For, as we know, Schopenhauer pointed out that we possess "the most direct knowledge"—"knowledge from within"—of our own selves and there we grasp the actual reality of existence itself. To be more explicit, he says that we know our own body in two extremely different ways: it is given as an object among objects and subject to the laws of other objects; but it is also given in quite a different manner, as we know it from within intuitively and immediately, and what we know thus is our inner self which is undivided, absolute "one and All". This "intuitive Selbsterfassung" is thus the knowledge of the essence and reality of all phenomena. About this immediate ("ganz unmittelbar") knowledge, Schopenhauer, has said that it is knowledge of a unique kind which as if by treachery places us at once within the fortress which it was impossible to take "from without, that is to say, that which we cannot grasp by means of concepts is known to us by the immediate intuitive feeling." Now in the same light may be understood the method of knowing the reality advocated by Bergson. "There is one reality, at least" he says, "which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by analysis"⁶ and this is the reality which expresses itself in us, i.e. our own self. "We may sympathise intellectually with nothing else but we certainly sympathise with

5. Intr. to Metaphysics, p. 31.

6. Intr. to Metaphysics, p. 8.

ourselves." Prof. Weldon Carr⁷ in his exposition of Bergson's doctrine of intuition makes it clear by referring to the two entirely different ways of knowledge that we have of our own body. In the consciousness of the external world that we have, there is, as Schopenhauer maintains, a particular object that we know in a way in which we know nothing else and that is our own body. We have a knowledge of it as an external object, like any other object that forms a part of the external world but we know it also in an intimate and immediate manner, in which we know nothing else. If, then, anywhere there is a possibility of our having a view of reality in its purity it will be in the inward glance that reveals to us, according to Bergson as well as Schopenhauer, the actual reality of existence itself. Here we get an *intuition* of reality, that is to say, not a perception or conception of it as an object, but a consciousness that has freed itself from all the logical forms so much so that even the relation of subject and object is removed. "We are laid asleep in body, and become a living soul" feeling ourselves at one with

"A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts,
And rolls through all things".

Thus the notion of the intuition of our own inner life as the reality is found in the system of Schopenhauer and Bergson alike. Both agree in the view that in the intuition of the self by the self we are in actual absolute contact with reality itself. And as we know, Schopenhauer calls this "intuitive *Selbsterfassung*" a key to the understanding of the whole of the phenomenal world—it leads to the "intuitive *Welterfassung*." "*Selbstbewusstsein*" in the words of Schopenhauer becomes the '*Ausleger der Bewusstsein anderer Dinge*.'"

7. Philosophy of change, pp. 26-27

8. Grisebach Edition Vol. IV. 115.

And he contends that for him who has come to know the reality in his own self-consciousness it becomes the key to the knowledge of the inmost essence of the entire nature. For knowing the reality in itself immediately in his own inner life he will then transfer this immediate experience to the rest of the objects of nature which are not given to him in such immediate experience. In this way he will obtain this new knowledge which is really suggested to him from "the inner knowledge" of his own self.

With Bergson also the procedure seems to be very similar. "The consciousness we have of our own self", he writes, "introduces us to the interior of a reality *on the model of which we must represent other realities.*"⁹ Intuiting our own selves (or in the words of Bergson, sympathising with our own selves) we come to possess the key to the knowledge of the inner reality of phenomena in general. The coincidence with the reality external to ourselves by means of intuition, then, is attained through ascribing to it the same reality that we experience within us in the most direct immediate intuitive way. It is only in this way that we can "transport" ourselves into the "interior of the things;" for the reality that expresses itself in the whole of nature, seems according to both Schopenhauer and Bergson to be precisely the same that we find in our own selves, as for them both it is grasped in precisely the same manner. Thus Bergson's statement that intuitive knowledge implies a 'coincidence of the mind with the generative act of reality' must be understood in the light of Schopenhauer's 'intuitive knowledge' and this as we have seen enables us to penetrate nature's outward shell and enter into the true inwardness of its life by first grasping the reality in its purity in our own inner self.

9. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 55 (*underlining mine*).

III

This sharing of the inner life of the reality which we aspire to grasp is also explained by Bergson (as by Schopenhauer) by reference to the "artistic perception." Schopenhauer identifies the artistic way of knowledge with the metaphysical way of knowledge. Bergson makes the identical comparison between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition. Referring to "intuition" he says: "That an effort of this kind is not impossible, is proved by the existence in man of an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception. Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as assembled, not as naturally organised. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it. This intention is just what the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model."¹⁰ And like Schopenhauer Bergson compares the philosopher, in more than one place, especially in his "Introduction to Metaphysics," with the artist or the poet. Neither of them employs scientific analysis or abstraction; their common method is intuition. This leads us to inquire more closely into the affinities of Bergson's conceptions with those of Schopenhauer as far as the theory of Art is concerned.

We have so far seen that Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer in the intuitive method of apprehending reality. The philosophy of both these thinkers seems, then, to belong to the same type of thought which we may call "intuitive". In the realm of the theory of Art we once more find a great and far-reaching resemblance between their fundamental views. Here I venture to draw attention to one or two points

which are very essential to the present enquiry. The object of Art according to both is to transcend the narrow sphere of utility and to put us face to face with the reality itself. Art is thus a more direct vision of reality and therefore stands in a diametrical opposition to the analysis and abstraction of science which are merely practical and utilitarian devices and tend to veil the true reality from our view. In this way we find that according to Bergson there is a close relationship between the methods of art and of philosophy as we notice in Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer maintains that the artistic perception of the reality is possible only when there are no pragmatistic considerations. We can apprehend the purely objective nature of things, he observes, "when we have ourselves no interest in them". The absolute condition of artistic knowledge is "the complete silence of the Will." When knowledge is thoroughly "purified from all will and its relations" that is to say, from all the utilitarian and pragmatistic relations then only it comes into direct touch with the true reality. Again and again he emphasises that this knowledge "does not proceed from intention or choice," is "entirely independent of the will"; it is "pure will-less knowledge." The needs of action constrain us to narrow our field of vision; and scientific knowledge whose function is to know the relations of things to one another in order to guide us in our actions is purely pragmatistic in its nature and procedure and thus affords only relative knowledge. But action in the pragmatist sense is the enemy of vision. The artist's faculty which perceives the reality is independent of that action and may be detached from it.

Returning to Bergson we find that a very similar attitude is adopted by him. According to him Art...has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short every-

thing that veils reality from us in order to bring us face to face with reality itself.¹¹ We come into direct contact with reality, "enter into immediate communion with things" with the help of art. But this purity of perception to which the reality is revealed "implies a break with utilitarian convention" (*une rupture avec la convention utile*), a complete "disinterestedness of senses or consciousness." The veil that is interposed between reality and ourselves, says Bergson, becomes "thin and transparent" to the artist; it is too "dense and opaque" for the common herd. The intellect serving as a light to our conduct gives a "practical simplification of reality." Therefore whatever alone has relation to our practical life (or in the words of Schopenhauer, whatever has a direct or indirect relation to our will to live) is apprehended, and things have been arranged and classified with a view to the use we derive from them. Thus in the ordinary man the intellect serves the utilitarian and practical purposes of life, deals with the conventional generalities, "takes note of the most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of thing." But art is "a more direct vision of reality."¹² It is the inner life of things that the artist sees through the forms and colours. He thus perceives "*all things in their native purity*".¹³ He transcends all the utilitarian conventions, turns his attention from that aspect of the world that has a practical interest and is free from the narrowing habits of the pragmatic life.

The task which Bergson thus allots to Art is evidently much the same as that which has been given to Metaphysics by him. For metaphysics also, according to Bergson, has for its object a direct and pure vision of reality. As opposed to all intellectual methods intuitive knowledge is made use

11. *Laughter* (English Translation), p. 157.

12. *Laughter*. p. 157.

13. *Ibid.* p. 155.

of here in order to grasp the reality in its essence by a simple act. And this act, as we know, involves a "break with the symbols"—"*rupture avec les symboles*." It stands in opposition to all conceptual representations which multiply their points of view without end, and still give us no reality. Thus the metaphysicians and the artist both seem to adopt the same method to obtain a direct vision of reality; and the one condition of this kind of pure perception is, as has been fully emphasised, the brushing aside of all utilitarian symbols by means of intuition, metaphysical or aesthetic. Just like the metaphysician the artist aims to get into direct contact with the "deep-seated reality that is veiled from us...by the necessities of life." And this grip of reality is the goal of the method of intuition which is the true method of philosophy. "At intervals a soul arises which seems to triumph...by dint of simplicity—the soul of an artist or a poet, which, remaining near its source, reconciles, in a harmony appreciable by the heart, terms irreconcilable by the intelligence." Thus there seems to remain no difference between the philosopher and the artist in the end.

This intimate connection between the artistic and the philosophical intuition which Bergson points out finds its parallel, as we know, in the system of Schopenhauer. We noticed above that Schopenhauer not only asserted a very close connection between art and philosophy but in some of his earlier writings he identified the method of the one with that of the other. As opposed to the sciences their method is intuition. The artistic perception and the philosophical knowledge of reality is thus according to him of the same nature. And the marked opposition between science and art that characterises the philosophy of Schopenhauer is, as we have seen, the essential feature of the philosophy of Bergson also.¹⁴

14 Cf. Hoffding's *Modern Philosophers*, p. 289.

The place of Mind in the Neo-Realistic Theory of Perception.

BY

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A. Modern Realism or Neo-Realism as it is called is really a movement of great significance in modern philosophy for its novelty of thought. It is not however a system i. e. a connected body of doctrines adhered to by a number of thinkers. Different Realists hold divergent views on the very same problems. The full exposition of the movement therefore would require a separate explanation of the views of each one of the Realistic thinkers. Negatively the realistic contention is based upon the Refutation of Idealism. But over and above this, this movement has also a positive thesis to place before the contemporary students of philosophy, and that is its peculiar theory of perception. It is with the rise of S. Alexander and Bertrand Russell in England and of the six philosophers in America—E. Holt, R. B. Perry, W. Marvii, W. P. Montague, W. Pitkin and E. Spaulding that this positive aspect comes to its full-fledged expression. Though they differ from one another in many respects yet they agree in fundamentals. All deny the subject and all make consciousness an object. Among the six American New-Realists, it is on Holt's Theory of Knowledge that all of them more or less rely, Perry refers to Holt's '*Concept of Consciousness*' as "the most able statement of the Theory". However, we shall confine ourselves here to a discussion of Holt on the one hand and Russell on the other.

B. If we are to put briefly the whole of the philosophy of the American Neo-Realists, we may say—"All that is object, is" and "Nothing is that is not object." In other words, it is the realism of 'being'. True and false, real and unreal, every thing is existing and existing quite independently of the mind. In Holt's conception of 'being,' 'terms' and 'propositions' that is 'active' and 'passive' elements are involved. Both of these elements are 'neutral', i. e. they are neither subjective nor objective. This unitary system is called a 'neutral mosaic' a monism of being, and this reality is of course physical reality. Now to Holt these 'neutral' entities, or 'Conceptual' entities as he calls them, are common objects belonging to both mind and physical objects.

Holt defines mind or consciousness as the 'cross-section of the neutral realm of being' separated or cut by the particular response of the nervous system. Consciousness is not the nervous system nor is it in the latter; it is out there in the world. It is an aggregate of objects which is defined by the nervous system. All nervous response, according to him is conscious. All organisms have nervous systems and their responses are nervous responses and therefore conscious. Even plants have consciousness. What we generally call unconscious is really not total absence of consciousness, but it is a lower degree of consciousness. But the difficulty is that this consciousness is as good as unconsciousness.

Now granting that consciousness is the cross-section of the realm of being, our knowledge of the past and distant facts ought to be always remembered. In order to get rid of this difficulty, Holt suggests that the system of knowledge is quite different from the system of events and facts. Space and time are relative and not absolute. Hence the space-time position of ideas is not the space-time position of objects and events. But this theory contradicts Holt's theory that knowledge is identical with object. It is there-

fore that he goes a step further and holds that though these two systems are quite different yet they intersect each other—which is also nothing but an arbitrary choice on his part.

Holt defines mind differently in different places. According to his 'Logico-ontological' definition of mind, it is an aggregate of 'neutral entities,' and knowledge is of concepts. According to the 'positivistic' definition of mind it is a 'cross-section' of objects. Again ethical definition is quite different. But he is not clear how these heterogeneous concepts can be reconciled with one another. Moreover, if we take mind as the 'cross-section of the neutral realm of being' as Holt maintains, then this mind can have no existence; we may assert its subsistence only. For, the 'neutral realm of being' is composed of concepts. The mind therefore is aware of only the universals and this awareness of the universals is nothing but thought. The connection of the mind is cut off from the realm of the particulars which are concrete and existent. This mind therefore can subsist only but cannot exist. Again if knowledge is the object itself, then who is conscious? "There are no such two things." Holt says, "as knowledge and the object of knowledge." "There is no knowledge 'of' an object as common sense dictates." But the question is—what is awareness then? Who is aware? If mind is a collection of objects and if nervous response defines that collection of objects like 'search-light' as Holt expresses it then what function does this consciousness discharge? It remains the same consciousness before as well as after the awareness. Here Holt suggests that after that awareness knowledge has to be assumed as a fact 'other than' the object. It is the same thing as Perry's theory of 'the "Immanence" of the object in knowledge' according to which the object is contained in knowledge and it physically enters the mind and the mind knows it. But this also does not help him in avoiding the difficulties

in regard to memory and imagination. The 'idea' of the objects is, according to this theory, identical with the object. In that case the idea of the past event is in the past time and the idea of the distant event is in the distant place ; but this is absurd. Then the idea without being identical with the object rather represents the object. But, to Holt there are no two kinds of knowledge—presentative i. e. sensation and perception, and representative i. e. memory and imagination. All knowledge to him, is presentative.

C. Mr. Bertrand Russell differs from the Neo-Realists of America in many respects. He has an independent theory of his own. But in spite of his peculiar theory he is a Neo-Realist. According to the Neo-Realists all *sensa* are real and Russell also upholds this view ; he even goes a step further by saying that 'only *sensa* are real.' Russell seeks to explain this objective world in the light of physical science and mathematics. However, one of the most important characteristics of Russell is that his philosophy is not a stagnant system. It is always in the making. The best way therefore of understanding Russell is to analyse his works and examine each of the phases of his philosophy separately.

Russell first of all thinks that the subject is on the one hand and the object on the other. Now this object by reflecting itself in the sense-organs produces '*sensa*' which are immediately apprehended by an act of the mind. In other words, we must begin as he maintains, by defining mind as something which possesses the character of being acquainted with things other than itself. The knowledge-relation, therefore, consists in a relation between the mind and some entity other than the mind which knows. But the object is not apprehended immediately ; it can be known only through the medium of the *sensa*. This is the view put forward in his '*Problems of Philosophy*' (1912). Here he makes a distinction

between two kinds of 'knowledge. What we perceive directly of an external object—say a table, i. e. its hardness, smoothness, brownness etc. are immediately known and these *sensa* are, according to Russell known by 'acquaintance'; whereas the table itself is just inferred and is known in a way which he calls—"knowledge by description." 'Knowledge by acquaintance' justifies us in assuming the existence of the physical object which we do not know absolutely. 'Knowledge by description' involves two things—(i) 'Knowledge by acquaintance' of the *sensedata*, and (ii) 'some knowledge of general truths' which is also based on the 'knowledge by acquaintance' of certain entities called 'universals'; and these 'universals' according to Russell, 'subsist.' However here we find that Russell recognises four kinds of entities—(i) 'knowing mind' (ii) 'physical objects known by description' (iii) 'sense data known by acquaintance', and (iv) 'universals known by acquaintance.'

The second phase of Russell's philosophy is seen in his book,—“Our knowledge of the External world” (1914). Its object is to abandon whatever may be doubted and to reconstruct this world of experience out of the least possible number of assumptions. Here he eliminated the object itself; it remained, no doubt, but remained as the cause of the *sensa*. In other words, from the different appearances of the *sensa* we are to 'construct' the object. Here he distinguishes sensations from *sensa*. Now these appearances of the *sensa* are to be quite different from one another, since they are perceived by different minds from different quarters. These different places from which a view of the world could be obtained, Russell calls 'perspectives'. There will be as many worlds as there are perceived 'perspectives'. Each of these he calls a 'private world'. But there is no room for the mind to act. The reality of the subject becomes doubtful, It may be known mediately if it can be known at all.

But in his third phase, i. e. in his 'Analysis of Mind' (1921), he seeks to explain the knowledge-function by a theory of the interaction of 'Neutral entities' which are neither mind nor matter. He dissolves the world of experience into a plurality of 'Neutral particulars'. Both mind and matter are derived from this common stuff—'neutral particulars'. The distinction between mental and material arises from the arrangement of these 'Neutral particulars' in different 'contexts.' And he explains this by the simile of a photographic plate which when exposed to a star in clear night reproduces the appearance of the star. But critical reflection will show that by the denial of the subject, we reduce reality to the physical objects only. The *sensa* become the physical effects of physical causes. *Sensa*, according to Russell, are private and temporary, since they are the physical effects due to the interaction of objects and sense-organs. But the difficulty here lies in the fact that a public or a permanent thing cannot be constructed out of these private and temporary *sensa*.

D. But of all the difficulties that the Neo-Realists are to face, the problem of Error is the most striking. They fail to give an adequate account of error. If there is no activity of the mind in perception, if the mind is one among the many objects that constitute the universe, then how can error be explained? In the case of taking the rope for the snake the error is in the false judgment of the perceiver. Realism says that in perception the appearance is the reality. But why this appearance does not stand as the reality after the illusion is over, is not answered. To Holt error has 'being' and therefore it is objective. Both errors in perception and in thought 'are'. The error of perception is the error of space, error of time and error of secondary qualities. But none of these phenomena prove the subjectivity of the percept. Again he does not admit the existence of contrary terms like red

and blue but he holds that the contradictory propositions like A-is-B and A-is-not-B have 'being'. They are 'objects of thought,' for, we are to understand them if we say that they are 'unthinkable impossibilities'. They have 'being', but what sort of 'being' do they have? For Holt 'to be' is to be objective and thus he is unable to give any explanation of subjective phenomena. Perception of blue and red colours in the same object at the same time is possible to Holt. It is not necessary for one to be subjective. For the qualities, he says "can interpenetrate like the objects in the mirror and behind the mirror," But experience hardly bears out this fact.

If we examine Russell, we find that *perhaps it was possible* to explain error from the standpoint which he took up in his 'Problems', because he recognised there the existence of physical objects and gave to the mind some sort of an active character. But in the second and third phases of his philosophy the constructive powers of the mind are totally denied. How then can an erroneous perception occur? To Russell the blue sense-datum of the colour-blind man who is looking at the grass is sure to be as real as the green sense-datum of the man with normal vision. He boldly asserts that "there are no such things as illusions of senses". Error, according to Russell, arises only in the following way: "objects of sense are called real when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal, when they fail this they are called illusions". But this theory of correspondence suggests some sort of activity of the mind by which it can transcend the sense-data presented to it, and then can create error for itself. But Russell's 'Analysis of Mind' denies all activity of the mind. Unless we grant a certain amount of activity to the mind, we cannot possibly account for error.

In conclusion it may be pointed out that the object does

not exist outside the process and hence it has no absolute independence in the sense in which the Realists hold it. The object is always contained in the process of perceiving and the latter on the other hand 'realises' itself in the consciousness of the thing. It is not given to the self from the outside which is the mistake of the dualistic theory of perception. Again it is not simply made by the self which is the defect of Solipsism. The subject and the object are two elements, which are distinguishable but not separable one from the other, in the unity which is experience.

The nature and value of appearance in Bradley's Philosophy.

By

J. N. CHURCH.

The purpose of this paper is to show that Bradley's attempt to link up appearance with reality and to make out that appearance is somehow a predicate of the real and partakes of its nature is based on an insufficient analysis of the nature of appearance. Bradley starts with a distinction between appearance and reality. Reality for him is the self-consistent and harmonious existence ; appearance is that which when analysed is found to be self-contradictory. The world of our experience, or the world as we know it, sets up a claim to be real, but when we set out to understand it, it reveals itself as bristling with discrepancies and absurdities. In fact, the entire structure of our experience, when examined by the test of reality, breaks down in contradiction. It fails to exhibit itself intelligibly, and its inner discrepancies proclaim it to be appearance and not reality. The chief feature of our world is relatedness. Everything stands in relation to everything else. Relations separate terms and give them individuality and independence ; at the same time relations penetrate their terms and destroy their self-sufficiency. Relatedness is thus a mark of appearance, since related terms are unintelligible and inconsistent in their meaning. Appearances in short are bundles of discrepancies. Before analysis, they seem to pass off as real. But when closely examined their claim to reality is found to be unsubstantial, and they are, to use Bradley's words "undermined and ruined".

But are appearances completely lost in the real ? Bradley does not think so. He believes that a deeper insight would

re-instate what we at first condemn. Appearances are not wholly unreal. They have a positive character and are for that reason not mere nonentities. Whatever appears, is, and as such it cannot be merely shelved and got rid of. Appearances must fall somewhere, and since there is no room outside the real in which they can live, they must somehow fall within and qualify reality, but in such a way as not to be discrepant. "Everything which appears is some how real so as to be self consistent." An appearance which is inconsistent with itself, cannot as it stands be true of the real. Reality cannot accept a self-contradictory appearance as a real or possible predicate, at least in the character which it reveals itself to us, for the "nature of the real is to possess everything in a harmonious form". Appearances therefore must be transformed before they can enter as elements in the real. "The bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity must hence somehow be at unity and self-consistent, for it cannot be elsewhere than in reality, and reality excludes discord". According to Bradley, therefore, appearances reveal discrepancy only when viewed in isolation, and he believes that by skilful rearrangement and by reshuffling the whole mass of fact, appearances can be made free from discrepancy in the Whole. An appearance which is inconsistent and unintelligible is subjected to transformation and it emerges out of this process "modified and corrected". Its discrepancy is "dissolved in a fuller harmony", and in the place of its former conflict and collision, it remains at peace with itself and with the rest of reality.

This assumption of Bradley requires careful examination. An appearance may be supplemented from without, but can the appearance, so transmuted, change its nature from discord to harmony? Bradley is right in holding that "reality cannot accept a discordant appearance as a real or possible predicate", but is he justified in the assumption that when appearance is synthesised its discrepancy ceases to exist?

Discrepancy cannot be removed from appearance, because it is inherent in it and goes to make up its very nature. Bradley starts with an ultimate distinction between reality and appearance and he recognises discord or discrepancy to be an infallible mark or criterion of appearance. But he does not see that where this mark is absent or is removed we have no right to call anything appearance. To remove the contradiction in appearance is to destroy appearance, and on this view appearances must completely be lost in the real. If appearance loses its discrepancy in the Whole, the distinction between itself and reality vanishes, for what is to mark it out as appearance? The very distinction between reality and appearance is made possible because of the discrepant nature of the latter. Reality possesses content and this content ultimately falls short of complete reality. But this falling short is possible only when appearance contains internal discord and discrepancy as an irradicable part of its being. Bradley's assumption that a "transfusion and reblending of elements" can succeed in removing the jarring character of appearance is without foundation. Discrepancy is not a character which appearance reveals under certain conditions, but it is its very nature. Appearances are discrepant, not because they are viewed in isolation, but because they lack self-sufficiency, because in short they are ideal.

Bradley has admitted that the essence of appearance consists in its ideality. Whatever be the nature of the transformation that appearances have to undergo, reality must ultimately consist of elements that in varying degrees *fall short* of the Whole. This constitutes the ideality of appearance. But that which is ideal is determined by relations from without and as such reveals inner discrepancy. As Bradley rightly puts it "to be defined from without is in principle to be distracted from within". So long then as appearances are contained in reality they possess ideality and so long as they

are ideal they can never be made to renounce their discordant and discrepant nature. Reality may be a very powerful absorbant indeed. It may be able to suck out the life and blood from appearances, so that in the real world these latter are mere ghosts and phantoms of their former selves. But one transformation reality can never effect. It can never succeed in sucking out the self-contradiction and the discrepancy which is at the heart of appearance.

There is another and what seems to me a more fatal objection to Bradley's view that appearances are transmuted in reality in such a way as not to infect the latter with self-contradiction. Bradley holds that appearances are not unreal because they have a positive character; but might it not be said that discord and discrepancy are also positive because they are given as positive elements in our experience? Appearance when analysed reveals a discrepant character. Discrepancy is thus a feature of appearance and objectively characterizes it. Now if by process of fusion appearances lose their discrepant character, it follows that discrepancy, as such, is not ultimate and is therefore wholly unreal. But discrepancy is a positive fact and is objective because it is experienced. Either therefore Bradley's Absolute must embrace discrepancy and discord as such, and in its turn be embraced by contradiction, or if it excludes or negates discord then it must forfeit its claim to be the all-absorbing and all-embracing synthesis. It may however be said that appearance reveals discord when viewed in isolation and the isolation of appearance is illusory in the sense that it is our way of viewing things. A harmonious unity is *judged* by us to be composed of parts externally related to each other. Externality and isolation are thus due to misinterpretation and misinterpretation implies an error of judgment. Isolation is not perceived, it is judged, and wrongly, to be a character of a *pearance*. If the absolute is a unity it follows that the externality of the manifold is as

such unreal. That the absolute contains external relations is hence a false judgment. But it should be noted that every judgment whether true or false has an objective basis. Judgment is based on perception or experience. Now before we can judge appearance to possess this or that character it must first be given in experience. But it may be asked in what way do appearances come to us when we judge them to be isolated? How are appearances experienced? Do they appear to us isolated or as synthesised? In the former case isolation ceases to be an error of judgment, for isolation is perceived and is therefore a positive fact of our experience. In the latter case error itself would become impossible. If appearances were experienced in their true nature i.e. as synthesised, we could not judge them to be so many isolated centres, each being a bundle of discrepancies. In short, isolation and therefore discrepancy, are not errors in the sense of being subjective constructions of our finite intellect. They are objective facts and are thus positive elements of our experience. As such they are not wholly unreal, nor can they be embraced in reality without breaking up the unity of the whole and thus degrading it to the level of appearance.

In fact Bradley overlooks the fact that self-contradiction is the essence of appearance and is inseparable from it. The ideal character which appearances reveal gives him the clue to his conception of an all-embracing synthesis. Appearances according to him reveal a tendency towards self-estrangement and self-transcendence. They therefore demand the wider whole in which they are taken up and absorbed. But do appearances really call for a synthesis? Their ideality seems to suggest that they do. But it should be noted that ideality is not the last word about appearance. Appearances are ideal no doubt, but their ideality *follows from*, and is not a *condition* of their nature as discrepant. Appearances are ideal because they are self-contradictory. The demands of

appearance are rooted in contradiction. They demand a synthesis which implies self-abnegation ; at the same time they clamour aloud for individuality, freedom and even isolation. Such are the demands of appearances. They want to eat their cake and have it. Bradley fails to see that the demand of appearance is illegitimate, because contradictory, and believes he can satisfy it by bringing forward his all-embracing synthesis.

Thus Bradley's attempt to link up appearance with reality by calling the former partially real is bound to fail, since the very nature of appearance as inconsistent precludes it from entering as an element in a self-consistent reality. Sankara sees the difficulty of synthesising appearance and reality and he therefore regards appearance as illusion. For Bradley, appearances are ideal, for Sankara they are ideal and illusory. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the nature of illusion as it is expounded in Sankara-Vedanta, but it might be mentioned that illusions for Sankara belong to the category of the indefinite. What is illusory is not wholly unreal, nor is it an element in reality. Appearances are positive no doubt, but only in the sense that they are facts presented in our experience—but the presentation is nevertheless illusory. Illusions are objective facts, but they are neither real nor unreal. In his chapter on Error Bradley almost recognises the illusory character of appearance when he says "we cannot on the one hand accept anything between non-existence and reality and on the other error obstinately refuses to be either. It persistently attempts to maintain a third position which appears nowhere to exist and yet somehow is occupied." If Bradley had followed up the hint contained in this remark he would have arrived at the conclusion reached by Sankara, that appearances are illusions, and that an illusion is that which cannot be defined either in terms of reality or unreality. Sankara's analysis reveals

that appearances supply us with no clue whatever as to the nature of the real. Reality does not lie in the direction of appearance, it cannot be obtained by a widening out and expansion of a finite content. Such a reality would only be absurdities of the appearance writ large. Sankara's conclusion is that appearance is MITHYA (false) and ANIRVACANIYA (inexplicable as either real or unreal). It is that which appears, without being real. More strictly appearances which are true from the finite stand-point are from the infinite stand-point ever non-existent. This is his MAYA—VADA, but an exposition of it would require a separate treatment.

Can Reality be ever defined ?

(Abstract).

By

(C. T. SRINIVASAN).

We find, we are making use of the terms, 'truth' and 'reality' to define Truth and Reality ! The objective of Truth, being truth itself, every attempt at definition is bound to fail. Yet Truth demands a definition ! But to define the one with the other is an absurdity. Here, the Upanishads teach us how Truth cannot be defined, how Reality cannot be grasped by showing conclusively that the Eternal Subject of all experience, cannot be defined or grasped as an object. They proclaim "Na Ithi, Not so." We can have an apprehension of it by an intellectual faith and not by speculative reason. Vedanta terms it Aparokshanubhava or Intuition.

What is 'conscious experience' ? Reality 'Sat' or Existence and 'Chith' or consciousness are not two different things ; they are two only in an empirical view of the transcendental. We may call consciousness 'A pure Act', involving individuation and differentiation, both fused into an actuality by a sense of present. Consciousness of a state covers the whole of Reality. But the Reality which is the 'witness', transcends the sense of present. Consciousness is transcendental, only we do not know it at that time. Hence it is termed by the Upanishadic seers 'Maya', the inscrutable. But the Real or God has not got really any Maya or error. The real Knower knows that He is the Absolute and secondless. If nothing else could be thought of as existent, where is the possibility or even the necessity for a definition ?

Consciousness is intuition only. In truth, it is the Reality itself that is felt to be. As there is nothing else but the

Real, 'Transcending' is a meaningless term. Intuition is the highest possible limit reached by consciousness in consciousness. Intuition means consciousness as a whole. Mere consciousness as a separate power is only an illusion over itself. Intuition helps consciousness to destroy the illusion of separateness and limitedness. The ultimate limit or ideal of all thought is perfect knowledge, which means Bliss for the unreal consciousness. That awareness of the state of non-duality in the individual, as in deep sleep, which the individual cannot account for, is what is called Intuition, which the individual realizes as that which transcends and absorbs his individuality and his limited consciousness.

The Status of Appearance in Sankara's Philosophy.

By

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A right interpretation of Sankara's Philosophy is still a desideratum. The ever-increasing mass of interpretative literature that has grown out of the attempts to present his thought in a methodical and systematic form is so divergent in its bearing and conflicting in its tendencies that it has become well nigh impossible for a modern student to disentangle the genuine views of the ancient thinker from what the interpreters have perhaps read into his doctrine. And if the greatness and vitality of a philosophical achievement are to be measured by the number of interpretations of which it is susceptible, then Sankara's philosophy should no doubt be accepted as the most monumental outcome of national genius in the domain of speculative thought ; and as such, it is surely deserving of a tribute no less striking than what is generally paid to the philosophical greatness of, say, Kant or Hegel.

Nothing is more central in Sankara's philosophy than his theory of appearance ; and the problem of right interpretation, therefore, reduces itself to the discovery of the status of appearances in his philosophy. Yet, it is precisely here that the divergence has been the acutest, both among his accredited exponents of the middle ages as well as among his interpreters of a more recent time. The difficulties in the way of a modern interpreter are increased by the fact that he has to reinterpret the vedantic theory of appearance in terms of western thought which is the living thought

of the day, and so the very first problem which he has to encounter is whether and how Sankara's doctrine may be presented in a systematic and coherent form. And even here there is anything but unanimity of opinions among contemporary scholars. Some think that Sankara's views leave unsolved certain questions which inevitably arise out of his expressed doctrines, and consequently "one could not treat Vedanta as a complete and coherent system of metaphysics" without taking into account "the questions and problems which Sankara did not raise" and which "have been raised and discussed by his followers." (Prof. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 437). There are others who think, on the contrary, that Sankara made a "successful attempt at systematization" and so it is possible to present his philosophy "in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself." (Pandit K. Sastri, *Advaita Philosophy*, p. ix.) It is far from our purpose here to estimate the comparative merits of these two methods of interpreting Sankara. Yet, it may perhaps be useful to remember that when an interpretation is avowedly based on the *ipsissima verba* of the original philosopher, its correctness is not necessarily proportional to the success with which relevant extracts are quoted in support of that particular interpretation. It is well known that widely divergent interpretations of Kant and Hegel have been sought to justify by profuse extracts from their writings. If then we are to confine ourselves to the pronouncements of the original philosopher, a better insight into his innermost beliefs is likely to be gained by supplementing what he says directly by what he implies indirectly. That is, the possibility of misinterpretation of a complex doctrine is to a great extent diminished when the direct conclusions of a philosophy are read in the light of the doctrines which it seeks to reject as false. The value of this indirect procedure in interpreting Sankara's philosophy,

we believe, can hardly be exaggerated. For, as is well known, Sankara, in presenting the fundamental conceptions of the vedanta, makes use of two entirely different stand-points, and is not always careful to specify the stand-point from which he is arguing in a given context. The consequence is a tissue of contradictions which open up the prospect for conflicting interpretations, equally supported by disconnected passages from his works.

We are precluded by the space-limit of the present essay from illustrating in detail the danger of ignoring the indirect implications of Sankara's polemic against alternative doctrines. Yet, no one who attempts to place Sankara's philosophy in its right perspective can afford to forget that through all his arguments, positive as well negative, there runs one unmistakable tendency to translate into the language of rational thought that which is at the same time admitted to be entirely beyond reason. On the one hand, Sankara is never tired of insisting that the mystic vision of the Unity does not admit of a rational proof, and that thought when left to itself may lead to any conclusion in accordance with the forensic excellence of the thinker. On the other hand, he is equally emphatic on the need of rationalisation as a stage towards the attainment of the intuitional vision. In this respect, Sankara's procedure is analogous to that of Plotinus for whom God is neither to be expressed in speech nor in written discourse, though we have to rationalise on Him "in order to direct the soul to him and to stimulate it to rise from thought to vision." That is, philosophy as the thinking consideration of things, as a rational discourse or 'mananam', is, for Sankara as well as Plotinus, a discipline or a training for moulding the finite soul and thus helping it to give up its finitude with all the limitations incidental to the finite stand-point.

Except in the light of these observations, Sankara's

theory of appearance will ever remain a mystery, an ingenuous makeshift to brush off the contradictions that arise persistently at every step of his exposition. Unfortunately, however, the interpreters of his theory, have, as a general rule, underestimated the importance of distinguishing the finite from the infinite stand-point for appreciating his position correctly. And the result is that they have been led to one of two extreme views, and Sankara is either interpreted as a subjectivist or a realist. Those who concentrate on the passages that compare the world of appearance to the apparitions in dream and illusions rush to the conclusion that the world, for Sankara, is but a prolonged dream or a systematic illusion. It then falls to the lot of their critics to point out that analogy should not be pressed too far, and that Sankara has expressly repudiated subjectivism by distinguishing between three classes of objects, namely that which is absolutely false, that which is illusory and that which has phenomenal reality. Both these interpretations, however, we contend, represent extreme views consequent mainly on the failure to distinguish between the finite and the infinite stand-points which, as we have remarked, pervade Sankara's exposition of appearance.

The subjectivistic interpretation which is favoured by a number of passages in Sankara's philosophy is implied in the popular version of his theory of appearance, and this is responsible for the widely current opinion that the world, for Sankara, is nothing better than a huge illusion or is such as dreams are made of. The mistake of this popular version of Vedantism has been successfully exposed by the contemporary scholars who have once for all placed it beyond doubt that Sankara is not a subjectivist in the same sense as Berkeley or Hume. His uncompromising criticism of the Buddhistic subjectivism, and his frequent insistence on the distinction between the phenomenal or *vyavaharika*, the

illusory or *pratibhasika* and the absolutely false or *alika*, ought to have exposed the mistake of those who think that the doctrine of *Maya* classes "the whole known world as illusion". (Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality*, p. 227). So far as the reality of the world is concerned, a better insight is likely to be gained if we remember Max Muller's remark that "these Vedanta philosophers have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in this phenomenal world." (*The Six Systems*, p. 183.) And when it is urged that "a pantheistic, or rather acosmic, idea of God such as that of Brahmanism not only offers no hindrance to idolatry and immorality, but may be said even to lead to them by a logical necessity" (J. Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 321) one may again retort in the language of Max Muller that it is "hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedanta philosophy, even in its popular form, holds out no encouragement to vice. Far from it. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline, whether as a student (*Brahmakarin*) or as a householder (*Grihastha*)." (*Ibid.* p.181.)

The fact is that the subjectivistic interpretation of Sankara's theory of appearance arises from a misapprehension which essentially consists in confusing the finite with the infinite stand-point as understood by Sankara. The world of appearance, with its ethics and religion, duties and worship, are real in the strictest sense of the term; but, they are so within finite experience alone. If the world is an illusion, it is emphatically not so *for* the finite ego, for whom an illusion exists only as different from reality. That is, it would be impossible to know an illusory appearance as such if there had been nothing real for us. When therefore Sankara compares the world of appearance with illusions and dreams he never means to reduce the world as it is for the finite ego to the level of what we call an unsubstantial shadow or an unreal

apparition. While, however, conceding to the world a full measure of reality, Sankara is equally emphatic on the ultimate nothing-ness of appearance when regarded from a different stand-point. This leads us to the consideration of the realistic interpretation of his theory, in order to see how far it avoids the confusion of the finite with the infinite stand-point which vitiates the alternative theory.

The essence of the realistic interpretation consists in pointing out that the world of appearance with its empirical objects and moral order are not false in Sankara's philosophy. From his doctrine of the sole reality of the Absolute Spirit follows, not the unreality of the world, but its relative reality only; Brahman manifests himself through the world, or, stated from the other side, the world is the manifestation of Brahman's nature, the self-expression or the self-realisation of the underlying Reality. All that Sankara means by the non-existence of the world, it is urged, is that the world should not be imagined as a factor separate from the Absolute, for, it has really a conditioned existence dependent on and sustained by the Absolute. To put these contentions into the form of a technical formula of philosophy, the relation between the Absolute and the world of empirical objects is neither one of identity nor one of difference; and Sankara, it is contended, does not content himself with exposing the defects of pluralism, but he continues his polemic right into the camp of the pantheist as well and thus repudiates mere identity and pure difference as equally inadequate, for representing the relation of the Absolute to the world.

This realistic interpretation, we believe, is valuable as a protest against the subjectivistic tendency which vitiates some of the popular versions of Sankara's philosophy. But as an interpretation of Sankara's ultimate position, we submit, it fails to emphasise the deeper aspects of the vedanta system which is not a system of philosophy in the ordinary

sense of reasoned knowledge. Systematised knowledge, for Sankara, is no doubt superior to the unsystematic knowledge of common-sense, and consequently a philosopher can not dispense with reason. But this is only a stage, a discipline intended to lead the philosopher beyond the domain of reason. Hence Sankara's repeated invectives against those who accept the ultimate and independent truth-value of rational conclusions. It is his considered opinion that reason with its principles of space, time and causality is incompetent for grasping the ultimate truth about the universe, but when conducted under the control, and in the light, of the scripture it may give us the negative assurance that the ultimate truth as laid down in the scripture, though beyond itself, is not entirely improbable. That is, reason, for Sankara, has the indispensable function of stimulating the finite ego to rise from thought to vision though it can never be an adequate substitute for the intuitional vision as an organ of knowledge. No interpretation of Sankara, we claim, can be accepted as true that ignores the intuitional basis of his philosophy and fails to distinguish between the stand-point of intuition and that of finite knowledge which enter into his exposition, often to the great confusion of the reader.

When judged in the light of these remarks, Sankara's theory of appearance, we believe, should be admitted to have two aspects. From the stand point of finite knowledge, or *yukti dristi*, the world is an appearance which, like an illusion, is there, inscrutable and inexplicable or *anirvachaniya*. This is shown by a criticism of the different theories of error, as well as by contrasting his own position with the alternative conceptions of the relation between the finite and the infinite within as well as without the school of vedantism then known to the world. On the other hand, the world of appearance, when regarded from the stand-point of the Absolute, or *sastra dristi*, is absolutely non-existent or *tukha*, existing neither

in the past nor in the present nor again in the future. From this stand-point, it is urged that there is neither a *summum bonum* to be attained nor a moral struggle for its attainment, neither a state of bondage nor one of liberation. There is only One without a second, entirely beyond the categories of one and of many, existence and non-existence, cause and effect; and consequently incomprehensible from the stand-point of finite experience. Finite thought which understands through distinction is incapable of comprehending the pure unity of intuition which is different from the category of unity, and which is pure being different from the empirical existence of things in space and time. And it follows from this that all questions of the relation between the pure unity and the world of appearance are irrelevant in as much as they assume the reality of at least two *relata* in the form of cause and effect, or substance and attribute, or end and means, or again the manifestation and the manifested. Hence again all we can say about the world of appearance is that it exists *for us*, but to penetrate further into the mystery of the origin of appearances is to go beyond our depths.

This aspect of Sankara's philosophy is thrown overboard if we interpret his theory of appearance either exclusively on the subjectivistic or the realistic lines, even when these interpretations are supported by profuse extracts from his works. Through all his polemics and expositions runs the agnostic conviction that all distinctions are within finite experience, that duality is inseparable from the finite stand-point, and that Reality is consequently beyond the competence of finite thought. Avidya and adhyasa are inseparable from the finite nature, and so our highest category may give us nothing but an appearance of the Reality. In this regard, Sankara's position may be compared with that of Plotinus and the mystics in general, or again with those of Spinoza, Kant, Schelling and Bradley. Spinoza's distinction between the

view point of thought and that of a higher faculty, Kant's critical limitation of the categories, Schellings's intuition to which finite thought may lead up, and Bradley's ultra-relational experience are reminiscent of the mystic aspects of Sankara's philosophy which have an important bearing on his theory of appearance. The chief difficulty of the problem of error, it has been pointed out, (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 186) is this that "we can not on the one hand accept anything between non-existence and reality, while, on the other hand, error obstinately refuses to be either. It persistently attempts to maintain a third position, which appears nowhere to exist, and yet somehow is occupied. In false appearance there is something attributed to the real which does not belong to it. But if the appearance is not real, then it is not false appearance, because it is nothing. On the other hand, if it is false it must therefore be true reality, for it is something which is. And this dilemma at first sight seems insoluble." Here Bradley raises, almost in the spirit of Sankara, the deepest problem about the world of appearances, and the problem has remained unsolved since the days of Plato and Aristotle. Appearances are still thought to have a quasi-substantive existence; or, as Alexander puts it, they have a twilight existence between the things they represent and the mind which understands them. According to Sankara, the problem is insoluble from the finite stand-point; they belong and do not belong to the real. We can not doubt that the appearances appear, they are co-existent with the finite ego. But from the infinite stand-point, they never exist and are as unreal as a castle in the air. But how the absolutely unreal can yet appear is a mystery to us, and it will ever remain as inexplicable as the origin of the finite from the infinite.

The theory of illusion in Dvaita and its Relation to other theories of illusion.

By

H. N RAHGAVENDRACHAR.

(The following position is based on the Nyāyasudhā Jijnāsādhikarana).

(1) *What is illusion ?*

The nature of illusion may be better understood by considering how it is contrasted with right knowledge. The following is a typical case of illusion. There is a shell. A person mistakes it for a piece of silver. His mistake is embodied in the judgment "This is silver". Under normal circumstances he ought to have the judgment "This is a shell". Owing to some mistake or other he has the judgment 'This is silver', in place of "This is a Shell". Of these the latter is correct and the former wrong. The latter is correct because it presents the object as it is (Yathārtha). The object that is presented is a shell, and the knowledge presents it as a shell. The former is wrong because it presents the object as it is not. The given object is only a shell and it is not silver and the knowledge in presenting it as silver presents it (the shell) as it is not.

The analysis of the two kinds of judgment, right and wrong gives us the notion of truth and error. Truth is the property of that knowledge which presents the object as it is. Objects of experience are of two kinds—positive and negative. The objects jar etc., are positive and the absence of the jar etc., is negative. A positive thing is apprehended even at the first instance of its apprehension as a thing that is existent. A negative thing is

apprehended at the first instance of its apprehension as something that is not. Correct knowledge presents the positive as existent and the negative as non-existent and wrong knowledge presents the positive as non-existent and the negative as existent.

This conception of wrong knowledge may be illustrated as follows—Let us take for instance the illusion "This is silver". What is presented here is silver and it is in fact non-existent; but it is presented as existent. What is really there is only a shell. It is existent but in the presentation of silver it is implicitly presented as non-existent. So since in this judgment the existent is given as non-existent and the non-existent as existent the judgment is wrong.

So far we know what illusion is. In this inquiry our interest is metaphysical. It is this interest that has given rise to divergent views of illusion. In order to understand what view of reality we have, starting from the problem of illusion, we have to sketch the presuppositions of illusion.

2. *The presuppositions of illusion :*

Wrong knowledge for instance "This is silver" does not occur to one who has not the idea (*samskāra*) of silver. So the idea of silver is the necessary presupposition of the judgment "This is silver". To have an idea of silver is not possible unless there is previously a right experience of silver. So the right experience of silver is another presupposition of the judgment of "This is silver".

Further the illusion "This is silver" does not happen to one who has not perceived at least some quality of the shell that is similar to the quality of silver. Glittering is such a quality. It is the quality of those things that glitter. Both the shell and the silver glitter. It is not possible to have the perceptual judgment "This is silver".

without first seeing the quality of glittering. Hence the experience of real glittering is another presupposition of the illusion "This is silver".

Further the person who has not seen the substance i.e., the 'this' part of the object, that has the quality of glittering cannot have the illusion "This is silver". In the judgment "This is silver" 'this' stands for the substance that glitters. So the right experience of the substance as 'this' is another presupposition of the illusion "This silver".

Further the illusion "This is silver" presupposes the non-apprehension of the shell as shell though it is known as a substance having some qualities. The cause of this may lie sometimes in the percipient himself and sometimes in the object itself or sometimes in both. In the present case the defective eye-sight of the percipient may be responsible for the illusion. If the sight is normal, that is to say, if there is nothing wrong in it, then it gives rise to the right apprehension of the object i.e., of the shell as a shell. On the other hand if there is anything wrong in the sight then though it grasps the shell as a substance that glitters; it does not grasp it as a shell. At the next stage owing to the apprehension of glittering, the impression of silver gains prominence since it is already known to the percipient that silver is a thing that glitters. Of course, at this stage, he might as well have the impression of a shell because of the same reason. But in fact he has not that impression. The cause of this may be mere chance or, as it is generally put but by Indian thinkers, it may be the destiny (adṛṣṭa of the percipient). So owing both to the experience of the shell as only a substance that glitters and to the prominence of the impression of silver the percipient has the judgment "This is silver".

So the presuppositions of the illusion "This is silver" are the idea and, with it, the right experience of silver,

the right experience of the quality of glittering, the right experience of the shell as a substance and the non-apprehension of the shell as shell, given these presuppositions the illusion follows. Similar is the explanation of any other illusion.

II. The *Dvaita* theory of illusion is fundamental to all the other theories :—

Taking the same case of illusion "This is silver" I shall now explain how the *Dvaita* theory of illusion is fundamental to all other theories. *Mādhyaṃika* starts from the idea that the silver that is given by the illusion does not exist and in the interest of "śūnyavāda" concludes from this that all that is given in illusion is unreal. His logic is that if some one of the things that are given by knowledge is unreal then all are unreal. The previous analysis of the presupposition of illusion clearly shows how this is a faulty logic and how illusion necessarily presupposes the right experience of real things. Further even *mādhyaṃika* who denies all has to admit that what appears in illusion is given as real at least in so far as the illusion continues. This is to admit tacitly that illusion presents the non-existent as existent and the existent as non-existent.

Vijñāna Vadin says that what we see in illusion is only the idea of silver and this idea for the time being appears to be an outside entity. This also clearly implies the *Dvaita* definition of illusion. For the silver exists only as an idea but not as an outside entity. *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika's* position is as follows :—"The unreal cannot be seen, so the thing that is given in illusion is not unreal. Idea and object are opposed to each other so the former does not appear as outside. Since the unreal cannot be known the thing that is presented by knowledge is real. But the silver that appears in illusion is not at the place occupied

by the shell. So it follows that it is the silver that is elsewhere, say, in the silver shop, that is presented by the illusion." This explanation of illusion also clearly implies the truth of the definition given by *Dvaita* for it accepts that the silver that is real elsewhere is presented as real at the place of the shell. *Prabhākara* thinks that to say that knowledge whose nature is to give reality presents the thing of one place at another place is absurd; so he denies the fact of illusion itself. Yet he has to account for at least the so-called illusion. This is his explanation. The so-called illusion is not a single piece of knowledge. It consists of two pieces of knowledge. In the illusion "this is silver" "this" is presented and "silver" is remembered. So these are different from each other. But owing to something wrong in the percipient the difference between them is not grasped. Hence there is the usage that "this is silver" is an illusion. "This position may be put briefly as that in illusion different pieces of knowledge appear to be non different." This shows that the definition accepted by *Dvaita* works implicitly in this theory.

Advaita view of illusion is as follows:—*Prabhākara* is right in asserting that every piece of knowledge without a single exception has its objective counterpart. But his denial of illusion is inconsistent with experience. When illusion is over we feel contradiction both in theory and practice. Let us take "This is silver" for example. When this is over we have the correct knowledge "This is not silver" and we find that our effort to obtain silver is a failure. So illusion is a fact. Now there are two things that seem to be inconsistent with each other. (1) It is only the real that is known and (2) the thing that is known during illusion is not real. The inconsistency here is only apparent. For it suggests a solution and with it ceases to be. The solution is that what appears in illusion is a type of reality which is

produced at the time of illusion and destroyed when the illusion ceases to be. Since this reality exists only so far as there is illusion, this may be called *prātibhāsika* (existing so long as its knowledge exists) so as to distinguish it from the type of reality that we normally experience. This theory may be put in short that illusion grasps the *Prātibhāsika* as the normal and it is not existent as the normal. This clearly shows how this theory also is based on the position accepted by *Dvaita*.

Viśiṣṭādvaita finds that it is too much to assume that there is a separate type of reality over and above the normal and offers the following explanation of illusion—"Things are similar. Similarity can only be explained by holding that similarity is partial identity. The silver is similar to a shell because there is some element of silver in the shell. But silver which is in the shell cannot be used. So the knowledge "this is silver" is regarded as illusion. This is so only from the practical point of view. Here also it is evident how *Viśiṣṭādvaita* makes use of the idea made clear by *Dvaita*, in admitting that in illusion the thing that is not practically useful appears to be practically useful. If the silver did not appear as practically useful then nobody would have tried to possess it nor is it sound to hold that a thing is in the things similar to it. This is not supported by experience. Things are similar because they have similar qualities. We must also note that absolute similarity of things can never be had. Things are similar only from the point of certain qualities, just as they are dissimilar from certain other points of view.

Among the Western thinkers the problem of illusion has come to receive a separate examination only recently. Yet we can trace some kind of conception of illusion from the very beginning of philosophical thought. When Parmenides taught that only being is and it is one and the senses which

show us a multiplicity of things are the sources of error, he implies a kind of the conception of illusion that it is something which presents that which is not. The same idea in some form or other runs throughout the monistic doctrines down to our own time. It is obvious how the conception supports the view advocated by *Dvaita*.

The realists of various types in the interest of showing how knowledge has its outside counter-part began to study the problem of illusion separately. We may take some of their views as specimens. The critical realists hold that error consists in ascribing characteristics or essences to a reality which does not possess them. Prof. Alexander holds that in illusion mind squints at things and one thing is seen with the characters of something else. In these conceptions it is clear how essences or characters that are not real in the thing in question are seen as real.

Mr. Russell denies "illusions of sense" and explains the so-called illusion by a reference to the relationship subsisting between the so-called unreal object and objects commonly believed to be real. Even accepting the explanation we may note that the so called illusion is impossible unless the uncommon relation is mistaken for the common one. The uncommon relation is not real as the common one. Hence it is obvious how this explanation is based upon the truth that *Dvaita* has brought to light.

III. Concluding Remarks.

Metaphysical consequences of the Dvaita theory of illusion.

The *Dvaita* theory of illusion strongly supports the realistic attitude of *Dvaita*. For in the very expression of the theory there is involved the idea that the knowledge of the external world is impossible without an external counterpart. This is obvious in the case of right knowledge. For illusion also somethings external are indispensable, such external things being the thing that is mistaken, its similarity to the thing for which it is mistaken and so on.

Sree Krishna Tattwa

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Indian philosophical systems in general have always shown as much regard for the spiritual experiences of the most trustworthy men as the sciences have been showing for sense-experiences, and the business of philosophy has been mainly the interpretation, systematisation, examination and criticism of those experiences believed to be on the highest planes in terms of speculative reason. Philosophy has therefore naturally become subservient to Religion.

In the history of the philosophical systems that grew in India, we find various conceptions of Reality, materialistic and idealistic, static and dynamic, pluralistic, dualistic and monistic and most of these systems are alive to this day, being influentially supported, and are found to appeal to particular types of minds dwelling in particular universes of experience. The system which has exercised the greatest influence upon the life and thought of India is the *Vedanta*, and it claims that its conception of Reality is based upon the deepest spiritual experience of the human soul moving in the highest plane. The Upanishads, being generally accepted as the standing records of such spiritual experiences, the Vedanta Philosophy makes them its basis, and undertakes on the one hand to interpret and systematise them, and on the other to examine critically all possible objections against its views as well as the claims of other systems to represent more correctly the nature of Reality.

According to Vedanta, the ultimate Reality is one limitless changeless differenceless spiritual entity, named Brahman, in which there is no distinction between subject and

object, substance and attribute, cause and effect, which is pure blessed consciousness existing in and for and by Itself eternally in perfection. The finite spirit can form no adequate conception of It, so long as it does not transcend its finitude; but when completely free from the limitations imposed by Ignorance (*Avidya*) it realises its eternal identity with It. What these finite spirits experience as the phenomenal world in the lower planes of experience is a false appearance (*Vivarta*) of Reality. The thorough comprehension of the inner character of Brahman is out of the question. The categories in terms of which the finite understanding attempts to form a vague notion of Reality are *Satyam* (pure existence) *Jñānam* (pure consciousness) *Ānandam* (pure bliss), these being the most universal concepts involved in the understanding of the phenomenal realities. In order to offer an explanation of the false appearances of plurality and change, this system admits a mysterious principle, called *Mūyā*, which is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, which apparently exists in, by and for Brahman, without in the least affecting Its essential purity and unity, and makes Brahman appear in innumerable names and forms constituting the phenomenal world.

The Vaishnava system of Bengal, founded by Sree Chaitanya, and expounded by his illustrious disciples and followers like Sanatan, Rupa, Jeeva, Krishnadas, Baladev and others, starts with Vedantic *Brahmavāda* and its Sankarite exposition as its basis, and claims to enter much deeper into the character of this Absolute Reality. Before the Bengal school of Vaishnavism came into existence, there had been four other influential schools of Vaishnavism, viz those of Ramanuja, Madhwa, Vishnuswami and Nimbārka, each of which claimed to interpret truly the Vedantic conception of the Absolute Reality, and each of which has been moulding the life and thought of numerous men and women to this day. They all attempted to refute the interpretation given to it by Sankara's

school, though they differed among themselves also in essential particulars. Bengal Vishnavism joins hands with them in combating Sankara's interpretation of the ultimate character of Reality, but differs in the positive aspect of its conception from the other Vaishnava systems also in no less important respects.

It begins with supporting the doctrine of the Upanishads that the ultimate substance and ground of the universe is Brahman, who is one without a second, but it objects to Sankara's conclusion that Brahman is absolutely differenceless, powerless, attributeless, inactive and impersonal. It adduces two kinds of arguments against the view. First, such characterisation of Brahman as lacking in any character whatsoever does not give expression to the highest order of spiritual experience of the human soul with regard to the true nature of Brahman. As Jeeva Goswamin has argued, when the finite spirit having transcended the lower planes of experience stands on the threshold of the highest supra-rational plane (*Anandamaya kosha*), it is, as it were, overwhelmed by the dazzling brilliance of the Absolute Spirit, and if its capacity has not been sufficiently developed by suitable spiritual culture to retain its spiritual individuality as a factor in the life of the Absolute and to form closer acquaintance with His inner nature, it loses itself in the Absolute and fails to recognise the transcendent particulars in the character of that supreme Being; and when it returns to the plane of *Buddhi* (reason), it is led to think that the highest Reality is nothing but an absolutely differenceless and attributeless unity of consciousness. The finite spirit, if it has developed sufficient spiritual power and insight, has not necessarily to lose itself in the Absolute universal spirit or to be contented with the apprehension of His purely general abstract character; but it acquires a right to enter into the innermost compartments in that highest spiritual plane to be in the closest touch with that su-

preme spirit and to be acquainted with the particular spiritual features of His transcendent character. When it is blessed with that acquaintance, it finds the conception of Brahman as interpreted by Sankara to be quite inadequate to represent that Highest Reality.

Secondly, the Vaishnava philosophers contend that the absolutely attributeless impersonal Brahman, devoid of power and feeling and will and knowledge, cannot furnish a satisfactory ground of explanation of the apparent realities of the lower planes of experience. The hypothesis of Illusion, they point out, is of little help, for not only does it presuppose the existence of those that are deluded, but it is altogether inadequate to account for this magnificent world of phenomena with such order and adjustment, plan and purpose, beauty and grandeur. The examples of rope and snake, the sun and its reflection, the sky and its blueness etc., have all been examined; they are shown to bear no conclusive analogy with the relation between Brahman and the phenomenal world, since the points of difference far outweigh the points of resemblance. Further, while Brahman is the only Reality without any elements of difference either within or outside Himself, each of the examples given implies more than one reality of the same order, and also implies extraneous reasons for the errors.

If Brahman is the one Reality without a second, and if it is Brahman that appears as the world of finite minds and matters, of multiplicity and change, of the different orders of reality of the lower planes of experience, the power and tendency of such self-manifestation must be inherent in Brahman, and the very conception of Brahman must involve the presence of this power and tendency. *Māyā*, which is assumed by Vedanta to account for these appearances of Brahman, instead of being conceived as an inscrutable and unreal source of illusion and error, should more rationally be con-

ceived as the real power and tendency (*Shakti*) pertaining to to the nature of Brahman. According to Sankara, Brahman, when conceived in relation to *Māyā*, which is unreal from the point of view of the Absolute, but appears real to those who are its products, acquires a relative and phenomenal character, which is transcended in the highest plane of spiritual experience. But the Bengal Vaishnavas, along with the other Vedantic schools, maintain that Brahman, through His own inherent *Māyā-sakti*, eternally reveals Himself as the world of finite minds and matters, and enjoys the inexhaustible glories of His infinite nature under limitations of time, space and different grades of development. The world as the creation of His own real power must be regarded as real, though by nature it is changing and consists of different orders of reality according to the different degrees of concealment and manifestation of His essential character in these self-expressions. Brahman as the *Shaktimūn* or the true self of the power is immanent in the world (*Antarjūmin*) as the real self of all.

So far Bengal Vaishnavism agrees with Ramanuja and Madhva schools. But while Ramanuja and Madhva emphasise the aspect of difference between *Shakti* and *Shaktimūn*, the self and its expressions, Chaitanya's school in general agreement with Nimbārka and Bhāskara schools, maintains that the relation between them is one of unity as well as difference (*Bhedābheda*) at the sametime, that *Bheda* (difference) and *Abheda* (non-difference) are two aspects of the relation. *Māyā* with its evolution is non-different from Brahman since it has no existence apart from that of Brahman, who is its self; but at the same time Brahman eternally transcends *Māyā* being absolutely untouched by its modifications, by the impurities and limitations pertaining to it. Thus the attributes which have significance only in relation to the world of *Māyā*, the categories which have application only in a relative

world, cannot give any true and adequate conception of Brahman. Brahman is consequently conceived as having at the same time a higher and a lower aspect,—a *Nirguna* and a *Saguna* aspect, a *Nirbishesha* and a *Savishesha* aspect, a *Nishaktika* and a *Sashaktika* aspect, a *Niskriya* and a *Sakriya* aspect. The lower aspect represents what He is as related to His *Māyā*, as manifesting Himself through His *Māyā-Shakti*, and the higher aspect represents what He is in Himself as transcending *Māyā*. But neither of these aspects can reasonably be called unreal. If our Formal Logic finds any inconsistency in affirming both these aspects at the same time of the supreme spirit, it is because Formal Logic begins with certain fundamental assumptions which belong to the lower intellectual plane and have no controlling influence upon the truths of the Supra rational plane of experience. There is no valid ground for regarding one aspect as real and the other unreal, or illusory out of respect for those assumptions, as Sankara's school thinks, for the truth about Brahman is spiritual and supra-rational and therefore not strictly within the domain of Logic.

The *Vaishnavas* hold that as the term 'Brahman' has been systematically used by the *Vedantists* to signify the attributeless differenceless pure abstract transcendent nature of Reality, it may be retained to point out one aspect of the Supreme Spirit, while the term *Paramātman*, generally used by the yogins, may be more advantageously adopted for indicating His concrete nature. *Paramātman* reveals His character both in its *Savishesha* and *Nirvishesha* aspects to a deeper spiritual experience attained by *yoga*, in which cognition is instinct with action, while only the latter aspect in abstraction from the former appears real to pure cognition of the intellectualists.

But Vaishnava philosophy does not stop here. *Māyā Shakti* is not the only power through which *Paramātman* reveals

himself. His *Shakti* is three fold. The one which conceals His essential spiritual character and creates the diversity of non-spiritual objects is the *Māyā Shakti*. The two other ways of His self-expression are His *Tatastha Shakti* or *Jeeva Shakti* and *Antaranga Shakti* or *Swarupa Shakti*. Through His *Tatastha Shakti* the supreme Spirit eternally manifests Himself as innumerable finite spirits or *Jeevas*, i.e. finite centres of experience, in which His essential spiritual self-luminous character is partially and progressively manifested, and to which as subject He reveals Himself as object and communicates His true and complete nature in proportion to their different grades of development. These finite spirits are placed in the world of *Māyā*. They live and move here in relation to and in interaction with its phenomena. The *Maya* imposes various sorts of limitations upon them and distorts their vision about Reality. But they never lose their essential spiritual character, and have an inherent tendency to get rid of those limitations and to realise, through the development and unification of knowledge, feeling and will, more and more clearly and completely the perfect nature of the Absolute Reality mirrored upon themselves. The mission of the life of each individual finite spirit in the world of *Māyā* is fulfilled, when by dint of its spiritual culture it transcends this world and having entered into the highest spiritual plane of experience consciously participates in the innermost life of the Absolute. These finite spirits are called parts (*Angsha*) of *Paramātman*. It is needless to point out that spirits being parts of a spirit should not be understood on the analogy of material parts and wholes. It means that the finite spirits are the individuated and limited manifestations of the essential spiritual nature of *Paramātman*. They are different in their individuality, but non-different in essence from the absolute source and ground of their existence. According to all the schools of Vaishnavism, the individual spirits, even at the highest

stage of their spiritual development, do not completely lose their individuality in the Absolute or realise themselves to be the Absolute, as Sankara's system holds. They find themselves in Him, by Him and for Him, and experience Him to be the sole Reality, but this experience itself indicates their retention of distinct individuality as parts as well as experiencers of the Absolute.

But the *Māya Shakti* with its evolution of the incomprehensible diversity of phenomena and the *Tutasthā Shakti* with its manifestation of countless finite spirits do not exhaust the nature of the Absolute Reality. He has His *Antaranga* or *Swarupa* Shakti, the innermost aspect of His nature, which transcends all other aspects and through which He eternally realises Himself as a perfect self-existence (*sat*), perfect self-consciousness (*Chit*), and perfect self-enjoyment (*Ananda*). *sat*, *Chit*, and *Ananda* are categories applied by Sankara-Vedantists also for forming an idea of the essential nature of Brahman. But they use them rather as implying negative characteristics, showing not that Brahman has the attributes of self-existence, self-consciousness and self-enjoyment, but that Brahman is an indescribable entity absolutely distinct from all objects of the knowable world of Maya. To the Vaishnava philosophers, they are real positive features of the Supreme spirit and each of them has a specific significance of its own. The *Antaranga Shakti* appears in three distinct forms. First, the *Sandhini Shakti*, by virtue of which the Supreme Spirit reveals Himself not merely as pure self-existence, but as the Supreme Personality eternally existing in and by and for Himself, as the perfectly free and fully self-realised Will, and as the ultimate ground and resting place of all existences. Secondly, the *Sambit Shakti*, by virtue of which He is revealed not merely as pure consciousness, but as the Supreme Personality fully conscious of Himself and the infinite glories of His perfect nature, and as

the only source of all forms of consciousness and intelligibility of the universe. Thirdly, the *Hlāḍini Shakti* which reveals Him as eternally enjoying the beauty, sweetness and grandeur of infinite perfection of His own nature. Thus, according to the Vaishnava system, deeper spiritual experience in the highest plane discovers transcendental *Visheshas* (particular characteristics) beyond the realm of *Māyā* in the *Nirvisheshā* aspect of Reality. The Supreme Person in that plane is *nirvisheshā* (without particular features), so far as *Mayik* or phenomenal attributes are concerned, but *savisheshā* (with particularities) as possessing transcendental spiritual characteristics.

Here we find that the idea of *Paramātmān*, though fuller and more concrete than that of Brahman, does not represent the complete nature of Reality, which, according to the Vaishnavas, is more clearly expressed by the significant name *Bhagavan*.

This, however, is not the last word in Chaitanya's religion and philosophy. Of the three elements of the innermost nature of *Bhagavan*, *Hlāḍini shakti* is considered to be the supreme, for in it the other two are included, harmonised and transcended. Perfect self-enjoyment involves the eternally self-fulfilled will and fully realised self-consciousness as elements in it. The *Hlāḍini shakti* is also the ground as well as the fulfilment of *Māyā shakti* and *Tatastha shakti*, which are its imperfect manifestations. It is the ultimate power in which all other powers are merged, the highest category in terms of which the Supreme Absolute Personality can be conceived. As mirrored in the *Hlāḍini shakti*, the Absolute appears truly and perfectly as He is in Himself. Hence the highest conception of Divinity should be sought in relation to the most perfect manifestation of *Hlāḍini shakti*.

Hlāḍini shakti the power through which *Bhagavan* enjoys himself, is, to Bengal Vaishnavism, the power of love (*Preman*)

and through this power of love *Bhagavan* enjoys Himself as beautiful. Love is the most perfect organ of enjoyment, and Beauty the most perfect character of the object enjoyed. The highest conception of Reality is the conception of God as perfect love enjoying Himself as perfect Beauty. The world process also is, in ultimate analysis, found to be imperfect manifestation of God's self-enjoyment. It is the process of His self-enjoyment in diverse forms and is the reflection of the communion of Love and Beauty of His nature in different planes of experience under various kinds of limitations.

Beauty, it should be understood, is not a quality among other qualities, Beauty means the whole nature perfectly realised, unified and enjoyed, and it is appreciated and comprehended, not by reason or understanding, but by Love. *Bhagavan*, mirrored in His *Māyā shakti* and *Tat istha shakti*, appears as almighty, omnipresent, omniscient, all-just, all-merciful, all-good, infinite, eternal and perfectly free and self-conscious Supreme Being. But mirrored in His *Hlādinī shakti* all His power and wisdom, justice and benevolence, greatness and goodness are merged in perfect beauty, which in point of intrinsic value transcends all those glorious features of Divine character and represents it fully. This conception of *Bhagavan* eternally enjoying Himself as absolute Beauty (*Rasarūj*) through His infinite power of love (*Premam*) is the conception of *Sree Krishna* of the Bengal Vaishnavas. This conception of *Sree Krishna* is thus the highest perfection of the conceptions of *Brahman*, *Paramātmam* and *Bhagavan* just as the *Hlādinī shakti* is the perfection of all other *Shaktis*.

Love is not a static principle, but a dynamic and self-evolving spiritual experience. By analysis of it, the Vaishnava philosophers have discovered its different stages, phases and forms, which can only be mentioned in this paper, but not explained. First, they enumerate and explain *Shānta*, *Dāsya*, *Sakhya*,

Bātsalya and *Madhura* forms of love, and point out that among these *Madhura* is the highest form, of which the others are partial manifestations. *Madhura* form of love, again, passes through the phases of *Sneha*, *Mīna*, *Pranaya*, *Rāga*, *Anurāga*, *Bhāva* and *Mahābhāva*. *Mahābhāva* represents the highest perfection of love, through which the complete beauty of the entire character of *Sree Krishna* is most perfectly revealed and enjoyed. This *Mahābhāva* is the *Sree-Rūhī* of the Bengal Vaishnavas, and the highest ideal of communion between *Sree Krishna* and *Sree Rūhī*, i.e., the highest perfection of the Absolute's self-revelation and self-enjoyment, is conceived as *Rīsu-Leela*. Hence their final conclusion is that *Sree Krishna* as revealed to, reflected in, and enjoying Himself through *Sree-Rūhī*, in eternal *Rīsu Leela*, gives us the highest conception of the Absolute Reality.

The nature of (Pratyaksha) Perceptual Knowledge and (Badhatmak nisedha) negative judgment according to the Vedanta.

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First we shall show that perceptual knowledge is nothing if not capable of being expressed in a judgmental form. Let us take the case of *Samsaya Jñāna*—the mental state of doubtfulness. Can it amount to any definite knowledge? No; for there is something given—a datum, the knowledge about which is indeterminate. The man has a bundle of sensations from the datum, but they do not amount to any definite knowledge, worth the name, unless he asserts something. He may judge the 'this' to be a stump or a man. The judgment may be true or false, and that is quite another matter. What we want to bring out is that nothing less than a judgment can claim truth. Any perceptual knowledge, worth the name, should be expressed in a judgment form.

Bosanquet, in his *Logic* (P.P. 67-70,) says that a judgment is the same thing as truth or falsehood. The sensations of a diseased organ may be abnormal, but cannot possibly be false, unless we judge erroneously. A judgment, he says, claims truth, and the validity that is claimed by it is objective validity. Moreover it does not claim truth at the time of the reference of the content to the subject, but it claims absolute unconditional truth for all time, unless a definite time is specified. So, every judgment has a *prima facie* truth-claim. This is the case with all our perceptions veridical or erroneous.

* I have drawn upon the following sources in preparing this paper :

1. *Advaita Siddhi of Madhusudana.*
2. Bosanquet's *Logic.*
3. Keynes's *Logic.*

It is important to note here that though all perceptions, have the *prima facie* truth claim, none of them has any internal guarantee about its truth or falsity. There is an external reference in our judgment by which the truth or falsity is to be decided. The pink rats of the drunkard have a *prima facie* truth claim; but since no such rats actually exist the judgment, 'There are pink rats', is false. In all our perceptions something is always contributed by the mind. The mind interprets the 'this'. This interpretation is the reference of the content or the what, to the that. And the interpretation might turn out to be true or false, for there is no internal guarantee of its truth, which is not subjective and temporary, but objective and unconditional. Hence the criterion of truth falls outside the judgment.

It is because every perceptual judgment has an objective truth claim, and again because the guarantee of that is not internally given, that there is room for the problem concerning the negating or cancelling judgment *Bīdhātmak-nishedha*.

The negative judgment the *Bīdhātmak-nishedha* can be maintained on two grounds:

(1) It might have for its ground another contrary perception.

(2) But this is not the only ground of negation. Even in default of such a positive contrary perception the original perception can be negated, if we can determine the absence of the suggested content by showing that it is incompatible with some characteristic found in the datum. We may not positively judge, and yet the denial may be significant.

Bosanquet seems to hold there can be significant denial only when that is grounded on the positive knowledge of a contrary universal. In his *Logic* (P.P. 280-292) he says "Negation in its primary shape is the exclusion of a suggested quality of reality." "Significant negation begins when positive differentials claim the same place in the same system, e.g. This

surface is not black has indeed a ground that it is some other colour". But the Vedantin does not stop here. For him this is not the only ground of a significant denial.

The Vedantin can enlist the support of other two logicians Sigwart and Keynes in his theory. Keynes, following Sigwart, says in his *Logic* (P.P. 123-25) "It is merely absurd to say that we cannot deny a universal unless we are able to substitute another universal in its place." We can significantly deny a judgment, in default of the knowledge of a positive discrepant content, if we can merely determine the absence of the suggested or affirmed content. This is so in the case of the judgment that the moon is not what it appears to be in size at the horizon; for we can never have a positive perception of the real size of the moon,

We now take the case of the illusory perception—This is a snake. This can be denied by the negative judgment: 'this is not a snake' on the ground that the man can positively perceive that 'the this' is a rope which claims the same place as the content snake in the datum 'this'. But it may be that the percipient is not able to reach a contrary perception; still he can deny that this is snake, if he can determine that the presence of the affirmed content snake is incompatible with some attribute of the datum itself. The percipient for example may not judge 'the this' to be a rope, and yet he might pitch upon the fibrous character of 'the this', the twists visible in it, and he can at once conclude that whatever has fibres, twists etc., cannot be a snake. Here there is no positive universal judged about the datum. Later on he may judge it positively to be a rope—and we really do not rest content with this sort of negation, as Keynes says, but it is none the less a significant denial.

For Bosanquet, a denial is bare when it is in the form of an infinite judgment i.e. a judgment whose predicate is an indefinite term as not-man, not-stone. Virtue is not-square,

Soul is not-red: These are infinite judgments. Here the sphere of denial is unlimited and hence it is not significant. A significant denial has a purpose or a bearing. It denies a particular idea, and has a positive significance.

When we say he is not a dishonest man, we do mean that he is honest, and not a monkey or a stone.

In the case of denial by determining of the absence of the referred content, we have made progress in our knowledge about the datum in so far as we have, definitely with a purpose, done away with an irrelevant and wrong alternative about the nature of the datum. Again we have acquired a definite mental attitude that 'the this' cannot be what it appeared to be.

However, we agree with Keynes, (P.P. 123) that we may not rest content with this and we come nearer to reality when we positively know the contrary content. That is our ultimate aim. Still by this negation our former knowledge gets amended, an irrelevant alternative is eliminated, and so far progress is made, and therefore the negation is none the less significant.

Epistemology of Samkara.

By

ASHUTOSH SASTRI

Samkara's system contains elements of realism and idealism. Samkara draws a clear distinction between Reason and Intuition as two different faculties having different scopes and functions—the one dealing with the relative and conditioned, while the other with the Absolute and Unconditioned. Reason therefore is not competent to pronounce any judgment upon the affirmations of intuition. This distinguishes Samkara's position from that of Rāmānuja; for while to Rāmānuja intuition is not essentially distinct from the logical faculty, to Samkara intuition is superlogical if not alogical. This divergence of reason and intuition is superlogical if not alogical. This divergence of reason and intuition is a special feature of Samkara's metaphysics.

Samkara brings out pointedly that though there is this divergence of function between reason and intuition, the two are not inherently antithetical. Reason by its own inherent dialectic comes to realise its inadequacy to apprehend Reality. For in trying to apprehend Reality, it involves itself in contradictions and antinomies. This is shown by an analysis of the nature of falsity and empiric illusion from the Advaitic standpoint. Samkara shows that neither sense-knowledge nor the thought-constructions of reason can give us reality as there are constant changes and denials in the report of the senses, and reality or truth can not consist in such constant change. It is a common experience that perception is denied by perception, perception by inference, inference by authority and so on. Thus empirical knowledge by its own denials establishes its own falsity. The seeming uniformities of experience obtain under some conditions and do not obtain under others. Truth of experience is thus subject to the conditions of space, time

and causality. This criticism of sense-experience applies to all finer forms of perception whether of religion, art or of morality. All experience is true in one way and false in another. Thus logical reason ultimately finds its own barrenness and discovers self-contradiction in all products of thought.

Reason ultimately comes to realise that reason is not the final arbiter of truth and that there is a super-logical way of apprehending truth by intuition. Sāṃkara's system brings out the great truth that Reality can be seen or intuited but not understood in the ordinary ratiocinative way. But this intuition of Sāṃkara is not something mysterious but self-luminous and with its emergence all duality and darkness vanishes. Reality or Self shines forth resplendent in its own light.

Psychology of Loneliness.

By

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The state of Loneliness influences man's physical and mental life in a variety of ways. The physical symptoms which it is supposed to produce are mainly those attributed to the "nerves". It has been known to accentuate digestive troubles, diminish muscular tonus, develop headaches and kindred ailments and in general to produce a more intensive consciousness of the organic sensations which are regarded by patients as indications of disease. On the mental side the consequence seems to be more serious and of a far-reaching character. It generally tends to disturb emotions and consequently impulses. It develops hallucinations and affects attentional adjustment in various ways. In brief, the isolation of an individual from his social environment is likely to induce a radical change in the nature of his personality as a whole.

A consideration of these facts which may be verified by every one in the course of his own experience, suggests two important problems. (1) What kind of relief does normal social intercourse offer to an individual so that its deprivation causes marked mental and physical tension? In other words we have to enquire into the character of the basic psycho-physical factors which make men seek company. If

No. of groups studied	Kinds of Groups	Story of exploits of some kind in which the speaker partially identifies himself with the hero or is the hero.	Scandal disgrace and misdeeds	Scandal sexual in significance	Religious involving items 1, 2, 3	General Social involving 2, 7, 3	Un-analysed
13	Old men leading leisured life.	62	12.5	5	6	10	4.5
27	Non-descript young men mostly in some minor occupation e.g. clerical etc.	58	17	22	X	1	2
14	Students.	60	13	7	4	8	8
16	Non-descript persons apparently in good vocation. Middle-aged (47-55)	48	21	12	6	9	4

we are able to discover the fundamental motives for this, we should be in a position to solve the further problem (2) viz. that of the origin of the various physical and mental disorders which accompany the phenomenon of isolation.

A person sometimes seeks company with a conscious purpose. He may desire to hear the latest scandal or unbosom himself of the last joke that he heard; he may wish to play a hand at bridge, or he may purposely set himself about to ingratiate himself in some one's favour. We find in this way that our social intercourse is sometimes guided by definite conscious purposes.

Should we pass on from this fact to the generalisation that all social intercourse satisfies certain purposive urges of man's nature? From the standpoint of those who regard the whole system of conscious states and behaviour to be *hormic* in their basis, the enquiry is superfluous. For, every situation that man seeks, fulfils one or the other of his impulses. But for others who do not accept this standpoint the question has a significance. It is sometimes maintained that social intercourse is analogous to the aesthetic phenomena. It is a situation which affords enjoyment in general rather than specific satisfaction to impulses. It is also maintained that social intercourse is a means of *interstimulation* of individuals; it is not necessarily teleological in its origin or value. The reason why a person seeks company is that it 'tones up' all the psycho-physical states, just as alcohol does for some persons. We may concede both of these as facts. Yet the problem remains as to how enjoyment in general results and how the mental life becomes stimulated. An analysis of the process from which these consequences ensue, would lead us to the hypothesis that the search for company is motivated by impulses; enjoyment and stimulation results from their satisfaction; and the misery of loneliness arises from their inhibition or inadequate fulfilment. The presence

of definable urges, even when we are not aware of them, is indicated by several facts. A change of interest in the character of emotional life inevitably brings about a change in the nature of the company which one seeks. The awakening of sexual impulse at puberty is accompanied by a liking for the society of the opposite sex. Inhibition, conscious or unconscious, of the impulse again produces interesting modifications in one's taste for company. A latent desire for self-assertion, in the same way, leads men and women to seek the society of their inferiors in a particular respect, age, wealth, strength, or education. In these and other instances, the play of an impulse or action tendency in the search for group-life is clearly discernible. The decline in the intensity of instincts through age marks an alteration in the character of one's society. A temporary diminution in the intensity of impulses through physical debility caused by prolonged illness makes persons fight shy of company. In the cases of Dementia praecox when the life of action reaches its lowest level, it is a difficult task to drag out the patient from the state of stolid isolation and silence. A relation is thus to be found between the tendencies to action and liking for company.

An analysis of typical forms of social behaviour clearly indicates the play of a variety of impulses as the individual finds himself in a group. By groups we mean in this case associations which come into being solely for social intercourse, such as those formed by persons engaged in general conversation or in sedentary games. The behaviour of individuals in a game of bridge clearly shows that some are more interested in asserting their own superiority than in the game itself. In the same manner, the analysis of the topics and manner of conversation in groups which have no *raison de tre* except social intercourse, clearly indicates the play of certain dominant impulses like sex, aggression etc. I had an occasion to observe a number of groups which

met at a public park in Calcutta and to note the topics of conversation. The results are presented in a tabulated form. It will be seen that by far the most popular subject for conversation is some kind of achievement either of the narrator himself or of a person with whom he apparently identifies himself. The disgrace of fellow beings is another topic of interest. Both of these point to the operation of what MacDougall calls the instinct of aggression. At the same time, other interests such as sex, are by no means unimportant. They appear in various contexts in the conversation which from its general tenor appears to be purposeless.

Again, if we observe the change in the attitude of an individual in the kind of group life which we have been considering, we are struck by the variety of moods. The active participant in the conversation appears to be perpetually passing from complacent acquiescence to self-assertion and from that to an attitude of apologetic withdrawal, all in the course of a few minutes. There are some of course who retain the same tone all through, but they usually bore others or recede into the position of mere listeners supplying the necessary background for their aggressive comrades. In the usual course of things, when a group of this nature runs its normal course, topics of discourse change in Kaleidoscopic succession; and along with this, the individual members pass through a whole gamut of interests. The impulses which are fulfilled in the group are necessarily incipient in their expression. The aggressive impulse manifests itself through gesture, a thumping of clenched fist or a high and excited voice; a complacent agreement finds expression through a wreath of smile and anger through the knitted brows. Such incipient expression makes it easy for an individual to pass through a series of moods in quick succession. For, no emotion or impulses are completely lived through; each arises and yields its place to the next. In this manner, even

an hour's group-life supplies for the individual the satisfaction of a variety of impulses.

I have had occasion to enquire of a number of persons the reason why they spend their time in apparently useless conversation. One of them states: "Conversation with friends may not lead to any direct benefit, but it has its use. It enables *you to discover and to show your power*. I feel a better man at the end of an hour's conversation, for, I spend the day as an underdog in my office". A second correspondent who is rather frank, says "In a company of friends, you can play the hero, make confessions of love and freely discuss scandals. We discuss everyday so many topics of interest that I would not miss the club for a single evening." Another correspondent gives a remarkable account of the part social intercourse plays in his life. "If I keep to myself" he says "I begin to indulge in reveries of all sorts and give myself up to meaningless phantasies. They cease to trouble me if I pass sometime in general conversation with friends or even with strangers." Evidently social intercourse offers vicarious satisfaction for the impulses underlying his reveries. "In a casual conversational group" we again are told "one passes through a variety of emotions, moods and interests in a short time. When this is not possible, the company becomes tedious. We have in our group one or two men who can take us through a large number of different topics which interest us. That is why the group has been holding out so long."

These accounts would support the view already stated. Our usual daily work, family and social environment do not ensure the satisfaction of all the normal urges. Those that remain unfulfilled, seek symbolic satisfaction through incoherent acts or through verbal representation. A conversational group offers facilities for such fulfilment. At the same time, the interplay of a variety of interests in the group limits the

scope of satisfaction of any particular impulse. The feeling of anger or resentment which a tale might arouse would soon yield its place to mirth evoked by a joke; the ego feeling stimulated by a narration of an adventure would be curbed by the story of a bigger exploit by someone else. In this way no impulse or emotion would be allowed to run to any morbid length.

Of all forms of symbolic representation of desires the verbal representation is the most economical in the sense that a simple speech-movement can convey a host of meanings. Conversation as an interplay of speech serves to objectify or rather to manifest the tendencies which seek expression. The social group limits what is peculiar to the individual. Hence, the satisfaction which is derived in this manner ceases to be morbid. Contrasted with this situation, a lonely person tends to elaborate unchecked the imagery which his desires call into being. Each image creates an emotional situation which in its turn gives rise to incipient movements and a further series of ideas and images. In this manner, when the check that one individual exercises over another is removed, all logical coherence of thoughts and the sense of social propriety are gone. Imagination and emotion actually 'run riot'. A perpetuation of such a condition would naturally develop abnormality. When the imagery in question is eidetic in character, hallucinations would mingle with thoughts and ideas.

For mature minds, however, the effect of isolation may not be so disastrous. The train of ideas and feelings when guided by logic and by a sense of form and symmetry may result in the production of works of art or of valuable systems of thought. In fact, persons who voluntarily seek isolation do so in order that their emotions and thoughts may expand in a desired pattern unhampered by the exigencies of social intercourse. For, in the group-life, the reaction of one person

upon another imperceptibly modifies the course of mental states and shape them into the customary mould of the group.

The principal condition for the development of mental phenomena into constructive wholes or into incoherent ideas and feelings seem to be the relative intensity of the ego-feeling. When the ego-feeling is intense, it naturally assumes a prominence in consciousness. The expression of ideas, feeling and impulses pertaining to it is checked and balanced by the presence of other persons. When an individual is alone, these run their course unhindered. They interpolate between the logical connection of ideas, and the course of conation and feelings. The ego-consciousness is conceived, for the present purpose, as primarily a group of organic and kinæsthetic sensations, motor dispositions and feelings to which are related the visual image of the body and its associations. This is essentially the notion of James and in some measure of Wundt. Now, if this group of experiences interpolate in the general course of thoughts and ideas, the logical linkage of ideas and meanings would undoubtedly be interfered with. For, the emotions and impulses arising out of situational particular to the ego and not the logical filiation of meanings would determine the sequence of mental states. In those cases where the ego-feeling is intense, the course of mental life would become allogical and would fail to subserve the purpose of adaptation to society and environment. In this way, an abnormal mental condition would be produced. There are, however, individuals who by training or heredity are less self-conscious. Their ego-feelings have been so balanced that these do not displace the normal tenor of thoughts and feelings. Thus, their ideas, images and feelings flow to a constructive end. For these individuals, isolation is not necessarily a curse. Loneliness does not mean for them a withdrawal from the world. When they are alone, the world lives for them in their idea; it is not dissembled by the impact of their ego.

Not all who appear to be self-less workers can stand the test of isolation. "When I was in solitary prison for several days" says a young man who was in prison for his political activities, "I began to be obsessed by thoughts about myself. It was all so strange I had never given a single thought to my dress, food, clothing or general comfort. Yet these began to get uppermost in my mind. Then, gradually strange desires and feelings arose in my mind. And I passed hours and hours in day dreams. If I attempted to think of anything, these day-dreams stood in the way. Ideas which were of supreme moment to me and all-absorbing were unceremoniously brushed aside by these feelings and fantasies." Fortunately for the person, the strain did not last long. The outcome would certainly have been disastrous for his mental health. Man's desire for association is therefore, essentially purposive in character. His usual tasks and duties leave many of the normal impulses unfulfilled. Social intercourse carried on by means of speech, and gesture offer vicarious satisfaction for these. Quite a large number and variety of interests can here work in a short time because they operate incipiently. The feeling of well being which results from an apparently purposeless conversation, is due to such fulfilment. Persistent worries and anxieties, consequent upon a maladjustment of certain conative tendencies, are temporarily forgotten because certain other conations have a chance of expressing themselves. When a person is isolated from his fellow beings, only a limited number of interests can fulfil themselves through the activities which the particular environment demands. There is thus a residuum of unsatisfied desires. The tension caused by these occasions the feeling of loneliness. Isolation leads to physical and mental troubles because each unsatisfied desire, runs its full course and fulfils itself in fantasies, images and situations represented by ideas. The ego-experience which involves the organic and kinaesthetic sensations and emotions

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also interpolates in the course of normal thoughts and ideas. Thus, the logical sequence of mental states, their form and proportion are disturbed. In short, isolation deprives the individual of the check and balance which society normally exerts and leaves only the unsocialised promptings to manifest themselves through the medium of images, thought and emotions.

A Study of Emotion in the Light of Gestalt Theory.

BY

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In an earlier paper (read last year at the Lahore Session) I examined the Behaviourist account of emotion and attempted to show that in his endeavour to find a purely naturalistic basis for Psychology the behaviourist had over-reached himself. In abolishing consciousness and suppressing the role of the central factor he had so unduly accentuated the importance of the physical and peripheral factors that a large part of experience remained unexplained. Certain outstanding phenomena like emotion and self-feeling could not be fitted into the Procrustean limits offered by the Stimulus-Response formula. Physiological facts and clinical evidence were detailed to show that far from being a mere isolated reaction or a mere organic or visceral reverberation emotion implied like all psychical experience a 'pattern-reaction', a whole-property or gestalt. Consciousness not understood in the traditional sense of an introspective abstraction but in the gestalt meaning of an objective, observational attitude was shown to be the invariable function of all activity. In this paper an attempt is made to present a theory of emotion from the view-point of Gestalt psychology, and to show that such a hypothesis appears to explain the psychology of emotion more adequately.

The chief difficulty in the way of a gestalt explanation of emotions has been that there is no clear account of an adequate physiological theory for such phenomena. But the gestalt physiology of the perception of movement, thought

and action seems to suggest a similar basis for the physiological mechanism in emotions. According to the theory of association perception of movement was explained as some kind of fusion between the successive stimulation of sensory centres. Movement was considered to be the product of the summation of various sensations. But if each centre was concerned in the production of a specific sensation-quality it was impossible to see how by mere association it could result in the perception of continuous movement. Wundt tried to explain this in terms of the movement of eye-muscles as supplying a special class of kinaesthetic sensations. But it was shown that in the perception of unusually fast movements the eye-muscles remain more or less stationary. The problem of the perception of movement thus attracted the attention of the gestalt psychologists, and Wertheimer in his Three contributions to Gestalt theory undertook a thorough examination of the question.¹ He pointed out that the hypothesis of independent centres which constituted the basis of association physiology was entirely unjustified. The principle of dynamogeny had already exploded the myth, and Wertheimer showed that in the perception of the movement of an object from A to B it is not the centres corresponding to A and B that are 'associated' but rather that sensory stimulations give rise to an irradiation of the impulse which spreads itself throughout and particularly passes to and fro between the neighbouring areas in the brain corresponding to objects A & B². Movement-perception

1. P. P. 86-89. For details see *Experimentelle Studien über das sehen von Bewegung* P. P. 161-278.

2. Cf. also Kohler's statement in his *Gestalt Psychology*: "We may safely assume not only that where two objects touch each other in visual experience, the *dynamical contact* of the corresponding processes is immediate and direct, but that the two processes take place in two *neighbouring areas* of the brain" P. 174.

thus consists in the short-circuiting of the dynamic impulse. This is how Wertheimer explained the phi-phenomenon.

Likewise association psychology fails to explain what are ordinarily regarded as the fundamental characteristics of thought viz. its activity, spontaneity and direction. Mere mechanical association of ideas misses this dynamic and vectorial phase. Further, an account in terms of images or association-paths would fail to do justice to the spontaneity of thought in which the non-imaginal the *Bewusstseinslage* and *einstellung* are admittedly important features. In thought and action there is the dynamical self-distribution of the impulse which irradiates into motor discharge, if the motor apparatus has had time to adjust itself to the demand made upon it. Thus voluntary actions under the guidance of a determining tendency resolve themselves into appropriate movements or motor-responses. Why the irradiation which spreads throughout the organism should particularly issue into motor responses is determined by the nature of the situation and the character and quality of the individual affected by it. When the situation is such that a ready made motor adjustment is not possible or will not meet the predicament action is paralysed or arrested and the impulse so dammed up may give rise to abnormal brooding or melancholy. These seem to be a redistribution of the impulse in the sensory centres in its search for a final outlet which may be found either in the habitual channels of action or in the involuntary system. In the latter case the visceral, organic and other symptoms characteristic of neuroses appear. In normal conditions, however, where the appropriate motor response is not forthcoming it might descend into the sub-cortical regions, and utilize the reflex or automatic mechanism. It is these transitions to motor centres which explain the dynamic and vectorial character of thought, and the *bewusstseinslage* and *einstellung* would appear to correspond to the passage of impulse.

The psychology of emotion bears a close resemblance to these characteristics of thought and movement-perception. Like them it is imageless though it may be associated with images and perceptions, and like them it has a dynamic and vectorial character. From this we might expect that a similar explanation in terms of the irradiation of the impulse would also hold in the case of emotions. But there are certain important differences between emotion and the other phenomena which make it an experience *sui generis*, though they do not vitiate the attempt to explain them in the light of the same ultimate principles. The conditions of stimulation of an emotion are very different from those ordinarily controlling thought and action. Emotion usually arises when the stimulus situation is sudden, or intensive, complex or conflicting. The suddenness or intensity of the stimulation overpower and 'seize' the organism in such a manner that it has no time to adjust itself in any appropriate manner. If there is time to prepare emotion hardly appears, for the impulse, instead of hurrying into reflex or automatic regions, finds its outlet in channels which training and personal acquisition have placed at its disposal. It issues into well-coordinated motor-responses which suit the situation. Emotion is further characterised by what has been called diffusiveness or, as Kulpo has suggested, it is 'indefinitely directed'. Indeed this indefinite direction constitutes its chief difference from action (or thought). "Whereas action-determination gradually forms and prepares for its own resolution in movement, the typical emotion, through its general appeal to the organism, replaces or disturbs the determination, which continues then an abortive course to a different sort of ending." ³ Action progresses systematically under the guidance of a determining tendency and ceases only with the eventual success or fulfilment of the object. In emotion, on the other hand, the

3. Bentley—*Field of Psychology* P. 296.

attempt at the resolution of the 'dramatic situation' is often frustrated and the feeling gradually decays or subsides.

Emotion is also accompanied by a higher intensity of organic and visceral disturbances which in ordinary action play their rôle rather unobtrusively. Apart from these differences there is a fundamental similarity between emotion and action in so far as both are imageless processes.

Again, when the situation is complex or conflicting it might give rise to bewilderment and hasty adaptation to circumstances, or conflict may result in the paralysis and arrest of action. In such cases the irradiating impulse runs in blind alleys, as it were, unable for the time being to direct itself into definite channels. This might be because the synaptic resistances are too great or the passages at its disposal too numerous. And the hasty adaptation might be accounted for in the same manner as when the individual is faced by a sudden and intensive stimulus-situation. In this case too the usual motor outlets which by their very nature do not make a heavy demand on the organism are thrown out of gear. In consequence the impulse has to find its outlet in unwonted channels that may happen to offer the least resistance to it. Or it may descend down to the ever-ready involuntary motor-apparatus and the sympathetic system. The complexity of the situation is relative to the constitution and history of the organism. A complex situation thus understood not only accounts for the wide-spread motor changes but also the organic disturbances visceral, vascular and others.

If we conceive the mechanism of emotion in this manner we can easily see how the various characteristics of emotional experiences are related to psychological processes. Emotion as a dynamic experience is not resolvable into sensory constituents alone in spite of James. This is so because the correlate of emotion is not the stimulation of particular centres but the

passage of the impulse irradiating in all directions. The psychical counterpart of this is the fact that an emotional situation does not affect an isolated tendency but the subject as a whole with his character, and individuality which reflect themselves in a pattern-reaction or a configurational whole. The fact of irradiation, furthermore, explains the diffusive character of emotion. For when the impulse spreads over the cortex and also to the sub-cortical regions the psychic correlate would naturally be of a diffusive character. The same phenomenon would also account for the fact that emotions are often indefinitely directed. When the impulses which irradiate are of a low intensity the connection between centre to centre is very weak and the psychic correlate would be an emotional tone rather than a specific emotion. Again, when the intensity of the impulse is so great that there is an over-flooding of the cortex and even of the sub-cortical regions there is a blind passion which knows no direction and no object. Between these two limits the impulses pass through definite sensory and motor centres giving rise to well-defined forms of emotive behaviour. It must be understood, however, that out of the many directions in which the impulses irradiate in an emotional situation only some follow a definite course which would depend upon the history and training of the organism. Thus a definite emotional quality would appear in the background of a mass of feeling-tone which corresponds to the general diffusion of the impulse. Parsons remarks that emotion appears as a splash, as it were, on the grey surface of the diffusive feeling-tone which characterises normal consciousness.⁴ This is in keeping with the view presented here, for an organism is subject to a multiplicity of stimuli which occasion a general spreading of the impulse over the central nervous system. And the normal effect of the organism corresponds to this phenomenon.

4. Parson—*Introduction to the theory of Perception* P. 31.

From this point of view fresh light is thrown on the relation of emotion to instinct. McDougall had viewed emotion as the peculiar affective quality of a certain number of primary instincts with which the organism was assumed to be hereditarily endowed. But this atomistic explanation obviously fails to do justice to the nature of emotion whose essential characteristic is its dynamic quality. It also overlooks the fact that emotion is a pattern-reaction, and a function of the organism as a whole, and not a mere isolated reaction-tendency. We have seen above that when the situation is sudden or intensive it throws the organism into a paroxysm of feeling and the dynamic impulse thus liberated may express itself into those organic or motor adjustments which the individual has been endowed upon by heredity or habit. There is no time for well conducted responses. Thus instinctive reactions become emotional. Thus, again, the sub-cortical regions and the thalamus appear to play a dominant part in all emotional experience. For, in emotion the organism is faced with a crisis which demands immediate solution, and in such an emergency well-coordinated action is obviously impossible. Consequently only the automatic and reflex behaviour which imply ever-ready stereotyped mechanism are pressed into service to resolve the situation. And this behaviour is, as we know, controlled by the lower centres and the thalamus. But to view emotion as merely a function of the thalamus, as Cannon has suggested⁵ is surely a mistake. For the irradiation of the impulse affects the organism as a whole. The impulse flows through the automatic habit mechanisms because at the moment those are the only ones available.

When time is, however, allowed and organic balance is restored the impulse issues into coordinated activity and emotion generally disappears yielding place to calm consi-

5. Cannon—*Easily changes in Pain, Hunger, fear, rage.*

derations. Or it may be transformed into a vague feeling or sentiment with none of its warmth or glow. Sentiments, thus, appear to be more or less a function of time. They lie midway between normal diffusive feeling-tone and emotion. We do not need to invoke any other principle in order to explain them as it has been sometimes done; * we have only to recognise the rôle of the temporal factor in relation to the impulse. The lower intensity of the stimulation may also contribute towards the same result, but time-transience and the cooperation of the central factors which it implies seem to explain the psychology of sentiments. They also explain what are called emotional moods. These arise when the outlet to the flow of the impulse has been either inadequate or lacking. In either case the impulse being dammed up diffuses itself throughout and occasions a massive feeling which continues in time as happens when for instance it sours an otherwise cheerful temperament. Thus moods might be more or less permanent or temporary. In all this the temporal factor plays an important part while the irradiating impulse spreads over the central regions, and the history and character of the individual greatly modify the colouring of the affect.

This also helps us to explain the vast variety of emotional experiences in human beings. The direction of the impulse, the motor-roots concerned, visceral concomitants, and general spreading constitute this variety on the physiological side. Its psychical correlative consists in the influence exercised by the character and history of the individual on the emotions. And since the physiological and psychological make-up of no two individuals is identically the same, their reactions to stimulus-situation are different. Even in the same individual the same situation does not always produce the same kind of affect. The dynamic impulse cannot be supposed to distribute itself in exactly the same manner on different stimulations.

6. E. g. by James and others.

A theory in terms of visceral concomitants and peripheral factors (such as that attempted by James and Watson) cannot explain this diversity of emotion. For the visceral and organic disturbances are more or less the same in various emotions, as Cannon showed. The fact is that visceral and peripheral factors affect emotion by a 'back-stroke', as it were. The expression of emotion is conditioned by the distribution of the impulse at the centres and cannot be looked upon as a determinant of emotion.

Further, emotion has a biologic value. As we have said above, emotion represents a crisis in the organism. In the interests of self-preservation—and eventually of race-preservation—the organism has to summon up all its resources to tide over the crisis and overcome the situation. Thus challenged it has to adjust its actions with as great a promptness as is possible under the circumstances. The digestive systems and other processes which can wait are for the time-being suspended so that the heart pumps out blood in large quantities to the motor-centres with great acceleration. And the automatic mechanism which is ever ready is soon pressed into service. All energy is diverted towards movements of offence or defence; which exactly it would be depends again on the history and training of the organism i. e., on the co-operation, however slight, of the central factors which the irradiating impulse must reach though for the moment it mainly appears in automatic and ill-adapted expressive-movements which characterise an emotional outburst. From this it ought not to be supposed—as it has been often done—that expressive-movements alone constitute emotion. Such an account misses the fundamental character of emotional experience.

To sum up: Emotion is an affect which is the dynamic quality of the *whole* organism. In emergency the impulse may succeed in producing only automatic and random movement or visceral and organic reverberations but its irradiations

spread *throughout*. Given time, the dynamical self-regulation of the impulse makes well-coordinated activity possible and emotion disappears. Emotion is, thus, not the correlate of certain instinctive tendencies, nor is it a mere visceral reverberation, nor again an isolated response to an isolated stimulus. It is a whole-property, a pattern-reaction an—expression of dynamic individuality.

Instinct and Civilization.

BY

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A great diversity of opinion prevails, as regards the nature of instincts. On the one hand, we have the mechanical conception of instincts, as represented by Watson, Judd, Warren, etc. According to these writers, instincts are coordinated activities of muscles, provided for, in the very constitution of the nervous system. They do not find any difference between instincts and reflexes "Each element in the combination", says Watson, "may be looked upon as a reflex. An instinct is then a series of concatenated reflexes".

Sharply contrasted with this view of instincts is that of writers like Stout, McDougall, Pillsbury and Angell, who regards instincts as psychological events, in which consciousness with all its implications, plays a decidedly important part. According to Stout, "Instinctive activity essentially involves intelligent consciousness, animals, in their instinctive behaviour, show the capacity of profiting by the lessons of previous experience."

There is, however, an agreement, between these views in one respect. Both of them regard instinct as an activity, aroused by an external object. The latter acts as a stimulus, calling forth an instinctive response. In other words, the stimulus, which sets the nervous mechanism to work, comes from outside the body, and therefore, does not originate in the organism.

The idea of instincts is greatly clarified, if we look upon the biological need of the body, as the starting point of instinctive behaviour. The need compels the animals to seek

for objects. Instead of an object, arousing instinctive activity it is the internal need of the organism, which sends it in search of objects, which can satisfy the need. It is a question of shifting emphasis from the extra-organic aspect of the animal behaviour to the intra-organic.

McDougall regards instincts as innate dispositions to specific form of behaviour. To my mind, the term innate disposition, is the psychological equivalent for what has been referred above, as the biological needs of the organism. It is however Freud, who has laid the chief emphasis, upon the biological character of instincts.

According to Freud, as Mitchell remarks in his problems of psychopathology, "An instinctual stimulus is a need, which can be satisfied only, by some inner change, which takes away the need. It would seem as if Freud, regards as instinctual, only those innate disposition, which are stirred into activity by stimuli, whose source is within the organism." The aim of the instinct, is to obtain satisfaction by getting rid of the organic condition, which has given rise to the stimulus.

The chief importance of this standpoint, lies in the contribution, which it makes to the understanding of the phenomenon of transformation of instincts. If instinct represents a need of the organism, whatever satisfies the need, is the object of the instinct. Thus "the connection between an instinct and its object is not very close, except where fixation has occurred, when there is no fixation, the object of the instinct may be changed many times in the course of life". (Mitchell).

The principle of the transformation of instincts is a necessary adjunct of the biological theory of evolution. If species have evolved from lower to higher forms, it naturally follows, that instincts have also undergone a process of evolution. In higher animals, we come across phenomena of instinctual transformation, even in the life time of individuals. It becomes most apparent, when we come to man. In fact, the

marvellous progress that man has made, in the various arts of civilization, ultimately owes its origin, to the capacity for transformation, inherent in his instinctive endowment. If our instincts were rigidly fixed, or only capable of being satisfied by a limited number of objects, our cultural achievements, would have reached their highest level of development at a very early stage of human evolution.

How can we explain the mechanism of transformation ? In the first place, it has already been indicated, that the connection between an instinct and its object is not very close, so there is no inherent or innate obstacle in the way of an instinct, changing its object, frequently in the life time of an individual.

It was, James, who for the first time, raised the veil from the mystery of the evolution of instincts, by his law of transitoriness. According to his law, unless provision is made for the satisfaction of instincts, at the age, at which they normally appear, they may be suppressed for the whole of the remaining life. Suppression of an instinct, however is closely allied to its transformation. It is mainly, when an instinct is suppressed or thwarted, that it is transformed. A thwarted instinct seeks to direct its energy into new channels. Possibly this redirection of energy is brought about, partially by the emotional disturbance, which invariably accompanies the frustration of an instinct. Emotion in itself, if it is violent, may be a hindrance in the successful carrying out of an instinctive activity. It may, however, serve as an acute and powerful incentive, to find a new outlet for energy, which has been dammed in one particular direction.

Thus the law of transitoriness, as enunciated by James, has proved fruitful, in pointing out the direction, in which one should look for the solution of the problem of transformation of instincts. The law of transitoriness, however, is not sufficient in itself. It may explain the suppression of an

instinct, but not its transmutation into socially more useful forms. It has to be supplemented by the law of sublimation. How the latter process actually takes place, no one has succeeded in formulating clearly. All that can be said is, that, when an instinctive energy is thwarted from its adequate expression, it is transformed by being transferred to an "analogue of the object of the instinct." It is thus possible to detect some analogy whether explicit or implicit, between the natural object of the instinct, and the various forms, which it assumes after transformation.

In the second place, we cannot ignore the part played by intelligence and imagination in the life of man. Ideals are regarded as sublimated or aim-inhibited forms of crude instincts; but instincts cannot develop into ideals unless they are worked upon, by the higher powers of intelligence and imagination. In the case of animals, devoid of these powers, no sublimation of instincts has taken place, in spite of a long history of evolution behind them. It is difficult to point out, in what exact manner, intelligence moulds the instincts, and helps their transformation to higher ideals;—moral, aesthetic and spiritual; but the fact, that it plays an important part in the matter, cannot be questioned.

The suppression of instincts, is a normal feature of human life. It is the price, that we have to pay, in order to enjoy the benefits of civilisation. It need not, however, be supposed, that every instinct, suppressed and finally transformed, inevitably and necessarily seeks redirection in socially useful forms. If it does so, the process is known as sublimation, if on account of various circumstances, an instinct, which has been denied its normal outlet, gets no chance to seek a successful and beneficent derivation, it may do a lot of mischief and injury to the human organism. In taking stock of our civilisation, while we may justly exult in its diverse cultural achievements, we should not forget the large number of nervous disturbances, to which it has given rise.

The growth of civilisation, is marked, in the first place, by increased control over natural forces, so that they are made serviceable to man's purposes, but the feature of civilisation, which is valued most, is the evolution of higher ideals and aspirations amongst mankind. Intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual ideals are prized as the most cherished possessions of humanity. In fact most of us, would be prepared to make immense sacrifices in the pursuit of these higher ideals.

All these higher achievements of man, are grafted on his instinctive life. As James so emphatically argues, the fact, that the higher ideals and sentiments have their roots in the soil of crude instincts, does not detract from their greatness. The instincts can be changed by education and environment, into higher modes of behaviour. This fact stands at the basis of the entire evolution of culture in all its forms.

The instincts of aggressiveness and pugnacity are formed in children, in their crude form. The quarrels of children over trifling matters, and their wanton cruelty to small animals are too well known to need any comment. The same instincts, however, in sublimated forms, may become potent force, for fighting against evil and injustice and for compelling nature to yield her secrets, for the advancement of knowledge and for the amelioration of mankind. The widespread interest in politics, and genuine desire, in the mind of many people, to bring about the welfare and happiness of those, who happen to be poor and destitute, owe their origin to the deep seated impulses of sympathy and gregariousness. Higher cultural evolution in the domain of religion, art and literature has been proved, to be the sublimated form of the sexual tendencies in man. The same can be said, in a tentative manner, about the contribution made by other instincts, towards the evolution of noble ideals.

For the sake of this paper, it has been assumed, that a certain number of instincts exists, without entering into the

question of their exact classification and nomenclature. It is immaterial for our purpose, whether one agrees with McDougall in the assumption of a large number of fundamental instincts, or with Freud, who believes that the primal unresolvable trends, are most probably two in number, namely Eros or the life instinct and the death or aggressive instinct, or finally with Jung's view of the libido which lays emphasis on "the fundamental unity of all instinctive energies, thus recalling in the mental sphere, the general notion of energies in the physical sphere." (Boudouin)

The final aim of civilisation, is to attain happiness for mankind. But the path, which it has chosen to reach the goal is intricate and circuitous. Starting from the view, that unrestricted indulgence in sensual pleasures, is the surest way to defeat the purpose of attaining happiness, it has evolved various sorts of substitute gratifications. It requires of us, higher standards of life, both economic and spiritual. It advises us to seek the joy of life in science, art, religion and humanitarian practices. The higher life, which is thus presented to us, can be pursued only, at the cost of instinctual gratification. It is no wonder, if civilisation has not brought an accession of happiness to mankind. As Freud remarks, "If civilisation requires such sacrifices, not only of sexuality, but also of the aggressive tendencies in mankind, we can better understand, why it should be so hard for us to feel happy in it".

The number of people, who have succeeded in sublimating their impulses, is practically very small. In the case of the vast majority of mankind, the powerful instincts of sexuality and aggressiveness specially, are suppressed from manifestation, on account of political and social sanctions. A slight relaxation of the rigours of law, is enough to awaken the primitive passions in their crude intensity, as was evidenced in the last great European War. There is also a fairly large

number of individuals, in whom the instincts have for various reasons, been repressed, leading to the outbreak of neurotic symptoms of all descriptions.

This is, in a nutshell, the position of civilization at the present moment. Leaving aside, the few persons with successful sublimation, there are some, whose instinctive energies have been weakened by physical exhaustion, brought on, by unhealthy living, boredom, uncongenial occupation and similar other causes ; the rest are either neurotics or disguised barbarians, with their instincts intact, waiting for a suitable opportunity to express themselves.

I would like to bring this paper to a close with the formulation of two rather fantastic questions. The first is, can the instinctive energy, which has transformed itself into a higher cultural value, relapse into its old form, or to put it in a concrete manner, can a philosopher of the type of Kant or Shankaracharya, or a spiritual man like Chaitanya or Mahatma Gandhi, revert to the state of primitive barbarism. The question is fantastic and yet pertinent. If reversion is possible, the whole effort of civilisation proves vain and futile, and we find ourselves landed into the most thoroughgoing mechanistic conception of human life. If, on the other hand, we assume, that the sublimated form of energy is a permanent acquisition, qualitatively different from its original source, the next question, perhaps more fantastic than the former, presents itself before our mind. Is it possible, that our instincts should in some remote future, get completely sublimated, so that, their manifestation in a crude form, may altogether become a thing of the past ? If so, what would be the nature of the society, composed of such individuals ? Perhaps there would be no society to bother about. The people of this hypothetical society would cease to take interest in acts of procreation or of self-preservation. They would most probably become *Jiwan Mukta* leaving no descendants behind, to perpetuate the race.

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We however, cannot contemplate such a state of society with equanimity. We shudder at the very idea of the complete sublimation of our natural instincts. The following quotation from Jung, therefore, will prove a source of consolation to most of us. "Just as in physical nature, only a very small portion of the natural energy can be transformed into practical useful energy, and by far the greater part must be left to work itself out. in natural phenomena, so in our psychical nature, only a small part of the total energy can be drawn away from the natural flow. An incomparably greater part of the energy cannot be utilized by us, but goes to sustain the natural course of life. Therefore the libido is by nature apportioned out to the various function-systems, from which it cannot be wholly withdrawn. The libido is invested in these functions as a specific force, that is not to be transformed."

The lost domain of Ethics.

BY

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It is a commonplace to say that with the flow of time interest in philosophy has shifted from point to point. The old questions which enthralled the minds of the throng of young listeners of Socrates, hardly create any enthusiasm in the minds of the young men of today. There was a time when the prime concern of a thinker was *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* or temperance or justice; and the hours and days spent upon questions of this kind were never considered ill-spent. But such speculation would little interest the world of today, except as relics of antiquity. It is an inevitable change and the change is not peculiar to philosophy.

Even in the sciences, new questions have come to take the place of the old. In science, however, this comes to pass, as we are frequently told, because the old problems happen to have been solved, leading to the vision of new problems in the distant horizon; the boundaries of knowledge being extended, new territories invite the attention of the conqueror. In philosophy, on the contrary, as her accusers would have us believe, old questions are given up not because they are solved once for all, but out of sheer inanition and fruitlessness of the search; and if new problems happen to engage our attention, that again is so because the philosopher must be in eternal search of his stone.

Whether the shifting of interest from question to question is a sign of life in science and of inanition in philosophy, may be left as an open question. The fact, however, is there that so far as philosophy is alive, she is not active with the

same questions that kept her busy at one time; and in this change, ethical problems have suffered in vitality and importance. Metaphysics and psychology still live an active life and feel that they have new problems to tackle. It may be due to the changing theories of physics and allied sciences which philosophy feels called upon to synthesise, or it may be due to other causes. In any case, we still have a growing philosophical and psychological literature.

But in ethics, we appear to have reached the end of our tether. We ruminate but we do not acquire: propagation of old dogmas by means of teaching still continues, but we have little addition to make. There seem to be no 'fresh fields and pastures new' for the moralist. He cannot claim the charm of novelty by making discoveries. In ethics there is no 'Raman effect', nor the romance of psychoanalysis, wherewith to dazzle the gaping world. Like an old dame on the wrong side of life, she attracts little attention from the thinkers of the world. The fact cannot be denied. The fresh literature on the subject does not bear signs of a vigorous growth; and that alone is evidence enough of the truth that ethics is not adding to her territory.

That is not all. What is worse is that ethics is forfeiting her ancient domain. That old questions of ethics do not revive the old enthusiasm, is only half the evil: perhaps these questions have been solved and nothing new can be said about them; and they have become common platitudes already. That truth must be told and justice must be done—is not disputed in the abstract. If that were all that moral science had to teach, its function might be regarded as fulfilled and it might be considered as having outlived its utility. And the lack of enthusiasm shown towards it, might well be regarded as deserved. Even this, however, is not true: the attitude of indifference towards ethics is not justified on the ground that ethics has fulfilled its purpose. And what is worse, ques-

tions that were essentially moral are being demoralised and usurped by other sciences. Not only is ethics making no fresh conquests, but she is being dispossessed of her ancient territory.

In the first place, is it really true that ethics has no new problems to face and that old problems offer no new difficulties? Have the questions been solved for all times to come? Did the ancients—as the orthodox Hindu still believes—foresee all possible situations and circumstances of our life and lay down a complete scheme which neither requires nor admits of any improvement? If that were the case, then Ethics like Arithmetic would only require to be taught—it should certainly live but would not have room enough to expand and to grow. It would then be a useful subject but not a growing science which has always new problems to grapple with. But is it not too much to ascribe even to the wisdom of the ancients to think that they really foresaw all the complex combinations of circumstances so that we had no unsolved problem to face? That, however, is not the case: all our difficulties were *not* foreseen by our forefathers and all our problems have not been solved. The indifference to Ethics is not justified on that ground.

The real fact, however, is that ethical questions are being usurped by other sciences. True, no science can be allowed to hold a monopoly in any problem; and the same problem in its different aspects may belong to different sciences. And hence problems pre-eminently ethical might well be shared by other sciences also. But the pity is that ethics is being gradually ousted from her birthright. It was all very well, no doubt, for another science to throw additional light on a moral question; but to monopolise the question—and to de-moralise it altogether, well, that was usurpation, pure and simple.

It is a serious charge we are bringing against our sister sciences and it must be justified by facts. Shall we take examples? Here is one—the much debated sex-problem. Several sciences are claiming share in it. Psychology—especially the *new* psychology with its doctrine of libido and all that stuff—has swallowed up a large slice of it. Then, there is Eugenics, the young aspirant to undiscovered dominions. And Sociology and Medicine and Economics have an ancient right to this question. And Art and Literature and Romance, without waiting to establish a right, have long been in possession of it—and possession is nine-tenths of law. And the result is, we not only read of love in literature, but freely discuss mind-cure and psychoanalysis and talk in public of pre-nuptial experiences and postnuptial liaison and openly speak of birth-control and sex-hygiene. But in all this hurly-burly the pristine truth is quietly forgotten that the relation of the sexes is a moral question also.

Take again another burning question of the day, viz., Property. It is claimed as a pre-eminently economic subject, for we are reminded, economics is the science of wealth. Nations and individuals are busy piling wealth and appropriating as much of others' property as is possible. Classes and communities organise their resources—their manpower and their vote-power—and mobilise them to capture what is their neighbour's. Claims are put forward; then the mailed fist; then either a clash or a conclusion. This is the game going on around us—from China to Peru, in India and in Europe, between Labour and Capital, among the coloured and colourless races of the world. But here again, Ethics has been dispossessed of her legitimate domain. She does not seem to have anything to say on the matter, except perhaps repeating the old maxim "Thou shalt not covet"—a maxim which has obviously been worn out by age. It is no wonder, therefore, that Ethics has lost her hold on the mind of modern man.

But Ethics is not dead yet; she is not completely repudiated. Like the discarded wife of a man who has the generosity to allow her a corner in his household, Ethics is still functioning in an obscure manner, for instance, under the patronage of S. P. C. A. Many able brains are now found busy discovering whether 40 Mds. is enough load for a buffalo-cart or whether it may be allowed to carry 60 Mds. And the morality of allowing such a cart to ply in the streets between the hours of 12 and 3, during the hot months, is a matter for long despatches and important speeches.

Whether our relations with the animal world be one of friendship and cordiality or one of perpetual war—whether, that is to say, we should continue to misuse and mal-treat the dumb millions of animals, or, our relations with them should be better adjusted, no doubt an important question. In Buddhism and Jainism, respect for animal life assumed a disproportionate shape and the world has refused to subscribe to it. But nevertheless, both for the sake of humanity as well as for the animal world and also for our self-interest, indiscriminate slaughter of animals also cannot be approved. The difficulty is, where to draw the line. Here, therefore, is an unsolved question whereon Ethics may lay her gripping hand. But there is no earthly reason why Ethics should fight shy of the larger questions and allow them to be swamped by the more pretentious sciences. Their tendency to dislodge Ethics and usurp her problems ought to be resisted.

Plato (496) drew the picture of a philosopher "who takes shelter behind a wall on a stormy day, when the wind is driving before it a hurricane of dust and rain; and when from his retreat he sees the infection of lawlessness spreading over the rest of mankind, he is well-content, if he can in any way live his life here untainted in his own person by unrighteousness and unholy deeds, and, when the time for

his release arrives, take his departure amid bright hopes with cheerfulness and serenity." Well, one must confess, it was a sheer defeatism in Plato. A philosopher's prime concern, no doubt, is to remain pure, but it is also his concern to make pure the world he lives in. He must put his shoulder to the wheel and set things right or, else, he is not functioning as a philosopher.

The mistake of allowing international relations to be adjusted by mere diplomacy, will be discovered one day. Failure here will lead men to the means of success. International like individual relations cannot be settled by systematic lying only. If the world is not proceeding more rapidly towards the solution of its problems, it is mainly due, it seems, to the dishonesty involved in dispossessing Ethics of her legitimate say in these matters. No good will come to humanity by stifling Ethics.

There was a time when disciples sat at the feet of their masters only to know how many times a chaste woman could lie to save the life of her husband, or, whether a man could take cucumber on the ninth day of the moon. Such questions have lost their value for us. But with them the value of Ethics also is not gone. We have other problems to solve. Who is not struck by the distraction and anguish of the world of today? Under the glamour and polish of an industrial civilisation, who does not notice the bleeding heart of humanity? The disease is there and it bursts out now in industrial strikes and now in communal clashes and now again in class war or political rising. And in all these cases, the moral aspect of the question is overlooked; and this demoralisation of issues makes the situation more complex.

Let it be recognised that the larger questions that engage the attention of humanity are ethical questions. The right to live, whether in reference to man or animal, individual or nation, is a moral question. Inter-national, inter-racial and

inter-communal questions cannot be solved by an appeal to physical force or the canons of expediency. The world of today has been guilty of a stupendous blunder in shelving morality in these matters. Whether it is the question of short skirts and bobbed hair or of oil mines in Iraq and dominion status in India,—no final solution of our difficulties will be in sight until and unless the moral aspect of the issues involved in them is recognised. We have rendered moral questions *un-moral* and look either to Art or to the other sciences for their solutions and wish to find a lasting adjustment of relations only by calculating prudence. People who talk of justice and fairness are condemned as idle visionaries. But the resulting conflict and chaos show that we are following the wrong track.

We shall probably be asked : When the Prime Ministers of the British Empire meet in a Conference and discuss whether it is profitable for Australia to export her wheat or whether New Zealand can become as great a manufacturing country as England, what contribution can the moralist make in a debate of this kind ? Our answer is : The moralist can at least show that ultimately these questions resolve themselves into the old question of Egoism *vs.* Altruism ; and ultimately the solution of these questions will depend on the preparedness of the High Contracting Parties for self-sacrifice. The philosopher should forget his race and creed; and unmindful of the plaudits of the platform or the pulpit, and absorbed in the meditation of the 'essential Form of the Good', he should, as Plato dreamt, point out to erring humanity the path to peace and happiness.

The Concept of Freedom.

BY
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The meaning of freedom:—Consciousness of freedom arises when we make a choice between two or more alternative courses. "The so called fiat of the will", as Alexander remarks in Space, Time and Deity "is nothing more or less than the consciousness, that it is we, who are consenting to the act or that the motive adopted proceeds from the self or character". It is the fact of consciousness, which distinguishes an action, which is distinctively human, from a purely physical action or movement. If a man falls down from the second storey of a house, it would be an instance of a physical action, determined precisely by the same mechanical laws as govern the falling of a stone. If, however, the same individual jumps down from the upper floor, because the house is on fire, and there is no other way out, it cannot be regarded as simply the resultant of the operation of physical laws, as is the case with the first action. The complication that has been introduced in the second case is due to the additional factor of the *appreciation* of the given situation, as involving certain definite consequences, which is absent in the first.

The mere fact, however, that an action is accompanied by consciousness is in itself not a sufficient evidence, that it is a free action. Impulsive and habitual acts are not the results of free choice. We would not be prepared to apply the category of freedom to such actions. In the case of most actions the real motives remain hidden in the unconscious while the apparent reasons that we ascribe to them, are simply the consequences of the rationalising activity. Mostly our actions are the outcome of a bias or prejudice, which is too subtle to be detected. Theoretically, it would be possible to effect a

complete detachment from bias or impulse of every sort whether conscious or unconscious and to act, in the words of Taylor, "on an impartial comparative judgment about the relative value of two goods of which we cannot have both". The question of the freedom of will resolves itself ultimately into the legitimacy or otherwise of the assumption, that the intellectual recognition, that one action is more valuable than the other, is in itself a sufficient motive to its performance.

It is a matter for psychology to decide whether we can act merely from the intellectual realization that a certain line of action is reasonable and right, apart from considerations of personal likings and dislikings. I think that the idea, that a certain action is right, can be a sufficient motive for action, even in the absence of an impulsive reinforcement. There is always a motive behind every action. The phrase "motiveless choosing", which according to Green is equivalent to liberty, is a self contradictory notion. Choice always implies a motive. The question is : What is the nature of the motive, which entitles an act to be designated as a freely chosen act ? The only answer that I think can do justice to the idea of freedom is, that the act which is the outcome of knowledge and not of mere uncriticised impulse, is a free act. I do not want to minimise the difficulties, inherent in the conception of freedom, as thus formulated. Our so-called knowledge may not be a genuine knowledge. It may only masquerade as such. The real inciting causes may be hidden from our view. All that can be said in this connection is, that we must try to make our knowledge as adequate as possible and to make our judgment of right and wrong as impartial as we can ; otherwise the mere consciousness that we are making a free choice, which at bottom, may be determined by hidden impulses or complexes, will be of no avail.

Psycho-analysis has done a great service in drawing attention to the fact, that our actions are, for the most part, deter-

mined by motives of which we are unconscious. People, as a rule do not know all the relevant circumstances, which directly and indirectly influence their judgment at the time of making a choice. It is only possible after a careful self-analysis which in itself is not an easy task.

It follows as a corollary, that freedom of choice is a rare phenomenon. It does not occur as often as some of us imagine. The measure of our freedom increases with the growth of knowledge. There are two sides to the question. In the first place, the free action should originate from a pure sense of duty or in other words from the perception that "an action is *per se* the right and reasonable act to be done". It is the great contribution of Kant to the science of morality for all time to come. In the second place the act should be backed up by adequate knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. Sometimes we think we are acting from a pure sense of duty while as a matter of fact, there is a hidden impulse working in the unconscious, of which we have no knowledge. At other times our conduct, though actuated by a sense of duty is based upon erroneous beliefs. This defect can only be remedied by means of genuine knowledge of the situation, in which we are acting. In this sense, we can say that our actions are relatively free, that is, relative to the adequacy of our knowledge of all the elements of the situation, subjective as well as objective.

It goes without saying that a sufficient knowledge of the situation is presupposed in all actions. We cannot launch ourselves into any activity, unless we possess some working knowledge of the circumstances in question; and yet for the sake of free choice we may attach a greater importance to the subjective factor of self knowledge than to the knowledge of the objective situation. Sometimes a man may not possess an adequate knowledge of external circumstances, but if he has made his choice in an impartial manner, after carefully

weighing the pros and cons of the various alternatives, in the light of the knowledge which he possesses, the choice may in this instance be called a free choice. His choice, if it is based on inadequate knowledge, may not be valuable from a practical point of view but it can be called free, if it has been made with complete detachment from bias, whether conscious or unconscious.

Freedom and Scientific Determinism.—Is freedom as understood above, compatible with predictability or scientific determinism? In the case of physical movements, it is theoretically possible to predict the effect, if all the relevant antecedent circumstances are known. It may be difficult for a human calculator, to predict, "without previous knowledge of the experiment, that blue exposed to one eye and red to the other would give us purple" (Alexendar). The point may be conceded to the emergent evolutionists that before the actual emergence of new qualities, they cannot be anticipated by human intellect. But it is not the same thing as to say that they are entirely unpredictable and unforeseeable. We may not be able to predict before hand, that hydrogen and oxygen, when mixed in proper proportions give rise to a new emergent, namely water, but it is only because we do not *see the connection* between the cause and the effect. If we could perceive the connection, it would not be theoretically difficult to foresee the effects occurring at different levels of evolution.

Can we say the same thing as regards such human actions as are called free. On the one hand, there is the view, that scientific determinism and freedom of will are incompatible. As against this, we meet the view that determination and freedom can very well go together.

"The determinism of the free act" says Alexendar, "is no more than this, that it has followed in fact from its antecedents, as they exist in the character of the agent and the circumstances, which appeal to him for action. The

freedom consists in the act of choice, there is no power of choosing behind the choice itself, no freedom of choice but only freedom experienced in choice. Had the character and other antecedents been different the act would have been different." Freedom according to this view, is nothing else, but a feeling that we have when making a choice, though the choice itself is determined by antecedent circumstances and the character of the agent. Suppose there are four alternatives to choose from. After deliberation, an individual decides to adopt one of them. According to Alexendar, freedom is simply the feeling aspect of choice, the particular choice made by the Agent being completely pre-determined by the various factors relevant to the situation. Freedom, understood in this sense, is not the genuine article we are in need of. This view wrongly uses the category of freedom in respect of an action, which is really not free.

In a way every action is determined, in so far as it proceeds from a motive. It has already been stated that a motiveless choice is an absurdity. Every choice has a motive behind it, and is determined by it. But the motive that determines a free choice is altogether a different affair from the class of determinating circumstances which condition a physical action. The motive is as it were, crystallised out of the previously existing factors, at the moment of choice, and is in its nature unforseeable.

Let us analyse a free act into its two important ingredients. On the one hand there are the circumstances or the situation, out of which the act develops. It is obvious that the free act cannot transcend the limitations, imposed by the situation. It is the situation, that calls forth the action. The latter cannot ignore the former and has to shape its course according to its requirements. The second important and more complicated factor is the mind of the agent. It is here, that we must search for the source of freedom, if it exists at all. The

mind of the agent, theoretically speaking, is what it is, on account of its native equipment and environmental influences. It therefore has a special point of view or a special character at the time of making a choice. My contention is, that the special point of view, brought to bear upon the choice of an alternative, by the agent, cannot be regarded as a wholly pre-determined affair. We are only wise after the event, when we declare that a certain action could only issue from a certain type of character. But we cannot say, before the choice has already been made, what the outcome of the choice will be. It is not because we are ignorant of all the factors involved in the character of the agent ; it is because, the mental factor is, in its very nature, unforeseeable and in-determinable in all its aspects.

In the first place, it is a well known fact that external circumstances influence the mind of an individual, and give it a definite shape. But the mind or consciousness, which is thus influenced, is not an inactive object, which passively receives the imprint of the environment. It reacts to the outer influences, and there is as yet no law to find out, in what exact way the mind allows itself to be shaped by the external circumstances. It is easy to make a glib assertion, that the character of the agent is moulded by the circumstances in which he is brought up, but it is impossible, I should say, to state the exact form, which the character will take as the result of these influences. Partly it is due to the fact, that the factors which are continually shaping the character of the agent, every moment of his life are so multitudinous and complicated, that no quantitative determination of them, in the present state of our knowledge is possible. But the main difficulty comes from the other side. The consciousness of man which reacts to these external factors defies all attempts at determination. Thus out of the two factors, governing a

free choice, namely circumstances and character, the latter is in its very nature indeterminable, and its effect, unforeseeable. A physical movement can be explained according to the principle of causal determinism, but not so an action, which is freely chosen, as one of its component parts, namely the character of the agent, cannot be completely determined and foreseen.

Conclusion :—It does not mean, however that the domain of mind, does not admit of the formulation of laws. Indeterminancy of behaviour, is according to modern physics, the characteristic of atoms, taken separately and yet, it is possible to discover laws, governing phenomena in nature. Statistics of probability, can reveal the working of laws almost everywhere. The domain of mind also, can be made amenable to laws. In the case of natural phenomena, indetermination is discovered only, when matter is analysed into its ultimate constituents. Lack of determination becomes more patent, when we come to mental phenomena, Mind however is not shrouded in complete obscurity. Discoveries are being made in the domain of mind as they are being made in the realm of matter. From the nature of the case, it is apparent that however far we may go in formulating mental laws, there would always remain the possibility of an irreducible surd, acting as a disturbing factor in our calculations about mental phenomena.

It is this aspect of mind, which provides a content to the concept of freedom. Freedom does not imply, that we can capriciously choose any course of action, towards which, for the time being, our mind is attracted in an incomprehensible manner. Our freedom is limited by the number of alternatives at our disposal. But within those alternatives, our mind may roam freely, provided that its choice is guided and controlled by the impartial judgment of the comparative value of the

various goods, from which we have to choose. I believe that the conception of freedom as presented here may possibly undo some of the tangles, involved in this most intricate problem.

The Concept of Social Force

By

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Sociology first borrowed the term "Social Force" from Physics, of the Nineteenth Century. But logicians of the scientific method no longer believe in Force as a reality. The superficial analogies to laws of Physics, given by Solvay or Carver¹ "disfigure and misinterpret not only the social phenomena but the laws of physics, mechanics, energetics, and logic as well". There is no unit of measurement, facts are few in number, the arrangement is not impersonal and unprejudiced, the behaviour of individuals in groups is not repetitive and quantitative measurement is not possible, as in Physics.

The study of historical tendencies as Social Forces is vitiated, among others, by the assumption that the temporal sequence of events is compelling from the nature of an inner development. This idea of time as a compelling force is neither psychological nor logical. The study of institutions as Social Forces becomes equally illogical in so far as they are supposed, sooner or later, to be the physical reincarnations of some social Force or other.

Even when the study of Sociology is thus vitiated, Psychology may yet tell us that there is Social Force, judging from the persistence or perseveration of any mental trait, the amount of resistance and opposition it meets or evokes, the work it can do in the matter of cohesion and impulsion, and in effecting certain momentous changes as noticed in the differences between the mentality of primitive races and children on the one hand, and civilised beings and adults, on

1. Sorokin-Contemporary Sociological Theories.

the other. Ward realised the importance of the contribution of Psychology to Sociology and postulated that the Social Forces must be lodged in the individual. The majority of American Sociologists² have followed his lead and taken the *individual living in society* as the human nucleus of the concept. As this is a more sensible view than that of group theorists we come to the facts of persistence or perseverance of mental traits, of the organic memory of Psychological events, of the direction and co-ordination of the behaviours of individuals living in association with one another.

If we classify mental events, (which are not similar to physical events at all points) we find that in the primary forms of incorporation through sensations (fusionary, ligatory or interpenetrative³), the central nervous system is increasingly assuming the rôle of the hero of the piece. When physico-chemical stimuli are supposed to be solely responsible for the incorporation of mental events, we cut out their mode, intensity, extent and temporal course for the sake of convenience. All these features of the so-called objective stimuli are responsible for the degree of organisation and its reference. The tendinous strain noticed in the primary organisation of experience through sensations becomes more prominent in the type of organisation through 'affects'. The role of affects in the incorporation of experience is not easy to detect, but there is enough evidence to show that their presence adds to or detracts from or otherwise fundamentally changes the nature of experience. They may be said to *suffuse* the entire incorporation, and create values. The third type of organisation is by images. The stimuli recede in the background, the affects persist, but the importance of the central initiative

2. House 'The concept of Social Force in American Sociology'. —J. Am. Sociology Sept, Nov, 1925 Jan, and May 1926.

3. The terminology and the method of analysis followed here are Dr. Bentley's in his "*The field of Psychology*".

and control becomes greater. Even in the most elementary form of pattern-weaving, 'the kinaesthetic factor involved in the tendinous pull is to a great extent dependent on central initiative and control'. The tendinous pull is not to be understood in terms of mechanical physiology as an arithmetic summation of the residues of bodily movements. In the secondary incorporations, it is only natural that the contribution of the centre is greater and more manifest through willing, memorial train, purpose and meaning. The secondary incorporations are real incorporations, but they are removed from the simple stimulus response correspondence. They do not cease to be potent for this removal, none the less. The difference is in the matter of references. As distinguished from the particular reference denoting an object, 'the total image may serve as the stage for memorial, imaginal and referential processes' (It is not experimentally clear how far this totality can be equated to a self-regulating principle of movement). In other words the secondary incorporations are charged with meaning. Images may be formed into a constellation, a ligation or a unity. When images are mixed with sensations, a mixed type of organisation is formed, different from the first in the matter of a larger contribution of the brain, and from the second, in so far as it does not depend immediately on the fulfilment of certain conditions in the cortex. This newness of integration, except in the case of abstract thinking, is not really novel; it may only be a revival or manifestation of antecedent functional residues. When we analyse, the conditions of this third type of organisation are found to be those of the primary type, the quality of repetition, time-interval, reference, and such immediate incentives to re-organisation as the general temper of the organism etc. The immediate incentives may be ordinary physical stimuli, but they are always fused with the functional residues of the brain present in thinking,

imagination, comprehension &c in order that the mixed type of incorporation may be formed. The external stimuli are 'no substitutes for the sensory eyes' located in the central nervous system, as the Behaviourists in their preoccupations are apt to suppose. The older school of Psychologists had also laid great stress on such brain-incentives as memory, imagination, thinking, habit &c. But in the light of experimental psychology, we have to reject the notions of such being so many states of mind. If they are so many functionings, then physically they leave certain residues in the central nervous system, which, when very strong are apt to leave the brain comparatively free of outside physical stimuli, and then, psychologically, to organise and integrate experience by lending them meaning and general reference. The new law of association, as framed by Dr. Bentley on the basis of experimental observations is possibly very near the truth. Although we know but little of the functions of the brain, we do have plenty of evidence that a total neural function leaves behind a total disposition or trend which tends to complete itself in the old way once it is renewed. To be sure, time, conflict, and confusion are constantly setting a term to this complete renewal, but the tendency towards it is, apparently, what we discover in our associative and determining tendencies and in our topical and habitational trends. In the reference side of mental processes, Ach finds an anticipation of the coming stimulus corresponding to the determining tendency on the physical side. Muller rejects the idea of anticipation and formulates a directive idea, an idea of a goal working on a mental disposition. This important goal-idea "commands attention, it possesses interest and interest serves to lend it a stronger perseveration and a greater associative effectiveness." We fail to detect either the physical background of such tendencies, or when it is detectable, we do not agree with the complete psycho-physical parallelism involved in such expla-

nations. They are mysterious tendencies, but they certainly emphasise the importance of the reference side of the brain's activity. The predicament, as in emotions, the meaning-series, as in perceptions, the topic and the novel-problem as in comprehension and thinking, all assemble relevant experiences in certain groups; and when the groups are in direct line with the functional trends, the organisation becomes comparatively stable. The relative stability is responsible for the resistance to opposition involved in the notion of force. The affective trends, the cortical residues and the referential series tend to directivity.

In other words, if the Science of Human Society is to draw from Psychology we cannot postulate the concept of Social Force in any way other than indicated. The conclusion is that if the term 'Force' is to be used at all in the study of human behaviours, it is to be used neither as a series of stimuli nor as a series of responses, but in the sense of dynamic relationships between them, which relationships are directed by the predisposition of the responding organisation, the affective trends and the meaning of reference of the organised experience. There is a kind of uniformity in the physiologic process, (if not in the logical one), though it does not lead to an identity or a close psycho-physical parallelism. The affective tendencies, and the tendinous pulls and other physiological trends are important co-ordinating and directing agencies. The role of affective trends is present even in thinking processes and judgments of value. What the reflex does for a short time in a particular way by particular mechanisms, the affective tendencies do for a much longer time in a more generalised yet a stabler way through the association areas of the brain. ⁴ *'The brain is the seat of all trends'* Memory or retention, the totality of the situation of present experience, the affective tendencies, and the organic state all

favour or oppose movement along habitual tracts. Heredity therefore plays an important part. If all these favour movement along certain neural tracts, the responses become automatic. This is how the spontaneity of a Social Force is to be appreciated. It not only means expenditure of energy but its preservation and organisation to oppose new forces, tendencies, interests, institutions &c. So the factorial description of Social Force includes (1) preservation, (2) affective dispositions, trends working on many types of associative incorporations, (3) the meaning side of the latter and (4) the interplay of all the above factors.

An orthodox Sociologist would hold that the role of Society in the make-up of those factors is very important and therefore the concept of Social Force is logically tenable. Thus, in the first place, it may be held that in so far as social life is psychological environment of the individual, it influences the cortical activities of the individual. But there is a deplorable lack of physiological evidence to prove any corresponding changes in the cortical structure of the individual since the beginning of social life. If physiological evidences are to be trusted, it may be said that such changes have set the stage of social life. It is clear that the social environment, must pass through the brain in any form in order that it may produce a momentum. And it is the environment that has changed. The brain remaining what it is, no wonder that the affective trends remain what they were, which possibly accounts for the persistence of so many of Prof. Small's interests, McDougall's instincts and sentiments, Holt and Thomas' wishes, Fougillee's ideas or Parks' attitudes. * Secondly, it may be held that as there have been important changes in

5. *Small's General Sociology* 425-436. *McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology* (121-164).

Park and Burgess—*Introduction to the Science of Sociology* Ch. VII.

the nature of social life, social affects and sentiments as clear from the fundamental differences in the mentality of the Primitive and the Civilised man, a proper understanding of the social changes would show the necessity of formulating the concept of Social Force. But we know that Prof. Levy-Bruhl's theory is untenable in the light of new facts collected by Rivers and Malinowsky. Levy-Bruhl's law of contradiction is a generalisation from an imperfect understanding of the connotations of certain words ('Thus the word 'Toa' does not signify only the dead, but the dying and the living old as well). Similarly, his law of participation, by which the part acquires the property of the whole by mere participation, is not a generalisation only suited to the supposed pre-logical state of mind, but perfectly applicable to many attitudes characteristic of modern civilised life as well. Another argument for the logicity of the concept of Social Force may be advanced by those who believe that what is true of the biological world is also true of the social world, i.e. the individual repeats the mental make-up and tendencies of the race; and they may take their stand on Piaget's findings of the child's world and his language, and point out that human beings in their childhood have no sense of significant relationship existing between ideas and ideas, or things and things and place them side by side (law of Syncretism); and that they are apt to generalise from one example (law of transduction); but that later on they develop the sense of intricate relationship and become scientifically careful about generalisation from one particular, chiefly through living in association. Therefore it may be concluded that as Society forces this change, there is Social Force. If we analyse this argument, (as Victoria Hazlitt has done in the British Journal of Psychology, April 1930), we will find that the a-logicity of the child (who is supposed to correspond to the pre-social stage) is an exaggeration arising from 'the over-

valuation of the verbal expression as a measure of thinking, and from an exaggerated view of the logicity of adult thought'. It may as well be that Prof. Piaget did commit the same mistakes as Prof. Levy-Bruhl committed in trying to fix a large number of ideas with different shades in one term of common parlance. It may also be that the ego-centricity is a remnant of the bad training of parents and nurses. Besides, an adult is very often childish in Prof. Piaget's sense. If Prof. Burts' statement that there is 'no evidence of any specific process of thought that could not be performed by a child of seven' is true, and true it is, then the main structure of the last argument falls to the ground.

Therefore there is no necessity for postulating the concept of 'Social' Force even from the psychological point of view i.e. even when psychological changes undergone by an individual are too prominent and supposed to be due to society. But the individual is always living in association with other individuals, and as such he has been studied. Thus the social factor may be said to be already involved in each term, in each factor and in each activity of the cortex. The word 'social' in the term Social Force does not mean a new factor which disturbs the analysis. The discussion does not mean that social interests, social sentiments and attitudes are not to be treated as facts. They are facts to be recognised by the social engineer but for the theoretical Sociologist, they are facts which go to make up the different factors in the movement initiated by the cortex.

The methods of Ethics.

BY

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Regarding the question "what things ought to exist for their own sakes?" as constituting the central problem in ethics, Sidgwick and Dr. Moore have employed (1) the method of elimination and (2) the method of isolation respectively to solve it and have thereby established what they believe to be certain intrinsic goods of life. But I have shown in my paper on "The values of Organic wholes" ¹ that the method of isolation—to which Sidgwick's method of elimination is ultimately reducible—cannot properly be applied in ethics. I have also suggested in that paper what I believe to be the proper method of ethics, viz., the method of opposite effects. It is my intention in this paper to elaborate this method and to work out some of its implications which would be confirmatory of some of my conclusions put forth in "Some Suggestions toward a New Ethics".²

In addition to the question mentioned above, viz., what things ought to exist for their own sakes, there is another kindred question often discussed in ethics: what things are related as causes to that which is good-in-itself? Let us apply our method to each of these questions and see what results we arrive at.

Let me first explain the method itself and its working. It is a very simple method indeed, and yet, like Occam's razor,

1. Read before the Fifth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Lahore, 1929.

2. Read before the Fourth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Madras, 1928.

it will be found to be most effective in eliminating innumerable entities claiming the title of 'intrinsic' goods in ethics. It asks the question: why do we pronounce anything at all to be good or bad in this world? Take any of the institutions of social life; take any of the virtues of moral life, either singly or in any combination you please; take any of the material objects or forces in the world, natural or artificial; and ask the question: why do we pronounce any of these, singly or in combination, to be good or evil? Is it not on account of their consequences or results? If not, imagine that the thing or object in question uniformly produced not its usual or present results, but just their opposite or different results; then ask yourself the question whether in such an altered state of things you would still pronounce the thing or object to be good or bad. If you can do so, then indeed you have established the claim of certain things to be called good or evil *per se*.

For instance, the proper appreciation of a beautiful object is generally supposed to be a good thing in itself and we will grant that this complete whole (Vide "The values of Organic wholes" for a discussion of the whole subject) does really contain all the necessary constituents: (1) The existence of the beautiful object itself (2) The existence of beautiful qualities in the object (3) a cognition of, together with a belief in, the existence of the beautiful qualities (4) the appropriate emotion towards the beautiful qualities. Now all these things may really exist; and yet do we generally or can we reasonably say that such an aesthetic enjoyment is by itself good? It *would* be good if it generally induced a noble frame of mind in the contemplating person and resulted in an elevated plane of thought, feeling and action. If on the other hand it resulted in exciting only base desires in the individual and generally induced a lower plane of mawkish sentimentality or utter indifference to the practical side of life, then we are all

agreed, I suppose, in condemning such a contemplation to be essentially evil. It may be replied that the beautiful should itself be so defined as to require the admiring contemplation to be necessarily good, as e. g., Moore does. (*Principia Ethica*, p. 201). But this is really to beg the whole question: why should beauty be saddled with the goodness of another's contemplation?

It may be said that the effect of an object or event being what it is, to suppose it were opposite or otherwise is to destroy its very nature as such an object or event. Now in the first place the inevitability of cause and effect here suggested is only true of natural phenomena; it is not true of moral causation, as I shall try to show shortly. And secondly even in their case, it is not the effect as such, but what it means for some living beings, its consequences for the destiny of the latter, that we really judge when we judge a natural phenomenon, e. g., a volcanic eruption, to be good or bad.

To show that in the case of causal goods, the reason why we pronounce a certain action to be good is its general utilitarian tendency is still easier. Truth-speaking, e. g., would not be good under all circumstances; practised without respect to circumstances and context, as e. g., in the case of a sick person, it would only result in the direst of consequences. And generally with regard to any course of action, it may safely be said that the value of such an action entirely depends on the value of its consequences. This is easily enough granted. But what is not as easily granted is the consequential proof of the value of the so-called intrinsic goods. Sophistication and prejudice and long-persisting habits of thought help to conceal from our view the simple truth that nothing is really good or bad but consequences make it so. Even the hypothetical worlds of Dr. Moore (*Principia Ethica*, p. 83)—the world of complete beauty and the world of perfect ugliness—would not be admitted to be good and

bad respectively, apart from their corresponding effects on human feeling. The reason why Dr. Moore is able to pronounce them good or bad is that in the very suppositious act of "imagining" the two worlds he is smuggling in the element of human feeling and their effects on such feeling.

Everything, therefore, that is called good is good only as a means to something else which in its turn is a means to some other thing and so on throughout the whole circle; all things are both relatively ends and means. Hence ethics cannot be a science of the ultimate good or goods, for none such exist *within the province of ethics*. It is only a science of the means. Or as I have put it elsewhere, ("Some suggestions toward a New Ethic") ethics discusses what is primarily a matter of qualification or condition, it cannot constitute an independent science by itself.

If the goodness of our action depends on its consequences, then the more excellently we can perform it, the better will be the consequences. This is what the Greeks meant by "virtue"—excellence in anything generally, the virtue of a doctor or of a teacher etc., consisting in the excellence with which he can discharge his functions. From this standpoint, therefore, a person who has realised all or a great number of his capacities would be better qualified, so far as producing good consequences are concerned, than a person who has realised none or only a very few of them. A scientist, e. g., or an artist or a musician or a great poet or scholar, or even a rich person for that matter, can produce far more good in the world than a person lacking in all these respects. This is the only rationale of the theory of self-realisation however much the idealists may dislike the company thereby assigned to them with the rational utilitarians; for what justification can they give for requiring everyone to realise all his capacities, other than that he can thus create the greatest good in

the world ? And from this standpoint it also follows that the end justifies the means, that all's well that ends well.

The goodness of the consequences depends, I said, on the skill or excellence with which the action is performed, but at the same time there is another side to moral action which brings out another fundamental feature of conduct. For moral causation is altogether dissimilar to natural causation. In natural phenomena, cause and effect are so related that the same cause always produces the same effect, different causes produce different effects. In moral phenomena, on the other hand, the same cause may produce different effects. It is doubtless a case of counteraction of causes, but a counteraction which cannot be anticipated or controlled in any manner. If I give a rupee to a beggar in the street and he goes home drunk and kills his wife, the consequence is something which largely depends on another being's volition--a feature thoroughly absent in natural causation. Such lack of uniformity in the consequences of our actions is true not only of individuals but also of different peoples and of the same people at different epochs. What is, however, denied here is not relative, but absolute uniformity of consequences ; freewill as much as determinism makes it impossible to predict the external consequences of an act depending on the varying volitional developments of other minds. It is this possibility of variation of consequences that accounts for the variation in the moral estimates of the same act by different people. One person may view the action from the standpoint of the consequences which he expected, another perhaps from the standpoint of the consequences which actually ensued. Our present estimates of the goodness or badness of an act depend on its usually observed consequences : if perchance these latter should in any case vary, the good may become bad, and the bad good. If this is admitted, it will also readily be admitted that, the emphasis being on consequences, if an act produces

beneficial consequences which were not intended by the agent, the action should nevertheless be called good, while if it produces harmful results not intended by the agent, the action should still be called evil.

But what determines the goodness or badness of the consequences themselves? I answer, the needs of life. Life is ever self-creating, and it devises never and yet never situations to expand, to grow, to develop. The urge is within life itself, and in response to this urge it builds up, tears down, replaces, repairs, changes, is always at work. Creation of new physical forms, of new social forms, the founding of institutions, the forming of new ideas, the achieving of great enterprises—all are the products of that expanding spirit of life which ever wants to recreate itself, re-form itself, refashion itself. In the degree in which the consequences of the act realise these diverse needs of life—which cannot be stereotyped, or predicted beforehand, or confined within narrow sheath—are they entitled to be called good, what we know as moral progress is the result of this urge of the unfolding spirit of life. A psychological study of the several impulses, feelings, desires and emotions that make up the rich content of life is quite relevant in this connection and ought to be undertaken by any writer on ethics.

Other such conclusions can be developed by the employment of the method of opposite effects but for want of space, I shall not attempt them all here. I only wish to emphasise in conclusion that hitherto we have been dealing only with the ethics of consequences. Ethics, as a science, can only concern itself with "goods"—with various kinds of consequences and the insuperable contradictions and confusions in which such an ethics lands itself I have tried to point out in my paper on "The Theory of 'Moral Goods' (Read before the First I. P. C. held at Calcutta, 1925.). These are, however, inevitable so long as we believe ethics to be a science of goods or values.

We shall then have sharply to distinguish from it what I may call the science of morality. The one has to do with the form, the other with the content of life. The one investigates the righteousness, the other the goodness, of our actions. The one considers the motives, the other the results, of our actions. Moral life may thus be said to be janus-faced. In what this other aspect of morality consists, what precisely is its relation to ethics, are questions to be dealt with on subsequent occasions.

First Principles of Indian Ethical Systems.

By

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA.

In recent times, a necessity has been felt to define Hinduism,—Hinduism, as contradistinguished from Mahammadanism, Christianity and other forms of religion. I have often thought over the task of defining Hinduism and am bound to confess that every time it has appeared to me as enormous, if not impossible. Yet Hinduism must be defined,—and the difficulty of exactly describing Hinduism is greatly increased by the fact that the definition is to be applicable not only to the orthodox Brahminism but to the other religious systems of India e.g. Jainism and Buddhism. One way of characterising Hinduism would be to describe it as a system which had Indians as its prophets, teachers, sages and seers. The description is no doubt applicable to all the three systems, Brahminism, Buddhism and Jainism but is, after all, very vague and devoid of any positive matter.

A careful study of the ethical doctrines of the above three Indian schools would, however, show that notwithstanding their differences, the Brahminic, the Buddhist and the Jaina systems are substantially agreed on important doctrines of morality. And this supplies a clue to our finding a definition for Hinduism which may unify the three systems,—varied in themselves as they undoubtedly are,—for the purpose of differentiating them from the other prevalent religions of the world.

For, let us look to the Jaina description of Dharma or system of moral practices. They are, as the author of the *Tattvārthādhigama* Sūtra says, ten in number viz.,—forgive-

ness (Kṣhamā), humility (mārdava), straightforwardness (ārjava), truthfulness (satya), cleanliness (śauca), restraint (samyama), penance (tapas), renunciation (tyāga), indifference (ākinchanya) and control of sexual passions (brahmacharyya). These ten modes of Dharma, as described by the Jainas are substantially in agreement with the ten Pāramis or excellent Perfections of the Buddhist which are,—dāna (giving away), śīla (power of enduring), nāskramya (renunciation), Prajñā (wisdom), vīrya (equanimity of temper) kṣhānti (forgiveness), satya (truthfulness), addisthāna (strength of resolve), maitrī (loving all), and upēkṣhā (indifference). Coming again to the Brahminic code of morals, we find the author of the *Padma-Purāṇa*, mentioning the following ten as the 'Angas' or parts of Dharma,—brahmacharyya (control of the sexual passions), satya (truthfulness), tapas (penance), dāna (charity), niyama (self-control), kṣhamā (forgiveness), śauca (cleanliness), ahimsā (non-injury), suśānti (peaceful temper) and aṣṭeya (non stealing).

The above similarity between the moral codes of the Jaina, the Buddhist and the Brahminic people points to a similarity in the fundamental bases of morality in the three ethical schools. The primary or cardinal virtues, according to the Jainas are, as is well known, Ahimsā or doing injury to none, Satya or truthfulness, Aparigraha or a spirit of non-attachment, Aṣṭeya or non-stealing and Brahmacharyya or the control of the sexual passions. The *Sutta-Nipāta* of the Buddhists, again, enumerate the Pañc-śīla as follows :—

1. Do not kill nor encourage others to kill. 2. Do not steal and make others also non-stealers. 3. Control your sexual passions and make others also do so. 4. Do not tell a lie and see that others also do not lie. 5. Abstain from drinking and instruct others also to that effect.

Lastly, we find the author of the *Srīmat Bhāgavatam* saying substantially the same thing.

"All pious practices are included in the four, *Ahimsā* (abstinence from killing), *Satya* (truthfulness), *Asteya* (non-stealing) and *Maithuna-Varjana* (controlling the sexual passions)."

Of the above-mentioned cardinal virtues of Indian Ethics, the virtue of *Ahimsā* is not only what is common to the moral codes of all the three schools but is one which differentiates the Indian system of morals from others. We may thus safely say that Hinduism is best defined as an ethical system in which *Ahimsā* occupies an important position. This is testified to by this among other facts that with the Jaina, the Buddhist and the Hindu proper (at least with the Hindus of the upper classes), vegetarianism is not only a great virtue but almost the common practice.

With the Jainas, however, *Ahimsā* is not only one of the cardinal virtues but in a sense, it is the only virtue and all other virtues are but secondary and subservient to it. *Amritachandra Suri*, for instance, in his *Purushārtha-Siddhyupāya*, shows how the virtues of *Satya*, *Asteya*, *Brahmacharyya* and *Aparigraha* are derivable from and have their explanation and justification in the principle of *Ahimsā*. *Ahimsā* is thus the very corner-stone which supports the stupendous edifice of the Jaina ethical philosophy. It is this supreme position occupied by *Ahimsā* in Jainism that distinguishes it from the Buddhist and the Brahminical systems. The author of the *Mahā-Bhārata*, no doubt, says,

"Dharma is characterised by *Ahimsā* and *Adharma*, by *Himsā*."

But it must be remembered that the philosophical systems under the authority of the *Upanishads* began with the idea that the world was unreal, so that Renunciation or *Aparigraha* was the supreme virtue with them. The vedic school regarded *Ahimsā* as a virtue, probably because it was a necessity for,—a condition precedent to,—the practice of *Tyāga*,

Sannyāsa or Aparigraha. There is reason to believe that yajna or Sacrifice was only a symbol for the ethical principle of Renunciation. The practice of yajna or Renunciation was the highest virtue with the people of the Vedic school and in the name of yajna, they sometimes sacrificed living animals. They could not accordingly practise Ahimsā very strictly ; at any rate, it was not the only virtue with them, although they admitted it to be of great merit.

The soft-hearted Buddha, on the other hand, was mortified at the sufferings of animals and it is said that he was one about to offer his own self at the altar of Sacrifice to stop the killing of innocent animals there. He commanded :—

“Being an animal yourself, you shall not kill an animal,... for know for certain, one who kills an animal is sure to have grief.”

The practice of Ahimsā was thus a great virtue, according to Buddha. But the first principle of his philosophy was “All existence is misery” and he was so much overwhelmed with this sad thought that he hastened to do the little amount of positive good that he could to his fellow-sufferers in the world. With the Buddhists, accordingly, love for all, which is Ahimsā in its positive aspect, was the chief virtue. In Buddhism, nowhere is this sentiment of love and sympathy for the suffering creation more manifest than in the Bhāvanās, the first three of which are respectively called the Maitrī, the Mudita and the Karuṇā. In Maitrī, the thinker wishes that every animal, be it a beggar or a rich man, a god or a toad, be happy. In the second Bhāvanā, the pious Buddhist wishes that the poverty of every kind be removed from all poor beings. In the Mudita Bhāvanā, the humble Bhikṣu wishes prosperity for all. The attractive beauty of the Buddhist ethical system and the humanitarian deeds of the Buddhist Emperors point to this insistence by the early Buddhists on the practice of universal love,—of Ahimsā in its positive aspect.

The Jainas, as we have seen already, made Ahimsā the first principle of their ethical philosophy. They not only deduced all other virtues e.g. Truthfulness, Renunciation etc. from Ahimsā but conceived its nature in a most comprehensive way and practised it with scrupulous care in both its positive and negative aspects. Like the Buddhists, the Jainas extended their love to all living beings. On this point, the Jainas speak of four kinds of Contemplation (which are akin to the Buddhist Bhāvanās), called Maitrī, Pramoda, Kārunya and Mādhyastha. These are best described in the words of Amita-Gati :--

"May my self, O Lord ! have love (Maitrī) for all beings, Joy (Pramōda) in mixing with good men, Sympathy (Kāruṇya) for the sufferers and Tolerance (Mādhyastha) for the ill-behaved."

Dāna or charity also is a great virtue with the Jainas. And while making a gift the giver is enjoined to look to the following four things :--(1) The *way* in which he is to give. He is to respectfully receive the donee, to seat him on an exalted seat, to wash his feet, to worship him, to bow to him, to be pure in speech, body and mind and to give in a faultless way. (2) the *thing* which he gives. This must not be injurious in any way and should preferably be such as would tend to the donee's spiritual welfare. (3) The proper *attitude* in which he is to give. The giver must not wish anything in return for the thing given, must give calmly, be happy in the act of giving, must not cherish any deceitful feeling, must banish envy from his mind, must not be sorry for his act of giving and must be humble in every way. (4) The *person* to whom the gift is made. A good man with needs should first of all be relieved. In this connection, it should be noted that the Jainas speak of Karuṇā-dāna also which means that food (āhāra), medicine (aushadhi), removal of the fear of the frightened (abhaya-dāna) and knowledge (vidyā) should be

made over to all beings,—human or sub-human, Jaina or non-Jaina. All these injunctions are intended for the faultless practice of love and sympathy, (Ahimsā in its positive aspect) and as a result we find not only the Jaina Kings and Emperors but Jaina people also in ancient India, founding hospitals, rest-houses and other objects of utility, for men and lower animals alike.

But the Jainas seem to have gone further than the Buddhists. They believed in the existence of the Soul-life not only in the animals but in trees, grass and many invisible organisms. Their philosophy asserted that all those souls, though many in number, were of one kind, as far as their essential nature in its purity was concerned. It was perhaps this idea of kinship with all living beings that led the Jainas to take care for and sympathise with even the very minutest form of organism. Amita-Gati gives expression to this feeling of comradeship in his fervent prayer,—

“Lord ! If in my moving to and fro, I heedlessly annihilated, mutilated, combined (incompatibly) or harmed organisms, having one sense or more senses, may such wrong acts of mine be avoided !”

The Jainas took as much care for the observance of the negative aspect of Ahimsā (i.e., not to injure any living organism) as they took for that of its positive aspect (i.e., to love and help all living beings). In order that one might not injure any living organism, however small and minute it might be, a Jaina was asked to see (1)—that he did not use harsh words; (2) that he did not think ill of others even in mind, (3) that he was careful in walking, (4) that he was careful in lifting and laying down things and (5) that he carefully examined his food and drink before he took them. The vow of Ahimsā was said to be transgressed if an animal was wilfully (1) tied up or otherwise confined, (2) assaulted, (3) mutilated, (4) overloaded or (5) prevented from taking its food

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or drink. A true Jaina was required not to take animate vegetable etc., not to give away to others weapons of offence, not to excrete in a place or put things there or spread mats or seats there without first carefully examining the place (if there were any living animal there). He was commanded not even to place his food on a living thing e.g. on a green leaf or cover his food with a living thing.

Some of the above-mentioned and similar practices of the Jainas, are laughed at as being extravagant, ludicrous and idle. It is nevertheless, undeniable that these injunctions exhibit sincere and honest attempts on the part of the Jainas to practise Ahimsā fully, —a doctrine which differentiates the Indian systems of Ethics from other systems, a doctrine again which Brahminism could not observe always, inspite of its appreciation of it and which Buddhism observed but partially.

The Ethics of Kant and the Gita.

BY

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The problem of what I ought to do is more important than the question of what I can know and it is the supreme merit of the Kantian theory of Morals that it alone in the history of European thought recognises the uniqueness of moral experience or the primacy of the Practical Reason over Pure Reason and thus carries us to the very heart of Reality more than Physics or Metaphysics. The Gita, Divine the Song of Duty expounds the ethics of Indian thought and is esteemed as the quintessence of Upanishadic wisdom. The study of the two works is therefore of profound interest to the student of comparative ethical thought and religion.

THE KANTIAN THEORY

In the *Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant develops the well-known theory of the Categorical Imperative as a Synthetical, Practical *a priori* proposition based on the Criticism of Practical Reason. Practical Reason or moral consciousness is reason and will emptied of all emotional content; and Will may be defined as reason in its practical aspect. The universal principle alone proves the value of the particulars of conduct and not vice versa. It is fatal to morality to deduce its principles from the empirical ideas of sensibility and utility and not from the ideas of Reason framed *a priori*. Pleasures and pain arise from the objects of sense and a sensuous desire is only a kind of self-love. Even the idea of happiness belongs to the sensitive subject and being contingent and subjective, it lacks definiteness and universality. But the objective principle of Reason determines the will of man which is subjective and contingent

and this determination is called the command or the imperative. What is desirable thus differs from what is actually desired, and moral action is good in itself and is not a means to something else whether it is possible or actual and therefore the imperative is not hypothetical, but categorical. The moral law is thus not a mere rule of skill belonging to art nor a pragmatic idea based on prudence but is duty for duty's sake. It is universal and absolute, has purity, dignity and incomparable worth. It shines like a jewel in its own light. Nothing in the world or even out of it can be called good without qualification except a good-will. As a synthetic proposition, the idea of duty has positive content and supplies its own formulæ for conduct which Kant states in the following ways:—

(1) Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law. The law of reason implies self-consistency and excludes the content of desire. Reason is self-legislative and it is only when the maxim of action can be universalised that it is right and therefore desirable. Else, the maxim would contradict itself. But if Reason contradicts sensibility then it becomes a mere abstract universal devoid of content and is a will that wills nothing. Contradiction implies a positive basis or presupposition.

(2) The second formula is more concrete and marks a transition from empty self-consistency to consistency with the self. The denial of the sensitive self implies the affirmation of the rational self. The formula may be stated as follows:—

Treat humanity in thy own person or in that of others as an end in itself and not as a means to an end. Things have a relative value, but persons are ends in themselves. The sensitive self is a phenomenolised subject explained in terms of causality. Sensitive individuality is a means to an end, but personality has its own intrinsic or absolute value. When the will is self-legislative and not governed by any foreign impulse, it transcends the world of sense and attains autonomy.

(3) The third formula is more concrete than the second because it insists on socialising the moral law and treating humanity as a kingdom of ends in which man is both sovereign and subject. As a sensitive being, the self is subject to the moral law; but, as a rational self it is self-legislative; the good man is a citizen of an ideal state in which each man treats himself as a person and not a thing, and treats others also as persons.

The Critique of Practical Reason is an enquiry into the nature of the Summum Bonum and shows the transition from ethics to religion. The idea of duty presupposes the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul and is the ground of our faith in God and these three are the postulates of the Practical Reason. Virtue is good in itself but not the whole good. The whole good is virtue crowned with happiness and it is only God that can harmonise duty and desire. God is the pure, Practical Reason in its personality and duty ultimately becomes a Divine command.

II. THE GITA THEORY

The Gita theory of morals has many affinities with that of Kant and may be developed as follows:—

In every action we should eliminate the spurious principles of sensibility and utility. Conduct influenced by Kama and Krodha or attachment and aversion is Kamyā Karma and should therefore be avoided. All rational beings should determine their conduct by means of Vyavasthātmikā Buddhi which implies both reason and will or, as Kant would say, Practical Reason. When it is thus emptied of all empirical content and is independent of utilitarian considerations, it becomes a categorical imperative and helps in attainment of autonomy or sthithaprāgnatva.

The Gita theory of Nishkāmakarma like the Kantian theory of morals may be formulated in the following three ways:—

(1) Act in such a way that the basis of your action is the universal law of Reason or Sāṅkhyabuddhi. Whatever is determined by Prakriti and its Gunas does not enter into the content of moral law. The pleasures of sensibility therefore have no value in moral life. While Kāmya Karma is particular and empirical, Nishkāma Karma is universal and rational. When Prakriti and its Gunas are eliminated from the content of conduct, it may lapse into the Sāṅkhyan formalism and mere reason without the dynamic energy of emotion becomes abstraction.

(2) The second formula seeks to remove this defect. Treat humanity in thy own person or in that of another, not as a product of Prakriti, but as Purusha. This formula is, as in the case of Kant, a transition from the self-consistency of Buddhi or Reason to the realisation of Self, or Purusha as entirely different from Prakriti and its Gunas known as Kaivalya.

(3) Treat the whole kingdom of Purushas or persons as deriving their moral good from the Purushottama. In the whole kingdom of karma every Purusha is both sovereign and subject; but God alone is Sovereign and not subject. His will is absolutely perfect and pure and from this religious feeling arises the sense of the inadequacy and futility of the finite will. Duty then becomes a Divine command, and Karma is transfigured into Kainkarya or worship of the Supreme.

III.

THE AFFINITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS.

(1) Both insist on the elimination of sensibility or Kāmya Karma from the content of moral consciousness. The Kantian theory of duty for duty's sake is the same as the Gita theory of Nishkāmya Karma. Inclination is opposed to Reason and the theory of self-sovereignty avoids the mechanical view of the Mimamsaka and the ascetic ideal of the Sāṅkhya and follows a middle course between hedonism and stoicism.

(2) Nishkama Karma is based on the purity of the inner disposition and is not based on external compulsion. The Kantian autonomy of the will corresponds to the Gita ideal of *Sthithapragmatva*. Both emphasise the moral ideal of self-sovereignty by self-subjugation. The Purusha or the rational self is realised by the elimination of Prakriti or inclination.

(3) Both insist on freedom as essential to morals. Kant speaks of the dual aspect of the phenomenal and noumenal in all our actions and it is only when we rise from the world of sense to the world of understanding that the subject determines itself by itself. In the same way, the Gita also lays stress on the detachment of Purusha from the trammels of Prakriti. Kant rejects all ideas of the mere statutory religion which relies mainly upon sensibility. The Gita also rejects the values of *Kamya Karma* and the pleasures of life here and in *Swarga*. Mere ritualism and a belief in the supernatural are not essential to the ethical religion. Miracles can never be a substitute for morality and even the importance of theology depends only on its moral worth.

IV.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GITA THEORY OVER THAT OF KANT.

(1) Karma and the problem of unmerited suffering and sin:—Kant recognises the radical evil in human nature and its universality; but, he refuses to accept the historical account which describes it as an inheritance from Adam. He believes in natural theology as opposed to revelation and dogmatism and tries to give a rational account of sin and suffering. If evil is inherited, then, it denies the sense of moral responsibility and morality in itself falls to the ground. He likewise rejects the belief in the devil as the source of sin. The evil propensity exists in all and it is an act of wrong choice. Yet it cannot be explained. In other words, from

the speculative point of view, the origin of evil is inscrutable. We cannot understand it either theoretically or practically. But the Gita theory of Karma which may be defined as the operation of causality in the moral level ascribes full moral responsibility to human personality and treats God as the dispenser of justice according to individual desert.

(2) The Theory of Freedom:—The Kantian view is based upon the absolute antithesis between Reason and Passion and its theory of freedom is more rational than moral. It is vitiated by the negative movement of thought and ignores the reality of the moral strife and choice. But the Gita recognises the strife between the good and evil in the moral nature of man and insists on the real and ultimate possibility of conquering evil.

(3) The question of authority or sanction for conduct :—Kant believes only in natural theology as opposed to revelation and tries to give a rational account of the problem of freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God by regarding them as the postulates of the moral life. Speculatively these are inexplicable and inscrutable ; but from the practical point of view, i.e. of morality, they are necessary. In criticising the three arguments, of rational theology known as the ontological argument, the cosmological argument and the argument from design, Kant proves that the being of God can't be established by speculative Reason. It may be proved by means of the same argument that the voice of Practical Reason is only a cry in the wilderness, "a nest of moral assumptions". If he can't extract existence out of thought or deduce the Infinite from the finite, we cannot prove that duty is a divine command, we cannot go from the good to God. If the question of Pure Reason is insoluble, the question of Practical Reason is equally so.

The Gita theory insists on a belief in revelation as the only sanction for conduct (Sāstram Pramānam) and affirms that

what is asserted in Sastra is rationally justifiable and also intuitively realisable. Kant, influenced by his earlier pietism, has no faith either in metaphysics or in intuition.

(4) Kant no doubt demolishes the method of dogmatism, but fails to realise the futility of mere criticism. He identifies knowledge with the phenomenal given in sense-perception and treats the moral and religious consciousness as a mere faith. But the Gita dissolves the dualism between Knowledge and faith by showing the possibility of a soul-sight of God and His goodness.

(5) Kant's theory of immortality may mean a perpetuation of our suffering for the cause of morality. The Gita asserts the eternity of the soul as opposed to its mere immortality and posits its essential goodness.

(6) The moral fervour of Kant is revealed in the following classical words:—"Two things fill the mind of man with wonder, the starry heavens above, and the moral law within." But owing to the antithesis that he sets up between the noumenal and the phenomenal, he holds a deistic view of God and practically treats Him as a *Deus Ex Machina*. Though in his later works he affirms the immanence of God in our moral consciousness, he fails to bring out the idea of divine immanence in the cosmic order. Religion then becomes external to morality and not essential to it. But the Gita regards God not only as Purushottama or the pattern of all perfections, but as the Antaryamin or the immanent Ground of the cosmic order. God is not only the Life of our life, but also the Value of all values.

(7) The Kantian theory of the kingdom of ends does not bring out the spiritual solidarity of all beings. The Gita emphasises not merely the brotherhood of man, but also the essential oneness of all beings including even the sub-human species. The Gita thus brings out the vital relation which

exists between ethics and religion. The transition from Prakriti to Purusha and from Purusha to Purushottama marks the stages of moral and spiritual progress and Karma is gradually transfigured into Nishkāma Karma and Kainkarya. Purushottama is the Inner Ruler Immortal in all beings. Every person as a mode of the Supreme Self, is both free and determined. He is morally free because it is really possible for him to detach himself from Prakriti and attain Kaivalya. Spiritually his will is attuned to the Will of God and self-sovereignty is transmuted into self-gift to God. While Kant insists on the value of respect and reverence for the moral law, the Gita delights in the reciprocity of love and the mystic irresistibility of Divine bliss. Then, goodness is transformed into godliness and God becomes the Self of man and man becomes the Self of God and the kingdom of God becomes a community of souls with God as the centre of the self as well as its circumference.

(8) The Doctrine of Grace:—Kant distrusts the theological idea of salvation as a supernatural gift. He rightly recognises the truth that we should deserve God's grace before we desire it, and not depend upon miracles. If his view is not accepted, it would lead to moral irresponsibility and the evils of predetermination and eternal damnation. But, he does not bring out the organic relation between God's grace and man's goodness. But the Gita theory of the Purushottama as the Self of Purusha does justice to both these factors. Man ought to be good and deserve the grace of God; and God being the Self of man, crowns virtue with happiness. There can be no salvation without self-sovereignty.

Kant has the supreme merit of formulating clearly the three topics of philosophy:—What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? These are the problems of metaphysics, ethics and religion. But without correlating these he keeps them in separate compartments. But in the Gita,

God is the supreme reality, the Source of all beings, and the Supreme Goal.

(9) The theory of Avatars: Kant accepts the Christian theory of incarnation, but gives a rational account of Jesus as the pattern of our moral life. But the Gita view accepts the theory in its historical and rational aspects and regards the Avatar as the descent of God into creation historically and mystically with a view to reclaim the sinner and restore righteousness and lead the cosmos to its divine destiny.

The Kantian theory clearly brings out the reality and primacy of the moral consciousness. Its profound analysis of the moral law and its dignity stands unmatched in the history of ethics. Neither metaphysics nor theology can explain away its uniqueness and take away from its absolute and intrinsic value. But from the synthetic point of view, the Gita ideal is more comprehensive and coherent and it does full justice to the three aspects of experience, metaphysical, moral and religious. It shows that God is the ultimate Ground of all existence, the Supreme Good, and the Supreme Goal. I can know Reality or God; I ought to do Good and I therefore hope for the eternal bliss of God. Thus the Gita provides the answer to the Kantian quest and harmonises the problems of pure and practical reason.

Freedom.

By

PROF. S. G. SATHE.

T. H. Green sees the difference between the Absolute Self which he calls 'Absolute or Perfect Consciousness' and the individual or the limited self which he calls 'human Consciousness'. So far he is one with the Vedanta doctrine about the difference between Paramatman and Jivatman. But he holds that the human consciousness is gradually growing or realising itself as the Perfect Consciousness. This would imply that the finite is related to the infinite in time i. e. that the finite would become the infinite provided ample temporal scope is given to it. He fails to see that in this way the infinite loses its real character as infinite. It is this mistake that accounts for his unsatisfactory treatment of the problem of 'Freedom'. No doubt he seems hazily to see that there is no sense in talking of man as a free agent so long as he is a finite being but he does not realise this point quite clearly and continues to treat of "Human Freedom". Really a limited and finite being is after all a part of the world in time and cannot be free. Green holds that the lower animals are not free because they have no self-consciousness and that Man is free because he has it.

Now in the first place we may ask whether there is such an impassable gulf between animal and human life as these assertions imply. Secondly, even though it is true that man is possessed of self-consciousness, he cannot on that account be declared to be really a free agent, so long as this self-consciousness is a consciousness of a self which is limited by and distinguished from other similar selves. It is proposed to be shown in this paper that Freedom is the peculia-

riety of the Absolute Self. Further since the Absolute Self cannot have anything which is to be accomplished and hence cannot be said to have "WILL" it is intended to be made clear that the Freedom that is attributable to the Absolute is certainly not the Freedom of the will. Green, on the contrary is out to vindicate the freedom of man as a WILL. The main strength of his argument lies in the fact which cannot be denied that man possesses self-consciousness. But it has already been indicated how even if this is allowed to be the peculiarity of man, it would be impossible to prove that it can help to substantiate the conclusion that man as a finite being and conditioned is free. If ever he rises above his conditions he ceases to be finite and then though free is not a man.

That Green's attempt to claim freedom of the will, to a finite being that man is, is vain becomes plain from the factor that he is evidently uncomfortable in his endeavour to belittle the factor of circumstances in the turn that a man's life gets, as compared with the other fact viz. character. He is trying his best to show that character is all in all and that circumstances are really created by character. Yet the reader cannot feel convinced by the argument. That circumstances help or hinder the formation of good character is a fact which it is difficult to overlook. That circumstances depend more on luck or chance is also undeniable.

Sidgwick has treated the question of Freedom in his methods of Ethics. Let us examine his position. He starts, by finding fault with Kant, who, he says, identifies freedom with rational conduct. Consequently irrational conduct according to Kant must be unfree conduct, the implication, obviously being that a man who is really free, will never choose any course of conduct which is irrational. If one does what is obviously irrational, one must be under the influence of ignorance, for no one can willingly choose what is evil. It

will readily be admitted that such an Ethical position is not different from the old Socratic dictum that Virtue is Knowledge. Virtue is the same as good conduct and Socrates identifies it with rational conduct, in the sense of conduct of a man who knows. A man who knows is bound to act rationally since what is irrational or evil can never be knowingly done. If evil is chosen, that is obviously because there is some ignorance at the root of the choice. What is really evil, appears through ignorance or infatuation to be good. Now a man labouring under ignorance or mistake is not himself. He is not himself till he knows exactly where he is, i.e. till there is full light of knowledge to guide him. If he acts through ignorance he is really not responsible for his action. He is, therefore, not himself i.e. not free. The conclusion is that all vice or wrong conduct is the conduct of an ignorant man i.e. of a man who is not free. Freedom therefore must be identical with rational behaviour. Sidgwick finds fault with this position of Kant, which it must now be clear is identical with that of Socrates. Sidgwick's ground is that there may be rational conduct which is the result of chance or even mistake. One may be right through mistake or it may be that one is compelled to do what is right though if left to oneself, one may not choose to do it. The obvious criticism of this objection on the part of Sidgwick is that conduct which is good by chance or through mistake, or through compulsion is certainly not conduct which possesses Ethical character and therefore need not be considered at all in the discussion of Ethical questions.

Another remark which Sidgwick makes in criticising Kant is still more unacceptable. It is that rational conduct though the result of deliberation may be found by the agent very irksome. Such conduct, Sidgwick holds, is not the natural conduct of the man, because it does not come spontaneously or freely. In such conduct, therefore, Sidgwick thinks the

man is not himself i. e. not free. If, however, such a view is accepted, the result would be that free men in the Sidgwickian sense would be of two kinds, viz, (1) those in whom Virtue is spontaneous i. e. results without struggle; and (2) those who do wrong or evil things spontaneously. The first type would deserve to be called divine, the second, beastly. Free beings, thus would be either gods or brutes. Such a conclusion will commend itself to no one. Virtue is generally taken to imply some struggle with the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil.

Sidgwick's own conclusion as the result of the whole discussion is that since rational action which he takes to be synonymous with virtuous action, is not and cannot be identical with free action, Ethical questions may be discussed without reference whatsoever to the problem of the Freedom of the WILL. Thus he holds that the libertarians and the Determinists may both scientifically discuss Ethical problems and agree as to these solutions, though they may actually differ about the answer to be given to the metaphysical problem whether man possesses freedom of the will.

Probably Sidgwick's disposal of the question of Freedom in this way will generally be pronounced as unsatisfactory especially by the libertarians. Yet the libertarians themselves are bound to feel that Kant's position is equally unsatisfactory. If you insist, after Kant, that no one is free unless he chooses to do what is right, the word freedom, it will be contended, loses its natural meaning. For all bad men will, in this way, have to be regarded as not free. But it may be urged that commonsense requires that if a man is free really he must have at least two alternative courses of action open to him. Otherwise while he will claim credit for good actions, he would escape responsibility for bad actions. If then such a position is unacceptable, free will must be regarded as Will that has the power of rejecting one of two given alternatives. Good action

is action deliberately chosen in spite of the alluring nature of the evil course and bad action, in the moral sense is action in which the appeal of the virtuous impulse is wilfully cast aside. Man as Will must mean a free agent in this sense ; otherwise i.e. if freedom is to be taken to mean the choice of only the good ; there is hardly any meaning in the use of the word choice or will. And yet the difficulty of conceiving the possibility of an open eyed choice of evil still remains. It cannot be got over unless we assume the unexplained existence of a bad will *ab initio*. It is attempted in this paper to show that all the difficulties connected with the problem of Freedom are due to making freedom an attribute of the Will, which it can never be.

The Socratico-Kantian position makes the distinction between Reason and Will non-existent. Men cannot, on that position be divided between the categories of good and bad, but between the class of the Knowing and that of the Ignorant. All moral distinctions vanish and give place to the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. If now in accordance with the Kantian position the word free is to be confined only to one who does what is right or if doing what is right is only possible to one who has true knowledge, freedom must obviously mean freedom from the bondage of ignorance. Freedom is not free will, but only clear or unobscured vision. It is light as opposed to darkness. Such would be the position of Socrates also. But let us see whether the actual teaching of Socrates is self-consistent and exactly in accordance with this conclusion. It is a convention with all Western writers on Ethics that morality or virtue is never complete. No action, however good morally is never completely so. Morality is an unending progress towards the ideal, which when reached, if reached at all, would transport a human being beyond the sphere of moral conduct. Virtue always implies a struggle and a victory. But the victory does not mean a final

exit of the element of evil or wrong from the field of action. Again, in another way also no virtuous action is even so far as it goes purely good. It always has some evil or disadvantage going along with it. For instance patriotism involves partiality to one's own countrymen as against foreigners. Charity is not altogether good, since it involves, as it always must, a kind of weakness in overlooking the faults of others. On the other hand strict justice involves punishment of the weak and erring and punishment is an Evil after all though it is a necessary evil. In short all morality is comparative, not absolute goodness. But so long as Evil is not absolutely eradicated, ignorance has not been, according to the Socratic principle, completely dispelled and there is no freedom in the sense of clear vision or true knowledge. All morality or virtue, we must conclude, involves more or less of ignorance and it follows that the so called man of virtue is still not a completely free being. It would seem to follow that morality and freedom are incompatible with one another. This is a legitimate deduction from the Socratic position. Those who accept the Socratic view cannot talk of the Freedom of the Will at all. It was hence perhaps that the modern problem of the Freedom of the Will had no existence for Socrates. We don't find it treated by Plato. Aristotle seemed to have come very near recognising the existence of the Will as a faculty distinct from Reason. But even *he* failed to make the distinction clear and after a brief struggle accepted the Socratic position that Virtue is Knowledge.

It can be shown now, in the light of the above discussion that this very tenet of Socrates is not thorough-going and therefore not quite consistent with his main position. By virtue Socrates meant good conduct which with him meant advantageous action. Now every action is directed towards some particular end. But when something is aimed at specially, other things are of course neglected. A man cannot aim

at everything at one and the same time. Perhaps he chooses for attention and effort, what is most advantageous under given circumstances. But after all 'most advantageous' implies comparison. Most advantageous means what is comparatively the most useful or profitable. But as already shown what is only comparatively good involves some evil and when there is Evil there must be according to the Socratic principle some ignorance as the cause of it. All human action and for the matter of that all action whatsoever must have this character. Action implies the attempt to achieve a particular end, involving the advantage or good of the agent. This involves double particularity. There is the particular end to the exclusion of other ends. Secondly the end is the good of the particular agent as distinguished from other agents. If it is seen that particularity is partiality and if it is also perceived that what is partial has evil implied in it, it follows that all particularity is the result of ignorance. The complete dispelling of ignorance would bring as its necessary consequence the banishment of all particularity and the cessation of particular ends and the distinction between particular interests. But with the cessation of particular Ends and consequently of particular interests, action at all would be unimaginable. In other words individuality would cease to exist. There would thus remain no possibility of Evil and as a corollary it would follow that ignorance would be completely removed ; i.e. there would be clear and unmitigated knowledge. The Soul would no longer be the individual soul, but the Absolute. The Self would be its true self, being no longer limited or bound by ignorance. When it is not bound it is free or liberated. But this freedom is not the freedom of the Will. The Will has no meaning in the freed condition of the Soul. The Will has always a reference to action, and involves individuality and can never be free. Freedom is an attribute of the Soul in its enlightened condition i.e. when it has true knowledge. The

conclusion to which we now come is that Knowledge is freedom or Freedom is knowledge which is different from the Socratic dictum 'Virtue is knowledge'.

The free or liberated Soul is the Absolute, The Brahman of the Advaita Philosophy. It is the realisation of the great utterance of the Upanishads "That thou art".

The unsatisfactoriness of the position of Green is that he is confounding Freedom in the sense of the Freedom of the Soul with the Freedom of the Will. He is confounding the Absolute self with the individual Self.

Free is opposed to bound as the Absolute is opposed to the related. Free is the Infinite as distinguished from the finite or the Limited. A free soul is Soul that has cast aside all limitations which ignorance imposes upon it. It is therefore above the conditions of desire, will and action. It cannot belong to the world, which is the result of ignorance and therefore is finite. A free soul has risen, as the result of knowledge, above its own individuality and has ceased to identify itself with any interest or interests. It has nothing to gain from worldly activities. It is neither pleased nor grieved by whatever happens in this world.

It would now seem to follow that in the controversy that goes on between the libertarians and the Determinists the latter who deny freedom to the Will are bound always to have the better of the argument. Every action must be determined by circumstances ; for whatever if finite must be limited and determined by other finite things and the Will is after all finite since Infinite Will is, it should now be perceived, an unmeaning expression because self contradictory expression. What the determinist however, fail to see, is that finiteness does not and cannot exhaust Reality or for the matter of that, that Finiteness is appearance and that Reality is Infinite. It is the want of this recognition that makes the position of the Determinist so unsatisfactory and unconvincing, to common

sense. The doctrine of the libertarians is attractive but difficult to be defended against the attacks of the Scientists. It is in this difficulty that the doctrine of Karma, accepted by all systems of Indian Philosophy, comes to the rescue. According to that Doctrine, so long as a man is a Will, i.e. an individual soul, his life is necessarily determined by the inexorable law of Karma and its consequences. It is, when the light of Knowledge dispells the darkness of the Soul that It becomes free and is identified with the Absolute.

Religion and Human Relations

By

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Religion arises out of man's normal relations to his environment. The distinctive feature of religious experience is that man creates an ideal world, which resolves the conflicts or stresses of his normal mental life and evolution. He thus develops a certain permanent attitude towards the physical and the social environment. Such a permanent attitude comes of a more or less complete fusion of his impulses, and this makes his adjustment to nature and to Society easier, more stable and effective.¹ Man's worship is characterised by a more or less complete blinding of a large number of impulses and interests in a religious object or image. But tenor of worship is determined by a dominant impulse. Indeed, the shifting character of the mental pattern is the basis of the variety of symbols which the individual creates and recreates as his worship becomes deeper and profounder. This is met with in the case of mystics in every religion who achieve the emptying of their sub-conscious. Normally the fulfilment of such impulses as are denied in the physical and human situation, is sought in the plane of ideas, images and symbols. Thus religious symbols like dreams, and reveries bear the impress of an individual's psychic make-up and privation of his dominant impulses and interests brought about either by himself or in the course of circumstances. In the case of primitive man the constant fear of life and dread of a hostile environment are the fertile ground of conception of powers

1. See articles by the writer :—*Religious Experience*, *The Sociological Review*, April 1930, and *Roots of Religion, Social Forces*, Vol. VIII p. 10.

which are terrible and yet in which he finds solace of mind. Indeed, the advance from savagery to civilization, from insecurity to security of life has been accompanied by an emphasis of the beneficent attributes of the divinity. Thus the belief in God's Providence did not arise in religion before society attained a good deal of stability.

During the last Great War there have been such infliction of acute suffering and such widespread fear that man's instinct of self-preservation rebelled against the prevailing concept of a beneficent divinity, and varied and heart-rending were the cries of despair against a satanic world and an ungodly god. H. G. Wells thus speaks through Mr. Britling "Why, if I thought there was an omnipotent God who looked down on battles and deaths and all the waste and horror of this war—able to prevent these things—doing them to amuse himself—I would spit in his empty face". The following is not cynicism but an outburst of sincere religious anguish :—

"God is helpless to prevent war, or else He wills it and approves of it. There is the alternative. You pay your money and you take your choice. If God wills war, then I am morally mad and life has no meaning. I hate war, and if God wills it, I hate God, and I am a better man for hating him ; that is the pass it brings me to. In that case the first and great commandment is "Thou shalt hate the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and Him only shalt thou detest and despise".² " We thus see how the denial of the impulse of self-preservation and constant fear and anxiety in the trenches here have shorn God of that universal attribute of beneficence with which society has endowed Him in the course of age-long devotion.

Gregariousness is another elemental drive. No age can bear comparison with this in the emphasis of the gregarious disposition in human nature. The individual is now nothing

2. *Quoted in Otto's Things and ideals.* p. 252.

if displaced from his group. The process of standardisation is levelling down all individual idiosyncracies under the steam-roller of uniformity. Individual ideas and feelings today are more determined by the social environment than ever before. Thus a social conception of religion has now emerged and God is regarded as equivalent to the group-spirit. Indeed, the conception of God as wholly immanent in human life here and now and as having no other existence than as guiding principles of social life is quite in keeping with the exaggerated emphasis of gregariousness in the present age.

Sex is an urge which is the most plastic thing in man's nature and the most all-determining for his career. Recent studies in the physiology and psychology of sex have gone to show that sexual desires and emotions have a basis much under than the sex organs proper, that these are present both in generalised as well as specific forms, and that these may be stimulated by ideas and images as well as by sensations. Stanley Hall remarks:—'Almost anything or any act may become an erotic fetish, and the calentures of love are seen not merely, in the best amorous literature but in the passionate impulsion of mystics to be completely absorbed in the Divine nature. Very much of that which makes or mars life is due to whether man's affections grovel or elimb, and no psychologist can fail to see that love of God and the libido have the same mechanisms, and that religious and sex normality and abnormality are very closely connected. 'Love rules the camp, the court, the grove ; for love is God and God is love'."

The relation between sex, and art and religion is, indeed, most intimate. Sex attraction easily leads to aesthetic contemplation and the latter is but one phase of religious experience. The whole process will be evident from the following analysis of Edward Carpenter:—

"The youth sees the girl; it may be a chance face, a chance outline amidst the most banal surroundings. But it gives the

cue. There is a memory, a confused reminiscence. The mortal figure without penetrates to the immortal figure within—and there arises into consciousness a shining form, glorious, not belonging to this world, but vibrating with the age-long life of humanity, and a memory of a thousand love dreams. The waking of this vision intoxicates the man; it glows and burns within him; a goddess (it may be Venus herself) stands in the sacred place of his temple; a sense of awe-struck splendour fills him and the world is changed."

Many cults and religious practices have utilised man's affections and directed them to the pursuit of God. The sex-urge is all-compelling and all-regulating and thus when it is educated for religion we have most remarkable instances of religious ecstacy and aesthetic comprehension of the universe woven together in a delicate human-divine symbolism. Thus the same urge which shows itself in brutal lust and aberrations without number, fashions when it is properly organised, a life in which the senses become so many roads to the realisation of God as the essence of Beauty. Religion then becomes as spontaneous and infinite in its joys as love itself.

For the Sufis, the mystic sect of Islam, earthly affection is a bridge leading to God. "Muhabbat is verily a link of the links of concord that bindeth the lover to the beloved; is an attraction of the attractions of the beloved, that draweth to himself the lover and, to the degree that him to himself it draweth, effaceth something of his existence so that, first, from him it seizeth all his qualities; and then snatcheth into the grasp of God, his zat."³ The senses are here the means of knowing Beauty which is the very essence of God. To know Beauty one must love. Thus the Sufi begins in the senses but does not end there. Unless one knows earthly

affection he cannot reach ideal love; but mere earthly love is barren. "Our senses barren are; they come from barren soil".

In Sufi mysticism earthly love is not disregarded but blossoms forth through the cult of Beauty into Divine love. With the sublimations of the desires and emotions of sex a rich and tender symbolism develops which indicates that the mind has moved far away from the pleasures of the senses. "Wine, the torch and beauty are epiphanies of truth. The wine-house is the fountain of meditation. Wine is the rapture that maketh the Sufi lose himself at the manifestation of the Beloved. By it, that one swalloweth at one draught the cup, the wine-house, the saki and the wine-drinker, and yet open remaineth his mouth."⁴

No such symbolism characterises the strange cult in Bengal known as *Sahaja* an offshoot of Bajrajan Buddhism, which either came to Eastern India through Nepal or was developed in India by the Buddhist monks and nuns when they lived a freer life in the Sanghas. It disregards altogether idolatry as well as Brahminism and cult of sacrifice, emphasises a course of psycho-physiological discipline of the mind. It recommends worship of man and woman, and frankly recognises the adoration of the opposite sex as the road to mental illumination and ultimately Salvation. *Sahaja* at its best implies that there is neither desire nor non-desire, neither wish nor repression. Everything is spontaneous in nature, so there should be spontaneity in human relations and experience. Thus sexual mysticism, outside the marital relation, and accompanied by religious preparation and discipline has given us an inspiring vision of the dignity and majesty of human relations through a realisation of the divine perfection and infinity of the human lover and beloved. ⁵

4. *The Awarifu-L-Maarif*, Introduction, p. 13.

5. See Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Siva and the Orient. Chapter on Sahaja*.

A religion of love and beauty and of passionless spontaneous sex can only survive in old civilizations where a host of taboos and injunctions, ballads, folk-songs, and rituals inculcate the romance and spirituality of sex and make it more a steady outpouring of minds than a violent intoxicating experience. Races and peoples differ in their attitude towards sex and much of this difference is due to control exercised by acquired habits and customs and the bending and training of this primordial impulse through ages. In the East, substitution, sublimation and diversion have been the method in the discipline of the desires and the feelings of sex and we have reaped a rich harvest of symbolism, religious rite and ritual, which serve the purposes of divesting the sexual relationship of much of its explosive, disintegrating character. Indeed, the racial education in sex, is responsible for the fact that there is no prudishness about sex in eastern society. Sex-symbolism and the apparent worship of the sex-organs or of their representations abound in eastern religions but in all these we see not an emphasis of sex but rather an attempt to relate religion to the whole life of man, to all his desires and emotions including the sex desire and emotion. We know how in the case of many of the Christian mystics, the thwarting of the sex-urge manifested itself in their divine love ecstasies and supremely delightful 'love assaults of God.' * A denial of the satisfaction of intimate companionship with the persons they loved was amply compensated by the constant intimacy and caresses from the God of their devotions. Religion as we have seen, has its roots in a fusion of all the urges of man. Now if a dominant impulse like sex be baulked or inhibited, there is an undue strain not merely on the sex life but on the whole life of the individual. Thus religion saturated with the sublimation and symbolism of sex comes in to restore sanity and balance; the God of Love and Beauty fulfils all man's fundamental impulses and interests

6. See Leuba, *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*.

and brings about such co-ordination in his mental life that joy as well as knowledge come easily. Love becomes the eternal expression of infinite beauty. The human lover becomes timeless in his sense of joy and beauty, is transported beyond the limits of space and time and foretastes the life immortal. Sex-desires vary but mildly amongst different individuals, though they differ much in respect to its satisfaction either in generalised or in specific form. The average man is seldom without a generalised sex desire during most of his life as well as a specific sex desire focussed towards a particular woman unless there be mental or physical defect or serious malady. A generalised desire of a sexual sort persists along with desire in a highly specific form even though the latter might receive adequate satisfaction and serves as the emotional basis of appreciation and cultivation of art, forms of literature, music etc. The generalised, personal and specific desires of sex blend with one another through many stages and in a normal individual the liability to sex desires of different types is constantly present.' Not merely is sex desire constantly operative and powerful but its satisfaction represents the reaction of the whole being, an integration of the entire organisation of the mind which is as marked as that which is physiologically effected by the sex-hormones. Thus it is natural that love becomes correlated with the mystical consciousness which expresses man's emotional relationship to the world conceived as a whole. Love like religion is the total reaction on life on a lower phase of consciousness and its harp-string thus vibrates in peculiar unison with that of religion. The sense of individual relationship which dawns with the arousing of sex ultimately flowers into the perception of Beauty; and to sex we owe the faint and partial beginnings of the human aspect of religion, and man's communion with and union with God as Love and Beauty. It is for this reason that the religion of

Love and Beauty must not be dismissed as fit only for over-sexed or sexually baffled persons. The normal person has within him a primordial urge which in its fluctuations and climaxes might, when properly disciplined and organised, be a source not of distress and strain but of joy and illumination. Sex degrades or illuminates the whole man. As it elevates, we have some of man's most intense joys, some of his most sublime experiences of Truth. No doubt a religion which is rooted in God as Love elicits a ceaseless experimentation of love between man and fellow-man and reveals the fullness of Beauty both in the life of Nature and humanity.

The psychological Basis of personal Identity.

(A Symposium.)

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Man has ever been an enigma not only to others but also to himself and so from time immemorial, ever since man could philosophise, thinkers in Greece, India and other civilised countries of ancient times have directed men's attention to the supreme problem of self-study. The religious and metaphysical interests of former days do not inspire the psychologists now a days as a class ; but the problem persists and the fascinating but difficult study of personality never shows any lack of enthusiastic and painstaking explorers of the dark chambers of the human mind. But the determinants of that personality are so many that without an adequate knowledge of those conditions, which is possible only to an omniscient mind, it is a vain attempt to understand its depths and all that we do is to form an idea that is sufficient for our practical needs. "To define a man's personality adequately", as Gordon points out, "We must describe his parentage and race, his bodily structure, his intellectual attainments, his emotional reactions, his practical achievement, and all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune that have fallen upon him from birth to death". How many of us possess that capacity ?

But the problem of the psychological basis of personal identity is a much simpler problem than that of personality. Here we are not concerned with those extra-psychological factors which are treated in genetics and endocrinology, embryology and characterology, nor even with the knowledge that is formed by others to deal with a particular individual socially. The problem is not by what bodily or mental peculiarity a man is known or judged by others but what knowledge he possesses of

himself as a persistent entity, undergoing a bewildering variety of experiences and yet linking them all up by a sense of common ownership. The sense of personal continuity is deeper than self-consciousness for even when the latter is present the former may not exist as happens when each secondary personality appropriates its own experiences to itself and yet the sense of continuity between the different selves is entirely lost. It is certainly deeper than mere personality for all secondary personalities in their moments of conscious behaviour display personality-traits even though the sense of identity and even of personality may be entirely lost to the subject himself. It must be remembered that while personality may change in course of time as the individual matures and assumes new attitudes and acquires new experiences, his sense of personal identity remains unaltered. Hume made capital out of the fact that "if any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives". We no longer fight for the unity and simplicity of the self in the sense in which rational psychologists and theologians defining the immortality of the soul understood it. We believe, on the contrary, that the self lives in its activities and changing aspects and the sense of personal identity is a relation that we establish among our changing experiences, impulses and emotions. We claim to be continuous with our past selves and are treated as such by the world at large. Time as the principle of change does not affect our personal consciousness even though it changes our personality. In so far, then, as we claim persistence through time we are not in it but it is in us, for it is as our past, and our present, and our future that time reveals to us its existence. The *Me* alters but the *I* retains its position as an abiding point of reference in the midst of all change—an unchanging witness (the *nitya saksi* of Indian philosophy) of its protean manifestations in time.

Psychology is not competent to judge the relative merits of the metaphysical soul-substance and the epistemological unity of apperception ; but at every step it feels that a reference to self is indispensable and in this view both the metaphysical Ward and the anti-metaphysical James agree. James takes care to point out that even though to give an accurate account of personal consciousness is the most difficult of philosophic tasks, yet "it seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned*"; and he goes so far as to assert that not only secondary personalities possess their own sense of continuity but even in hysteric catalepsy thought tends to assume the form of personal consciousness and develop a memory. In Psychology we are confronted with the task of ascertaining how personality develops in reliance upon psychical factors and also how in spite of undoubted changes that the personality undergoes the normal mind is able to relate the successive states in such a way as to ascribe them to a single principle. Incidentally it has to discuss what mental function more than any other is the basis of psychic integration and also why it is possible in the case of dissociation to tenant a single organism with a number of distinct personalities and thus to lose that sense of continuity on which personal identity depends.

While we are indebted to the British empiricists for attacking the problem from the correct psychological angle, much of their discussion has now only an antiquarian interest. No one, for instance, would care to discuss in psychology the distinction between the identity of substance and the identity of personality as has been done in Locke, although all would agree with him that "it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of substances"

and that accordingly if it were possible for the same system of thought to tenant different bodies with a sense of continuity, popular view might not agree to call the different bodies the same man and yet the philosopher would be justified in identifying them psychically. The body is only a mark of identification by others, but the sense of continuity is the only basis of one's own personal identification.

The possibility of one soul getting into many bodies is no longer a live question except in mediumistic phenomena and religions believing in transmigration. But in recent years the reverse problem has come more and more to the front, namely, how in a single body many souls seem to dwell. In double and multiple personalities there is a disintegration of the unitary self, and in its place appear a plurality of selves with incompatible character-components and the sense of continuity utterly lost. In the physical world the transformation of one kind of energy into another according to strict causal law may affect the appearance but is supposed not to endanger the identity of the original energy ; but in the psychical realm our main concern is not the conservation of the stuff of experience but its peculiar architecture or configuration. Hence even if the law of psychical causality enables us to explain adequately the transformations and abnormalities of personality and we are satisfied that every bizarre fancy has its appropriate cause, the sense of personal ownership may fail to envisage the totality of psychic manifestations in a single organism and the kingdom of mind may be divided among competing rivals that absorb according to their power and opportunity a greater or less portion of the total personality and attain dominance under favourable circumstances. These rivals are very seldom on friendly terms and sometimes they do not have even a nodding acquaintance with one another.

What then is present in a well knit personality that marks it off from such a disintegrated mental realm ? Before we

answer that question let us bring out the implications of the term 'personal identity' which is the subject of this paper. First of all, there is present in all sense of personal continuance a consciousness of being a person who is embodied in a living body. Secondly, there is the sense of continuity in the midst of a ceaseless change of states. The sense of embodiment is not really a necessary constituent if the etymological significance of the term is strictly adhered to ; but as a matter of experience it is found that the reference to the body is almost invariably present and anything affecting the bodily sense has a profound influence upon the resulting sense of personal identity. And this is natural, for after all man is an embodied being and any personality sense that he may develop cannot avoid a reference to the tenement of his psychic principle. But the difficulty arises when we try to determine the exact contribution of the body to the development of the sense of identity.

Thus it has been maintained that at the base of our sense of personal identity lies that more or less permanent group of sensations which we call our bodily feeling. Wundt had cautiously referred to the origin of self-consciousness in the mass of organic sensations that on account of their indistinguishable character form an abiding sensibility on which the sense of persistence might be easily based. James too had said that the appropriations of the passing states of consciousness are to the most intimately felt part of their object, the body, and the central adjustments in the head. *"These are the real nucleus of our personal identity, and it is their actual existence, realised as a solid present fact, which makes us say 'as sure as I exist, those past facts were part of myself'".* But it was left to Janet and more particularly to Ribot to emphasise the importance of coenaesthesia in the sense of personal identity. In his two monographs, namely, *Diseases of Memory* and *Diseases of Personality*, Ribot develops at great

length the 'organic consciousness' theory of the origin of personality sense. He cites cases to show how with a change in the bodily feeling the sense of personal identity is also materially altered. Thus one person fancies that his body is made of wood, glass, stone, butter, etc. ; another fancies that he no longer exists ; a third searches for his body below the bed-sheets ; a fourth thought that the Devil had taken away his body. Then there is the celebrated Lambert case, reported by Foville, in which a soldier who was seriously wounded at the battle of Austerlitz retains the memory of his past experiences but imagines that he had died at that battle, believes that his present self is a mere machine made in the imitation of Lambert who was dead, and talks of himself not as 'I' but as 'that thing'. In all such cases the explanation has been sought in the radical alteration of the organic sensations, resulting from anaesthesia of this or that part. According to the well known principle of Janet that anaesthesia carries with it, loss of organic sensibility inhibits certain memories and cuts off the continuity of personality sense. In such cases of 'depersonalisation', as Ward calls it, the failure of the usual group of organic sensations is at the root, although opinion is divided as to whether the failure is due to the defect of working in the endocrine system or to the altered working of the autonomic system. It has been urged that without some alteration in the character of the organic sensations there can be no material alteration of personality and no discontinuity of the personal sense.

When it is remembered how frequently a discontinuity in the sense of personal identity is accompanied by disturbances of sensibility, how even in normal cases deep changes in organic outfit and operation bring about a change in character and personality at different ages and how truly clinical materials confirm Janet's law about the relation between anaesthesia and amnesia, one cannot very well dispute the

truth of Ribot's observations. What, however, is not clear is why the gradual alteration of the organic sensibility in course of ontogenetic development should not affect the sense of continuity; for it is really immaterial whether the change is sudden or gradual,—as soon as sufficient change would occur there ought to be an amnesia and loss of appropriation of at least such period of life as had a radically different organic consciousness. On the contrary, nothing is so tenacious as an old man's memory of his childhood experiences although the organic consciousnesses of these two periods are the most widely divergent in their composition. Besides, it cannot be proved that in all cases of personal discontinuity there is a radical alteration of coenaesthesia—the transition from one personality to another in some abnormal cases is so quick (although in the majority of them a kind of sleep or stupor intervenes) that the supposition of a sudden change of coenaesthesia seems a little bit strained. In higher forms of personal identity the organic factor plays a minor part and the reference to the body is almost absent and without assuming at least additional factors the phenomenon cannot be entirely explained. But the most serious objection is that the organic sense theory is really an attempt to meet the Humain demand of an unchanging experience as an explanation of personal identity with the help of Leibnitz's doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. It takes for granted, as can be seen in James's writings, that unbroken continuity and imperceptible difference are sufficient by themselves to explain the sense of sameness and the experiences able to satisfy those two conditions are bodily feelings.

Does Memory then supply the necessary psychological basis? Even if a sensation cannot be kept unaltered for two moments together, the memory of it may last for life under favourable conditions and enable us to feel that we are continuous with our own past. After temporary lapses sentience

in sleep we take up the thread of consciousness exactly where we left it and even in dreams we manipulate our old fancies in curious ways. Thus sometimes with recognition and sometimes without it we are turning again and again to our past life for materials of thought and building up the life of imagination which is so distinctive of the human mind. Some of these past thoughts come with a sense of past ownership—a phenomenon that characterises not only the revivals of a normal mind but also such abnormal conditions as hypnotism and even alcoholism in certain subjects. The operation of the mnemonic factor, the reactivation of neurograms, and such hypothesis have been invoked to explain the phenomenon; but what differentiates revival in human mind from animal learning is the presence of what has been called by Hoffding 'free idea' or mental imagery, accompanied in some cases by the feeling that it has been experienced in that form before, i.e. a sense of recognition. It would be difficult to establish that the entire past is conserved and can be revived under proper conditions; even if it can be, it is not so revived except under necessity (or under certain inexplicable physiological conditions); and when it is actually revived, all the details of the original presentation are not called up but a selection (conscious or unconscious) is made of the available materials. It is evident, therefore, that when Memory is put forward as the basis of continuity it is not meant that every bit of past experience must be retained and actually revived before we can claim personal continuance. On the basis of what we are able to revive and remember we infer that the forgotten experiences were also parts of our own personality according to the principle of colligation as was done by Kepler in respect of the orbit of Mars with this difference, however, that he did not observe every point of the orbit and we felt every one of the now forgotten experiences.

There is no doubt that there is substantial truth in the

contention that personal identity is an affair of memory provided it is made clear that by memory is meant not mere revival but a sense of recognition. But the difficulty begins to pop its head when we enquire about the principle that appropriates the past to itself. In normal minds the entire past is recognised by a unitary self as belonging to itself; but in double and multiple personalities the most noticeable characteristic is the breach in the continuity of the memory series. There are lesser integrations in the psyche that instead of being unified into an organic whole prefer to keep their own individuality intact and refuse to have any commerce of any kind with other integrations. The greater the independence of these different psychic constellations the looser is the mental integration; in extreme cases the organisation of these different constellations may be so far lost that one group does not recognise the other groups. If instead of tenantry the same body these psychic constellations had got into different organisms and if it had not been possible to establish sometimes points of contact between these integrations by an elaborate technique, it would not have mattered in the least if these groups of thought had been called different persons. But as very often these integrations are complementary to one another and fractionate the entire psyche into its constituent tendencies and memories, no such demarcation is possible and we are obliged to consider one of them as normal and the rest as aberrations of the normal personality. In this respect there is not much difference between neurosis and dissociated personality: each has its origin in some unconscious protest against the conscious self. It would be incorrect to say however that at all times the normal psyche is a loose federation of lesser integrations of ideas, tendencies and emotions and that they are held together into the semblance of a unity by the tact or duress of a dominant monad or a super-ego. Just as a cankerous growth in the body shows the possibility

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of a group of cells getting out of control although the body is at all times an organised system, so also in the mind the psychic cancer shows the limitations of central control but does not establish the virtual independence at all times of different psychic constellations. What we have said above about the independence of psychic constellations is therefore to be understood as a mode of speech for easy understanding and not as an exact description of facts. Thus even in such well-known dissociation as hypnotism where the subject is willing to believe himself to be what the hypnotiser says he is, there is a limit beyond which suggestion cannot go, for instance, a grossly immoral suggestion to a good man under hypnotism will not be carried out and the sublated goodness will assert itself by producing a hysteric fit in the hypnotic state and making the subject unconscious and incapable of receiving further suggestion of that type. There is a limit beyond which the colonial conception of personality is not to be pushed: because a plant or even a lumbriculus can be cut into many parts and out of each parts a new plant or lumbriculus can grow, who would assert that the plant or the lumbriculus did not have a unitary life at any time?

But let us resume. If we admit, as we must, that each personality keeps a record of its own experiences and that in each organism it is possible to have more than one such personality, either spontaneous or induced artificially, what is it that determines the grouping or the sense of continuity in each? The most obvious answer is that it is memory that knits certain experiences together into a single constellation or organisation and that personal identity is a product of the operation of memory alone. The classical treatment of this doctrine is to be found in the pages of Locke and Hume. Says Locke, "Could we suppose any spirit' wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness of past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all

the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity; any more than that of any particle of matter does". Hume also points out how "memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions" and how, in the production of the sense of identity regarding anything, unbroken continuity, indiscernible difference, subservience to a common end and a relation of causation among the various parts all have a share. "As a memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we not memory, we never should have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitutes our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of causation from memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed". Dr Mitchell endorses Hume's view when he says that "it is on the continuity of memory that the feeling of personal identity is based".

Both positive and negative arguments may be adduced to prove that the "memory hypothesis" is based on a foundation of solid facts. That the normal mind should fail to establish its identity with such abnormal conditions, to take Morton Prince's seriation, as intoxication, trance, fugue, hypnosis, delirium, sleep, multiple personality, etc. because no memory of the mental states under those conditions persists in normal mind negatively proves that memory is the most important factor in psychical unity. That we should fail to recognise a portion of our past and yet claim continuance therewith is a contradiction in terms. In the majority of cases there is not only failure of recognition but failure of revival as well a con-

tingency that might indeed happen in normal consciousness also but there only practical means are lacking to call forgotten experiences back to the mind and there is no insurmountable barrier against recovery as in respect of the experiences of abnormal conditions. Hypnotic condition and normal personality, alternating and multiple personalities are reciprocally amnesic and the self-consciousness that each condition evinces is distinct from the self-consciousness of the rest. But if personal identity means stamping the entire series of conscious states in an organism by a sense of common ownership, these independent psychic formations can hardly be called parts of the same self. Each subordinate psychic structure develops its own memory and, even when interrupted by other structures, links itself on to its past manifestations when reinstated and forms a more or less independent personality. Its value depends upon its adaptability to social conditions to which ultimately all personalities have to react. The intense pre-occupation of the hysteric, the stuporous condition of the hypnotised and his subjection to an alien will, the half-awake condition of the somnambulist, the inco-ordination of thought and action in the alcoholic and the passive condition of the medium are all unfavourable for the development of a socially useful personality and exhibit secondary memory-formations that are interesting but not useful. As compared with them, alternating personalities and multiple personalities possess a sense of personal identity that is socially valuable for each such personality can retain or acquire a power of adjustment to social conditions and therefore escape notice at first. Only in exceptional cases does a mediumistic personality reveal its power of adjustment, as in the Watseka Wonder case where there is a preternatural identification of one personality with a dead individual without the usual stupor—a phenomenon which superstition would call spirit possession and Indian religious belief would call reincarnation with reminiscence,—

made mysterious by the presence of the memories of the dead person. This phenomenon is closely related to the other curious experience known as false recognition, pseudo-memory or *deja vu* in which there is recognition without previous experience with the effect that the personality is stretched beyond its legitimate limits solely on the ground that memory is present. This constitutes the positive proof of the memory hypothesis according to which memory and personal identity go together in presence and absence both. And so, as Prof. Dawes Hicks observes, "if an individual subject tries to determine by introspection what it is that constitutes the continuity which he ascribes to his inner life, surely the first thing discerned by him will be that the capacity of retaining and reviving "the contents of previous states of consciousness lies at its very base".

But if the strength of the memory hypothesis lies in the number of its upholders and its apparent logic, its difficulties are not small. Even if it be admitted that all cases of personal identity are cases of conscious memory, it is not true that all cases of conscious memory are cases of personal identity. We have inserted the word 'conscious' advisedly for it is seldom contended that unconscious memories or engrams due to mnemic influences unless they are reactivated, have any bearing upon the sense of personal continuance, favourable or otherwise. Or when it is urged that "the hysteric suffers mostly from reminiscences", it is not contended that the somatic conversions or symbolic bodily movements are continuous with the original experiences of the individual concerned. Even in normal life we are hardly able to establish connection with many habits and dispositions of which the conscious beginning has been entirely forgotten. But the question is whether even when past experiences are revived they are necessarily recognised as parts of the same self.

Before we refer to such revivals in abnormal life it is well

to remember that even in normal life many past experiences saunter into our minds without producing the least idea that they were once acquired. Glaring plagiarism would occur without rousing the least suspicion that what is claimed to be a personal production is really a reminiscence. So just as in false recognition there is recognition without real revival so here there is revival without recognition; the effect is that in the former there is a sense of one's own past where it ought not to be and in the latter there is no sense of past experience where it ought to be. In abnormal cases where reciprocal amnesia or exclusive memory is absent and one personality has an inclusive memory in relation to another this phenomenon of revival of that past without a sense of personal identity is most clearly present. There is this difference between normal and abnormal conditions that whereas in the former the revived experience, failing to be affiliated with the only personality at work, slinks into the position of a mere figment of imagination, in the abnormal condition the remembered experiences are assigned to one personality or other. A reference to actual cases will elucidate the point.

Thus in recent years a number of cases have distinctly proved that although generally in dissociation the personalities are amnesic to one another it is not impossible that co-conscious personalities should be at work in such a fashion that one personality overlooks what is going on in the mind of other personalities. It knows their thoughts and gives an account of them but it does not appropriate them to itself, always assigning them to this personality or that and passing judgments on the character of each. Janet's Leonie (Mme.B.), Azam's Felida Y, Morton Prince's Miss Beauchamp, Dr Prince's Doris Fischer are cases in point. Persons interested in the theological bearing of these cases may profitably turn to the triangular fight of Dean Rashdall, Prof. Muirhead and Dr. Schiller in the pages of the Second Supplementary

Volume of the Aristotelian Society as to whether from these cases it is possible to establish the inclusion of individual minds in the mind of God. Our object is more modest : we wish to ascertain what light these cases throw on the contribution of memory to the sense of personal identity.

In Janet's case the second personality (Leontine) knows the experiences of the primary one (Leonie) while the third personality (Leonore) knows the experiences of both of them, so that the three personalities form, as it were, concentric spheres of knowledge. In Azam's case the secondary personality remembers not only her own experiences received in a previous occurrence but also the experiences of the normal life. In the Beauchamp and Doris cases four personalities sometimes jostled with one another with inclusive memories of different kinds and degrees. The most interesting feature of almost all these cases is that the least capacity of reading the thoughts of other personalities is located in the normal personality ; for obviously the existence of that capacity would mean linking up the abnormal manifestations with the primary self and a possible dissolution of the abnormality. Similar is the case with revivals under hypnosis of the forgotten experiences of the normal mind : there the reverse procedure is possible only by a kind of post-hypnotic suggestion but not normally. Even in reciprocally amnesic personalities the experiences of one life are sometimes recovered in the form of dreams in another life ; and sometimes hypnosis may restore memories of experiences of other personalities. But for our purpose the conscious inclusion of one personal self by another is of greater importance in discussing the problem of personal identity.

It is evident that if memory were the only condition of identity the inclusive personality would have absorbed the included personality within itself. But while it has as good a memory of the experience of the included personality as the

latter, it never confuses its own identity with that of any other personality: it always ascribes them to the proper owner of those experiences. Often there is conflict between these personalities and one personality would play pranks with another as, for example, the Sally personality did with the B. 1. personality in Miss Beauchamp case. The B. personality in the Maria case of Dr Cory threatens the A. personality with transference of her own sex-affect to her; in the Anna Winsor case the right arm protects the subject against the left as much as possible and keeps up rational behaviour when she was otherwise delirious. This arrange relation of the different personalities is found not only in multiple personality but have been found to be possible in hypnosis also. Morton Prince cites the case of a young man hypnotised by another who entirely independently of suggestion became by turn a gay Lothario, a malicious and sadistic Jack-the-Ripper and a melancholy Jacques and yet retained the memory of them all. In another case of his own a similar transition from sobriety to recklessness both in hypnotised and in waking condition without breach of continuous memory was observed.

It is evident, therefore, that some additional factor must operate to provide that solder between memory states which alone can link them up into a continuous personality. This cementing principle is provided by that aspect of our mental life which alone can supply that warmth and intimacy or animal warmth, as James would say, without which the experiences of life fail to produce a unified structure. What then is that aspect? Ribot, after propounding the question: Is it the memory that produces the feeling of identity, or the feeling of identity that constitutes the memory?, answers that both are effects, the causes of which must be sought in the organism. But after fighting the cause of coenæsthesia to the end he suddenly tells us that within the term 'organism' he includes its instincts, tendencies and desires. "As we

progress in our review of the facts", he observes, "one conclusion appears, as it were, of itself ; it is that *personality results from two fundamental factors, the constitution of the body with the tendencies and sentiments that manifest it, and the memory*". And again : "the ego is not solely a memory, a storehouse of recollections connected with the present, but an aggregate of instincts, tendencies, desires which are simply the activity of its innate and acquired constitution. To use expressions in vogue, we might say the memory is the static ego, the group of tendencies the dynamic ego". Rapidly in modern psychology the view is increasingly gaining in importance that, as Dr Cory puts it, "the solidarity of a life is due, primarily, to its emotional concord".

That an affective organisation of personality is a workable explanation can be supported by two lines of evidence. Thus it is found that neurosis has generally a traumatic origin and the many cases of dissociation begin equally in an emotional shock. The normal course of mental development receives a set-back and the new conditions demand a new adjustment. If this can be effected consciously, the traumatic experience leaves only a scar behind but does not disintegrate the personality. But when conscious adjustment becomes impossible--and that is generally the case with emotionally unstable persons--the disturbed self seeks relief in flight from the primary condition to which the traumatic experiences is so repelling and develops a secondary personality. Nothing is so common in such cases as the blotting out of all memories of the period of the greatest emotional stress following upon and including the shocking experience : in the process of abreaction this original emotion finds vent and the new adjustment restores the personality to its original condition to some extent. Now in the process of flight the personality may progress to any earlier stage which has been emotionally harmonious ; but extreme limits may also be reached and the tendency

towards infantile regression may take the individual, as it did in the cases of Mary Reynolds and Thomas Hanna (though not exactly for psychic reason in the latter case), to the moment of birth and all things learnt before may have to be acquired over again, although all the signs of mature intellect may soon assert themselves in the process of re-education.

The other noticeable fact is that when there is any alteration of personality, the affective constellation, whether as mood or as temperament or as sentiment, undergoes material alteration. In multiple personalities thus far studied the emotional equipment of each self is different from that of the rest to a greater or less extent, and in alternating personalities they are very often diametrically opposed. Reference may be made to the B O A case, the Maria case and the Miss Beauchamp case where the entire affective organisation varied from personality to personality and the character changed completely in consequence. Where the secondary personality is a creation of the unconscious wishes and desires which the normal personality is unable to realise on account of external or internal difficulties, the character of the secondary personality is determined by the principle of psychic compensation and is generally dominated by antagonistic impulses and emotions in relation to the primary self. A prudish old maid will assume the gaiety of a girl in a dissociated condition. Similarly, where there is an ambivalent attitude towards the same object, disruption of personality may effect an emotional dichotomy, as when a devout clergyman blasphemes in madness. Here the emotional life is a function of the new attitude and is thus far dependent upon a prior integration of thought and purpose. Similarly in co-conscious personalities, where a subliminal and a supraliminal self may exist side by side, the emotional ingredients may be entirely different. In manic-depressive insanity where the emotional integrations are entirely opposed there is reciprocal amnesia between the two conditions in many cases.

But another type of disintegration may also occur. Here the various sentiments may dissociate first, carrying with them their own constellation of ideas and ends. Even in normal life we remember one set of facts when we are sad and quite a different set when we are merry. The partiality of emotion in revival is a well known psychological phenomenon. It is likely that the dominant emotion supplies the nucleus of organisation in personality-formation and when the different emotion components somehow get dissociated they tear the personality asunder into different complexes with impervious walls of separation in between. Such must be the case in manic-depressive insanity. We purposely leave out the question of physiological cause as being outside the scope of this paper ; for it has been urged that toxic influence and physical violence may also bring about a division of memories and tendencies among different personalities and it is not improbable that in such cases the two hemispheres of the brain fail to act in unison as they ordinarily do. But we can certainly accept the view that the various instinctive urges which are also the foundations of our emotional life, as McDougall has well shown, gather in course of their working different memory-systems round about themselves and in the period of their most active manifestation colour all thoughts. A young man's thoughts turn to love and an old man's thoughts turn instinctually, if Freud is to be believed, to death. If in course of our ontogenetic development we leave successive memory-systems behind, it is because the nucleus of life has undergone alternation with the decay of one instinct and the rise of another, much in the same way as in the atomic structure the stability of the system is determined by the constitution of the nucleus. But as the instincts do not die out, their constellated systems can be unified only by a master sentiment, as has been urged by Cory and McDougall, and any slackness on the part of this sentiment will mean a withdrawal of central control and a

possible emergence of conflicting constellations of past times with their emotions and memories. Whether we are justified in drawing the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of monadic organisations in the same organism as McDougall does or as Wildon Carr is beginning to do we shall not presume to discuss here. But if there be any truth in the James Lange theory that an emotion is the mental counterpart of certain organic changes or in the ordinary theory that an emotion produces those changes or in Ribot's own theory that emotion and somatic expression are two aspects of one and the same thing we can understand why coenaesthesia should alter in psychio disintegration, for each personality is not only a new memory-system but also a different emotional system as well. How exactly different emotions sensitize different memories cannot be satisfactorily described, but that they do so is an indubitable fact of experience; in this respect their similarity with the action of certain poisons that act on special parts of the body is striking. The tendencies of emotions to perpetuate themselves by calling up memories favourable to their own continuance is one of the commonplaces of psychology.

There now remains only one more question to ask, namely, why in the face of the conflicting components of personality we still manage in the largest majority of cases to retain the sense of personal identity. The explanation is to be found in the very simple instinct of self-preservation which is common to the whole living world. In the case of man the self that is sought to be preserved is not the life of the body or the continuity of the race but the world of thoughts and feelings formed by continual social intercourse. James has ably shown the various extensions of the self made by man in course of his mental development. Without a social reference man is unthinkable; but it is this society that at once facilitates and inhibits development. Still we manage somehow to strike a normal balance of adjustment to existing conditions. But

when the conditions of life alter suddenly either objectively or subjectively by the maturation of certain latent tendencies the personality may be thrown out of gear and it may be impossible to retain the memories of the past and yet adjust oneself satisfactorily to the new situation. Where the hope of any adjustment is absent the result may be death from emotional shock or suicide, i. e., a complete abnegation of the will to live. But where a change in reaction makes continued living possible, merciful obliviscence intervenes and wipes out the past, thus enabling the individual to begin a new adjustment. In altering personalities reciprocal amnesia keeps the two memory-systems in insulated chambers. In cases where memories are retained they are not appropriated but simply overlooked from the outside.

This phenomenon may be utilised to form a picture of the destiny of the self if after the dissolution of the body there is persistence of any kind. The disembodied spirit is in such a novel situation that it is useless and impossible for it to revive all the memories of its embodied existence, especially if it be true that anaesthesia and amnesia go together and the body is the seat of emotional expression. If the spirits have a finer vesture, they will certainly lose some of the grosser emotions and together with their disappearance will also disappear some memories of mortal life. Similarly, if the ultimate destiny of the self be heaven or hell, the environmental stimuli and the body (if there be any) are such that a considerable portion of mortal experience will disappear. Heaven may be a place where the internal and external conditions render the revival of only euphoric memories possible just as in hell the torments of worldly existence are alone revivable. Heaven is what we are in our happiest moments and not a wholesale translation of the earthly personality. If here below it be possible to forget a considerable portion of our past life and yet feel ourselves the same, why should it be necessary to remember everything in

heaven or hell ? The true incomprehensibility, as J. S. Mill puts it, is not that we feel our identity but that "a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality".

Psychological Basis of Personal Identity.

II

By

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The problem of 'personal identity' may be approached from several points of view. We may enquire whether the identity maintains itself to the last moment of metaphysical analysis; we may ask if it is a necessary assumption in knowledge and in the sphere of action; and we may also try to understand whether it is essential to accept the notion of personal identity for the conservation of values, social aesthetic and religious. The point of view, however, from which the psychologist attempts to analyse the nature of personal identity and to estimate its significance for the course of mental life, is different from all of these.

The term 'personal identity' signifies, in the first place, the continuance of a group of relatively constant mental states and behaviour patterns for an appreciable period of time. The task of the psychologist is to explain how such a constant mental and behaviour pattern is *maintained*. Stated in this way, the historic solution of the question offered by James and Wundt appears to be significant and sufficient. They hold that since the organism maintains its unity for an appreciable duration in order that it may effectively adjust itself to its surroundings, a relatively constant group of organic and kinaesthetic sensations arise. It is these that sustain the ever-varying ideas and feelings and the changing patterns of motor-tendencies, in a condition of relative constancy. To these are added the experiences of the past, which may operate as conscious memories or as the unconscious *mneme*. And the image of the body or the pictorial self, serves as a

constant point of reference for all the subjective states. The self, conceived in this manner, serves as a *referent* for social purposes, as a source of activities and as a repository of experiences and motor tendencies. Its identity is maintained, so long as the body operates as an integral whole, the environment remains relatively the same and the process of adaption to it is continuous.

Apart from this type of unity and identity which I propose to designate as functional, there is said to be a *consciousness of identity* which is revealed in introspection and presumed for epistemic purposes. The fact of functional unity and identity can well be explained in terms of the body and the environment, as we have seen above, which remain for individual the same for all practical purposes through an appreciable stretch of time. Such an identity moreover could be sufficiently explained in most of the contexts, as arising from a *correlation* of the different psycho-physical factors, and its general nature defined and understood in a way similar to that in which the G-factor is accepted. But the consciousness of identity is neither a *construct* nor an hypothesis; it is regarded as a datum of immediate experience. And this datum, persisting as an accompaniment of, and inseparably involved in, every moment of conscious life, invests the human organism with a feeling of personal identity. This feeling which we shall call the self or the ego-feeling together with the *functional identity* defined above, constitutes the psychological basis of *personal identity*.

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We need not dwell further on the nature of functional identity which is recognised as a fact, so far as it goes, by most of the psychologists. It is the question of the ego-feeling which needs more elucidation. Certain aspects of the problem, however, should be briefly considered before we can approach the essential features.

(1) In the first place, we have to consider whether the consciousness in self-feeling is that of identity or of mere continuity. Whether these two are the same or belong to two orders of facts cannot be decided yet on the basis of psychological evidence. We may discuss it from the point of view of epistemology ; for instance we may try to discover if *continuity* does not rest on the basis of identity of self-consciousness. But it is mainly a logical issue which we do not propose to consider here. For the purpose of this paper, identity and continuity are equivalent.

(2) Secondly, 'identity' or 'continuity' need not imply a perpetual existence. The assumption that the self persists beyond the moment when it is experienced is a matter of inference. We are not concerned with the question of its validity, nor of the consequence which would ensue if the inference were valid or invalid.

(3) The self-feeling again, as we have already suggested may be regarded as a *construct* or as an hypothesis. It may also be regarded as an experienced fact. The former would lead us to a logical treatment and the latter to an introspective and empirical analysis. The formulation of hypotheses for explanation should naturally follow such an analysis. It is to this latter task that I propose to apply myself.

A number of laboratory investigations have been carried on during the last seven years for determining the conditions of arousal of what is known as self-feeling and for the introspective study of its nature. The conditions under which it *could best study* are (i) predicament (ii) choice and (iii) emotive tension as contrasted with emotive outburst. The experiments of Martin, Aveling and a number of others have clearly brought this out. Only some features of the nature of the experience could be brought out by introspective observation under these circumstances.

From the introspective data at our disposal we find that it is (1) in the first place regarded as peculiarly subjective experience. This is what is usually described as a feeling of intimacy or as a feeling of 'my-ness'

(2) Secondly, it is described as a *dynamic* experience. It is more like what we may call impulse-feelings than like ideas.

(3) As a consequence, it is more intimately related to imageless experiences such as attitudes, *Einstellgen Bewusstseinslagen* and emotive experiences than with experiences possessing a sense-imaginal content.

(4) Fourthly, it is apparently an experience which does not possess a sense-imaginal content. It is probably for this reason that it is described as a subjective or intimate experience. I am not sure that these do not represent the same fact in two different ways.

(5) Fifthly, the arousal of the self-feeling seems to be connected in some way with the arousal of sense-imaginal experiences. For, as a matter of general observation we find it to change with the change of the sense-imaginal contents.

(6) In the sixth place, the content of the ego-feeling changes from time to time. It possesses at one time a highly emotional tone and at other times a kinaesthetic or motor propensity. It is sometimes a point of awareness a referent, if you please as in the attentional states, and at others, it loses itself in the object attended.

(7) As a result of this, the self-feeling appears to be intermittent as an experience. It is not observable as a conscious fact at all points on the course of consciousness and cannot consequently be regarded as phenomenon which persists for all times. An hypothesis in regard to the self experience, then, should be sufficient for the explanation of these facts and of others that can readily be observed.

An interpretation of these facts has been attempted by a long line of Psychologists as Mr. Bhattacharya's excellent survey shows. I shall try to present an alternative hypothesis which in my opinion offers a better orientation of the facts.

(1) In the first place, (i) the subjective character of the experience suggests that the self-feeling is essentially *transitive* (as contrasted with the substantive) in character. The self-feeling is subjective, as the transitive experiences have been regarded as peculiarly subjective by a long line of thinkers. (ii) The fact that the self-experience does not possess sense-imaginal contents suggests the same view. For the transitive experiences would naturally be contentless. (iii) The *dynamic character* of the experience also suggests that the experience would be transitive in character. For, the dynamic experiences like those of activity, relating etc, are essentially *transitive* (iv) Lastly the fact that the self-feeling is affiliated to attitudes etc., also supports the view *that the basis of self-experience is transitive in nature*. If then we can further specify the conditions of these transitive experiences, a working theory of self-feeling may be found.

One of the conditions for the arousal of self-feeling is a situation of *predicament* and *choice*. This suggests that the transitive experience should be *intense* in order that the self-feeling may arise. The intensity of the self-feeling may be due to the unconscious *factors*; it may also arise from the character of the stimulus situation. As a matter of fact we find that *mental tension*, conscious and unconscious which arises in neurosis and in normal life, serves to engender an exaggerated feeling of self. In the period of puberty and the early youth when the organic tension is high, and the transitive experiences are many and intense, the self-feeling takes a definite shape.

The transitive experiences can only arise along with the substantive ones. Hence it is that the self-feeling is associated with the various types of sensory experiences and ideas. It is for this reason that the different orders of self-experience as described by James, are defined in terms of sensory and ideational processes. It is again for this reason that the development of the self-feeling is described in terms of ideas and and perceptions. But it would be an error to identify the self-feeling on the basis of this fact with an assemblage of ideas which serves to define it.

It is for this reason again that I cannot subscribe to the views of James and Wundt which Mr. Bhattacharya presents so well. For, the organic and kinaesthetic experiences are conditions of self-feeling only when they give rise to intensive transitive experiences ; they themselves are not constituents of the self-feeling. But these sensations are arising as they do out of the working of the vital organs of the body, *do* always give rise to transitive experiences. Hence it is that they have come to be regarded as constituents of the self-feeling. Again, since the transitive experiences vary in intensity within a wide range, we can speak of the degrees of self-feeling.

We may ask, however, about the basis of the transitive experiences themselves. Here I propose to suggest a certain physiological correlation which in my view offers a way out of many of the difficulties which other hypotheses have to face. One of the most important contributions of the Gestalt School is that they have suggested a correlation between certain psychic processes and the *'passage of nervous impulse'* between the different centres. Psychologists have hitherto attempted to correlate psychic processes with *Cellular Stimulation*. The Gestalt School has suggested that certain correlations of psychosis may be found with the *transition* of the impulse rather than with the cells. This is how experiences

like the Phi-phenomena are explained. The *transition of the impulse* corresponds to experiences which are dynamic, subjective and contentless. It is for this reason that such experiences as *Bewusstseinslage einstellung* as well as the configuration as a whole would be supposed to rest upon this physiological basis.

It has been said by some that the theory of the passage of impulse which Wertheimer has suggested is essentially hypothetical. But on that ground, we would not be entitled to accept even such a well-known theory as Hering's theory of Colour-vision. For, there also, the physiological conceptions are entirely hypothetical.

If then we apply the Gestalt Conceptions to the problem before us, we might say the physical basis of the transitive experiences rests upon the passage of impulse from centre to centre. The self-feeling arises when the transition of the impulse is rendered difficult through complexity, predicament and other conditions imposed by the environment and bodily-constitutions. It is the last factor again that would serve to explain the hypertrophy of the feeling through hereditary and other factors.

Self-feeling arises when a novel situation has to be faced. It would naturally be so, for, a new line of communication between centres and hence a new transitive experience is arising. The feeling disappears on habituation because, the predicament has disappeared. The self-feeling again disappears through bewilderment. This suggests the fact that when there is rapid irradiation, a more intensive experience of emotion supersedes the self-feeling. The self-feeling arises when the impulses spread through a number of routes not very well established and not too *numerous* for *adequate* motor response. How numerous it should be would depend upon the history and training of the individual.

I need not further elaborate the hypothesis. It can be illustrated by application to a large number of facts of daily occurrence. The theory would explain the subjective character, the contentlessness, the vectorial properties, and the dynamic nature of the self-experience. It would also explain the filiation of the self-experience with emotions, attitudes and impulses. It would further offer a more tenable interpretation of the facts on which James rests his view.

A theory of self-feeling in terms of transitive experiences, the physical basis of which consists in a transition of nervous impulses from centre to centre, would offer a more adequate solution of the facts of dissociation. The dissociated selves possess self-feelings peculiar to themselves. This could only happen if the *materials* for the constitution of the ego-experience pertain to each group of conscious states separately. Again, some of the dissociated groups contain experiences which belong to others. This phenomenon indicates that the difference between the dissociated selves is matter of organisation. The theory presented above seems to offer an adequate explanation of most of these facts.

The identity of persons then, rests on the organisation of mental states and behaviour patterns into relatively constant systems. With these psycho-motor complexes there arises a subjective ego-feeling. The manner in which mental states arise and motor responses set in, their quality and intensity, produce conditions which are sufficient for the arousal of the *experience* of personal identity. Any breakdown in the psycho-motor patterns or any appreciable change in the manner of their operation would profoundly disturb and alter the character of the unity and identity of the personality as a whole.

Psychological Basis of Personal Identity.

III

By

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The problem of personality, says, Mr. Bhattacharya, has occupied man's attention from times immemorial, but in spite of that it has remained an enigma. Personality, has a hereditary aspect both social as well as individual, a physiological aspect, a psychological aspect, and an environmental aspect. So complex and intricate a problem could hardly be within the competence of a single scholar however well equipped he may be. He consoles himself, however, with the thought that in this symposium we are not required to tackle the whole problem of personality, but deal only with its Psychological aspect, which he defines in the next paragraph, as—"What knowledge man possesses of himself as a persistent entity, undergoing a bewildering variety of experiences and yet linking them all up by a sense of common ownership".

I will not quarrel with him as to the legitimacy of isolating one aspect of a complex phenomenon, and thus essaying the task of explaining it. I will only urge that such a simplicity does not really save us from facing the complexities of the problem as a whole, but only postpones the evil for a later day. We may begin with the Psychological aspect of personality, but I do not see how we can explain it without bringing in all the other factors with which it is complicated. The problem of personality, as falling within the province of Philosophy is really one. There may be so many different aspects from which it may be approached, but each separate aspect cannot be finally dealt with in isolation from the rest, unless we are

prepared to maintain that this particular aspect or factor is the basic or ultimate factor, and all the others are derived from it.

While therefore we may for convenience agree that the philosopher may approach the problem from the Psychological point of view, I do not quite agree with him in the manner in which he specifies this method of approach. Let me quote his own words—(P.1.) “The problem is not by what bodily or mental peculiarity a man is known or judged by others, but what *Knowledge* he possesses of himself as a persistent entity”. In this sentence Mr. Bhattacharya is referring to two supposed facts (1) Man is a persistent entity. (2) He knows that he is such an entity. Now which of these constitutes the Psychological problem of Personality, or do they both require a Psychological explanation? According to the manner of Mr. Bhattacharya's statement, it would seem that it is only the latter problem viz. man's *knowledge* of his persistent identity that he is concerned with, but a careful study of his paper shows that it is really with the first problem viz. the fact that I *am* a persistent entity, with which he is mostly occupied. At any rate it seems to me very important to distinguish these two facts, if facts they be, from one another, for their mixing up will lead to hopeless entanglements. If we are explaining man's *knowledge* of his own identity, then we have got to undertake a genetic study, trying to trace the development of this belief. We have to bring out the various factors which have cooperated to establish the belief in personal identity, without necessarily having to deal with the *fact* of personal identity as such, for obviously the belief that I am a persistent entity can exist, without my actually being such an entity. To take a parallel case Hume explained why we believe in causality, though of course, he denied that any such fact as that of causal relationship actually existed.

To take another parallel case, many men and races have believed that human life persists after death. One Psychological problem connected with this would be to explain how this belief in Immortality arose, but the study of this question would not be at all relevant to the problem as to whether in point of fact, man is immortal or not. Thus the problem as to how the belief in personal identity arises, is quite a distinct problem and not to be confused with the other problem as to whether man is a person or not, and as to what the fact of his being a person implies, and how it is to be explained. In the course of what follows, I shall not in any way deal with man's *belief* in personal Identity, but shall confine my attention to the facts of Personal Identity alone, and shall consider how Psychology may best explain these facts.

When we ask ourselves what are the facts with regard to mental life, which have given rise to the conception of personal Identity, then the most obvious and striking fact which is referred to by most Psychologists, is what Mr. Bhattacharya calls the sense of common ownership which links up all my scattered and varied experiences into a unity. As subjectively experienced this is the "Warmth and intimacy" of which William James speaks, which characterises one's own experiences. When Peter wakes up after a night's sleep, on remembering the dinner he had eaten before going to bed, he recalls his own relish of it, with a warmth and intimacy, which the thought of the dinner which Paul, his twin brother had eaten at the same time, totally lacks. There is obviously some intimate link between my own experiences which on the one hand binds them internally into a unity, and at the same time marks them off from other's experiences, which however similar they may be to mine, remain always numerically separate from mine. This is what we refer to as the Psychological individuality, the Psychical Centre, to which the transitory states of consciousness are referred. Now we know

this directly and at first hand only with regard to our own consciousness. We find it corroborated with regard to other human beings from the account which they give us from their own introspection, and we infer it on general grounds with regard to animal mental life, in so far as that is characterised by sentience. This factor of *individuality* then, is a datum for Psychology. In its attempt to find facts of consciousness, it finds that every fact of consciousness it can find, is owned or possessed by some one, or in other words has a peculiar relationship with a particular group of other facts of consciousness viz. an intimacy or warmth, which it does not have towards other groups of mental facts. It is this fact we have to explain and I take it that all theories of personal identity are intended to explain this feature of our experience. Of these theories there are any number and it will be possible for me to mention only a few of the most obvious ones. In the first place the sense of unity and one-ness which characterises my consciousness may be explained by the fact, that all those experiences which I call my own, have a peculiar connection with my body, which the experiences of others do not possess. Crude as this theory may sound, I do not think it is so lightly to be set aside, for so far as the commonsense belief in personal Identity is concerned, it seems essentially to rest upon some such ideas. That living bodies constitute an organism possessing a peculiar unity which marks them off from other living bodies, and relates successive states of their being with one another, so that their past and present are organically continuous, seems to me an indubitable fact. If the organism which I call mine were to absorb certain Cholera germs today, then in the course of time, the germs will incubate and bring about that disorder which we call Cholera. But you cannot give cholera to me by swallowing the germs yourself. It seems to me quite reasonable to hold that the unity or individuality of the body is primary, the Unity of

consciousness is only something derived, because of its connection with bodily processes. There are, however, several serious objections urged against this view. In the first place it is urged that the Unity of the organism is by no means so intimate as it is supposed by commonsense to be. The unity of the body is only organised unity of millions of nerve structures which are loosely associated with one-another. It is further quite possible for some of these structures to become dissociated from one another, so that they can function relatively independently of one another. It is urged that if the unity of consciousness were only a unity of this kind, then it would be inadequate to explain the facts.

On the other hand Mr. Bhattacharya makes use of a converse argument to dispose of this hypothesis we are considering. He cites cases of multiple personality in which to all outward appearance, the organism retains its unity, but the Kingdom of the mind, as he puts it, is divided against itself. This objection, however, does not seem to me conclusive as we are not in a position to assert that in the case of multiple personality, dissociation of organic structures in the brain and nervous system has not taken place.

I am however not prepared to accept the hypothesis that the unity of consciousness is derived from the unity of the organism, and that for this reason, that no mental fact can be based upon or explained by a purely physical fact. I am prepared to adopt the view that individuality at the organic level is correlative with individuality at the Psychical level, but I am not prepared to accept that one is merely the product of the other. It would not be possible to give any reasons for this attitude in the present connection except merely to point to this fact, that by handing over the problem to Biology we do not solve the difficulty. 'Biology has no more a ready made theory of individuality than Psychology has, and nothing will be gained by ignoring one aspect of the matter. In my

opinion the problem of individuality has a dual aspect, a Biological and a Psychological aspect, but the final solution of it is the task of Philosophy, which will face the problem as a whole in the light of the data provided by both the Sciences.

Let us then return to the Psychological aspect of the matter, and see if we can account for the peculiar unity of consciousness by taking Psychological factors alone into consideration.

Here the first theory which we may consider, is the theory of the substantive self or Ego. Mr. Bhattacharya dismisses this by calling it Metaphysical or Epistemological. I am not sure whether in Mr. Bhattacharya's vocabulary these are terms of abuse or of praise. In any case, I take it, that in this symposium we are trying to be metaphysical and not merely empirical. We are attempting to find a satisfactory explanation for certain facts of consciousness. If the concept of the Self or Ego explains these facts, then let us by all means be metaphysical and examine it. Ward for example does maintain that the "Self" is a postulate for Psychology. That without assuming a "Self" *who* is conscious we cannot begin at all. Now if I understand his position, he maintains that the fact that conscious experiences are owned, constitute peculiar systems or unities, differentiated from each other, is to be explained by the fact, that they are the experiences of a self. A Self I take it is a Psychic entity quite different in character from a Psychoses. The Self is never experienced. It is what *has* experiences, what owns these, recognises them, is aware of them, but is not itself ever experienced. The Self is there before the experiences begin. It remains—continues, and in some sense is the same, whatever the nature and character of the experiences which it undergoes. My heart ache today, when I was parted from my beloved,*and my ecstacy years ago when I was in her delectable company, have a peculiar intimacy and unity, because the self which loved and enjoyed,

and the Self which now mourns are one and the same. Peter can live over again the enjoyment of his over-night's dinner because he is the same Peter who ate it last night.

Now my objection to this view is not that this is metaphysics, but that it is bad metaphysics. What is it that Professor Ward means by a Self? He tells us that it is a spiritual principle, that it is a Psychical centre, a Monad in the Leibnizian sense. Evidently it is something outside the stream of consciousness. It cannot therefore be known through introspection. That was Hume's quarrel with it. But we would not reject it on that ground. For the Self may not be directly known, yet it may be necessary to postulate it in order to explain what is directly known. Undoubtedly we are permitted to postulate entities outside the range of our experiences, if our experiences cannot be explained without the help of such entities. But we have no right to postulate entities which observe no canons of Logic, and which when assumed are quite useless for accounting the very facts, which necessitated their assumption. The Self we are told remains the same, inspite of all the changing experiences which it undergoes. If the Self is so unconcerned about his experiences, then in what sense may we ask are they "his"? That aspect of these facts then which necessitated the assumption of a self, remains as unexplained after the Self was assumed, as it was before. Further the Self is supposed to be there before experience begins. But what is a Self which has neither present consciousness, nor the memory of a past? Besides if there is any truth in the contentions of Abnormal Psychology, there is much in the Self of which it is never conscious, though it is continually at the mercy of these buried complexes under whose influence it may be led to do all kinds of things, for which all that it is required to do is to fabricate excuses, which delude not only others, but even itself. It becomes then merely the victim of dark plots within and of open insurrection

without, for environment and social influences play havoc with it just as much as its own repressed and forgotten experiences.

The concept of a Self or Ego then does not help us, and must be set aside by Psychology not because it is metaphysical but because it is useless.

Let us turn then to a different type of explanation of personality, the type of explanation which Mr. Bhattacharya chiefly had in view when writing his paper. In this type of explanation it is to some empirical aspect of experience itself that we turn in order to explain the Sense of Personal continuity. Here I may be brief for I have little to add to what Mr. Bhattacharya has already said. He considers firstly the view that the sense of Personal unity consists in a core of organic sensations of our own body which in the normal course of things do not undergo sudden and violent changes. His objections to this view are that it does not provide sufficient continuity, and that because we do not notice the changes in coenaesthesia it does not follow that such changes are not actually taking place all the time.

Now I do not feel that this view can be so lightly rejected. This view is in fact a modification of the First view from which I began namely that our sense of Personal identity has much to do with the body, only as now stated it is free from the objection that I then urged against it viz., that it tries to explain something mental by referring it to a purely physiological fact. It seems to me true that the organic sensations which we are receiving from our body, form a sort of background to whatever other consciousness we may be enjoying at this time. Thus the fact that all my experiences have a peculiar sense of belonging together, may be explained by the fact that in all of them there is present this complication with my general body feeling, and that this remains more or less constant. Mr. Bhattacharya urges against this, that nevertheless the general body feeling is undergoing change, and

therefore if this is the core of my Self, I cannot really hold that the Self remains the same and is identical with itself. But no one who is prepared to look at the facts is likely to contend that the *Self* remains the *same* and *identical*. The only empirical fact we have got to explain is the *myselfness* of my experiences, not that *I* am the *same* as *I* was two years ago or even an hour ago. The Personal identity we know is the identity of a changing and growing personality, an identity in difference, to borrow a phrase from the Hegelians, and not a bare identity.

While therefore I am not prepared to reduce the whole sense of personal identity to coëncathesis, I never-the-less hold that it constitutes an essential element of personality, and that in its absence, or sudden and violent alteration, our sense of personal identity would be lost.

The second view considered by Mr. Bhattacharya is that Memory supplies the basis of personal identity. After careful analysis of both normal as well as abnormal evidence, he arrives at the conclusion that the memory hypothesis is based on solid facts. Never-the less he rejects it as inadequate. His grounds are, to summarise them very briefly (1) Not all that is remembered belongs to the Self, (2) that in Multiple personality the dominant personality remembers the experiences of the Secondary personalities.

Neither of these arguments is in my opinion conclusive, because in the first case we are dealing with diseases of the memory, and it is obviously wrong to conclude that something which one cannot do when one is ill, one could not have performed when one was well. With regard to the second point I would contend that the dominant personality does not really strictly speaking *remember* what the secondary personality has experienced. It merely knows or is aware of what the other personality is experiencing. If memory includes recognition of the past, a sense of familiarity and so on, as it

obviously does, then the kind of knowledge enjoyed by the Dominant personality of the psychic life of the Secondary personalities can not be called memory.

I do not however regard memory as an adequate explanation of our sense of Personal identity, and that for this reason. I hold that memory is itself a phenomenal aspect of consciousness, and as such is to be explained in terms of Personal identity rather than that Personal identity is to be explained in terms of it. Let me make this point a little clearer. In the first place let me point out that I am using memory in the sense of Personal recollection, and not in the general sense of Mnemic Causation of mental phenomenon in which Semon and Russell have used that term. There is a certain sense in which whatever a mind has lived through or experienced in the past, helps in part to determine what it shall live through or experience in the present. But in memory proper it is not merely that my past is determining my present, but I *recollect* or *recall* the past, with the idea that I myself had lived through it or experienced it. In this sense memory can only be ascribed to man and perhaps to a few of the higher animals. Now in this special sense of memory, I would contend, that I could not thus recollect or remember, unless in some sense the experience recalled had the sense of "intimacy or warmth" or continuity and unity with my present, which we are at this moment trying to explain. Thus the past that I *remember* is to be explained by the fact of my Personal continuity and not vice versa.

Mr. Bhattacharya then proceeds to the final part of his paper in which he contends that the core of personality is to be found in affective organisation. If I understand his position rightly, he is supporting the view that Personal Identity is the outcome of the organisation of the affective life of the individual around specific objects in the manner in which Shand and McDougall have worked out this view. With this final view

adopted by Mr. Bhattacharya, I find myself placed in a fearful quandary. I find that in thus ending up his quest for the basic factors of Personal Identity, in the doctrine of the sentiments, Mr. Bhattacharya has led me hopelessly astray. I feel that I have been cheated, because I had hoped to be led to those basic or ultimate facts on which Personal Identity is grounded, instead of which I have been shown what Personality may develop into and become when it has reached the highest stages of development.

Let us for a moment revert to our original problem, which as you remember, was to explain that peculiar feature of our consciousness, which we express by saying that they belong together, or are owned by some Self or other. Now Mr. Bhattacharya is telling me that this "Myness" of experience, is due to the fact that I have developed certain relatively permanent mental attitudes, which again are organised under certain still broader and more permanent attitudes, and finally under a Master Sentiment. But what I fail to understand altogether is as to how the sentiments themselves could be formed unless Personal Identity in the sense of "continuity" and "belonging-together" of experiences was already there.

If the Romeo who waits under Juliet's window were not the same, as the Romeo who had previously seen and admired her at the party, how could he ever be said to be in love with her? The sentiments of love and hate can only arise in a Self that persists, and it is the persistence of the Self which makes them possible, not these upon which the persistence of the Self can be based.

Let us return then to the problem from which we began? We said that there is a peculiar feature with regard to consciousness, viz., that you do not find any fact of consciousness which is not owned, or possessed by some Self. There is no such thing as a Mere thought, but what we find is always "My thought". "Your thought", "his thought". This we

called the Personal aspect of consciousness, and it is this that we have been trying to explain. That is to say we have been trying to find some other feature or features of consciousness, which is more fundamental, more basic than this, and from which, or through a combination of which, this aspect of consciousness can be accounted for. Our review of Mr. Bhattacharyya's paper has shown us that we cannot find any such feature either in our body-feeling, or in memory, or in our emotional attitudes. All these are derivative from our Personal consciousness and not the personal consciousness which is derivative from them. I shall attempt in what follows, to put forward my own views with regard to Personal Identity, in as brief and simple a manner as I can. I am afraid these views will sound extremely crude, but I hope to have some later opportunity of developing them more fully, than I am able to do in the present connection.

It seems to me that in Psychology we must begin with certain postulates. One such postulate is what I propose to call the Psychological Individual. Another is what I will call a situation. Given a Psychological Individual, placed in a situation, there results Experience on the one hand, behaviour on the other. The Psychologist's business is to study what experiences the Psychological individual lives through in specific situations, or if you like, to find out in what manner he responds to specific situations. In either case we shall be studying the character of the mental life of the particular Psychological individual we select for our enquiry. In so far as the particular individual serves as a type of a whole group of individuals, by studying his mental life we shall be studying also the mental life of the whole group. But if you ask me, what is this Psychological individual himself, on what is the fact of his *individuality* itself based? Then to a certain extent, and in a certain sense, I must protest, that you are pushing one out of the bounds of my own enquiry. As a

Psychologist, I cannot produce a Psychological individual out of nothing. You must supply this to me, before I can begin my study at all. But still if you persist and say, after all what is this individual, how is he constituted, what factors when put together have brought him about, then the sort of thing I will tell you is this. I will say that this Psychological Individual is a body-mind, has always been a body-mind, and that these two aspects of him are so mutually involved and complicated that they cannot really be looked at apart. What this Complex Psycho-physical organism is at any time, is determined by what he has been before, by the situation he is placed in now, and also by what he is striving to be in the future. There was a time, when this particular Psycho-physical organism did not exist. The conditions of his coming into being, can be described to you in considerable detail by the Physiologist. I am not concerned with this pre-natal stage. But as he is born, he is already a body-mind, enjoying some kind of sentience, and making certain kinds of responses. It is from this moment that my interest in him begins. When I examine it at this stage, I find that he has a certain physiological as well as a certain mental structure. On the mental side I can say that his structure consists in certain instinctive impulses which function under certain specific situations. Besides, this structure is not static but plastic. It will go on being modified in the course of his life. But this modification is not a mere suffering or enduring of things, it is a living, a growing from within. His life is so to speak a pushing out from a centre to a circumference which is extending all the time. But he grows not only by thus widening himself outwards. but also in the normal course of things, by a closer knitting together, a more intimate organisation of his own inner cravings and life of subjective enjoyment within. I admit, that the possibility of dis-harmony remains, because of the diversity of impulses with which he began, and the

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stresses of circumstance to which he is open from without. These stresses and conflicts may become so pronounced that sometimes what was one-body-mind, a correlated structure of associated neural and mental tendencies, may dissociate into several relatively independent systems. Never-the-less if the normal tendency is followed, the development of his individuality will be both in the direction of width of interest, as well as the internal harmony within. Personality, as I understand it, will thus be an ideal progressively achieved by our Psychological individual in the course of his life. It will be based upon the raw material which we have called a body-mind organism which must be assumed as being there from the very start. It may be objected that Personal Identity on this basis is not really explained but merely assumed. But I should protest that what I am assuming is no mystical entity such as a soul, a metaphysical abstraction as a pure Self. What I assume is what is actually given to the Psychologist as his ultimate data, a Psycho-physical organism, whose process of coming into being are the natural processes of conception, gestation, and birth, and whose present characteristics are determinable in terms of neural and Psychical structures. Thus the basis of Personal Identity is a Psycho-physical organism, which comes into being according to known laws, grows and develops in accordance with laws partly already known and partly in the process of being discovered, and possibly disintegrates and ceases to be in accordance with other laws from which on the Physiological side at any rate medicine is slowly lifting the veil. From the union of Physico-chemical cells springs the Psycho-physical organism, having the potentiality of self-hood and Personality. Whether with the dispersal of the biological organism, and the decay of its mental faculties, the self also disintegrates and devolves into the merely physico-chemical units through the organisation and union of which it had come into being, raises the problem

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as to whether values which have once *emerged* in the course of time, must necessarily be conserved or not, which lies quite beyond the scope of this paper.



